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Foreword
We are pleased to introduce this new thematic issue of International Develop-
ment Policy. This issue, number 10, explores some of the complex development 
challenges associated with Africa’s relatively recent and rapidly-progressing 
urbanisation. Analysing urban settings through the diverse experiences and 
perspectives of inhabitants and stakeholders in cities from Addis Ababa and 
Johannesburg to mid-sized cities such as the mining boomtowns of Eastern 
Congo, this collection of articles invites readers to ponder the evolution of in-
ternational development policy responses across the region.
The contributions are organised in four parts. Part one includes an introduc-
tion by the guest editors, Carole Amman and Till Förster, and a scene-setting 
chapter by Edgar Pieterse. Part two looks at urban governance and is followed 
by chapters addressing policy, planning and informality in part three. The ru-
ral-urban continuum is explored in the fourth and final part. Sixteen authors 
and co-authors have contributed, several of whom are based in the Africa re-
gion itself, and all offering a rich variety of expertise and viewpoints drawing 
on anthropology, economics, geography, political science and sociology.
Articles in this issue were the subject of lively exchanges during the 7th Eu-
ropean Conference on African Studies (ECAS), held in Basel in late June and 
early July 2017. The editors are grateful for the substantive comments of the 
anonymous reviewers and others who commented on earlier drafts.
Taken together, the articles challenge readers to reconsider the relationship 
between urbanisation in Africa and conventional development narratives, and 
make an important contribution to the existing literature. We hope this col-
lection will resonate especially with new readers across the Africa region as 
well as among our regular readership of scholars and practioners, thanks to 
its timely and relevant focus on a region whose population is set to shift from 
predominantly rural to urban in just over a decade.
The Editors,
Basel, Bern and Geneva, July 2018
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Preface
International Development Policy is a critical source of analysis of development 
policy and international cooperation trends and is aimed at scholars, policy 
makers and development professionals. It offers a diverse range of academic 
views from both industrialised countries and emerging economies.
International Development Policy is edited by the Graduate Institute of In-
ternational and Development Studies, an institution of research and higher 
education dedicated to advancing world affairs. Located in Geneva at the heart 
of an international centre of multilateral governance, the Graduate Institute 
benefits from a rich legacy linked to the founding of the international system 
and the League of Nations in the 1920s, and the emergence of the developing 
world in the 1960s.
http://devpol.org
http://graduateinstitute.ch/research
We extend our thanks to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) and Geneva Canton’s Service de la Solidarité Internationale (SSI) for 
their financial support.
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Chapter 1
African Cities and the Development Conundrum: 
Actors and Agency in the Urban Grey Zone
Till Förster and Carole Ammann
Abstract
Africa is urbanising faster than any other continent. The stupendous pace of urbanisa-
tion challenges the usual image of Africa as a rural continent. The sheer complexity 
of African cities contests conventional understandings of the urban as well as stan-
dard development policies. Lingering between chaos and creativity, Western images of 
African cities seem unable to serve as a basis for development policies. The diversity of 
African cities is hard to conceptualise—but at the same time, unbiased views of the ur-
ban are the first step to addressing the urban development conundrum. International 
development cooperation should not only make African cities a focus of its engagement— 
it should also be cautious not to build its interventions on concepts inherited from 
Western history, such as the formal/informal dichotomy. We argue that African cities 
are more appropriately regarded as urban grey zones that only take shape and become 
colourful through the actors’ agency and practice. The chapters of this special issue 
offer a fresh look at African cities, and the many opportunities as well as limitations 
that emerge for African urbanites—state officials, planners, entrepreneurs, develop-
ment agencies and ordinary people—from their own point of view: they ask where, for 
whom and why such limitations and opportunities emerge, how they change over time 
and how African urban dwellers actively enliven and shape their cities.
1 The Urban Challenge in Africa
Cities produce difference—and they accommodate difference. African cities 
are no exception. They rather seem to accelerate processes of differentiation 
to a degree that makes it difficult to conceive them as an entity, to understand 
their social complexities and, not least, to govern them. The pace of urban-
isation in Africa currently exceeds that of all other continents. Soon, more 
Africans will live in cities than in rural areas. As reliable statistics are hard to 
establish, estimations vary, but 2030 seems to be a safe bet for the turning point 
(un desa, 2014; UN-Habitat, 2008, 2016; adb, 2016a; also Chapter 6, this issue). 
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Other estimates claim that the watershed could already be reached by 2022—a 
mere blink of an eye from a historical perspective.1 To some extent, this incred-
ible acceleration is due to the belated beginning of mass urbanisation in Africa 
(see below).2 But besides its historical framework, urbanisation in Africa today 
presents multiple challenges, which—regardless of its inherent problems—
also find expression in Sustainable Development Goal (sdg) number 11, from 
the UN (2015). African urbanism is a challenge for our scholarly understanding 
of social change, the status of such cities and what they are about to become, 
and of their role in national, regional and world development, and last but not 
least, contemporary African cities raise questions of how they can be governed 
and planned. As conventional forms of governance often fail, new, ‘…hybrid 
institutional forms have to be developed’ (Smit and Pieterse, 2014, 160). African 
cities thus challenge conventional concepts of development and social theory. 
Mario Pezzini, director of the oecd development centre, says that ‘it is not 
possible to separate these issues’ (The Guardian, 2016; adb, 2016b, 143–189). 
Social theory and development practice have to be thought of as one.
Cities and their relationship with their hinterland must be understood in 
their full complexity—else all attempts to govern them will fail. Hence the 
significance of the urban and urban studies for the national, regional and 
eventually global future (Pieterse, 2008; Parnell and Pieterse, 2014). Very much 
the same holds true for development agendas. Ignoring the urban dimension 
would mean conceiving the future without one of its most important, if not 
the most important of its dimensions. Cities can drive development by provid-
ing education, work and consumption opportunities. At the same time, they 
can also drain their hinterland by drawing resources into the exploding African 
megacities: rural areas lose their best minds as they move into cities—very 
much as the global North attracts the best brains.
For many, cities are at the centre of a new world geography (Robinson, 
2005). They are also the sites where new social theories have to prove whether 
and how they can be translated into policies that advance the lives of ordi-
nary people. Without thorough, empirically based and theoretically informed 
1 Comparing estimations over the past two decades shows how volatile estimations are (e.g. 
Kessides, 2006; Potts, 2012; and Chénal, 2016; also Chapter 6, this issue).
2 It took Europe 110 years to move from 15 per cent urban dwellers in 1800 to 40 per cent in 1910. 
Well into the twentieth century, urbanisation was mainly a phenomenon of the industri-
alised global North. But in 2013, a little more than a hundred years later, six of the ten coun-
tries with the highest urbanisation rates in the world are in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 
2014). In Africa, 14 per cent of the population lived in cities in 1950, and in 2010, 60 years later, 
the percentage was estimated to be 48 per cent—roughly twice the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century growth rates of urbanisation in Europe (adb, 2012).
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knowledge, we might only address the symptoms and ignore the real problems. 
One of the targets of sdg 11 is to ensure access to basic services and housing for 
all urbanites by 2030 (UN, 2015). However, it is ‘…surprisingly difficult to secure 
accurate data of access to basic services in rural and urban areas in African 
countries’ (Pieterse and Parnell, 2014, 11). Again, there is a need for much more 
empirical research and theoretical reflection on African cities. Admittedly, this 
collection cannot fill that gap—but it contributes to rethinking African cities 
by raising key questions that need answers. How the urban revolution in Africa 
is handled will depend on how well it is understood and how—besides the 
political participation of the populace (Smit and Pieterse, 2014; Oldfield, 2015)—
the continent’s intellectuals will be able to engage in this debate (Pieterse 
and Parnell, 2014; Watson, 2014; Oldfield, 2015). We would gamble with our 
shared future—not only with that of the estimated half a billion Africans who 
currently live in these cities—if we did not engage with these issues (un desa, 
2014; Datta and Shaban, 2016).
Writings on urbanisation in Africa tend to be normative; many views are 
either overly optimistic or pessimistic while balanced perspectives seem to be 
the exception. One strand of literature over-romanticises the African city. This 
focus stresses the innovative potential, the creativity and the entrepreneurial 
attitudes of African urbanites. It considers the African city as a particularly vi-
tal space from where, for example, a huge variety of artistic expressions emerge 
(Pinther et al., 2012). The other strand, in contrast, focuses on what African cit-
ies lack compared to metropolitan areas in the global North and accordingly 
develops a crisis narrative by depicting African cities as not working—while 
claiming at the same time that urbanisation is a prerequisite for development. 
For authors like Mike Davis (2006), the bustling cities in the global South con-
sist mainly of chaotic slums where poverty, frustration, corruption, crime and 
violence thrive due to a lack of housing and basic infrastructure and to the lim-
ited opportunities they offer their inhabitants. This Afro-pessimistic dooms-
day scenario depicts African cities primarily as violent and ungovernable and 
eventually as a mirror of the whole continent.
African cities and their inhabitants do face numerous challenges (see UN, 
2015). However, to understand cities and urbanisation in Africa, normative ap-
proaches will neither work as heuristic instruments nor produce the insights 
needed to advance urban development. At best, they may highlight a particular 
perspective, but they will also restrict the spectators’ view to that one aspect—
namely, that cities in Africa fail to meet expectations based on the historical 
experience of Western urbanisation. In this issue, we thus look for the many 
opportunities as well as limitations that exist for African urban dwellers from 
their own point of view. We ask where, for whom and why such  limitations and 
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opportunities emerge and how they change over time (Pieterse, 2008; Chap-
ter 2, this issue). By acknowledging the prevalent tension between invention 
and intervention (Obrist et al., 2013) and applying an actor-centred approach 
that analyses the wide range of urban practices, we aim at moving beyond a 
simplistic discourse of modernity and development. Therefore, we focus on 
how various actors bargain, manoeuvre, resist, mediate and flexibly adapt their 
everyday lives in an ever-changing African urban environment (Chapters 11 
and 13, this issue).
African cities are ‘works in progress’ (Simone, 2004a, 1); they are fluid, com-
plex, and marked by a huge breadth, diversity and heterogeneity—both across 
and within cities. What is more, cities in Africa are not exceptional and are as 
ordinary as any (Robinson, 2006). They are confronted with many problems 
such as vulnerability, poverty and inequality and are characterised by a con-
stant competition over resources (Kennedy, 2015) and the making and control 
of urban spaces (Massey, 2005; Healey, 2007) just like many other urban areas 
all over the world (Myers, 2011). But they also produce that specific urban mix-
ture: the connections and disconnections that breed new ideas and opportuni-
ties (Amin and Thrift, 2002, 3).
Edgar Pieterse and Susan Parnell (2014) point to some commonalities 
that might be typical features of African cities; namely, a) rapid urbanisation 
(Chapters 6 and 10, this issue); b) the strong link between the rural and the 
urban due to circular migration patterns (Chapter 13, this issue); c) large peri- 
urban areas that characterise the cities’ outskirts (Chapters 10 and 11, this issue); 
d) the informality of urbanisation that affects the economic and the social 
sphere (Chapters 9 and 11, this issue); e) urban primacy, a particularity rooted 
in the colonial past due to which many countries have one large urban centre 
typically three to four times larger than the second largest city; f) rivalling and 
partly overlapping power poles (Chapter 13, this issue) that make it difficult for 
ordinary citizens to know whom they should address to achieve certain goals; 
g) land and housing as major issues due to unclear legal situations; h) huge 
inequality between cities’ inhabitants, which results in almost no interactions 
between the urban elite (Chapter 12, this issue) and poor citizens; and finally 
j) urban youth constitutes a particularly vulnerable large cohort in many Afri-
can cities (Pieterse and Parnell, 2014, 9–15; Chapter 11, this issue).
The current state of urbanisation in Africa has its roots in the history of the 
continent. It is no less related to the present economic, social and political set-
tings that African cities have to cope with. A fundamental and still influential 
characteristic is the comparatively short history of urbanisation on the African 
continent. A handful of bigger towns had emerged in medieval West Africa, 
and smaller urban areas persisted there through the first part of the nineteenth 
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century, while eastern and southern Africa stayed mostly rural, with the excep-
tion of a few scattered Swahili trading towns (Iliffe, 1995, 118). The situation 
did not change much when the continent came under colonial domination by 
the end of the century. Throughout the incipient phase of the colonial era, the 
African continent remained mostly rural, intermingled with some small but 
growing colonial trading towns along the coasts. At that time, only Cairo had 
more than 900,000 inhabitants. Ibadan, Tunis and Johannesburg, which fol-
lowed next, counted between 100,000 and 210,000 residents each. This picture 
changed rapidly after World War ii when urban areas began to expand at an 
unprecedented pace. Between 1940 and 1960, the population of many African 
cities more than doubled. Simultaneously, new cities emerged, for instance the 
mining towns of the Copperbelt (Chapter 13, this issue). However, other towns 
also shrank when the colonial powers withdrew or because caravan routes 
became less important (Freund, 2007, 65–67).
In the postcolonial era, the pace of urbanisation accelerated enormously 
because of the rural–urban migration that drew masses of peasants to cities 
that were increasingly unable to absorb them. By the end of the millennium, 
large African cities like Lagos, Cairo or Kinshasa had become endless urban 
agglomerations of over five million people (Freund, 2007, 143–145; Burdett and 
Sudjic, 2007). Nevertheless, Europeans perceived and often continue to per-
ceive Africa as a rural continent; and so did development cooperation well into 
the twenty-first century, where the image of rural Africa remained the basis for 
development aid and later development cooperation. The reduction of pov-
erty in Africa was thought of, conceived and planned as technical cooperation 
in rural areas, largely ignoring the urban realities of the continent.3 For a long 
time, applied research and development policies focused on agrarian and pas-
toral issues. Thus, many programmes assisted and still support African farmers 
to increase their harvest, to promote sustainable land management and to de-
velop strategies to deal with climate change. The aim of many governments—
supported by international development agencies—was to reduce circular 
rural–urban migration patterns. We do not claim that such programmes are 
irrelevant.4 However, we advocate readjusting the focus away from the rural to 
3 Michael Lipton (1977) popularised the term ‘urban bias’ in development since the late 1970s. 
He claimed that development cooperation focused almost exclusively on cities and ne-
glected rural areas—a misjudgement that has had an enormous and devastating influence 
(e.g. Riddell, 1985).
4 The interdependence of local subsistence and cash crop production with international value 
chains has been a central theme of economic anthropology since the 1960s (e.g. Meillassoux, 
1981). International development agencies recently rediscovered this link but framed it— 
unlike the critical studies of the 1960s and 1970s—no longer in terms of rural dependency but 
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Africa’s urban areas as sooner rather than later, this is where the majority of the 
continent’s population will live.
As recently as 2007, political scientist Goran Hyden wrote: ‘After 40 or more 
years of trying to assist sub-Saharan Africa to develop and modernize, the 
region remains an enigma to the international policy community. [ … ] The 
proverbial elephant has been examined from all possible angles with only a 
minimal discovery of what really works in Africa. The main reason is that the 
international development community has been reluctant to learn what the 
elephant is all about when up close’ (Hyden, 2007, 16751). We share his view 
and believe that urban Africa is part of that elephant sitting squarely in the 
room. There is an urgent need to engage more in basic as well as applied re-
search on African cities—and to look at them as ordinary cities facing ordinary 
problems. Thus, we need to thoroughly understand how local actors live and 
engage in African cities. Most of the contributions to this issue mirror this shift 
in development studies and put local actors and their agency first.
From a foreign, in particular Northerners’ perspective, the ordinary, ‘normal’ 
African city is an informal city. While the former colonial centre often turned 
into a business district with metallised window panes, the areas where the 
local population lived soon transformed into mushrooming neighbourhoods 
that no planning could keep up with. Behind the restricted zones once meant 
to protect the white colonisers and later the privileged state bourgeoisie, 
shanty towns extended in all directions. As early as in the 1920s, the colonisers 
perceived these ‘spontaneous settlements’ as a challenge to their visions of an 
emerging urban Africa (Njoh, 2009). Well-organised towns were supposed to 
serve as showcases for the attempts of Western powers to order African soci-
eties. In new political contexts, such ambitions to some extent continued to 
inform development policies—including those of the UN, whose target is to 
upgrade slums and provide safe and affordable housing for all by 2030 (UN, 
2015), the new donor countries as well as postcolonial administrations (Jones, 
2012a). ‘Slum upgrading’ is only the most obvious intervention in areas that 
are usually considered ‘informal’ (Jones, 2012b; Chapters 6, 7 and 9, this issue).
Since late colonial times, these ‘informal’ settlements grew faster than any 
other part of the respective cities. These settlements’ populace was difficult 
to control; and, probably more important, unlike the ‘formal’ centres, which 
often looked like cities in the motherland, these areas were hardly legible to 
planners and civil servants. The difference was often cast in the grand binary 
distinction of the time: the ‘old, traditional, African’ ways of living and  housing 
in a more euphemistic perspective as food security for the urban populace (adb, 2016b, 2; 
African Center for Economic Transformation, 2017).
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were represented by the unordered, spontaneous, poor and unstructured set-
tlements while the well-built ‘modern’ centre stood for a promising African 
future (Drakakis-Smith, 2000).
The dichotomy transformed repeatedly and adopted more than once anoth-
er shape after independence. The most prominent is certainly the opposition 
of ‘formal’ vs. ‘informal’ that, at first sight, still divides most African cities. In the 
1970s, the economic anthropologist Keith Hart (1973, 1985) and others5 had de-
rived the term ‘informal economy’ from the enormous cleavage between those 
who paid taxes and profited from official, legal, waged, regulated employment 
and its many benefits and the masses who had no official employment and 
who had to make a living as ‘autonomous’—that is, self-employed— workers in 
the unregulated, often illegal, small-scale spheres of the urban arena. Broadly 
defined, informality covers all unregistered or officially unobserved economic 
activities. This definition implies that there is an agency, usually the state, 
that registers and observes. In the end, the binary distinction juxtaposes state- 
regulated economic activities to all others that the state is unable or unwilling 
to control. Because of the—from a Western perspective—‘weakness’ of most 
African states, the ‘informal sector’ is sometimes identified as Africa’s most 
prominent contribution to economic theory (Collier, 1993).6
This opposition made Africa’s cityscapes legible to planners and develop-
ment experts. Slums and the infamous bidonvilles in French-speaking Africa 
(Balandier, 1955, 1957) were redefined as ‘informal’ settlements that were not 
recognised or addressed by the administration ‘…as an integral part of the city’ 
(UN-Habitat, 2008, 7). Hence the assumption that informality is directly re-
lated to poverty (e.g. Rauch, 1991). Of course, this definition comes with real 
disadvantages for the people living in these areas, who often account for three 
fourths of the urban populace. They frequently have no access to public ser-
vices, no electricity or water supply and only insufficient living areas, and their 
houses are constructed of inadequate materials and thus easily affected by 
natural disasters (UN, 2015). No less important is that they often do not have a 
right to the places and houses where they live. They usually have no title deeds 
5 More generally first outlined by W. Arthur Lewis (1955), who coined the term ‘shadow econ-
omy’. As ‘informal economy’, the concept was popularised in the 1970s and 1980s (de Soto, 
1989). Ilda Lindell (2010a, 2010b) and Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer (2014) provide 
overviews.
6 Statistics and quantitative data on the informal sector are notoriously unreliable. Estima-
tions for sub-Saharan Africa currently vary between 20–25 per cent for South Africa and Na-
mibia and 50–65 per cent for Nigeria, Benin and Tanzania (Medina et al., 2017). The urban 
informal economy is usually larger than the national informal economy, in terms of how 
these relate, proportionally, to the urban and national economy at large.
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
 Förster and Ammann 10
<UN>
and in many cities they are regularly expelled whenever the urban council sees 
a need to do so (Chapter 9, this issue).
From a critical perspective, the facts are obvious. The inhabitants of ‘infor-
mal’ settlements have no right to the city—their city is not theirs (Lefebvre, 
1968; Purcell, 2014; on South Asia see Anjaria and McFarlane, 2011). The ‘formal– 
informal’ bifurcation thus has immediate relevance for urban governance and, 
by extension, for any development policy (Chapters 4 and 9, this issue). It cre-
ates an administrative reality that no actor, whatever their background and 
intentions, can ignore. Having no deed for the place where one lives makes 
one extremely vulnerable to expulsion, which not only implies the loss of one’s 
home but more often than not the loss of all belongings. It is no surprise that 
most slum dwellers would do almost everything to get their shacks registered 
as private property—even if their home does not consist of much more than 
the two or three corrugated iron sheets of the roof and sun-dried mud bricks 
(Chapter 7, this issue).
If there is a chance to do so, people who construct ‘illegally’ at the margins 
of ‘formally’ recognised areas try to reproduce the patterns that they believe 
a ‘formal’ planning of the urban council would have produced. That will, they 
presume, ease their recognition as a ‘formal’ settlement at a later date: urban 
and development planners must learn to work with these areas—regardless of 
whether they emerged as unregistered or as registered settlements (Roy, 2005). 
Though entirely illegal from an official point of view, such neighbourhoods 
may look as if they were constructed by a construction company under govern-
ment supervision. They often have the same street grid and reproduce housing 
patterns very similar to those of the officially recognised neighbourhoods next 
to them. In an act of ‘inverse governmentality’, they thus breed similar forms of 
urban housing and governance (Nielsen, 2011). The street vendor, the market, 
the tiny shops at the street corner, or illicit drinking spots—they all work in the 
grey zone that such apparently informal neighbourhoods provide and protect.
Unlike the formal–informal divide, which projects the normativity of West-
ern tax- and state administration on African cities,7 the grey zone is an open 
concept. It recognises that neither urban economies and practices nor the 
roles of the many different actors are fixed. Actors can adopt one or other role 
according to how they judge a particular situation and what suits them best. 
They may be tax collectors when meeting a stall owner on the market—and 
a friend or patron a minute later when they exchange a few words with the 
7 To conceive the ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ dichotomy as two types of practice (McFarlane, 
2012) is a step forward but does not solve the problem as practices may merge as much and 
as often as the actors change their position in an ongoing interaction.
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trader. Living in a grey zone means that that one has to judge and to weigh 
repeatedly one’s interactions with others as people are the institutional infra-
structure that one must most often rely on (Simone, 2004b). Only when having 
engaged in an interaction does the grey give way to colours: the ‘formal’ and 
the ‘informal’ are at best extreme positions on a sliding scale.
Unsurprisingly, the dichotomy of ‘formal’ vs. ‘informal’ does not play a de-
cisive role outside the narrower administrative context. Most urban actors do 
not care whether a particular practice is ‘formally’ recognised or not. However, 
that does not mean that there are no rules or that they are living in a cha-
otic setting. Although development experts perceive the ‘informal’ sector as 
‘chaotic’ because it is unregulated, that is a big misunderstanding. Unregulated 
does not mean disordered nor does it necessarily mean confused. Indeed, most 
people living and working in settings that development experts qualify as ‘in-
formal’ do have to follow strict rules and regulations. The difference is that 
these rules are neither written nor necessarily registered and enforced by the 
city and its administration. They emerge out of the myriad of interactions that 
ordinary urban dwellers engage in day in, day out. They grow out of the every-
day politics of urban governance.
Notwithstanding its opaqueness, the urban grey zone can be a strictly regu-
lated space. The grey zone thus sets itself apart from the usual understanding 
of the ‘informal’ sector as an unregulated market. The street vendors in front of 
a church, mosque or supermarket usually have to respect invisible limits. They 
must not sell things that other vendors offer next to them—or that the super-
market sells—and they must not intrude into the territory of neighbouring 
vendors who sell the same stuff. More often than not, they also pay ‘taxes’—
that is, a daily fee collected by the ‘owner of the place’. Often, street vendors do 
not know why a particular person claims to be the ‘owner’ of the place—but 
they know that the man gets angry if he does not get the daily fee. It may be 
small and insignificant for a shop owner—but it may be very high for vendors 
with no capital and no other income than the little that they sell over the day. 
In addition, they sometimes have to pay twice: first to the ‘informal’ owner and 
second to the ‘formal’ tax collector of the urban council. Living in the grey zone 
is not easy. ‘One has to struggle to survive’, many of these people say. Rules in 
the ‘informal’ sector can be much stricter than the ‘formal’ rules of the urban 
council—and may extend right into the heart of global cities such as New York 
(Touré, 1985; Stoller, 1996; in general Brown, 2006; Bhowmik, 2010).
Does it really make sense to divide urban economies into ‘formal’ and ‘in-
formal’ sectors? Or a city’s neighbourhoods into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ ones? 
To characterise African cities as ‘informal’ cities? In addition to what we have 
already outlined, other processes also put the ‘formal–informal’ divide into 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
 Förster and Ammann 12
<UN>
question. The grey zones may become dominant when an institution disin-
tegrates or when it loses interest in a particular area. Such transformations 
were sometimes labelled as ‘re-informalisation’ (Myers, 2010, 2011, 89–97). Very 
much as the processes of inverse governmentality, they may lead to partial for-
malisation—that is, to hybrid forms where ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ rules coexist 
or overlap (Oldfield, 2002). But that is not the main characteristic of the urban 
grey zone. ‘Informal’ as well as ‘formal’ practices are indistinguishable as long 
as the actors do not specify them as such—or, to use a metaphor, when they, 
through their practice, morph the grey into clearer, legible colours.
Using conventional development language thus leads to contradictory 
statements: ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ often merge in everyday life. Myriad forms 
of ‘informal’ practices exist within the ‘formal’ economy. At the same time, 
the activities in the ‘formal’ sector very much depend on those in the ‘infor-
mal’ one (Chapter 3, this issue). Not only the urban poor make a living from 
the ‘informal’ sector; better-off urbanites also profit from unregulated forms 
of production, distribution and service provision, especially since the struc-
tural adjustment reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank (Murray and Myers, 2006, 13–15). The emerging urban middle 
class and its interaction with local state employees and politicians (for India 
see Fernandes and Heller, 2006; Baud, 2015) is of increasing importance to de-
velopment cooperation—though the highly loaded term ‘class’ may not apply 
in Marxist terms. Again, empirical research is lacking, and much still needs to 
be clarified. The contribution of Chapter 3 of this issue is an important step 
towards such a clarification.
Obviously, it is impossible to draw a clear line between the ‘informal’ and 
the ‘formal’ in African cities (Pieterse and Simone, 2013). It depends on the ac-
tors and the situation whether a particular practice may fall under the Western 
rubric of ‘formal’ and state governed or ‘informal’ and regulated by others, but 
it is also possible—and often much more likely—that it merges the two. So, 
if we have to learn what the elephant is all about, we have to learn it from the 
actors.
If the distinction of ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ is flawed, what does that mean 
for development cooperation? The many panels on ‘informality’ and urbanity 
in Africa at the European Conference on African Studies 2017 show that the 
large and ongoing scholarly debates about the meaning and the consequences 
of ‘informality’ and development cooperation have not ended. Our notion of 
the grey zone meets to some extent Oren Yiftachel’s (2009b) concept of ‘gray 
space’ in the context of Bedouin Arabs’ struggles in Israel and Palestine. Ac-
cording to Yiftachel, ‘gray spacing’ is ‘the practice of indefinitely positioning 
populations between the “lightness” of legality, safety and full membership, 
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and the “darkness” of eviction, destruction and death’ (2009a, 247). His ex-
ample shows that the actors not only have to deal with economic constraints 
and attempts to extract fees or taxes from them—they are deeply entangled 
in urban politics. Our concept of the urban grey zone takes this understand-
ing a step further. We take the grey zone as an opaque space that the actors 
not only confront but through their daily social practice incrementally morph 
into a colourful cityscape. By positioning themselves in interactions with other 
urbanites, they create the colours that allow them to perceive the city as a life-
world of their own agency.
Development agencies have to rethink conventional concepts that their in-
terventions build on—and their own position in the social and political urban 
space. Any intervention in such a context is inevitably a political statement. 
There is no purely ‘technical assistance’ or ‘technical cooperation’, as the name 
of some big development agencies suggests. The materiality of the infrastruc-
ture is not a technical instrument only. The segregated colonial city with its 
cordons sanitaires that separated the white urban centre from the periphery 
and the ‘indigenous’ population is only the most obvious case in point (Eckert, 
2002, 2011). The congestion between the city centre and a suburban neighbour-
hood today may have a similar effect. On the one hand, not to construct a street 
means to seal the neighbourhood off from the city as a political space, but it 
also fosters the emergence of an autonomous suburban social and political 
space where new actors may emerge (Chapter 11, this issue). On the other hand, 
constructing a four-lane expressway that cuts the neighbourhood into two also 
has a double-sided effect. Besides inhibiting the formation of a  cohesive com-
munity, it may easily bring local actors into the city centre, where they may ar-
ticulate their political claims in unexpected ways, often to the dislike of those 
in power (Merrifield, 2013; Diouf and Fredericks, 2014; Chapter 8, this issue).
Cityscapes mirror urban politics (e.g. Habitat International 2015 on urban 
megaprojects). African cities as ‘sites of assemblages and centrality, territori-
alisation and connectedness’ (Robinson, 2013, 1) are characterised by stark con-
trasts. Today, many African cityscapes display an ‘additive’ and ‘poly-nucleated’ 
urbanism (Brenner and Schmid, 2011, 2015): one neighbourhood after the other 
is added—but they often remain disconnected, rather focused on themselves. 
Only a few major axes run through the endlessly urbanised landscape, con-
gested throughout the entire day and much of the night. Moving from one 
neighbourhood to the other is often extremely time consuming and especially 
challenging for vulnerable people such as disabled or old persons (UN, 2015). 
There is no public transport system except tardy minibuses that cannot ad-
vance because of traffic and because people enter and exit the buses every few 
hundred metres—eventually congesting the street as much as private cars do. 
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Hence, many tiny shops and street vendors persist for all those who cannot 
 afford a car to drive to the main market or the next mall. Africa’s urbanites are 
actors and subjects of continuous social, political and economic transforma-
tions and actively situate themselves in their cities as economic, social and 
political spaces. To move or not to move, to walk or to take a minibus ride is not 
only a pragmatic judgment of the current situation, it is also an act of articulat-
ing one’s claims to the city as a social and political space.
Development policies are neither neutral tools nor instruments of social en-
gineering—and neither are remittances, which have become the largest flow 
of foreign investment in many African countries (Gupta et al., 2009; Nyamongo 
et al., 2012).8 They are an important part of and play a multifaceted role in 
urban politics. Therefore, they require a thorough knowledge of the inhabit-
ants and how they act and articulate their claims to the city. That makes urban 
development a highly intricate venture that goes far beyond planning exer-
cises. Continuous and critical reflection on the all too often mixed impacts of 
development policies is an imperative to bring urban change in a good way. 
The contributions to this issue address this conundrum—they aim to provide 
insights into the urban life-worlds that African urbanites create, and ask how 
that local, urban knowledge relates to three themes in African urbanism; ur-
ban governance; planning, politics and the urban grey zone; and the urban-
rural continuum.
2 The Contributions to This Thematic Issue
The contributions to this issue approach African cities from cross-cutting and 
interdisciplinary perspectives. They avoid normative, preconceived categories 
and look at African cities as they are experienced and lived by actors on the 
continent. We understand urbanity as a social practice of urban dwellers who, 
through their interactions, create encounters and distanciation in urban social 
spaces (Förster, 2013). They thus set the frame for urban governance, politics, 
planning, economics and not least how African cities relate to their outer, rural 
conurbation area. We structure the chapters around the themes mentioned 
above.
2.1 Urban Governance
Among the many problems that cities are facing in Africa, governance is a key 
issue. ‘Policies do not occur in a vacuum’, as the World Development Report 
8 Here, the flow of remittances within and between African countries should not be neglected 
(Sander and Maimbo, 2005).
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aptly notes. They are the outcome of complex political and social settings 
within ever changing rules that are influenced by various actors (World Bank, 
2017, 29). As municipalities are, with few exceptions, financially and institu-
tionally weaker than their counterparts in the global North, they often can-
not plan and order urban space as urban administrations would do elsewhere. 
They have to engage in novel forms of governance that are not based on West-
ern models and their history. Research on urban governance in Africa thus has 
turned into a fascinating field that calls for new concepts and urban theories to 
analyse the entanglement of the many actors that engage in and deal with cit-
ies and the urban. The author of Chapter 2 looks at different levels and scales 
of urban governance in Africa. Having been part of international, regional and 
national bodies responsible for drafting new policies, he is intimately famil-
iar with urban agendas in numerous African cities and analyses how they re-
late to global policy frameworks—namely, the New Urban Agenda adopted 
by the United Nations at Habitat iii, 2016. The author’s analyses also address 
the local level, including Khayelitsha, a suburb and former township of Cape 
Town, South Africa. As director of the African Centre for Cities, also domiciled 
in Cape Town, he has a deep insight into urban policies and the formation 
of urban governance in other parts of the continent. The author proposes a 
radical change in the future political and institutional landscape: territorial, 
macroeconomic and infrastructure investment regimes should be thought of 
as one. In his contribution, he outlines how this new landscape could—and 
should—look and what conditions need to be fulfilled to extend such multi-
scalar politics in Africa.
The author of Chapter 3 adopts another, complementary perspective on ur-
ban governance in Africa. He mainly looks at Kisumu in Kenya as an example 
of the urban middle ground—the many ordinary, medium-sized cities on the 
continent that are neither sprawling megacities nor country capitals with their 
extraordinary responsibilities and corresponding budgets. The author’s ana-
lytical lens focuses on three basic fields of governance: land use management, 
the provision of basic services, and mobility. His basic findings are obvious: the 
World Bank’s concept of good governance, largely based on normative Western 
understandings of the Westphalian state as an institution of superior legiti-
mate power, does and will not work in Africa. One has to recognise, he argues, 
that neither the state as an institution nor state actors as individuals occupy 
the same dominant position in African cities as they do in the global North. 
Therefore, he uses governance mainly as a lens to analyse how decisions are 
made in African cities and how they are eventually implemented. By juxta-
posing a general typology of actors to the three basic themes of governance, 
the author concludes that there is no alternative to collaborative forms of 
 governance—as messy and conflictual as they often are, they take the deeply 
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political character of governance into account while government-oriented 
models will fail to depoliticise governance.
In Chapter 4, the authors examine a practical case of urban governance: the 
effectiveness of conventional anti-corruption and good-governance policies 
in Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, East Africa. As many state actors and also 
development agencies still make use of the formal–informal dichotomy, the 
authors look at how such basic convictions shape the perception of corruption 
and how corruption is related to informal practices blurring its presence in the 
daily lives of the populace. They identify three such practices: a) co-optation 
as the recruitment into social networks where corruption is sustained, b) con-
trol as a practice of normalising and securing the persistence of corruption by 
disciplining those who might deviate from corrupt patterns of behaviour, and 
c) camouflage as a way of obscuring where corruption actually plays a role in 
the administration and its subordinate bodies. Corruption sustains, the authors 
conclude, a moral economy that, on its part, also legitimises these practices. As 
a normalised form of interaction, corruption depends on political regimes that 
build on clientelist networks. To claim that corruption is ‘endemic’—as some 
politicians repeatedly do—is no more than a shortcut. Bypassing a thorough 
empirical analysis, it labels corruption as a disease for which no cure exists. 
The authors show that such analyses are possible and need to be done.
Chapter 5 addresses one of the sdg 11 targets, namely the provision of inclu-
sive, green and public spaces (UN, 2015). The author zooms in on a failure of 
collaborative governance and thus counterbalances to some degree the more 
general statements of the preceding contributions. The author asks why the 
co-management of parks in Johannesburg, South Africa, does not work in the 
post-apartheid era. Since the budget allocated to such sites by the city council 
is limited, many neighbourhoods in middle-class areas engage in a sort of com-
munity management of already existing parks. Opposing agendas are fostered 
by the deep mistrust between certain actors, in particular the mainly white 
middle classes and the City Park authorities dominated by black South Afri-
cans. This opposition provokes the emergence of political articulations and 
creates a discursive space where the voices of other actors, in particular those 
of lower-income communities are often not heard. This deeply conflictual, po-
litical configuration makes the management of the parks extremely complex 
and eventually marginalises other, private actors and their initiatives.
2.2 Planning, Urban Politics and the Urban Grey Zone
The second section of this special issue looks at planning, urban politics and 
the urban grey zone, which all feed into what is usually known as the ‘informal-
ity’ of urbanisation in Africa. Rapid urbanisation processes are highly sensitive 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
17African Cities and the Development Conundrum
<UN>
issues for the actors involved. Politicians, planners, local entrepreneurs, devel-
opment experts as well as ordinary urbanites have different and often contest-
ing visions for their city. The African city is characterised by stark contrasts 
within itself. Thus, the same city looks very different from one neighbourhood 
to the next. While glittering skyscrapers might dominate the central business 
districts where governmental buildings are located and where the country’s 
financial centre lies, many areas of the city’s grey zone are marked by modest 
houses and insufficient, decaying infrastructure. These are the areas where up-
grading and transformation processes are frequent—and where development 
policies are most relevant, as the following chapters demonstrate.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of urbanisation in Africa and relates it to 
general demographic trends on the continent and elsewhere. The prospects of 
an extremely rapidly growing urban population point at future challenges of 
development cooperation and, indeed, at what these changes in Europe’s glob-
al neighbourhood will mean for the aging population of the global North. The 
author does not come up with easy answers; he just points at the  dimensions of 
the long-term tendencies. It is clear that, already today, the  image of  Africa as 
a rural continent no longer reflects realities on the continent. The author then 
analyses the wide variety of cities in Africa and introduces the Sustainable Cit-
ies Initiatives in Africa that aim at answering the challenges of urbanisation, 
focusing particularly on the environment, land use, public transport, water 
and sanitation as the most burning issues in Africa’s exploding megacities. He 
shows that regional and international networks of cities may lead to a more 
sustainable development of African cities, but it is also clear that some cities 
and urban agglomerations on the continent are not visible in these networks— 
indicating the importance of expanding and strengthening these networks. 
The same holds true for thorough, empirically grounded research on urbanisa-
tion in Africa, which is done by only a few institutions on the continent.
Chapter 7 takes a close look at how inhabitants who live at the fringes of Na-
mibia’s capital Windhoek make claims in the context of upgrading policies that 
have been ongoing for over 15 years. The author demonstrates that while some 
campaigning and sporadic movements have received wider attention, most 
forms of claim-making over land, services and housing emerge from the resi-
dents’ everyday experiences. The contribution nicely illustrates the diversity of 
the settlements and actors involved as well as the blurred boundaries between 
tolerated and non-tolerated practices, licit and illicit procedures, and between 
formality and informality more generally. The author concludes that contrary 
to all too many other, more autocratic settings, the relationship between state 
representatives and the poor inhabitants in Namibia is not marked by opposi-
tion but by mutual dependency, which leads to co-optation and collusion.
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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, is an example of a rapidly growing city in 
an authoritarian development state. In Chapter 8, the author analyses the for-
mation of physical and social spaces and how these processes relate to social 
and economic differentiation. The formation of such spaces is key to under-
standing the range of urbanisation in Africa. In practical terms, this may mean 
looking more attentively at the impact that, for instance, the construction of 
streets and other infrastructure has on how the urban populace can dwell, 
make a living and articulate their interests. In particular, large streets with sep-
arate lanes and heavy traffic may affect the ways urbanites as social actors can 
situate themselves in the city. They can prevent, as the author writes, ‘spatial 
dialogics’ and dialogic articulations that would sustain the city as a collective 
social space. An approach that looks more carefully at how common ground 
emerges in the formation of urban social spaces would no longer follow the 
usual, linear model of development to solve specific economic, environmental 
or social problems. It would rather foster a circular approach—a continuous 
engagement with different concepts and ideas as they are articulated by the 
people in different spaces in the city.
In Chapter 9, the authors are also interested in the impacts of major spatial 
transformations that significantly influence the everyday lives of ordinary ur-
banites. The authors analyse decongestion policies applied in Accra, Ghana, 
over the last decades to remove unwanted urban dwellers and activities within 
the city centre. The municipality argued that the policies were aimed at beau-
tifying the city, easing traffic flows, reducing crime and preventing the regular 
flooding of large areas. In their contribution, the authors analyse the effects of 
these policies with regard to inclusiveness, sustainable development and the 
promotion of the right to the city more generally.
2.3 The Urban-Rural Continuum
The last section in this special issue focuses on the rural–urban continuum. In 
discursive formations of many African urbanites, a huge discrepancy between 
urban and rural modes of living and lifestyles is noticeable. While the city is 
related to ‘modern’ ways of life, the village is considered the representation of 
‘traditional’ values. However, such a clear-cut binary distinction between the 
two is utterly impossible: the rural and the urban are interlinked in manifold 
ways. The footprints of the city are visible in rural areas—very much as ru-
ral ways of living shape urban areas. One such example is urban agriculture, 
which replenishes the food basket of many a household in urban Africa. As cit-
ies expand, they extend more and more into the surrounding rural area, adding 
to the expansion of what can be labelled the city’s outskirts, the city’s fringes, 
suburbs, peri-urban areas or peripheral neighbourhoods. Consequently, it is 
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often not clear where a city begins and where it ends. Ash Amin and Nigel 
Thrift (2002, 1) go as far as to claim that ‘[w]e can no longer even agree on what 
counts as a city… The city is everywhere and in everything’.
In Chapter 10, the author foregrounds exactly such urbanisation processes, 
analysing former villages that have merged with the city. The author critically 
distances himself from research that analyses urban phenomena in the global 
South from a ‘Western’ perspective as done for example by the Globalization 
and World Cities (gawc) research network or the work informed by Lefebvre’s 
idea of planetary urbanisation. In contrast, he utilises urban theory from the 
global South for the global South, applying Chinese concepts to explain urban 
transformations in Senegal and Zanzibar. When analysing villages swallowed 
up by the cities in the Pearl River Delta, Chinese urbanists distinguish three 
forms: villages in the city, villages on the edge and villages in the suburbs. The 
author utilises these three concepts as lenses to explain what has recently been 
happening in the West District of Zanzibar and Dakar’s satellite city of Pikine. 
The author’s comparison is a convincing example of how African cities can be 
thought through the urban elsewhere (Robinson, 2016).
In Chapter 11, the author zooms in on this same city—Pikine. He examines 
the various ways through which young men live and shape their city and vice 
versa. Even though Pikine lacks basic infrastructure and is characterised by a 
high degree of urban poverty, its young urbanites take pride in being from this 
place. Through the explanation of specific expressions young men frequently 
use in the vernacular language, the author demonstrates how they situation-
ally adapt to the daily challenges they face. Male youth does this by, among 
other practices, switching between different identities and appearances and 
by applying specific coping strategies. They typically characterise themselves 
as being smart, having stamina and making the best of every situation thanks 
to their improvisational capacities. Like this, young men are able to make a liv-
ing and get by in the challenging everyday life-worlds of urban Africa.
The author of Chapter 12 is also interested in urban milieus, this time in 
East Africa. More specifically, he applies the distinctiveness of cities-concept 
developed by German sociologists to examine the particularities of a  growing 
segment in almost all African cities, namely the middle-income strata. In his 
study, the author identifies six different, but partly overlapping milieus in Nai-
robi and explains their connections to rural areas: the Neo-Traditionals, the 
Social Climbers, the Cosmopolitan-Liberals, the Christian Religious and the 
Young Professionals. The last two are analysed in more detail. The Christian 
Religious are active church members and strictly follow religious rules. At the 
same time, they are highly ambitious and convinced that they will—thanks 
to spiritual support—socially advance. For Young Professionals, in contrast, 
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 conspicuous consumption and individual lifestyles are essential. These mi-
lieus, so the author argues, are bound to their city in particular ways just as, 
vice versa, the different cities shape the lifestyles of these milieus.
In Chapter 13, the author is also interested in rural–urban transformations 
but approaches them through mining ‘boomtowns’ in the conflict-ridden area 
of the Kivu provinces, Democratic Republic of Congo. In an ethnographically 
rich description, the author demonstrates how three emerging mining towns 
have become important political, economic and social resources for the actors 
involved. These ‘boomtowns’ offer fascinating lenses with which to explore 
how different political, economic, humanitarian, civil and military actors 
(violently) struggle for power, authority and control. The author argues that 
due to their urban character and the natural resources they contain, emerg-
ing ‘boomtowns’ have intensified the already existing conflict dynamics in the 
Kivu provinces.
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Chapter 2
The Politics of Governing African Urban Spaces
Edgar Pieterse
Abstract
Drawing on the author’s direct experiences in urban policy formulation processes on 
various scales, this chapter makes a case for a more intimate reading and account of 
macro policy shifts that may hold the potential to advance transformative politics on 
the national and the urban scale. It argues that new policy concepts and frameworks 
can advance a more focused politics based on an analysis of the nature and terms of 
infrastructure investments and considers whether such investments are advancing a 
more inclusive, labour intensive and sustainable pattern of development in African 
cities and towns. The chapter asserts that urban governance policy discourses are 
now connecting urban investments and regulation with macroeconomic imperatives, 
which could lead to a greater awareness of urban governance within centres of state 
power. Structurally the chapter identifies examples of policy artefacts on the global, 
pan-African and national scales to demonstrate the shared potential for a new kind 
of transformative politics. Thereafter, the chapter sets out a potential methodological 
register to track, analyse and engage these processes on the urban scale in order to ar-
rive at a propositional sensibility with regard to governing diverse spaces. It calls for 
a form of research and analysis that is not merely evaluative, after the fact, but rather 
positioned in the processes of unfolding. There are not enough of these kinds of schol-
arly accounts that can enrich and deepen debates about the politics and practice of 
multi-scalar urban governance reform in diverse African settings.
1 Introduction
My experiences in conducting urban policy advocacy and advisory work over 
the past three years are the entry point for this chapter, accumulated in the 
run-up to the bi-decennial convening of the United Nations Conferences on 
Housing—Habitat iii. This chapter offers a reflection on why formal discur-
sive shifts at both the global and the African level, about the territorial un-
derpinnings of sustainable development, offer new opportunities to both 
imagine and instantiate a fresh politics on how urban areas are governed. It 
seeks to sidestep the typical approaches to the dynamics of multi-scalar urban 
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 governance in Africa, which either provide neo-Marxian accounts of macro-
economic processes of neo-liberalisation (Miraftab, 2004; Obeng-Odoom, 2015; 
Ferguson 2011) or constructivist perspectives on the significance of everyday 
urbanism in shaping forms of rule, government and counter-governmentality 
(Bayat, 2010). This chapter relates to both strands in the literature but seeks to 
offer a closer reading of formal policy shifts with an eye to the kinds of critical 
politics that might emerge, building on the conceptual framework proposed 
by Scoones et al. (2015) and Swilling (2016).
The chapter starts by briefly rehearsing the various policy formulation pro-
cesses I have been active in since 2015 to provide a contextual reference point 
for what follows. The following section traces some of the emblematic mile-
stones in this policy reorientation with an eye to what it might mean for the 
imperative to rethink and remake multilevel governance arrangements ani-
mated by new normative policy imperatives such as ‘infrastructure-led growth’, 
closely linked to the macroeconomic imperative to achieve ‘structural trans-
formation’. These policy imperatives matter because they are forging and fore-
grounding a more explicit spatial articulation of macroeconomic policy. This 
articulation in turn instigates significant institutional reforms that announce, 
I believe, novel political opportunities for deep democracy and cultural citi-
zenship (Pieterse, 2008; Mbembe, 2016). The second half of the chapter sets 
out a potential methodological register—in the broadest sense—to track, 
analyse and engage these processes on the urban scale in order to arrive at a 
propositional sensibility with regard to governing diverse spaces. It therefore 
calls for a form of research and analysis that is not merely evaluative after the 
fact, but is applied in the processes of unfolding. There is a dearth of these 
kinds of scholarly accounts that can enrich and deepen debates about the poli-
tics and practice of multi-scalar urban governance reform in diverse African 
settings.
2 Policy Artefacts to Reshape Urban Governance
This section situates my positioning in relation to the production of a number 
of policy artefacts on the pan-African and national (South Africa) scales during 
the last few years. Specifically, at the global level, I contributed to the technical 
research processes of UN-Habitat to formulate an overarching narrative about 
the state of the world’s cities, with an eye to proposing comprehensive reforms 
to effect structural change. More specifically, I worked on Chapter Six of the 
World Cities Report 2016 (UN-Habitat, 2016), which deals with governance. 
 Another global report that was published in 2016 was the GOLD iv report, 
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by United Cities and Local Government (uclg 2016). I collaborated with two 
colleagues to draft the synthesis and recommendations of this report, which 
explored the implications of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and its goals (sdgs) for different categories of territorial organisation: metro-
politan areas, intermediary cities, regions, small towns and rural areas.
At the African level, I collaborated with colleagues at the African Centre 
for Cities (acc)—an interdisciplinary research hub at the University of Cape 
Town—to craft a primer on what an African perspective might comprise re-
garding a new urban agenda for the world as governments were preparing for 
Habitat iii, the United Nations convening on urbanisation that happens every 
twenty years. This work was published in early 2015. It was crafted to serve as a 
resource for governmental preparatory processes at national and sub- regional 
(e.g. West African, Southern African) levels to clarify the African perspective 
for Habitat iii (UN Habitat and uneca, 2015). Questions of governance, in-
stitutional design and politics were central to this paper, published under the 
 auspices of UN-Habitat and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (uneca). 
A second pan-African intervention took the form of a background research 
 paper for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(oecd) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) as they were drafting the 
Africa Economic Outlook 2016, themed: Sustainable Cities and Structural Trans-
formation (oecd, et al., 2016). The two Africa-focused policy papers had to 
confront the articulation of African specificities with emerging global dis-
courses generated by the sdgs and the Paris Agreement, or Paris climate ac-
cord. This meant addressing systemic dysfunctionality as detailed by academic 
commentators, and the routine violation of rights and obligation (Davis, 2006; 
Myers, 2011; Swilling and Annecke, 2012).
Alongside this work on a global and African scale, I was deeply involved in 
national policy drafting processes in South Africa that sought to formulate the 
Integrated Urban Development Framework (rsa, 2016). This framework was a 
forerunner of National Urban Policies, or recognised tools toward global urban 
agendas as sanctified by the New Urban Agenda adopted at Habitat iii. This 
experience gave me an opportunity to work through the discursive gymnastics 
required to articulate highly localised demands, histories and institutional im-
peratives with African and global discourses about urban governance, regula-
tion and politics.
Lastly, and in anticipation of criticisms that I am simply the ‘bagman’ for 
what academics call free-floating or ‘travelling’ discourses (Harris and Moore, 
2013), during this time I also worked closely with a social movement called the 
Social Justice Coalition (sjc). The sjc is operative around safety and  sanitation 
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issues in areas of Khayelitsha, one of the largest suburbs of Cape Town.1 Strictly 
speaking, this was not conventional research but rather a process of mutual 
socialisation and exchange. I spent time with a cross-section of the leadership 
of the sjc, on a periodic basis, to creatively explore dilemmas of strategy and 
tactics, drawing on social history methods in a focus group setting. In return, 
I offered my experience and knowledge of comparable social movement prac-
tices in other urban settings of the world, as well as earlier periods of social 
struggle in Cape Town. These intimate conversations were profoundly impor-
tant as an anchoring device while I was plying my policy craft on these other 
scales of policy politics.
One of the insights gained over the course of this work was into the ways 
in which the political/policy ground on questions of urbanisation in sub-
Saharan Africa had shifted from only a few years before this engagement. In 
2014, Sue Parnell and I published the edited volume Africa’s Urban Revolution; 
many chapters in that volume confirm the long-standing lament about the 
 anti- urban bias practised by most African governments, manifested in mired 
devolution efforts combined with futile anti-migration policies (UN-Habitat, 
2014). However, over only a few years there has been a sea change at various 
levels of formal governance across the continent. Most significantly, at a pan-
African level, the African Union, uneca and the AfDB have all been driving 
a much more aggressive line around the imperative to rethink, remake and 
reinvest multilevel governance arrangements to improve the prospects of 
‘structural economic transformation’ and inclusive growth. These gestures to-
wards an African-centred perspective on inclusive modernisation rest on an 
acknowledgement of urbanisation as evident in Agenda 2063—the signature 
political programme and ideological frame of the African Union, initiated in 
2013 in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establish-
ment of the Organisation of African Unity (African Union, 2014). This 50th 
milestone informed the 50-year horizon of the revitalised pan-African vision 
as reflected in the designator: Agenda 2063.
Embedded in this new policy discourse is an unmistakable recognition 
that unless a stronger territorial or spatial understanding begins to drive 
routine processes of infrastructure investment and economic development, 
most African countries will remain low-income and marginal in global value 
chains (uneca, 2015; 2017). Furthermore, it is recognised that the impera-
tive to coordinate, sequence and calibrate disparate investments in highly 
1 See the Social Justice Coalition website http://www.sjc.org.za (accessed on 18 April 2018).
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complex and volatile systems requires a territorial proximity, for which the 
traditional model of national-centric planning and management is not well 
suited.
3 Major Discursive Shifts
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations 2015), as em-
bodied in the 17 sustainable development goals (sdgs), is highly significant 
and reflects the culmination of at least two decades of sustained human rights 
struggles to push back on the narrow economistic precepts of neo-liberal 
managerialism.2 For example, there is an explicit recognition that growing 
intra- and inter-country inequality is a major impediment to inclusivity. This 
is a profound break with the reformist ‘poverty reduction’ orientation of the 
Millennium Development Goals of 2000. The sdgs also acknowledge the en-
vironmental limits of the dominant growth model that remains the de facto 
reference point for governments and companies. Thus, there is a strong push 
to mainstream the work and perspective of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (unep) on sustainable production and consumption, linked to 
a separate set of goals on changing the carbon intensity and resource con-
sumption patterns that underpin global value chains across all domains of 
economic activity. In other words, in the sdgs there is a mainstreaming of 
the long-established political claims and policy proposals to internalise nega-
tive environmental and social costs, opening up a line of politics to build a 
broad-based front against extractive and exploitative capitalist processes. It 
is precisely these ambitions that have reinforced a more popular discourse 
and imagination about post-capitalist futures and trajectories (Mason, 2015; 
Srnicek and Williams, 2015). Lastly, the sdgs also recognise the importance 
2 It is important to keep in mind that since 1990, with the publication of the first Human De-
velopment Report by undp, there has been a fierce ideological contestation between the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations. Fundamentally it turned on Amartya 
Sen’s human capabilities approach versus a narrow neoclassical perspective on market-led 
development. After Rio+20, the green economic perspective, riding on the momentum of 
the environmental limits work of the ipcc, was able to broaden the mainstream debates to 
incorporate various shades of green analysis (Swilling and Annecke, 2012). Throughout these 
processes, the human rights struggle of social movements and watchdog bodies have been 
instrumental in keeping up the political pressure necessary for mainstream arguments to 
shift away from crass neo-liberalism to a broader, more heterodox perspective as manifest in 
the sdgs and the Paris Climate Accord of 2015.
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of sustainable urbanisation as a precondition for a more green and inclusive 
economic patterning of development. This is a major departure from the aspa-
tial and implicitly anti-urban orientation of the mdgs (Parnell, 2016) and has 
created room for a pointed argument that the sdgs must be ‘localised’—that is 
to say, driven from the grassroots by municipalities and citizens’ movements—
to find resonance and sustained traction in diverse contexts (Pieterse, et al. 
2017).
A number of broader dynamics made it possible for the sdgs to break with 
the welfarist reformism of the mdgs. Firstly, the damaging environmental im-
pacts of existing economic globalisation processes have been argued convinc-
ingly through climate change evidence and its calculation-driven discourse, 
creating an opening for the broader sustainable development perspective 
of yonder to stage a comeback after being unable to substantively shift the 
economist reference points of international and national developmentalism 
(Scoones et al., 2015). Secondly, the exclusionary and alienating aspects of neo-
liberal globalism were made evident through the lingering effects of youth un-
employment and political volatility across many oecd countries, especially in 
southern Europe, linked to the decentralised impacts of terrorist violence re-
lated to so-called alienated youth. Populist ideologues on both the left and the 
right stepped into this disjuncture, unsettling traditional centrist parties (and 
coalitions) across the oecd world, but also deeply entrenched political par-
ties that have been in power since independence in many African countries. 
The post-2008 era spelled political uncertainty, volatility and changing public 
attitudes towards incumbent political parties, undermining the hegemony of 
economic globalists and the political parties who grew fat off those ideological 
regimes (Castells and Himanen, 2014).
These broader trends played out in interesting ways in much of sub- Saharan 
Africa. The ‘boosterism’ narrative that Africa’s economic time had come, which 
took hold and flourished post 2000, was starting to experience strain. gdp 
growth rates started to slow and stagnate, and substantial investment gaps re-
mained. Two structural breaks on sustained and high economic growth were 
identified across development and private sector think tanks: limited and 
inefficient infrastructure and weak governance and regulatory practices that 
constituted systemic risk for large-scale investment (McKinsey Global Insti-
tute, 2016; PwC, 2015). Of course, these two dynamics are inextricably linked. 
It is against this background that my focus turns to the announcement and 
promotion of Agenda 2063. In keeping with the nature of these aspirational 
and norm-setting policy frameworks, Agenda 2063 envisages a profoundly 
transformed Continent, people and economy: ‘an integrated, prosperous and 
peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force 
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in the international arena’ (African Union, 2015, 1). This vision is meant to be 
realised through a highly focused, strongly normative and popular agenda that 
is cognisant of the importance of
… mobilization of the people and their ownership of continental pro-
grammes at the core; the principle of self-reliance and Africa financing its 
own development; the importance of capable, inclusive and  accountable 
states and institutions at all levels and in all spheres; the critical role of Re-
gional Economic Communities as building blocks for continental unity.
African Union, 2015, 1
This assertion hints at the seductive yearning for a uniquely African social 
 solidarity, rooted in long-standing (perhaps imagined?) cultural values and 
practices that have endured despite the horrors of colonialism, ready to be mo-
bilised for a modernised version of what Africa was always meant to be: united 
‘to realize its Renaissance’. It would be the easiest thing in the world to poke 
holes in the kitsch fabric of this obvious fiction. But that would be to miss the 
point about the importance of animating narratives that create a semblance of 
a shared footing in order to have certain kinds of political conversations that 
may, or may not, lead to coordinated action across profound differences and 
disagreements. I will return to the notion of shared narratives and the work 
they do in the fabrication of political and public spaces.
Notably, Agenda 2063 is certainly a product of its time. At least since the 
mdgs there has been an unmistakable adoption of performance manage-
ment rhetoric and planning across most development frameworks and agree-
ments. For example, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has 17 
goals and 169 targets that all nation states will be measured against on an 
annual basis in anticipation of achievements by 2030. Similarly, Agenda 2063 
must be read alongside the ‘First Ten Year Implementation Plan 2014–2023’, 
published by the African Union. This 140-page compendium of goals, targets, 
indicators and so forth set out in meticulous detail—even if some are wildly 
optimistic—how the seven aspirations (see Box 1) of Agenda 2063 will be re-
alised. This is not the occasion to delve into the function of these kinds of 
policy artefacts, but it is important to recognise their existence and how they 
might provide a staging ground for a nuanced politics of critique, collabora-
tion, learning and experimentation and the forging of novel coalitions across 
sectors and scales. These artefacts are not meant to be taken literally. They are 
discursive mechanisms aimed at instilling confidence and purpose in a sea of 
uncertainty and uncontrollable factors that will scupper the most well-laid 
plans (Roe, 1993).
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One of the most important impacts of Agenda 2063 is that it has made a clear-
ing for a more grounded and politically astute macroeconomic policy dis-
cussion under the sign of the concept of structural transformation (uneca, 
2015). This concept represents an attempt by African economists to confront 
the deep-seated legacies of colonial exploitation and the ways in which these 
laid the tracks for the asymmetrical incorporation of African economies into 
globalisation. It then follows that extraordinary policy focus and discipline 
is required to deploy macroeconomic and fiscal levers of the state to escape 
 historical traps of dependency in favour of a more dynamic and inclusive tra-
jectory. However, this cannot be done without leveraging the collective power 
of supranational regions in Africa and, ultimately, the African continent as 
a single economic organism characterised by the ‘Free movement of people, 
goods, capital and services to increase trade and investment among countries’ 
(African Union, 2015). If Agenda 2063 does nothing else but give genuine im-
petus to a single economic and labour market for Africa, it can be regarded 
a success. Furthermore, structural transformation is linked to a more explicit 
consideration of space and territoriality in meeting the lofty aspirations of 
the African Union and its member states. The rapidly expanding work from 
uneca (2015, 2016, 2017) has been the most significant body of development 
thought to substantiate the political, policy and regulatory implications of the 
lofty ideals of Agenda 2063.
Box 1: Aspirations of Agenda 2063
1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable 
development
2. An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of 
Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s renaissance
3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, 
justice, and the rule of law
4. A peaceful and secure Africa
5. An Africa with strong cultural identity, common heritage, values, 
and ethics
6. An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the po-
tential of African people, especially its women and youth, and car-
ing for children
7. Africa as a strong, united, and influential global player and partner.
Source: African Union (2015)
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uneca has produced a series of development reports on various dimensions of 
structural transformation. This output ranges from an analysis of trade policy 
(uneca, 2015) to an exploration of why an explicit green economic approach is 
the most promising for realising the ideals of structural transformation (une-
ca, 2016), and the most recent focus on the connections between urbanisation 
and structural transformation (uneca, 2017). It is this last report that I draw 
upon to illustrate the policy narrative that uneca is driving, which is achiev-
ing significant traction with key infrastructure financing institutions such as 
the AfDB, the World Bank, various Chinese banks and the  Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (dbsa).
But first, a few words on the policy meaning of structural transformation. At 
its core, structural transformation denotes processes to ‘shift labour out of low-
productivity agriculture into higher-productivity manufacturing and modern 
services’ (uneca, 2017, 20). Across most of sub-Saharan Africa, this shift is 
not occurring fast enough and many countries display an economic structure 
almost unchanged since the postcolonial era (see Figure 2.1). Thus, the rela-
tive shares of agriculture, industry and services have remained more or less 
the same—with the exception of manufacturing as a component of industry, 
which has actually declined since 1960 in relative terms. These patterns persist 
despite a dramatic expansion of the labour force and educational improve-
ments, particularly over the past two decades. Large-scale, labour intensive 
and productive industrialisation is not on the cards for most African econo-
mies, a situation that leaves them marginal and vulnerable in an increasingly 
Box 2: Structural Transformation
Structural transformation is the defining characteristic of the develop-
ment process. It entails the allocation of resources—especially new 
investments—from low- to high-productivity activities within and across 
sectors, especially the agriculture, industry and services sectors. […] Four 
quite relentless and interrelated processes define the structural trans-
formation process: (a) a declining share of agriculture in gross domestic 
product (gdp) and employment; (b) the rapid process of urbanization 
as people migrate from rural to urban areas; (c) the rise of a modern in-
dustrial and service economy; and (d) a demographic transition from 
high to low rates of births and deaths. The final outcome of structural 
transformation is an economy and society in which agriculture as an eco-
nomic activity has no distinguishing characteristics from other sectors, 
at least in terms of the productivity of labour and capital or the location 
of poverty.
Source: uneca (2015)
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integrated global economy and, most importantly, unable to absorb new en-
trants into the formal labour market.
Given the youthful demographics of sub-Saharan Africa and the persistence 
of high fertility rates, this is a recipe for economic and political ruin— especially 
as young people are more prone to participate in oppositional protests and dis-
ruption, dynamics that are seemingly exacerbated by the proliferation of mo-
bile digital technologies (Honwana, 2012). This speaks to the centrality of the 
structural transformation discourse across pan-African political, development 
and financing institutions. It is also a discourse that can enrol and animate the 
private sector and civic groups keen on fostering a politics of inclusion and 
voice, especially for youth. It even resonates with proponents of the informal 
economy because these practices are seen as evidence of a lack of structural 
transformation and therefore as ideal agents to be supported in order to deep-
en industrialisation and productivity. However, the dimension of the uneca 
outlook that is most striking is the recent embracing of a spatial and territorial 
perspective in thinking through the governance preconditions for reorienting 
macroeconomic and infrastructure policies to derail the low-industrial, path-
dependent track that most African countries find themselves on.
Earlier in 2017, uneca launched its flagship annual development report, 
themed Urbanization and Industrialisation. It unpacks with refreshing candour 
the connections between African urbanisation and economic performance:
African cities thus face low productivity, tepid job creation, high informal-
ity, huge infrastructure and service gaps, weak linkages with rural areas, 
high levels of informality, increasing inequalities, growing environmental 
damage and vulnerability to climate change and weak institutional sys-
tems and capacities. Unless resolved, these impediments will undermine 
Africa’s urban potential for structural transformation. […] The challenge 
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Figure 2.1 gdp composition by sector, Africa, 1961–2012.
Source: uneca (2015, 47)
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confronting Africa is thus to accelerate structural transformation by har-
nessing the rapid urban transition to promote economic diversification, 
with a special focus on industrialization that will create jobs, enhance 
access to basic services and reduce inequality and poverty.
uneca, 2017, 20
The second part of this position is based on an assumption that as urbanisa-
tion intensifies the growing population represents crucial potential markets for 
goods, services and especially infrastructure systems that will have to conduct 
the generation and circulation of economic value. Thus, for uneca, the key to 
structural transformation lies in territorial and infrastructure planning because 
global value chains have particular geographies and there is policy scope to re-
think and re-engineer these geographies through thoughtful and anticipatory 
infrastructure planning in order to foster dynamic, interdependent and differ-
entiated national and (subnational) regional economies. In the previous report 
in 2016, uneca goes further and argues that territorial infrastructure planning 
can disrupt uneven development and urban primacy, as well as catalyse a si-
multaneous transition to a green economy in terms of the underlying technolo-
gies that will shape energy, mobility, water and ict investments (uneca, 2016).
Significantly, the Urbanization and Industrialization report goes further than 
infrastructure and foregrounds the problematic urban form (spatial structure) 
of many African cities, which not only reinforces social segregation but also 
represents a substantial cost for urban livelihoods and businesses. However, the 
report not only argues for refined macroeconomic policy but also for drastic in-
tergovernmental institutional reconfiguration so that local actors who are most 
knowledgeable about local conditions can do the frontline work of detailed in-
dustrial and spatial policy design, effectively providing a renewed argument for 
the substantive devolution of powers, functions and financial authority. This is 
important because evidence from many sub-Saharan African countries dem-
onstrates that devolution reforms have essentially become stuck for at least the 
past two decades, with cases of re-centralisation when opposition political par-
ties were able to get a foothold in municipal governance (Resnick, 2012).
uneca can be this bullish in its policy arguments because of important 
shifts that have taken place at the African Union level. In order to prepare for 
an African regional perspective on a new urban agenda deliberated at Habi-
tat iii in 2016, the African Union established a new political subcommittee 
on Urban Development and Human Settlements of the African Union Spe-
cialized Technical Committee on Public Service, Local Government, Urban 
 Development and Decentralization. This technical committee was itself a nov-
el structure when it was first convened in 2014. The work of this subcommittee 
culminated in the adoption of the Common African Position on the Third 
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United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, 
in February 2016. The Common Position sets out a number of approaches that 
set the stage for the Africa Economic Outlook 2016 and uneca’s publication, 
Urbanization and Industrialization. These overlapping and mutually reinforc-
ing macro policy frameworks are indeed unprecedented and represent, if read 
carefully, a radically different institutional and political landscape for future 
governance dynamics as territorial considerations become interlinked with 
macroeconomic decisions and infrastructure investment regimes. In the sec-
ond half of this chapter, I delineate what this political landscape contains in 
order to make a speculative argument for ‘translational research’ that can doc-
ument, critique and extend multi-scalar politics.
4 Recasting the Nature of (Urban) Governance
In the wake of the sdgs, the Paris Climate Accord and the New Urban Agenda, 
the formal policy reference points of an ideal multilevel governance approach 
have shifted. It is now recognised that multilevel institutional configurations 
must be defined in relation to a macroeconomic policy ideal that seeks to 
 accelerate industrialisation. This ideal is based on a locally defined set of eco-
nomic strategies that seek to intervene in the value chains of key economic 
sectors that depend on expanding urban populations. It is further accepted 
that the infrastructure investments required to optimise industrialisation and 
urban efficiencies should be made and coordinated by local actors who un-
derstand the micro dynamics of the territorial economies that should anchor 
economic diversification. It is further asserted that these infrastructure invest-
ments should not only drive industrialisation but also create a platform for 
a transition to a low-carbon and resource-efficient economic structure that 
optimises labour absorption. These are significant discursive shifts that raise 
daunting questions about how one can change the predominant dynamics and 
values of pre-existing governance cultures.
Three weighty problems present themselves. First, most African countries 
and cities are marked by infrastructural and spatial path dependency dynam-
ics that are notoriously difficult to change. In other words, the regimes of in-
frastructure technological design, operations and management are  crystallised 
around a deeply entrenched set of vested interests. Since infrastructure in-
vestments have long lead times, what is currently on the books will remain a 
dominant structuring force for at least the next five to ten years. Second, tech-
nical path dependency is reinforced by an even more pernicious dynamic of 
institutional inertia. There is a large body of scholarship on the dysfunctional 
nature of public sector bureaucracies in many African countries (Rakodi, 2002; 
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Stren, 2014). Typically, the public sector remained cast in the mould of colonial 
administrations, especially in terms of hierarchical power relations embed-
ded in command-and-control decision-making. This was a system that proved 
useful to entrench a new postcolonial administrative elite that was  intimately 
entwined with the political party machines that overdetermined the econ-
omy, politics and administrative functioning. These dynamics were further 
entrenched and perverted when new public administration tools around pri-
vatisation, corporatisation, partnerships and performance management were 
overlaid in an instrumentalised fashion. Instead of promoting greater respon-
siveness to the needs and demands of citizens, bureaucratic power became 
more intensified and opaque but draped in a language of accountability and 
performance, fuelling deep-seated mistrust and public cynicism. Rents that 
politically connected actors are able to extract rely on this institutional dys-
function. Third, in most African contexts dominant ruling political parties 
overdetermine every aspect of public priority setting and resource allocation. 
This is such a pervasive fact of life that most actors and citizens simply take it 
as a given and this power is derived from keeping the system as is.
The culturally specific manifestation of these dynamics needs to be made 
legible through careful research and analysis. Three conceptual entry points 
are relevant for this research work: narrative, ritual and deal-making. The nar-
rative dimension of governance refers to where dominant circulating discours-
es are deployed to fashion and reproduce the necessary fictions (or facts) of 
rule. These are large, muscular and often masculine normative frames such 
as patriotism, pan-Africanism, empowerment, Ubuntu, and the like. These 
narratives stabilise nation building and forge the basis of the legitimacy and 
authority of ruling elites. Importantly, such narratives feed off and blend in 
with popular cultural currents that congeal the meanings of citizenship and 
political attachment. It is arguable that the highly successful Pentecostal mega 
churches that are mushrooming across African cities in all linguistic regions 
manifest a similar dynamic (Adesoji, 2016; Rakodi, 2014). It is unhelpful to dis-
miss the popular cultural beliefs and practices of this order as false conscious-
ness or deceit. These narratives endure and reinvent themselves because they 
function in highly subtle and resonant ways as public affects (Amin and Thrift, 
2013; Connolly, 2014). They are best dislodged and problematised through com-
peting narratives that have a stronger affective pull.
The ritual dimension denotes the embodied institutional scripts that flow 
from these narrative frames and allow for a certain kind of translation into ad-
ministrative practices and effects. It is in rituals that the performative dimen-
sions of politics come to the fore. In a context of relatively limited resources 
due to small tax bases and highly truncated systems of patronage, rituals are 
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even more exaggerated and achieve a life force and dynamism of their own. 
Generally, political party cultures, hierarchies, decision-making systems and 
informal networks shape these, but they are always interwoven with formal de-
liberative governmental procedures in both the legislature and the  executive 
and administrative components of the state. Arguably, party dominant bu-
reaucracies take their cue from these ritualised practices to establish a set of 
administrative systems and practices that quickly manifest in unique rituals 
that must be mastered if one is to get anything done or enabled. These rituals 
can vary widely, ranging from militarist efficiency to the extravagantly baroque 
(Mbembe, 2001). It is not possible to move economic or political agendas for-
ward without understanding and engaging with these performative dimen-
sions of statehood. Furthermore, non-state cultural reference points, such as 
religious affiliations or hometown networks, are vital to the maintenance and 
reproduction of these rituals.
Deal-making is another dimension of the unravelling and remaking of mul-
tilevel governance. The understanding of framing narratives and the ritual of 
performative politics are helpful to decipher the profound gap between formal 
state rhetoric and practice, and how such practices relate back to party dy-
namics and elite functioning. However, they are always intertwined with a pro-
found pragmatism to cut deals in order to navigate opaque ‘rules of the game’ 
and keep resources flowing. Deal-making happens behind the translucent 
screens of narrative and ritual. In other words, if actors who want to advance 
an alternative, more progressive politics fail to read the prevailing narratives 
and their functioning, along with the rituals of public administration, they will 
simply not be effective in shaping narratives or destabilising practices that re-
produce the status quo. This brings this chapter to its penultimate thematic: 
what kind of politics can be imagined and institutionalised to ensure that the 
progressive normative ambitions of Agenda 2063 and the trope of green struc-
tural transformation can in fact be achieved?
5 Reimagining Power Through Infrastructural Politics
The most potent politics aggregates around infrastructure (Larkin, 2013; Swill-
ing, 2013). Since infrastructure deficits and malfunctioning constitutes the 
largest brake on sustained economic growth and accumulation, it attracts an 
inordinate amount of political and technical attention, not least from interna-
tional actors on the financing side of the development industry (Pieterse and 
Hyman, 2014). The downstream effects of infrastructure malfunction are also 
most likely to trigger social dissent and protest and, in this sense, always carry a 
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political charge. The planning and financing of infrastructure falls to the most 
powerful centres of the state: ministries of finance, economic development, 
and infrastructure, and typically the presidency.
These actors are also the primary targets of pan-African norm-setting fo-
rums and national commitment, which does, in theory, create leverage in 
terms of holding them accountable and advocating, at the policy narrative 
level, around adopted or professed norms. For example, the assertions and 
commitments embedded in the Common African Position on a New Urban 
Agenda adopted in February 2016 are highly consistent with the recommenda-
tions from uneca’s work discussed earlier. Since the senior ministries in the 
state are involved and a number of bold and clear policy propositions have 
been accepted, it is conceivable that a radical, transformative platform can be 
constructed to shift the trajectory of the country and the city. However, this 
does depend on a savvy coalition of actors from diverse sectors of civil society 
who are able to explicitly connect local demands for more transparent and 
equitable infrastructure investments and democratic decentralisation reforms 
with the normative imperatives of these pan-African frameworks. Increasingly, 
the African Union (AU) and various UN bodies that deal with these questions 
are creating spaces for civil society actors to engage, monitor implementation 
and apply pressure. If these opportunities are exploited by various civil society 
networks and movements that work on social justice and democratisation, this 
potential can be realised (Miller et al., 2006).
Significantly, infrastructure systems also reveal most clearly the co- 
existence of formal and informal systems of social and economic reproduction. 
For example, given the low levels of baseload energy infrastructure, the major-
ity of African households are responsible for their own micro infrastructure so-
lutions. This is typically expensive and inefficient but energy-poor households 
find a way (Jaglin, 2014). Similar scenarios pertain to water access, sanitation, 
transport, housing and so forth. A rich and helpful academic research agenda 
has sprung up to make legible and comprehend these hybrid sociotechnical 
systems that underpin the functioning of African cities and communities. In 
the case of energy, most urban households who live in slum conditions rely on 
biomass, which is not particularly efficient and often detrimental in environ-
mental health terms. Similarly, most of the (public) transport infrastructure—
minibus taxis—is privately owned and operates in a grey zone of semi- formality. 
Likewise, neighbourhood-based social enterprises and/or cooperatives orga-
nise waste management and sanitation disposal (Thieme, 2017). The point is 
that any future evolution of these hybrid infrastructures must engage with 
the de facto hybrid functioning of these systems and allow for a contextually 
defined transition to more effective, integrated and formal structures over 
time, with an acceptance that multiple systems with different rhythms and 
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institutional forms will have to coexist for the foreseeable future. It is indeed 
these system adaptions that can undergird the green economy, as envisaged by 
uneca (2016) and others (Cartwright, 2015; Hyman and Pieterse, 2017; oecd  
et al., 2016; Pieterse and Hyman, 2014).
Notably, the expansion of infrastructure investment and the concomitant 
planning of future systems that are more inclusive and adaptive will require a 
change to multilevel governance systems. It is in this imperative that the stron-
gest potential for a transformative politics lies. Why? Infrastructure priorities 
defined in terms of the imperatives of access, green economic transitions and 
basic urban efficiency demand a more coordinated, sequenced and integrated 
approach to infrastructure planning, investment, delivery, maintenance and 
repair. And since any infrastructure response will have to acknowledge and 
incorporate de facto hybrid systems of functioning, it will also require care-
ful and sustained engagement with informal providers and intermediaries. 
The imperatives of coordination and incorporation demand a localised insti-
tutional framework for infrastructure planning and management, especially 
as the complexity of variegated demands in major urban hubs intensifies and 
international investors demand localised institutional capacity and account-
ability. These exogenous factors conspire to create novel political openings 
and opportunities for progressive urban actors wishing to animate new terms 
of engagement and urban incorporation. However, this implies a savvy and 
nimble political sensibility and capacity. In order to clarify and advance what 
this imaginary might add up to, I explore a few conceptual diagrams that can 
anchor localised strategies.
6 Triangulating Dimensions of Governance, Forms of Power,  
and Political Settlement
Earlier in this chapter, I proposed the utility of distinguishing between three 
nested dimensions of contemporary governance: narrative, ritual and deal-
making. In order to get a purchase on the strategic opportunity structure for 
the kind of transformational infrastructure politics of green growth and liveli-
hood enhancement, it is important to adopt a sociological analysis of power 
in the state and its cultural embedding in society. The applied development 
policy literature (Pettit, 2013) that distinguishes between visible, invisible and 
hidden power provides a useful prism without suggesting that it exhausts the 
complex flows and dynamics of power and counter-power in the heterotopic 
sense. If we take one step further and triangulate these two aspects with an-
other pragmatist framework to characterise the dominant features of political 
economy factors that shape macro politics and its intricate folds, the work on 
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political settlements by Kelsall (2016) represented as a 3-D space offers some 
useful insights. I will briefly expound on these two frameworks before mak-
ing some cursory remarks on how they can enrich a transformational urban 
politics.
The first framework is the useful typology on visible, invisible and hidden 
power proposed by Pettit (2013) and Gaventa (2013). Visible power is the mani-
fest capacity of actors in formal decision-making bodies and public spaces to 
present and advance their interests, (ideological) perspective and priorities. 
In substantially democratic institutions, these power contests are regulated 
by legally enshrined principles and tend to fix public attention because they 
embody what is deemed ‘proper’ politics worthy of media attention. Much 
government, donor and civil society energy is invested in participatory gover-
nance instruments that target formal decision-making arenas. On the urban 
scale, this would typically be either the municipal council or a host of ancil-
lary participatory mechanisms that seek to effect consultation around council 
decisions or various kinds of municipal planning processes. The assumption 
is that there is a direct connection between what is being discussed in these 
chambers and plans, and the routine functioning of local state institutions.
By contrast, hidden power as a concept in this framework illuminates the 
ways in which formal political and policy deliberative processes and forums 
are not a level playing field—the ways in which numerous voices and interests 
are systematically excluded from the debate. Hidden power explains how of-
ficial political and policy arenas are constructed and hemmed by specific dis-
courses (Flyvbjerg, 2001) and associated institutional habits. These discourses 
incorporate assumptions about how to frame an issue, what is ‘sayable’ and 
what is politically or culturally considered taboo (Healey, 2004; Pieterse, 2005). 
Hidden power is effective when the media or citizens do not question the very 
assumptions that structure a public policy issue.
Hidden power works effectively because it is culturally underpinned by in-
visible power, which stems from subjectivity—or, how a person understands 
and enacts a sense of self as an expression of self-esteem, confidence, self-
worth, dignity and corporeality. Theoretically hidden power draws on the 
overlapping insights of Gyatry Spivak, Michel Foucault, Paulo Freire and Steve 
Biko. In highly stratified, patriarchal and unequal societies, those at the bot-
tom of the privilege pile are systematically devalued and considered inferior, 
in part due to their material and educational deficits and in other senses due 
to their membership of ‘inferior’ classes or castes. Thus, invisible power ‘in-
volves the ways in which awareness of one’s rights and interests are hidden 
through the adoption of dominating ideologies, values and forms of behavior 
by relatively powerless groups themselves. Sometimes this is also referred to as 
the “internalisation of powerlessness” in a way that affects the awareness and 
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consciousness of potential issues and conflicts, even by those directly affected’ 
(Gaventa, 2013). In undemocratic and authoritarian societies, political elites 
and dominant groups actively reproduce these cultural systems of devaluation 
and social exclusion because they reinforce their hold on power and resources. 
In an era in which religious ideologies, intertwined with accumulation prac-
tices and political sway, exercise increasing influence over the affairs of the 
state and the economy, various cultural belief systems tend to reinforce invis-
ible power (Naim, 2013).
Moving on from forms of power, it is instructive to consider the intervention 
by Kelsall (2016) who created an analytical tool to generate a more precise and 
contextually specific account of dynamics from a given political settlement 
and how it structures the opportunity space for visible and invisible power. 
The tool is structured along three axes to create a cube space of triangulated 
description (see Figure 2.2). The first axis denotes the nature of horizontal 
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Figure 2.2 The political settlements 3-D space.
Source: Kelsall (2016, 3)
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elite incorporation. It simply addresses whether the majority of elites accept 
the political settlement and have given up on the option of using violence to 
disrupt or end it. If many elites maintain the option of violence, the axis will 
indicate exclusion.
The second axis addresses why elites are willing to accept the political set-
tlement: are they ‘in’ because they get a share of the ‘spoils’ or are they persuad-
ed by a larger common purpose that flows from a broader narrative of nation 
building, or developmental statehood, and so forth, which create a basis for the 
more inclusive structuring of institutions? Of course, in most places it would 
be a combination of these kinds of discourses interwoven with some measure 
of sharing the spoils. Returning to the earlier points about the emergence of 
qualitatively different developmental narratives about green industrialisa-
tion and employment being the core of the ‘African Renaissance’ or Agenda 
2063, it becomes clearer how these signifiers can potentially be put to work to 
deepen the ideological and symbolic repertoire of local political actors who 
want to embrace a pan-African cosmopolitanism. I would go so far as to say 
that the progressive aspirations of Agenda 2063 that pertain to the entrenching 
of ‘democratic values, cultural practices, universal principles of human rights, 
gender equality, justice and the rule of law’ and the consolidation of ‘capable 
institutions and transformative leadership’ are norms worth supporting with 
vigour as a means of bolstering the cultural appeal of a broader non-personal 
political aspiration (African Union, 2015). This also speaks to the third axis of 
the framework.
The third axis denotes the nature of the bureaucracy or public sector. In 
its ideal form, it is predominantly propelled by impersonal principles of rule- 
driven fairness, administrative justice and meritocracy, or is based on per-
sonalised systems of exchange that manifest as rent seeking, patronage and 
clientelism. There is a rich literature on the ways in which these lumpy con-
cepts fail to account for the micro negotiations that can see outcomes whereby 
forms of patronage and clientelism can in fact produce inclusionary outcomes, 
especially when non-elites are adept at playing and subverting the ‘rules of 
the game’ (Duncan and Williams, 2012; Kelsall, 2016; Platteau, 2004). These ac-
counts enrich this pragmatist frame, they do not obviate it.
In summary, there is a significant deepening of pan-African developmen-
talist discourses that connect macro outcomes such as inclusive growth and 
environmental sustainability with a stronger territorial imagination about how 
states need to restructure their internal multilevel systems to become more 
effective, popular and inclusive. This can, and should, be seized by progressive 
actors and scholars who wish to instantiate a more radical, democratic and 
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inclusive urban politics. However, to be effective in this regard it is important to 
deploy research and analysis to build a much more rounded and fine-grained 
account of the status quo and why it remains stubbornly impervious to suc-
cessive waves of policy reform. Such a research effort demands a more sober 
and direct account of the political opportunity structure if it is to progressively 
instantiate these emerging developmentalist discourses. This section of the 
chapter suggests the triangulation of three analytical prisms. This begins with 
a broader analysis of the nature of the political operating field through the 
adapted use of Kelsall’s 3-D cube, which typifies elite incorporation, culture 
and bureaucratic disposition. The crude accounting that such a step yields can 
then be nuanced by isolating the ways in which overarching narratives of na-
tionhood and state-building create a series of rationalities for specific rituals of 
state performance, which in turn provides a canopy for a wide range of ground-
ed micro practices of deal-making within which ordinary people and their var-
ious intermediating social networks are always hard at work to capitalise on 
deals or renegotiate them. However, to establish a truly grounded reading of 
the cultural terms of these processes, it is necessary to overlay the analysis with 
an account of how visible, hidden and invisible power dynamics work in prac-
tice. This requires fine-grained and possibly ‘embedded’ research to account 
for the practices, rationalities and dynamics of public institutions charged 
with interpreting and enacting broader normative visions. In the last section 
of this chapter, by way of a conclusion, I make a case for sustained social sci-
ence research to populate the triangulation imperatives with sound data and 
analysis. However, this is not enough; we need to think of the role of research 
as integral to the larger imperatives of fostering new institutional systems of 
governance, management and rule that strengthen national imperatives to dis-
charge coordination and alignment. At the same time, we need to recognise 
that alternative local governance and policy processes cannot emerge unless 
they are connected to experiments, which can generate novel ways of plan-
ning, structuring, investing in and running sustainable infrastructures that 
contribute directly to economic empowerment and socio-spatial inclusion.
7 Fostering Exploratory Research Milieus
At the risk of frustrating the reader, I will not elaborate in any detail upon what 
this experimental research milieu entails but will simply deploy a diagrammat-
ic overview of its recursive logics (Figure 2.3). The entry point is the fundamen-
tal task of academic research: critical thought. Such thought is  conventionally 
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the interplay between established theoretical assumptions, a research ques-
tion, which leads to a research strategy, and the eventual reporting on the out-
comes of the research. Fundamentally, such work is driven by a desire to figure 
out what should be done to ‘solve’ and engage the problem at the core of the 
research question. However, instead of adopting muscular explanatory theo-
ries that have fixed the structural determinants of the problem, this approach 
is interested in foregrounding the range of possible actions with an eye to what 
might work in the entangled messiness of the real city.
Actions are tabulated in two columns: probable future directions versus 
possible future directions. Critical social scientists are very well trained in 
probability. We can offer long lists of why the status quo is likely to remain 
stubbornly in place, and the more our outlooks are shaped by structural on-
tologies, the more we are trapped by probable horizons. In contrast, actions 
in the possible futures column are adopted by actors who are willing to take a 
couple of leaps of faith, believers as they are in the potential of surprise, con-
tingency and new conjunctures that trigger unexpected cultural affects. Those 
who struggle to leave the land of the probable tend to conclude that the only 
worthy next step is confrontational political action, which in turn requires 
more theoretical fuel to keep the critical thought project alive.
The ‘romantics’, on the other hand, for lack of a better term, are keen to enter 
experimental labs, sites and milieus with a diversity of practitioners invested 
in the issues at the core of the research question (Swilling et al., forthcoming). 
This cohort is fated to learn how to conduct translational research—a practice 
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of intermediating between different knowledge registers in order to move be-
tween science and experience, codified knowledge and tacit understanding, 
abstracted ideas and experientially based insights, and so on (Parnell and Piet-
erse, 2016). However, to achieve genuinely novel and surprising insights, these 
different registers need to be animated by various learning techniques that are 
able to surface and articulate both reasoned and affective rationalities. If done 
well, if curated with care, if underpinned with rigorous scholarship and com-
mitment to social justice, these experimental labs can produce genuine inno-
vation with regard to how to understand specific problems and/or new ways of 
tackling them (Simone and Pieterse, 2017).
At all times in these experimental milieus the goal is to figure out how to 
institutionalise novel approaches that can have material effects that will, over 
time, and through learning, impact on large numbers of people. The core drive 
of experimental milieus is to figure out what has a chance of succeeding and 
how the innovation can be scaled and sustained through the routine function-
ing of democratic institutions. In some cases, the experiments may be too mod-
est or narrow to translate into institutional propositions. In such instances, the 
search moves to theorisation—raising new questions that can challenge and 
stretch the theoretical accounts of what might or might not work in a given 
situation. Both the practice of institutionalisation across differences and theo-
retical spadework contribute, ultimately, to deep learning. Such learning has 
to be embedded in the cultural aspirations of social and knowledge actors in-
vested in figuring out an urban politics that excites, animates and instigates 
transformational political acts.
8 In Conclusion
A core argument of this chapter is that we are in the midst of a number of 
important policy discursive shifts that will trigger the establishment of new 
urban governance mechanisms and processes. It is important to pay attention 
to these processes and not assume a priori that they are simply more of the 
same. Instead, we need to offer a critical perspective on why these institutional 
proposals are not simply about technocratic competence but rather a differ-
ent kind of politics that needs researchers to identify and analyse the ways 
in which vested interests and hidden dynamics of power operate to frustrate 
infrastructural modernisation and democratisation. Thus, this is not an argu-
ment for only conducting research linked to institutional experimentation 
that must supplant conventional scholarship. On the contrary, we need a lot 
more interdisciplinary analysis of political institutions, lifeworlds and culture 
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across the visible and hidden dimensions of politics that shape urban life and 
opportunity. This is especially important at a time when investments in the 
built environment are increasing, with profound spatial effects. However, I 
do think that the established academic research approaches and theoretical 
frameworks can be enriched and expanded if there is more articulation with 
localised practices of speculative research. In my reading, both traditional 
academic research and applied speculative exploration are essential to make 
sense of the new kinds of cultural–political–institutional configurations that 
are emerging in order to substantiate new normative commitments and aspi-
rations. By paying attention to the multilayered nature of these contradictory 
processes, explicated in this chapter, we might yet have something useful to 
contribute to a new African urban politics and imagination.
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Chapter 3
Urban Governance in Africa: An Overview
Warren Smit
Abstract
Africa is urbanising rapidly and is facing enormous urban challenges, such as the 
growth of slums and increasing inequality. Secondary cities, with their smaller econ-
omies and less capacitated local governments compared to primary cities, face par-
ticularly severe challenges. However, responsibility for key urban governance issues 
is often fragmented amongst large numbers of government stakeholders with limited 
capacities and conflicting interests. Key urban governance stakeholders therefore 
need to be brought together in collaborative processes to jointly develop and imple-
ment new strategies that are based on a broader range of interests and meet a broader 
range of needs. In order to be able to do this, understanding actual urban governance 
processes, which are essentially about how different actors interact to make and 
 operationalise decisions, is vitally important. This chapter highlights the diversity of 
actors involved in urban governance in Africa and the complexity of urban governance 
processes, with Kisumu, a secondary city in Kenya, used as an example. Key actors in 
urban governance in African cities include all levels of government, political parties, 
traditional leaders, private sector organisations and informal business organisations 
(such as traders’ organisations), international agencies and civil society organisations. 
The basic objects of urban governance can include a wide range of issues, such as 
land use management, the provision of basic services, ensuring access/mobility and 
 ensuring public health and safety. The diversity of governance actors and of agendas 
complicates addressing urban issues, but can also be seen as an opportunity for lever-
aging additional skills and resources through collaborative urban governance process-
es that bring different stakeholders together to develop and implement more holistic 
and  inclusive strategies.
1 Introduction
Africa is the most rapidly urbanising region of the world and has immense 
urban challenges, such as growing slums and growing poverty and inequality, 
combined with weak government capacity (UN-Habitat, 2014). Urban  Africa, 
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though, also has enormous opportunities and potential for innovation. Key 
to effectively tackling urban challenges in Africa is an understanding of ur-
ban governance processes and how they can be enhanced and strength-
ened. This chapter attempts to highlight the diversity of actors involved in 
urban  governance in African cities, and the complexity of urban governance 
processes.
It should be noted that Africa is a vast and diverse continent, and there are 
enormous international and intra-national differences in urbanisation dy-
namics and governance conditions. Nevertheless, there are certain key urban 
governance trends that are widespread in Africa. Drawing on a review of the 
literature on governance in Africa and on personal experience of working in a 
number of cities across the continent, I review some of the key issues relating 
to African urban governance, showing how responsibility for key urban gover-
nance issues is often fragmented amongst large numbers of government stake-
holders with limited capacities and conflicting interests, and that, in order to 
overcome these challenges, governance stakeholders need to be brought to-
gether in collaborative processes to jointly develop and implement new strate-
gies that are based on a broader range of interests and meet a broader range of 
needs. As secondary cities in Africa face particularly severe challenges—given 
their weaker economies and weaker local governments compared to primary 
cities—I particularly focus on the experiences of secondary cities, using Kisumu 
(the third-largest city in Kenya) as an example. This chapter is partially based 
on a review of 101 peer-reviewed articles relating to urban governance in Africa 
(see Smit, 2016) and partially on a stakeholder workshop held in Kisumu in July 
2015 and the analysis of interviews with a range of governance  stakeholders in 
Kisumu conducted in June 2016.
First, I briefly review some of the key challenges facing African cities. I then 
discuss different conceptions of governance and define my working definition 
of governance as the complex ways through which groups and individuals en-
gage with each other to, in practice, make and operationalise decisions. Using 
Kisumu as an illustrative example, I then discuss the key governance actors 
found in most African cities and examine four particular arenas of urban gov-
ernance: land use management, the provision of basic services, transport/mo-
bility, and food safety. Although certain aspects of these governance processes 
function adequately, there are also many cases of fragmentation and a lack 
of coordination between urban governance actors. Finally, I discuss the pos-
sibility of overcoming these problems through developing collaborative gov-
ernance processes that bring different stakeholders together to develop and 
implement more holistic and inclusive strategies.
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2 Urbanisation in Africa
The urban population of Africa has been growing rapidly, from an estimated 
237 million in 1995 to an estimated 472 million in 2015, an average growth 
rate of 3.44 per cent per year (UN-Habitat, 2016). Although megacities like 
Lagos  dominate the literature on African cities, in fact, the fastest growing 
urban centres are the smaller cities with less than one million inhabitants, 
which  accounted for 62 per cent of the urban population in Africa in 2015 
( UN- Habitat, 2016).
Unlike urbanisation in many other parts of the world, urban population 
growth in most of Africa has generally not been accompanied by a commen-
surate increase in formal employment, resulting in growing urban poverty 
and increased urban vulnerability (Bryceson and Potts, 2006; Fox, 2012). The 
 capacity of government bodies to plan for and manage urban growth in  Africa 
is  generally relatively weak (Myers, 2011). The net result of rapid urbanisation 
and inadequate capacity for planning or managing cities is the rise of inequal-
ity, the increasing prevalence of informality, and increased health risks. The 
growth of ‘slums’ is the most tangible manifestation of these issues. In 2014, 
an estimated 56 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s urban population lived in 
informal settlements or other types of slum—that is to say, areas lacking ad-
equate housing and services. The number of households living in slums in sub- 
Saharan Africa has been growing steadily—from an estimated 111 million in 
1995 to 201 million in 2015 (UN-Habitat, 2016).
Secondary cities in Africa face particularly severe challenges. The concept 
of ‘secondary cities’ emerged from the concept of ‘primate cities’ proposed by 
Jefferson (1939). Whereas primate cities are the large cities that dominate the 
economic and political life of their countries, secondary cities are essentially 
non-primate cities, ranging from small cities of about 100,000 people to na-
tional second cities with populations in the millions (Rondinelli, 1983). It has 
recently been recognised that secondary cities play a key role in urbanisation 
processes (for example, Roberts, 2014). Secondary cities generally have weaker 
urban economies than primate cities, and thus ‘suffer from weaker institution-
al and financial bases’, but, simultaneously, ‘rates of demographic growth are 
often higher in secondary compared with primate cities’ (UN-Habitat, 2016, 
172–173). The net result is that secondary cities are typically characterised by 
‘chronic inequality of opportunities, widespread poverty, inadequate capital 
investments in public goods, and lack of pro-poor social programmes’ (UN-
Habitat, 2016, 173). Kisumu in Kenya is a typical example of a secondary city. It 
was founded in 1901 by the British as a railway terminus port (Anyumba, 1995), 
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and now is the third-largest city in Kenya, with a population of about 500,000 
people, compared with more than 3 million people in Kenya’s primate city, 
Nairobi (afd, 2013). As with many African countries, the national economy is 
highly concentrated in the primate city, with few manufacturing activities in 
secondary cities (Otiso, 2005). The smaller revenue base means a smaller and 
less capacitated local government. As is typical of many secondary cities in 
Africa, Kisumu is strongly linked with a specific ethnic identity (Luo), where-
as the primate city of Nairobi is more cosmopolitan. Intersections between 
ethnic identity and political parties have generally meant that parties in op-
position to the national government have generally predominated in Kisumu, 
frequently resulting in conflict, such as was the case during the elections of 
October 2017 (Allison, 2017). All these factors have combined to make urban 
governance challenges in Kisumu particularly complex.
Urban governance is both one of the key challenges facing African cities 
and a potential lever for helping African cities become more equitable, with 
a better quality of life for residents. ‘Governance’ is also a contested concept 
that can mean many things; in the next section, I discuss the concept and what 
seems to be a useful definition.
3 The Concept of Governance
Governance can be defined in various ways. The term governance became 
widely used in the 1990s to refer to the shifting patterns of governing linked 
to the ‘hollowing out’ of the state associated with neo-liberalisation (Rhodes, 
1997; Stoker, 1998). The term governance was seen as signifying ‘a change in the 
meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’ 
(Rhodes, 1997, 652–653). Whereas ‘government’ was seen as being character-
ised by hierarchies and clear separations between state and society (Kjær , 
2011), governance at the local level is seen as being characterised by a blur-
ring of public–private boundaries, the rise of networks, and an increased role 
for actors other than the local government in the attainment of public goals 
(Pierre, 2005).
The term ‘good governance’ became especially linked with the World Bank, 
as a normative ‘development paradigm’ (Obeng-Odoom, 2017). The World 
Bank’s first mention of ‘good governance’ was in the foreword to the 1989 World 
Bank Study Sub-Saharan Africa—from Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World 
Bank, 1989), and the concept was further fleshed out in two subsequent re-
ports, Governance and Development (World Bank, 1992) and Governance, The 
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World Bank’s Experience (World Bank, 1994). The World Bank’s conception of 
governance, which largely focused on efficiency and accountability, has been 
criticised for being ‘a mainly administrative and managerialist interpretation 
of good governance’ (UN-Habitat, 2016, 10), for being too depoliticised, and for 
being associated with elements of neo-liberal ideology, such as the need to 
promote conditions favourable for international businesses (Doornbos, 2001; 
Olivier de Sardan, 2011; Pearce, 2003).
United Nations (UN) agencies also instituted campaigns for good gover-
nance, but with a greater emphasis on democratic practice and human and 
civil rights (UN-Habitat, 2009). undp defined governance more broadly, as ‘the 
mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups ar-
ticulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and 
mediate their differences’ (undp, 1997, 2–3). The two key aspects of this defi-
nition are as follows: ‘Governance as a concept recognizes that power exists 
 inside and outside the formal authority and institutions of government. […] 
Second, governance emphasizes “process”. It recognizes that decisions are 
made based on complex relationships between many actors with different 
priorities’ (UN-Habitat, 2002, 12–13). Building on this, UN-Habitat launched its 
Global Campaign on Urban Governance (Taylor, 2000; UN-Habitat, 2002). UN-
Habitat has defined urban governance as ‘the sum of the many ways individu-
als and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs 
of the city […] It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements’ 
(UN-Habitat, 2002, 14). UN-Habitat’s good urban governance campaign fo-
cused on the outcomes of governance, seeing good urban governance as result-
ing in ensuring that all residents have ‘access to the necessities of urban life, 
including adequate shelter, security of tenure, safe water, sanitation, a clean 
environment, health, education and nutrition, employment and public safety 
and mobility’ (UN-Habitat, 2002, 14).
Many scholars have used the UN conception of governance, or similar defi-
nitions, in an analytical way, to understand actual processes of governing and 
the complex ways in which different governance actors engage with each other 
(through formal and informal processes and in relationships ranging from co-
operation to deep conflict) to make and operationalise decisions (for example, 
Bakker et al., 2008; Smit, 2016). In reality, non-government stakeholders have 
always played a key role in governing, and using governance as an analytical 
concept can help shed light on how decisions are actually made and imple-
mented and can assist in identifying opportunities for intervention. As Koech-
lin (2016, 7) notes, using the concept of governance in this non-normative way 
‘opens up a window to identify and understand complex forms of interaction 
and co-ordination between different actors’.
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One of the key characteristics of using a governance lens is the recognition 
that there is a wide range of actors involved in governance, such as various 
government organisations, civil society organisations—for example, non- 
governmental organisations (ngos) and community groups—and the private 
sector (Devas, 2001). Using a governance lens is essentially about  understanding 
these actors and the relationships between them. Inextricably intertwined with 
these processes are power and politics. Power can be conceived of as  being 
distributed amongst these different actors and ‘exercised from innumerable 
points’ (Foucault, 1998 [1976], 94) by individuals such as planners, policy ana-
lysts and researchers, and politicians (Richardson, 1996). Power is not evenly 
distributed, however, as there are particular ‘centres’ or ‘nodes’ with concentra-
tions of power (Lindell, 2008). These ‘governance nodes’ are groups of decision 
makers where knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilised to manage the 
course of events (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003). As 
Watson (2009) notes, different nodes can have very different ways of viewing 
the world, or ‘conflicting rationalities’, which can make engagement extremely 
difficult. In particular, there is a vast divide between an ‘increasingly infor-
malised and marginalised population and techno-managerial and marketised 
systems of government’ (Watson, 2009, 2272).
These governance nodes impact on cities and towns through a range 
of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ decision-making and regulatory processes.1 As 
 Devas (2004b) notes, informal governance processes are, in practice, often 
more  important than formal governance processes. Closely linked to these 
 governance  processes, of course, is politics; as Rakodi (2001, 216) notes, these 
issues of power, resources, accountability and legitimacy are ‘the stuff of 
politics’.
4 Urban Governance Actors in African Cities
The essence of using a governance lens is recognising that there is a wide range 
of actors involved in urban governance, with very different interests and agen-
das. Below, I discuss the main types of urban governance actors in African cit-
ies: government, traditional leaders, the private sector, international agencies, 
and civil society.
1 As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, formality/informality should be re-
garded as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, but I use the terms to refer to the respective 
ends of the continuum.
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4.1 Government
All levels of government can play an important role in governing urban ar-
eas. Policymaking and the division of national revenue typically occur at a 
national level, and subnational levels of governments (states, provinces, coun-
ties or districts) often also perform key functions. Although the allocation of 
functions between different levels of government can vary enormously from 
country to country, local government bodies generally play a key role in urban 
governance.
Much of Africa did not have a tradition of strong local government in the 
 colonial or early post-independence eras. However, from the 1980s onwards 
there was a shift towards decentralisation in Africa as governments and in-
ternational agencies decided that improved urban management, decentralisa-
tion, and local democracy were interlinked (most notably, in the World Bank’s 
‘good governance’ agenda). The implementation of decentralisation in Africa 
has, however, been very uneven and partial, and has in some cases been re-
versed (Andrews and Schroeder, 2003; Smit and Pieterse, 2014; UN-Habitat, 
2008). Although there are potentially advantages to decentralisation if it is 
undertaken carefully (with capacity development and resource allocation ac-
companying the transferral of responsibilities to lower levels of government), 
it has been argued by some scholars that the rushed and partial decentralisa-
tion of public authority in Africa has often resulted in local governments that 
are ‘weak, disorganized, inadequately trained and staffed, and often underre-
sourced relative to the new range of responsibilities they are expected to take 
on’ (Meagher, 2011, 51). In addition, the role of local government is often further 
complicated by the key position it plays in the patronage system of political 
parties (Obeng-Odoom, 2017) and by the widespread phenomenon of African 
cities often being the bases of political parties in opposition to national gov-
ernments led by parties with a largely rural support base (Resnick, 2011).
Simultaneously with increased decentralisation (and also linked to the ‘good 
governance’ agenda of the World Bank), there has been a shift in recent de-
cades in the way local governments in Africa operate, towards privatisation and 
partnerships (Myers, 2005; Nunan and Satterthwaite, 2001; Olivier de Sardan, 
2011). Privatisation of service delivery often disadvantages the urban poor, who 
are unable to pay for adequate levels of service provision. This is exacerbated 
by local governments usually having ‘inherited a collection of repressive by-
laws, and planning and building standards, which are unsuited to the needs 
and ability to pay of the poor’ (Devas, 2001, 404).
The case of Kisumu reflects the typical complexity found in urban gover-
nance in Africa. Kisumu Municipal Council used to be a relatively autono-
mous local government body, located within Nyanza Province. Subsequent to 
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the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, there was major restructuring of subnation-
al gov ernment in Kenya, resulting in counties becoming the main subnational 
level of government. There is still a municipal administration (Kisumu City), 
but although it is meant to have a Municipal Board (according to the 2011 
 Urban Areas and Cities Act) the Governor of Kisumu County has not offi-
cially established this board (as is generally also the case in other counties in 
Kenya). Kisumu City essentially functions as an agency of Kisumu County, with 
all Kisumu City officials employed by Kisumu County. There are also a number 
of independent agencies that operate in the area, such as the Kisumu Water 
and Sewerage Company (kiwasco). In addition, many national ministries 
also play a direct role in Kisumu; for example, the National Ministry of Land 
and Housing allocates land within the city area.
Closely intertwined with these various levels of government are political 
parties. Although there has been a rapid spread of multiparty democracy in 
Africa in recent decades, the political landscape tends to be dominated by cli-
entelist political parties (i.e. those which focus on providing benefits to their 
constituents), which analysis suggests are less likely to improve the quality of 
public services than are programmatic political parties (parties with coher-
ent and consistent positions on policy issues) (World Bank, 2017). As is very 
common in African cities, Kisumu is (and has almost always been since in-
dependence) the base of a political party in opposition to the ruling party at 
the national level—the Orange Democratic Movement (odm) party, which 
became part of the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (cord). Members 
of this party hold most elected positions in the Kisumu area, including that 
of county governor and those of members of parliament and members of the 
county assembly. There has been frequent violent political conflict in Kisumu, 
most notably the violence following the 2007 General Election (for example, 
see Harneit-Sievers and Peters, 2008).
4.2 Traditional Leaders
A typical characteristic of urban governance in Africa is that traditional leaders 
often play an important role in governance—for example, with regard to land 
allocation in peri-urban areas. Traditional leaders can be more accessible to 
residents than elected politicians are, although they can also be ‘unresponsive, 
corrupt and interested mainly in maintaining power and patronage’ (Devas, 
2004a, 118). Olivier de Sardan (2011) notes that their only real accountability is 
to higher levels of government.
In Kisumu, outside of the historical core of the city, traditional leaders play 
an officially recognised role in governance. ‘Locations’ are headed by Chiefs, 
‘sub-locations’ are headed by Assistant Chiefs and ‘sub-units’ are headed by 
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one or two village elders (Omedo et al., 2014). Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs and vil-
lage elders all play an important role in the governance of Kisumu—for ex-
ample, in government health-promotion campaigns (Omedo et al., 2014).
4.3 Private Sector
Large private sector organisations, such as property development or food pro-
duction companies, can play an important role in urban governance in African 
cities. In some cases, ‘their actions can be damaging to the poor, forcing them 
off land they occupy and preventing informal traders from operating’ (Devas, 
2001, 400). Informal business organisations can also play an important role 
in urban governance, governing marketplaces for example, but they usually 
have less influence on government decision-making than do big, private sector 
companies (Brown et al., 2010). For example, a study of informal business or-
ganisations in Nigeria highlights their limitations in affecting formal decision-
making, noting that ‘small entrepreneurs pay their local government taxes and 
even some state-level taxes, but they continue to receive little in the way of 
basic services in return’ (Meagher, 2011, 68).
In Kisumu, big property development companies are playing a major role 
in the urban transformation of the city, through investment in a number of 
large development projects, mainly shopping malls. One company, which is 
investing in a mixed-use project linked to a shopping mall, has the stated ambi-
tion of turning Kisumu into another Dubai, for the East Africa region (Matete, 
2016). The Chamber of Commerce also plays a prominent role in Kisumu, lead-
ing, for example, attempts to relocate street traders away from the main shop-
ping street of the city. Informal trader organisations play an important role in 
managing all the marketplaces in Kisumu (for example, by ensuring that these 
markets are cleaned).
4.4 International Agencies
Multilateral agencies, development banks, and international donor agencies 
play a large and important role in African cities. Most global aid and loans to 
Africa are linked to the ‘good governance’ agenda and the promotion of decen-
tralisation and democratisation (Dietrich and Wright, 2015). In Kisumu, the 
World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement (afd) are particu-
larly active funders and have invested vast amounts in infrastructure, including 
in the new motorway system that encircles the city. Particularly notable is the 
Integrated Strategic Urban Development Plan (ISUD-Plan), which is funded 
by afd and has a budget of 40 million euros. It seeks to prepare for the city’s 
future through a range of strategies, including planning Kisumu’s expansion, 
upgrading informal settlements, refurbishing and building new markets, and 
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by developing strategies for capital investment in the city (afd, 2013). There 
are also a number of international ngos active in Kisumu on a range of issues, 
such as Plan International (which works on children’s rights).
4.5 Civil Society
There is a vast range of civil society associations who, in practice, play a key 
role in urban governance in Africa. These include ethnicity-based networks, 
home-town associations, youth associations, savings groups, and funeral 
groups ( Devas, 2001; Olivier de Sardan, 2011; Tostensen et al., 2001). These 
 organisations often, in practice, perform roles undertaken by the state in  cities 
in the global North, such as providing basic services, allocating land, ensuring 
safety, providing social security nets, and so on. In addition, many Western-
style community associations have been set up by international development 
agencies, often with a focus on ‘wells, grain mills, credit, seeds, market garden-
ing, etc.’ ( Olivier de Sardan, 2011, 25). Various types of religious associations 
(for example, charismatic movements and Islamic brotherhoods) also play 
an important role in urban governance in Africa, particularly with regards to 
humanitarian interventions such as providing food (Olivier de Sardan, 2011). 
ngos can also be important ‘in enabling communities to organize and articu-
late demands’ (Devas, 2001, 401).
As is the case with most African cities, Kisumu has a large number of civil 
society organisations, most of which belong to a federation called the Civil 
Society Organisation Network. There is a particular concentration of ngos in 
Kisumu, with an estimated 900 based in the city—this figure includes a num-
ber of international ngos, but mainly consists of local organisations (Prince, 
2013). There are a large number of hiv/aids organisations with offices in Kisu-
mu, as the surrounding region has an hiv prevalence rate that is double the 
national average (Camlin et al., 2013).
5 The Objects of Governance
Governance does not occur for its own sake; there are particular objects, tan-
gible or intangible, that are governed. Governance can be considered as ‘col-
lective practices addressing societal problems’ (Förster, 2016, 211). In an urban 
context these ‘problems’ are the collective issues that have always impacted on 
the lives of residents whenever large groups of people live in close proximity 
to each other, and include how to govern who can do what where, how to en-
sure access to water and sanitation and solid waste disposal, and how to ensure 
there is a well-functioning transport system. The most basic object of urban 
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governance is land allocation and land use management, which essentially is 
about who can do what where. The second most basic object of urban gover-
nance is the provision and management of basic infrastructure/services, such 
as water, sanitation, and waste management. A third key object of governance 
can be considered as the movement/accessibility system, which is essentially 
about how people and goods can get around from one part of the settlement 
to another—at its most basic, this will consist of footpaths and roads, while 
at a higher level there would be buses, trains, and so on. In most settlements 
there are formal or informal organisations that attempt to govern these issues; 
for example, in informal settlements there are typically residents’ associations 
that allocate land and ensure some basic level of service provision and mainte-
nance of footpaths (Smit, 2006).
Beyond these basic and widespread objects of urban governance, found in 
most contexts, there are also many other possible objects of urban governance, 
such as ensuring good health and well-being, ensuring safety from crime and 
violence, disaster risk management, education, social/cultural development, 
economic development, environmental management, and so on. In this chap-
ter, I discuss the three basic objects of urban governance, and also look at food 
safety as an example of another object of urban governance.
5.1 Land Use Management
African countries generally have multiple land administration systems: formal 
systems of deed registries with freehold and leasehold title; officially recognised 
customary tenure systems; and informal, extra-legal tenure in informal settle-
ments. Areas with formal tenure generally have zoning schemes and building 
regulations enforced by the state, whereas these are generally not enforced in 
customary or informal tenure areas. African cities are often characterised by 
‘unregulated peri-urban land development’ (Kombe, 2005, 113). The ability of 
local government to control such sprawl is often limited by peri-urban areas 
being in customary ownership and under the authority of traditional leaders 
(for example, Gough, 1999).
A major land use management issue in many African cities is urban agricul-
ture. While some scholars see urban agriculture as having an important role to 
play in poverty reduction and food security (e.g. Lee-Smith, 2010), most African 
national and local governments are intolerant of urban agriculture, seeing it 
as incompatible with their ‘modernist’ visions of what cities should look like 
(Kuusaana and Eledi, 2015; Simatele and Binns, 2008; Tong, 2010), viewing it as 
a rural activity ‘whose practice within the city boundaries is inappropriate and 
detracts from the modern image of the city’ (Simatele and Binns, 2008, 2). In 
African cities experiencing steep economic decline, however, there has been 
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a rapid increase in levels of participation in urban agriculture, and organisa-
tions of urban farmers can play an important role in promoting and support-
ing urban agriculture (Schmidt et al., 2015). In Dar es Salaam for example, the 
activities of urban farmers’ associations include ‘joint production on commu-
nally held property and serving as a loan or finance agency for their members’ 
(Schmidt et al., 2015, 158).
Another important aspect of land use management is the governance of 
retail, which essentially is about who can sell what where (and when). Much 
of the retail sector in most African cities can be classified as being at the ‘in-
formal’ end of the formality/informality continuum. There are usually a wide 
variety of different types of informal food retail outlets, such as large, tradi-
tional marketplaces (which might have thousands of traders), various types of 
informal shops and kiosks, and street traders. Urban governance can impact 
on informal traders in various ways, including through processes for allocating 
trading space and through the provision of infrastructure and services, such as 
water, electricity and refuse removal.
Marketplaces are a particularly important element of urban food systems 
in Africa and are an important site of urban governance. Market associations 
generally play an important role in managing marketplaces in Africa (King, 
2006; Lyon, 2003; Porter et al., 2007). In Maputo, for example, ‘the market com-
mittees provide infrastructure (water, toilets, etc.), maintenance and security 
services, and organise cleaning in their respective markets […] The commit-
tees also act as the principal regulators in the markets’ (Lindell, 2008, 1889). 
Trader associations govern marketplaces using a range of techniques—such 
as surveillance, peer pressure and control of physical space (Lyon, 2003)—and 
can sometimes also influence the plans of local government (King, 2006). Lo-
cal governments also usually play a role in managing marketplaces, partially 
because trader fees can be a significant source of local government revenue 
(King, 2006). As most local governments lack adequate power to plan, regulate 
and provide infrastructure and services, this role is often limited to collecting 
fees (Meagher, 2011). Whereas traders in marketplaces have some protection 
as a result of the large number of traders and some form of official recogni-
tion, street traders are much more vulnerable. There are frequently waves of 
evictions of street traders to ‘clear the streets’—for example, when there is a 
change of political power or when a major event is about to take place (Devas, 
2001; Hansen, 2004; King, 2006).
Over time, the nature of food retail in African cities has been changing, with 
increased growth in ‘formal’ retail outlets. In the past two decades there has 
been rapid growth in supermarkets in Africa, with largely negative impacts on 
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the food security of the urban poor (Crush and Frayne, 2011; Reardon et al., 
2003, 2004, 2007; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). For example, between 
1995 and 2012, Shoprite Checkers, a South African supermarket chain, opened 
131 supermarkets in 16 different African countries outside of South Africa (Bat-
tersby and Peyton, 2014). Currently, the roll-out of supermarkets is being driv-
en by the private sector; Crush and Frayne (2011, 806) note that there is an 
‘absence of regulatory controls on supermarket expansion in urban markets’ 
in Africa (for example, as to where they are located, how big they are, whether 
they are accessible to pedestrians, whether they offer trading space for infor-
mal traders, and so on).
Kisumu is typical of African cities in that it has a low-density, ‘formal’ histor-
ic core (mainly consisting of land leased from the state on 99-year leaseholds), 
where building and regulations are quite tightly enforced, surrounded by a 
zone of dense, informal areas (many of which are been upgraded) and ‘ances-
tral land’ areas (now technically under freehold ownership) where planning 
and building regulations are much less enforced (Anyumba, 1995). Kisumu is 
also typical of state views of urban agriculture in African cities. An estimated 
50 per cent of Kisumu’s residents are engaged in urban/peri-urban agriculture, 
even though it was, until recently, technically illegal in terms of public health 
and water legislation. With the introduction of the Urban Areas and Cities Act 
of 2011 urban agriculture became legal. In terms of retail, Kisumu has 30 mar-
ketplaces, with Kibuye market being the biggest. Kisumu City collects fees from 
these traders on a daily or monthly basis—at the Jubilee Market, for example, 
the fee is 30 Kenyan Shillings per day for traders outside the market (collected 
every day) and 350–600 Kenyan Shillings per month for stalls inside the market 
(paid monthly to the City)—but provides little in return. Market associations 
play an important role in managing marketplaces. In some markets, such as 
Jubilee market, traders’ associations collect additional fees to provide services, 
including sanitation and cleaning. A number of markets are scheduled for re-
development (through the provision of new multi-storey buildings) as part of 
the Kisumu Urban Project, but all these projects have been delayed. In Kisumu, 
street traders are in a precarious position. For example, the street traders who 
occupy the pavements of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Avenue (the main street of 
Kisumu) are constantly at risk of being relocated due to perceptions that they 
obstruct the pavements and negatively impact on formal businesses along the 
street. In the past two decades the number of supermarkets in Kisumu has 
grown to 20, many of them the anchor tenants of shopping malls. There has 
been virtually no local government control over the location/design of super-
markets or what they sell.
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5.2 Provision and Management of Basic Infrastructure/Services
Providing basic services such as water, sanitation and waste management is 
usually a key purpose of urban governance. In most cases, this is the main of-
ficial role of local government, but in general only a small proportion of Afri-
can urban residents are served by state-provided services—as noted earlier, 
56 per cent of Africa’s urban population live in unserviced areas (UN-Habitat. 
2016), and even many serviced areas have stand-alone infrastructure such as 
vip toilets and boreholes rather than networked infrastructure. This gap in in-
frastructure provision has (partially) been filled by the provision of services in 
particular areas by community groups and ngos.
Kisumu reflects the typical complexity of service provision in African cities, 
particularly water provision. The Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (ki-
wasco) is a privatised utility company that was set up in 2003 to replace the 
water and sewerage department of the former Kisumu Municipal Council. It is 
supervised by Lake Victoria South Water Services Board, one of seven regional 
water boards in Kenya. As the formal water and sewerage network was limited 
to only the area of the former colonial town, in order to roll out water provision 
to peri-urban areas kiwasco has relied upon a network of subcontractors who 
in turn sell water to connected customers and to water kiosk operators, the lat-
ter selling on to unconnected customers (Schwartz and Sanga, 2010). Although 
this approach has been successful in extending the provision of water supply, 
the net result is a very uneven pattern of access to water, with the extent of 
piped, private connections and yard taps ranging from 97.6 per cent of house-
holds in a high-income area (Milimani) to only 2.8 per cent in Migosi Estate 
(Wagah et al., 2010).
Solid waste management is a particular area of concern, with the Kachok 
dumpsite in the centre of Kisumu unable to cope with all the waste generated 
(Munala and Moirongo, 2011; Sibanda et al., 2017). City officials estimate that 
only between 20 per cent and 35 per cent of solid waste is collected (either 
directly by the City or by private collectors who sell their services to compa-
nies and institutions), leaving about 65–80 per cent (of which most is organic 
waste) uncollected (Sibanda et al., 2017). There are a number of informal waste 
pickers in Kisumu, who play an important role in the recycling of waste.
A number of ngos and community groups are actively involved in the pro-
vision of water, sanitation, energy and solid waste management (e.g. Practical 
Action and sana International), but these are generally small, ad hoc projects.
5.3 Urban Transport Systems
The key elements of urban transport systems are the provision and mainte-
nance of roads, managing traffic, and ensuring the roadworthiness of  vehicles. 
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In general, urban transport infrastructure in African cities is inadequate. 
A study of 14 cities in Africa found that ‘to a greater or lesser extent in each of 
the cities, the networks of paved roads and associated traffic control facilities 
are deficient’ (Kumar and Barrett, 2008, 37). The stock of vehicles is also largely 
inadequate: ‘widespread dilapidation is apparent, as basic safety standards 
with regard to lighting, tires, and brakes are openly flouted. Systems and proce-
dures for routine vehicle inspections are clearly failing, while petty corruption 
among police officers means that no action is taken on the road’ (Kumar and 
Barrett, 2008, 37). The net result is that many African cities are choked with 
traffic congestion.
Kisumu used to be a rail centre and important harbour, but now its main 
transport links are roads. A number of agencies are involved in providing and 
maintaining roads in Kisumu (Kenya National Highways Authority, Kenya Ur-
ban Roads Authority, Kenya Rural Roads Authority, etc.), with lots of overlap 
and duplication. It is estimated that only about 30 per cent of the existing road 
network is being maintained. Although not very pedestrian friendly, Kisumu’s 
transport system generally works well, with a wide range of affordable trans-
port options, such as minibus taxis, tuk-tuks, boda-bodas (motorcycle taxis) 
and bicycle taxis. A Bus Rapid Transit (brt) system is planned for Kisumu, 
even though evidence suggests that brt systems are only feasible in larger 
 cities (Hidalgo and Gutiérrez, 2013).
5.4 Food Safety
The main determinants of food safety are ‘the procedures and standards 
and regulations (or lack of) for food production, processing, and packaging’ 
( Ericksen, 2008, 240). Many food-safety regulations need to be enforced at a 
national level, but at the city scale there needs to be local-level enforcement— 
for example, in the form of regular visits by health inspectors. While regu-
lating and enforcing food production, processing, distribution and retail in 
the formal sector can be relatively straightforward if there is sufficient ca-
pacity in place, addressing food safety in the informal sector is probably the 
main  food-safety challenge faced at the local level (Cambaza dos Muchangos 
et al., 2015).
Street foods are a particular concern. Numerous studies have confirmed 
that street food can have a high risk of contamination (for example, Roesel 
and Grace, 2015). Typical issues include inadequate access to water and sanita-
tion, inadequate refuse removal, and exposure to flies, which can all result in 
the contamination of food.
Some, but not all, local governments are involved in enforcing standards 
of hygiene amongst informal traders (Muyanja et al., 2011). Even where local 
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 government does attempt to enforce health standards, this enforcement is 
often only partial. For example, in Abeokuta, Nigeria, food vendors are required 
to obtain an annual certificate from health authorities, but a survey found that 
only 31 per cent of vendors had these (Omemu and Aderoju, 2008).
The Kisumu City Health Department is meant to ensure food safety, but is 
understaffed (they say they ideally need 30 health inspectors, but only have 14). 
The department runs a clinic for food handlers, carrying out screening and 
vaccinations for typhoid, hepatitis B and TB. The health inspectors check ‘hot 
spots’ once per week, but there is a lack of equipment with which to undertake 
proper tests (such as testing milk).
6 Conclusion
The net result of the wide range of governance actors with very different 
 agendas found in urban governance processes in Africa is that, as Lindell 
(2008, 1896) notes with regard to the governance of marketplaces in  Maputo, 
‘ governance appears to lack any semblance of coherence and to be frag-
mented, disjointed and split by deep antagonisms. The key actors continu-
ously challenge each other’s legitimacy to “govern”’. The governance of most 
issues is characterised by fragmentation and a lack of coordination between 
 governance actors; in the case of government actors, the ability to enforce reg-
ulations is usually quite limited. Skills and resources seem to be more thinly 
spread and diffused than is the case than in the global North, meaning that one 
or two urban governance actors acting in isolation on their own are seldom 
able to address many key urban challenges. As a result, key problems such as 
inadequate infrastructure in marketplaces, traffic congestion and inadequate 
waste disposal systems are not addressed, and the problems persist and grow 
over time.
Although this diversity of actors can be seen as a problem, it can, however, 
also be seen as an opportunity for mobilising additional skills and resources 
with which to address challenges in African cities. Following this view, there 
have been repeated calls for collaborative governance—bringing ‘multiple 
stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in 
consensus-orientated decision-making’ (Ansell and Gash, 2008, 543)—and for 
the ‘co-production’ of contextually appropriate projects and policies by a range 
of urban governance actors (Polk, 2015). In the words of Harrison (2006, 320), 
we need to recognise the existence of multiple rationalities and search for ‘the 
in-between spaces, the interstices, where different conceptions of the city, 
and of planning and rationality, have intermingled and have produced hybrid 
 logics and practices’.
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There have been some attempts at this in Kisumu, initially through the multi-
stakeholder Kisumu Action Team (kat). kat initially only represented a nar-
row range of interests, but subsequently included broader  representation—for 
example, of the informal traders in Kisumu (Onyango and Obera, 2015). kat 
used ‘interdisciplinary, cross-sector and policy approaches […] to solve some 
of the urban planning and development issues in the city, drawing on inputs 
from various stakeholders’ (Onyango and Obera, 2015, 93). This was a conflict-
ridden process, but resulted in the raising of substantial funds for an ambitious 
range of physical upgrading projects in Kisumu, such as the  redevelopment 
of the marketplaces. kat then transformed into the Kisumu Local Interac-
tion Platform (klip), a consortium of Kisumu City, Kisumu County, the Civil 
Society Coalition, the Chamber of Commerce and the two local universities 
(Maseno University and the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University of Science 
and Technology) that undertakes collaborative research and implementation 
to develop Kisumu (Polk, 2016). In this way, the limited skills and resources 
available for dealing with urban problems in a secondary city like Kisumu have 
been pooled together and used to leverage more resources, and different inter-
ests have been brought together to develop strategies that are more holistic, 
inclusive and sustainable.
Access to information and data is crucial for effective collaborative gover-
nance. Although many governments are wary of making data accessible to 
the public (World Bank, 2017), this is an essential precondition for civil soci-
ety and other stakeholders to engage with government bodies in collaborative 
governance.
In order to be able to collaboratively design and implement interventions 
to improve the quality of life of urban residents, we need to better understand 
existing, complex urban governance processes and the competing interests of 
urban governance actors. Through establishing multi-stakeholder forums such 
as kat and klip, and through ensuring that all stakeholders have access to 
information and relevant data, different interest groups can be brought togeth-
er to successfully collaborate on planning for and managing cities, and more 
appropriate local strategies and projects can be developed and implemented. 
Collaborative governance can be messy and conflictual, but only through fa-
cilitating engagement and collaboration between different urban governance 
actors can urban challenges in Africa be effectively addressed.
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Chapter 4
Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives 
on Co-optation, Control and Camouflage in 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda
Claudia Baez Camargo and Lucy Koechlin
Abstract
This article applies a novel conceptual framework to characterise and assess the 
 repertoire of practices used by informal networks to redistribute power and access to 
resources. These distinct norms and practices are typologised as co-optation, control, 
and camouflage. Co-optation involves recruitment into the network by means of the 
reciprocal exchange of favours. Control is about ensuring discipline amongst network 
members by means of shaming and social isolation. Camouflage refers to the formal 
facades behind which informality hides and is about protecting and legitimising the 
network. All three are relevant to a more fine-grained understanding of corruption 
and its underpinnings. Findings from our comparative research in three East African 
countries (Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) suggest that these informal practices are 
relevant to an understanding of the choices and attitudes of providers and users of 
public services at the local level. Adopting this analytical lens helps to explain the 
limited impact of conventional anti-corruption prescriptions and provides a basis to 
develop alternative strategies that harness the potential of social network dynamics to 
promote positive anti-corruption outcomes.
1 Introduction
The literature dealing with corruption has typically based its analysis on a 
principal–agent model of decision-making, which assumes corruption hap-
pens as the result of flawed incentives on the part of the agent and weak moni-
toring capacity of the principal (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Policy 
solutions based on this conceptualisation prescribe measures such as a tougher 
criminalisation of corruption and stronger monitoring mechanisms in the pub-
lic sector. The lack of success of conventional anti-corruption measures in many 
countries, including in sub-Saharan Africa, has subsequently led other schol-
ars to conceptualise corruption as a collective action problem (Persson et al., 
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2013; Marquette and Peiffer, 2015), which although providing a  compelling 
framework to explain the unyielding persistence of high levels of corruption 
has nonetheless failed to provide alternative policy solutions. While the con-
ceptual debate on this topic continues (Heywood, 2017; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017), 
a growing consensus points to the need to collect empirical evidence in order 
to better understand the practices underpinning corruption, which evidently 
persist despite structural and institutional reform (Baez- Camargo and Passas, 
2017).
Regarding African countries, the lack of a context-sensitive approach to 
anti-corruption measures is not due to a lack of data. In fact, a vast body of 
 literature on Africa has illustrated extensively particular features character-
ising African political regimes (Bayart, 1993; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999) as well as particular social norms and practices among 
citizens that in one way or the other are associated with the prevalence of high 
levels of corruption (Hyden, 1980; Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan, 2006). It would therefore be useful to work towards developing bet-
ter systematic approaches linking the evidence on local drivers of corruption 
to the wider debate on anti-corruption. Such approaches should avoid a purely 
relativistic perspective while ensuring that generalizable dimensions are well 
specified and allow for contextual variation.
Relevant questions to be asked include: How are the decisions and practices 
of key national and subnational actors shaped? What are the practices that 
individuals find useful in addressing their problems and needs? What are the 
networks linking up different actors, and how are they articulated? How do 
these networks and their practices underpin corruption?
In this chapter we present empirical evidence1 aimed at identifying those 
practices and norms that inform the agency of local actors, whether they be 
political and business elites, bureaucrats and providers of public services, or 
citizens, in three East African countries: Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
1 Empirical evidence presented in this paper stems from the findings from two research proj-
ects of the Basel Institute’s Public Governance Division. The first project, entitled ‘Informal 
Governance and Corruption—Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action Para-
digms’, is funded by the joint UK Department for International Development (dfid) and 
British Academy Anti-Corruption Evidence (ace) programme. For more information about 
the ace programme and the project please visit http://www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption 
and http://www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660. The second project is entitled ‘Corruption, So-
cial Norms and Behaviours in East Africa’ and is funded by the East Africa Research Fund 
(earf) of dfid. For more information about earf and the project please visit http://www 
.earesearchfund.org/ and http://www.earesearchfund.org/research-corruption-social-norms 
-and-behaviors-east-africa (accessed on 2 May 2018).
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In the analysis of the empirical evidence from the case study countries we 
favour an approach to the characterisation of local governance processes that 
moves attention away from conventional categories and dichotomies (such as 
state vs. non-state actors, public vs. private, or sector-based assessments), shift-
ing our analytical attention to the socially grounded practices that transcend 
the public sector.2 That notwithstanding, we make use of the term ‘informal 
governance’ because, although it reproduces dichotomies that are empirically 
and conceptually debatable, it connects closely to the manner in which cor-
ruption is problematised among international development practitioners, who 
constitute a key audience for our research. In this sense, our use of ‘ informal’ 
does not imply a fundamental divide between different spheres, but signifies 
the wide and contingent range of repertoires that actors have at their disposal, 
which transcend and straddle essentialist distinctions between ‘the public’ 
and ‘the private’.
In this chapter, we build on the evidence emerging from the ongoing re-
search projects, discussing data collected from focus group discussions (fgds) 
and interviews conducted across the three countries—namely, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Rwanda.3 The data strongly indicates the importance of social 
networks linking up actors that shape and are shaped by particular patterns of 
informal governance. Thus, social networks emerged inductively as heuristic 
entry points for a better understanding of prevalent practices and norms as 
well as lines of inclusion and exclusion of actors.4 Throughout the chapter we 
pay particular attention to the role of social networks as articulations through 
which social norms are enacted and reiterated. Through this analytical lens 
2 For a discussion of a non-normative, inductive approach to governance see Blundo and Le 
Meur (2008), Bevir (2013) or Koechlin (2015).
3 The projects used qualitative data collection methods with the support of a team of local 
researchers. The data presented in this paper was collected during research activities con-
ducted between January 2016 and August 2017, activities that involved focus group discus-
sions (fgds) at two sites (one urban and one rural area) in each country. In the fgds we used 
the health sector as an indicative entry point to study the interface where corruption risks 
arise. The participant profiles of the focus groups were a) community members, b) providers 
of health services, and c) managers of health facilities. A total of 18 fgds were conducted. 
The local researchers are Prof. Tharcisse Gatwa and Mr Abel Dufitumukiza of the Protestant 
University of Rwanda, Dr Richard Sambaiga and Mr Egidius Kamanyi of the University of Dar 
es Salaam, Prof. Paul Bukuluki of Makerere University and Mr Robert Lugolobi, independent 
anti-corruption consultant in Uganda.
4 The concept of social networks is sociologically highly loaded—for a critique of social net-
work analysis see (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994); for the seminal contribution to the actor–
network approach see (Latour, 2005). Here, the significance of social networks as a frame of 
reference emerged inductively from the data, and still needs to be theorised adequately, al-
though our interpretations are closer to the constructivist approach of actor–network theory.
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we seek to gain a better understanding of ‘real’ governance processes5 and the 
ways in which they underpin or reproduce corruption.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides general background 
information about the prevailing conditions across the three countries with 
regard to the fight against corruption. Section 3 outlines the conceptual ap-
proach used for uncovering locally determined drivers of corruption and the 
general traits characterising social networks in the three countries. Next, we 
describe how networks utilise the practices of co-optation (Section 4), control 
(Section 5) and camouflage (Section 6). Finally, in Section 7 we reflect on the 
implications of our findings.
2 Background Information on Corruption in Rwanda,  
Tanzania and Uganda
East Africa presents excellent opportunities to explore what may be impor-
tant factors impinging on the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Regional 
trends point to sharp differences in performance that are reflected in the three 
cases included in our research.
At one extreme, Uganda represents a modal pattern in the region, involv-
ing endemic corruption in spite of extensive reforms and anti-corruption in-
terventions implemented by the government of President Yoweri Museveni. 
Instances of bribery, favouritism, absenteeism and gift-giving are widespread, 
with significant negative impacts on the provision of basic public services. The 
situation is confirmed by research findings in which Ugandan participants cor-
roborate the perception that corruption is rampant and has become a nor-
malised feature of daily life.
In Rwanda, the government led by President Paul Kagame is considered to 
have achieved significant success in controlling corruption by means of radical 
public sector reform, enforcement of traditional accountability mechanisms, 
and the introduction of locally designed governance tools (Golooba-Mutebi 
and Booth, 2013; Bozzini, 2014). Strong political commitment is operationalised 
in a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to corruption based on harsh punishments and 
their strict enforcement, coupled with mass campaigns sensitising the public 
about the value of anti-corruption measures and integrity, which have resulted 
in Rwanda being categorised among the least corrupt countries in Africa.
In the case of Tanzania, high levels of corruption have pervaded all aspects 
of public administration for decades, becoming a constant feature in the 
5 See Olivier de Sardan (2008), who coined the expression ‘real’ governance.
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 experience of citizens in their interactions with the state, especially when it 
comes to the delivery of public services. However, since the 2015 election, the 
government led by President John Magufuli has vowed to renew anti-corruption 
efforts, and has taken significantly bold actions to punish and prevent illicit 
behaviours. Although some of the measures undertaken by the current admin-
istration have generated national and international criticism on the grounds 
of being perceived as detrimental to essential democratic rights and civil lib-
erties, it is nonetheless remarkable that President Magufuli’s promise to fight 
corruption has received overwhelming support from Tanzanian citizens.6
These three distinct anti-corruption outcomes are consistent with the re-
cent East African Bribery Index (eabi), which found that 81 per cent of re-
spondents in Uganda describe the level of corruption in their country as high, 
whereas in Tanzania 44 per cent of respondents describe levels of corruption in 
their country as medium. A majority of Rwandan respondents—61 per cent— 
describe corruption in their country as low. Furthermore, the eabi also indi-
cates that Ugandans share a grim assessment of past and future performance, 
as 59 per cent of respondents believe that corruption has increased in com-
parison to the previous year and will continue to increase during the following 
12 months. In contrast, a positive outlook was shared among a majority of Tan-
zanian and Rwandan respondents (70 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively), 
who believe that corruption has decreased in comparison to the previous year 
and will continue to decrease in the subsequent 12 months (70 per cent of re-
spondents in each country) (Transparency International, 2017).
3 Conceptual Approach to Social Networks: Solidarity,  
Lock-in and Protection
Research findings from the three countries confirm a vast body of literature 
regarding the role of social networks in East Africa and beyond: strong person-
al connections constitute an effective mechanism with which to pool scarce 
 resources and provide access to goods, services, resources and even career 
 opportunities in contexts of resource scarcity and weak state performance 
(Jauregui, 2014; Ruud, 2000; Chang et al., 2001; Grodeland et al., 1998; Ledeneva, 
6 A citizens’ assessment and expectations survey published in September 2016 reported that 
‘96 per cent of Tanzanians approve or strongly approve of President Magufuli’s performance 
since taking office’ (Twaweza East Africa, 2016). Numerous local and international media 
have also reported on the popularity of President Magufuli. See for example the bbc’s profile 
of the president (Nesoba, 2015) and the New African’s analysis of ‘John Magufuli: Tanzania’s 
rising star’ (New African Magazine, 2017).
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1997; Sneath, 2002). The findings concerning social networks deserve to be fur-
ther emphasised in the context of the present chapter because they provide 
valuable insights about local social practices that are linked to the prevalence 
of corruption but are nevertheless not normally taken into consideration in 
conventional anti-corruption programming.
Whereas it is clear that individuals belong to multiple, overlapping net-
works anywhere, the type of networks that are most relevant for this research 
are those to which the individual feels bound by obligations that are enforced 
and sanctioned by stringent social controls. Such networks are the social 
equivalent of what political science refers to as the leader’s ‘winning coali-
tion’ (Mesquita et al., 2005), meaning those constituencies whose support is 
most essential for maintaining support and legitimacy in the case of the po-
litical leader, and status and social recognition within the community in the 
case of the individual. They are the core networks, or reference groups (Koni- 
Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, 2017), in which strict social norms are enforced 
and the individuals feel obliged to satisfy the expectations of the group.
Indeed, our data shows how informal social networks generate strong moral 
imperatives, including a sense of obligation to provide mutual assistance and 
reciprocity for favours given, which go above and beyond any respect for the 
formal legal framework. Individuals are thus expected to share with their next 
of kin, who in turn feel strongly entitled to a share of the wealth. Obligations 
vis-à-vis networks outside the family are based on strong norms of reciproc-
ity. Thus, social networks rely on a transactional logic characterised by the 
exchange of a gift and then a counter-gift, sequentially. These imperatives 
translate, in practice, in that an individual who has a position in the public sec-
tor has the duty to utilise that position for the benefit of his or her network and 
that the economy of favours penetrates the public arena at the point of service 
provision in the form of practices of bribing, gift-giving and favouritism.
Significantly, the research suggests that inclusion criteria for entry into the 
core networks may be fluid and instrumentally constructed. This means that 
networks are sometimes expanded in a deliberate manner to link up individu-
als increasingly far removed from each other on the basis of pragmatic con-
siderations. As one Tanzanian research participant remarked, ‘when you have 
a problem and you do not have people to help you with it, then you go ahead 
and build the network to the person who can help you’. Thus, we find that the 
size of the core networks varies considerably across the three cases and this 
variation appears to be related to state effectiveness in terms of accessibility to 
essential public services and enforcement of the rule of law.
Thus, the research findings suggest that extensive social networks are more 
prevalent in Uganda and Tanzania, where formal rights and entitlements are 
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seen as having little bearing on the actual provision of essential services such 
as healthcare and where there is a perception that law enforcement is weak. 
Contrarily, core networks appear to be much smaller in Rwanda, where the 
perception is that services are provided according to the formal legal stipula-
tions and that detection of corrupt actions is effective and followed by sanc-
tion enforcement.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter we zoom into the practices of the 
social networks in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda through the analytical lens 
of three distinct patterns of governance practices, which we have previously 
identified (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva, 2017) and by means of which politi-
cal, business and social networks pursue their goals, whether these be to stay 
in power, maximise financial gains, access resources and services or simply ‘get 
things done’. In this chapter we discuss these informal practices—which we 
have termed co-optation, control and camouflage—and argue that they are 
associated with high levels of corruption because they ultimately enact an in-
formal redistribution of power and resources.
– Co-optation is associated with recruitment or strategic appointments into 
public office of allies and potential adversaries, who are granted impunity 
in exploiting the power and resources associated with public office in ex-
change for mobilising support and maintaining loyalty to the regime.
– Control mechanisms are instrumental to the management of clashes of hid-
den interests, to ensuring elite cohesion and to enforcing discipline among 
allies, which is why the unwritten rules of co-optation depend on the ex-
istence of such informal control practices. Common examples involve the 
selective enforcement of anti-corruption laws against opponents or rene-
gades, underscoring the validity of the saying attributed to former Brazilian 
dictator Getulio Vargas: ‘For my friends everything, and for my enemies the 
law’.
– Camouflage refers to the manner in which the realities of political co- 
optation and control are hidden underneath institutional facades and poli-
cies consistent with a commitment to good governance and democratic 
accountability. Thus, punishment of a detractor may be presented as evi-
dence of the leaders’ commitment to anti-corruption.
4 Co-optation
The first of the informal practices we have identified is co-optation, which is 
the means by which recruitment into the network takes place. A key feature 
of co-optation is that it is transactional; it involves establishing a relationship 
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that is based on strong bonds of trust, reciprocity and loyalty, which enable 
and sustain a system of mutually beneficial exchanges. Thus, a gift, an appoint-
ment, a bribe or a favour are used to establish a relationship, which gener-
ates indebtedness on the part of the accepting party and a gift economy arises. 
The balance of indebtedness never gets settled; otherwise there would be no 
relationship. Practices of co-optation happen in a top-down, horizontal, or 
bottom-up fashion.
Co-optation can occur in a top-down fashion, initiated by higher-level 
 officials (e.g. at the Ministry or District Council level) or mid-level service man-
agers (for example, hospital accountants) and targeting lower-level staff and 
service providers (for example, nurses and teachers). Top-down, actors engage 
in co-optation in order to promote and consolidate their own positions. They 
do so by rewarding supporters and by neutralising opposition through a discre-
tionary allocation of opportunities and resources, thus nurturing and expand-
ing the networks that ensure support. In turn, the beneficiaries can typically 
extract rents in return for their unconditional support. Top-down co-optation 
can extend to the grassroots level incorporating important social groups into 
the ruling coalition, and is observed in the prevalence of patronage and clien-
telistic networks.
Practices of top-down co-optation in the public sector result in situations 
where service providers are confronted with the demands of hierarchical net-
works in the workplace in addition to their formal work responsibilities and 
the demands and expectations of family, friends and acquaintances. According 
to our research findings, vertical networks can be found in the Tanzanian and 
Ugandan health sectors as the result of corruption in the recruiting process. 
Research participants from both countries indicated that employment is often 
obtained through network connections where a relative, friend or other social 
acquaintance of the appointing official recommends a particular individual 
for a position. Under those circumstances, it is understood that the job giver 
is granting a favour to the recipient, who thereafter enters the workplace with 
an unwritten, but well understood, indebtedness vis-à-vis the sponsor. Corrup-
tion in recruitment also happens when substantial sums are paid to secure a 
position. In such cases the debt is both a moral one (for being considered for 
the position, for which the bribe is just the precondition) as well as a real one 
(as invariably one will have to raise money with family and friends to generate 
enough funds to pay for such a position).
In such contexts, where employment is obtained not by virtue of skills and 
professional qualifications, but rather as a personalised transaction cemented 
by social connections and/or money, loyalty tends to be much more valued 
than on the job performance when it comes to being eligible for promotion 
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or other benefits. The research data further suggests that vertical networks are 
conducive to collusive behaviours in which corrupt service providers enjoy, if 
not the full support and complicity, at least passive concealment on the part 
of their colleagues.
Co-optation can also be exercised horizontally when two or more networks 
engage in practices that serve the mutual benefit of all those involved. Thus, po-
litical elites frequently not only obtain the support of key non-state actors but 
also become recruited into exercising public authority to inordinately favour 
particular interests. For example, powerful business interests may be co-opted 
into supporting the interests of the political elites (e.g. financing electoral 
campaigns), receiving in exchange substantial benefits (e.g. large government 
contracts). Horizontal co-optation also happens when public officials use their 
decision-making authority over the provision of services, access to opportuni-
ties or distribution of resources instrumentally to grow their own networks. In 
Uganda, head teachers or principals at prestigious schools have been known 
to informally earmark some slots in the enrolment process in order to please 
higher ranking public figures or wealthy families whose children would not 
otherwise be accepted on the basis of their grades alone. Other accounts from 
Tanzania indicate that health staff may choose to provide preferential treat-
ment strategically to particular patients, say a teacher, with a view to receiving 
a favour in return through help with a child’s enrolment in the future.
Bottom-up co-optation is associated with informal networks at the com-
munity level, where membership of particular social groups binds individuals 
through ties of reciprocity and moral obligation into supporting each other 
and pooling resources. Co-optation practices at this level are associated with 
corruption because when a member gets a position in public office then the 
network expects this person to extract rents for the benefit of the group. In 
Uganda and Tanzania, like in many other African countries, a fair amount of 
social pressure is exerted on individuals who are formally employed or some-
how perceived to be relatively affluent, pushing them to acquire resources for 
the benefit of their group—thereby legitimising certain corrupt acts and prac-
tices for the sake of the community, family and kin.
Social pressures may also be associated with more extortive modalities of 
bribing and even embezzlement. This can happen when the opportunities for 
material redistribution that a provider’s salary allows do not adequately meet 
the expectations of the networks. This was vividly narrated in an interview 
with a medical doctor in Tanzania, who explained that the prevalent socially 
constructed preconception is that holding a medical degree is associated with 
a high salary, which is drastically contradicted by the reality of prevailing wag-
es in the public health sector.
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The research data from Tanzania and Uganda shows that social networks 
tend to be extensive and fluid. In this regard, exchanging favours is a key prac-
tice conducive to expanding social connections, which works to both initiate 
and corroborate co-optation into the network. ‘There is a reciprocal relation-
ship, meaning today you have helped me, tomorrow I must find a way to return 
the favour’, as one Tanzanian Focus Group Discussion participant described 
it. Thus, building a network involves evolving relationships on the basis of a 
reciprocal exchange of favours, goods and resources. These hinge on the mu-
tually reinforcing conditions of indebtedness on the part of the recipient of 
the favour and entitlement on the part of the giving party. These practices are 
observed in the case of the delivery of public health services in that patients 
actively seek to co-opt health workers into their networks based on the belief 
that otherwise it will not be possible to obtain the medical treatment required. 
This is one reason why patients often bring unsolicited gifts of different kinds 
to their appointments at the health facility with the expectation that by doing 
so they can create a privileged relationship with the provider.
In Uganda, service providers estimated that in about half of the interactions 
concerned users offer unsolicited ‘gifts’ to providers. Tanzanian service provid-
ers mentioned that they are used to receiving gifts from people in the form of 
material goods, such as maize, rice, goats, beans or through a credit transfer via 
mobile phone. Due to the ambivalent nature of the gift, one service provider 
stated that one has to try to figure out what the gift means in the current con-
text and if it would create an environment in which one is suddenly indebted— 
when the motive of the gift was a form of co-optation—which raises the 
question, as one participant asked: ‘How do you deal with such matters, when 
you have already eaten the fish he bought?’ Further examples of the different 
types of co-optation are described below (Table 4.1).
The case of Rwanda provides both contrast to and confirmation of the prac-
tices described above. According to evidence from our research, in Rwanda 
favouritism is the modality of petty corruption that is still most prevalent in 
the health sector, where preferential (faster) treatment is given to family and 
friends of service providers. However, the instrumental use of gift-giving or 
bribing to build useful networks appears to be less utilised in Rwanda. Where-
as this certainly has to do with the potential risk of detection and punishment 
that accompany such activities (discussed in the following section), an im-
portant element to underscore is that the Rwandan regime, by significantly 
improving the quality and accessibility of public services, has made the func-
tionality of network building for the most part redundant, in the sense that 
no informal strategy such as gift-giving or appealing to social connections is 
needed in order to receive adequate treatment.
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The generalised experiences among Rwandan research participants indicate 
that for the most part service provision is delivered as stipulated by formal 
rules and entitlements.7 In other words, one of the drivers for the growth and 
and nourishment of social networks identified in Tanzania and Uganda—that 
is, overcoming the challenges associated with the poor quality and accessibility 
of essential services—is mitigated in Rwanda with improved public services.
5 Control
The second pattern of informality is control, which relates to how informal net-
works enforce discipline among their members. This can happen by means 
of the selective enforcement of formal rules (e.g. anti-corruption laws) or 
 informally (e.g. by means of veiled threats or exclusion from the network). 
7 These rules emanate from Ubudehe, a home-grown solution and poverty-reduction initia-
tive and one of the country’s core development programmes. Ubudehe involves a system of 
categorisation of all households according to income level, which forms the basis on which 
entitlements are determined and subsidies allocated.
Table 4.1 Types of co-optation
National level Workplace  
(service provision)
Community level
Top-down 
co-optation
Political appointments 
of supporters and 
opponents
Recruitment 
and promotion 
practices
Patronage and 
clientelistic 
networks
Horizontal 
co-optation
Symbiotic relationships 
between political elites 
and business interests
Collusive 
 behaviours in the 
work place/use 
of public office to 
build networks
Instrumental 
construction of 
networks
Bottom-up 
co-optation
Expectations of voters 
about leaders’ duty to 
provide particularistic 
benefits to their groups
Favouritism in 
service provision 
and embezzlement/
abuse of office to 
favour network
Proactive 
 gift-giving to 
build networks in 
order to include 
useful individuals
Source: Compiled by Claudia Baez-Camargo
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 Interestingly, informal control also occurs bottom-up, whereby powerful  actors 
are locked into the system and expected to tend to the demands and expecta-
tions of their networks, otherwise risking negative consequences ranging from 
social shaming to even violence.
There are several kinds of sanctions that can be expected if one does not 
adhere to the norms of the networks. Practices of control among hierarchical 
networks in the workplace were illustrated by two Ugandan rural health work-
ers, according to whom people not only become corrupt to get better positions, 
but also because those not participating in the prescribed corruption schemes 
or those who denounce incidences of corruption may face serious repercus-
sions. As one health worker experienced: ‘If you refuse, you miss the job [op-
portunity] or your name will not appear on the payroll’. Therefore, fear over 
losing one’s job or being bullied can translate into a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy, 
as explained by a nurse who had witnessed incidences of corruption involving 
fellow health workers: ‘Although you know what is happening, you stay quiet 
because it’s beyond your understanding’.
As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of social networks is related to 
the manner in which they embody deeply ingrained values of reciprocity, soli-
darity and moral obligation towards one’s group. Based on these values, certain 
behaviours are expected. Concretely, when it comes to the family, the entitle-
ment to partake of the gains of one’s next of kin is an essential, unquestionable 
premise of social life in the three countries. Consequently, one of the worst 
transgressions occurs when an individual is seen to turn his or her back on a 
family member. This can result in social isolation and shaming, although in 
some contexts the consequences might be more extreme as explained by a 
service user in Kampala: ‘If my brother earns 15 million and I ask him to help 
me pay twenty thousand shillings for my son to register for exams and he tells 
me about his cow, which is sick, and that he needs 100,000 for it to get treated 
yet he can’t help me with only twenty thousand shillings, then what do I need 
from him apart from beating him to death?’
Outside the family, social networks rely on an expectation of reciprocity 
in the ongoing exchange of favours and gifts. Service providers recounted the 
difficulties they face rejecting unsolicited gifts from users; because the act of 
presenting and receiving a gift is socioculturally anchored, rejecting a gift can 
be interpreted as disrespectful.
The significance of the control that can be exercised by social networks is 
underscored by the notable extent to which fulfilling one’s duties and obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the network is closely linked to social status. In the fgds par-
ticipants were asked about the actions that gain individuals respect and good 
social standing in their communities versus those that cause a person shame 
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and to fall into disgrace. Some of the fgd responses to this question are sum-
marised above (Table 4.2).
In Tanzania and Uganda, the expectation of help and a contribution to the 
network’s welfare described above influences the behaviours of service provid-
ers profoundly. For example, if a service provider does not favour a relative 
in service provision or rejects a small bribe or a gift, the perception among 
research participants was that this person’s adherence to formal rules destroys 
his or her trust-based relationships, and such a person might be ultimately 
abandoned by the community. The infringement of socially embedded norms 
is therefore seen as affecting the moral economy of the community, because it 
threatens the socially constituted values and practices of economic redistribu-
tion that are critical to meeting essential needs.
The responses from Rwanda are particularly interesting as they suggest the 
tensions generated by a context in which there are strict constraints in place 
inhibiting service providers from engaging in those practices that are nonethe-
less still regarded as the gateway to social status and respect. Rwandan service 
providers can therefore be characterised as being subject to bottom-up control 
Table 4.2 Actions conducive to gaining and losing status
Uganda Tanzania Rwanda
Actions/conditions conducive to gaining status/respect
– Help the group
– Get jobs
– Solve problems
–  Steal from others to share 
with group
– Being wealthy
–  You do everything to 
help relatives or friends
–  High income/education 
(being called ‘profes-
sor’)/ appearance
–  Use the office to enrich 
him/herself to help his 
associates
–  Helping relatives settle 
financial obligations 
and other problems
Actions/conditions conducive to shame/falling into disgrace
–  Discriminate against  
members of the group
–  Losing an influential  
position
– Applying the law
–  Being poor (esp. after  
having had money)
–  Demanding excessive 
bribes
–  Failing to help your  
relatives or friends
–  Not helping to meet the 
 family’s needs
–  Being caught in an act of 
corruption
Source: Compiled by Claudia Baez-Camargo
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in a similar manner as their Tanzanian and Ugandan counterparts, as attested 
by the following statement from a Rwandan health worker: ‘Actually, when you 
refuse to render the service, people you are associated with will say that “hav-
ing him is like not having someone”’. The effect of this is that the worker is put 
aside and is looked upon as a bad person, even losing friends or the apprecia-
tion of their extended family’.
However, social pressures exist in significant tension with formal control 
mechanisms in Rwanda, which because of its enforcement of a zero-tolerance 
approach to corruption has distinguished itself significantly from Tanzania (at 
least until recently) and Uganda. In Rwanda, instances of petty corruption in-
volving bribing or favouritism are harshly sanctioned, including by means of a 
policy of naming and shaming whereby individuals guilty of corruption are pub-
licly identified in published lists that not only bear their names but also those of 
their parents and community. Our research indeed suggests that, because the 
sanctions against cases of corruption are widely perceived to be extremely harsh 
and effectively enforced, compliance is commonly associated with fear with re-
gard to the possible reporting of negative performance or to legal repercussions.
Our research also shed light on creative solutions by means of which health 
workers in Rwanda negotiate the tensions that exist between the formal and 
the informal norms they must abide by. In particular, health workers gave ac-
count of receiving family members for treatment outside the opening hours of 
the health facility to avoid openly disrupting the first come, first served rules 
of service provision. Rwandan fgd participants also expressed that bribery 
still can occur but requires intricate arrangements to avoid disclosure and may 
only be arranged with people who are well known and trusted by the service 
provider for fear of being denounced to the law-enforcement authorities.
For those reasons, Rwandan health providers concluded that corruption has 
increasingly become a private affair, meaning that it is restricted to the inner-
most circle of the informal network, due to the harsh costs associated with 
detection and the risk of being shamed extending to the whole family. Conse-
quently, the strong enforcement of anti-corruption laws in Rwanda appears to 
be resulting in a situation where core networks are shrinking.
Interestingly, the research findings from Tanzania suggest how the incen-
tives of service providers are being reshaped with increased enforcement of 
sanctions against corrupt behaviours under the current regime. As in Rwanda, 
this exacerbates the tensions between the demands of the formal and informal 
normative frameworks to which the service providers are expected to respond. 
One participant in the service providers’ fgd explained that they ‘only employ 
you as an individual and not as a family. However, they [the family] do not 
understand such a thing […] they do not know the regulations the employed 
have to follow’.
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Thus, the perception that anti-corruption enforcement is tightening means 
that the opportunity space to engage in practices of petty corruption is shrink-
ing. Interestingly, service providers are now developing a new language to 
convey the situation. According to anecdotal evidence, public officials who 
cannot grant a favour or provide the amounts expected by their networks re-
sort to simply stating ‘Magufuli’ to communicate the idea that under the cur-
rent president things have changed.
6 Camouflage
The third informal pattern is camouflage, which refers to how informal prac-
tices of co-optation and control take place beneath a facade of commitment 
to formal procedures, such as the rule of law, anti-corruption measures or 
democratic accountability. Camouflage also takes place under the guise of re-
specting ‘traditional values’. Practices of camouflage protect the network from 
external scrutiny by external actors and play on the coexistence of multiple 
normative frameworks (Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Blundo et al., 2006).
Thus, informality becomes difficult to grasp to an outsider precisely because 
it makes use of the formal order (whether based on legal or traditional norms) 
in order to pursue hidden agendas. For example, camouflage is routinely used 
by corrupt political regimes to create a smooth facade that legitimates them 
not only vis-à-vis donors and the international community but also with 
domestic audiences. Seemingly upholding certain pledges with regard, for ex-
ample, to elections or legal reform, de facto the reforms are undertaken to facil-
itate relations with external actors, often succeeding in hiding ‘real’ processes, 
practices and power from closer scrutiny.
Whereas camouflage is normally seen to be a practice exercised from the 
top down, evidence suggests that it might also be practiced from the bottom 
up. For instance, lowly public officials may use ‘correct’ (i.e. formalised) proce-
dures to hide malfeasance and extraction from the law enforcement authori-
ties or citizens may convey bribing as an expression of the gift-giving customs 
cherished by society.
In our research data one of the most conspicuous forms of camouflage re-
lates to the ambivalent nature of gift-giving. fgd participants elaborated on 
how although a gift can be offered simply as a gift, the expectation of a counter- 
gift—in the form of a service or a favour—is inherent, understood by all par-
ties involved although it may never be explicitly articulated. Thus the act of 
gift-giving is intrinsically ambivalent and a bribe can always be disguised as a 
gift. Rwandan fgd participants explained that a gift is perceived as part of the 
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social routine, an inherent social practice, and as such is described as a public 
rather than a private transaction. A bribe, in contrast, is an essentially private 
transaction. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that if the bribe becomes ex-
posed (taken out from the private into the public realm), it should immedi-
ately morph into a gift.
Kampala health facility staff agreed that there is nothing wrong with giv-
ing preferential treatment to family members—‘Your relative must be given 
priority; if there is not an emergency, my mother, father, son or daughter come 
first’—because this is the way things should proceed ‘according to culture’. In 
this context the same health staff gave other examples of practices of camou-
flage that make use of social norms to cover up illicit activities. Some research 
participants recounted how support staff at the health facility often ask them 
to treat their family members, when in reality they are soliciting bribes from 
health facility users in order to pose as a relative and thus get them expedited 
treatment. There were stories told of support staff that sometimes requested 
speedy treatment for up to five sick relatives in one day. This practice is referred 
to as ‘clan soccer’, and according to the fgd participants it takes advantage of 
the fluid manner in which the terms ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ are used in Uganda.
Camouflage is also proactively used in other ways in order to get access to a 
network. Participants of fgds in Tanzania and Uganda described how service 
providers often assess the situation to determine whether it is worth co-opting 
the service seeker into their network. Thus, service seekers recount how they 
prepare before going to the facility; strategies include dressing up in order to 
give the impression that they have resources that will make them attractive, 
or—conversely—dressing down and bringing small children along to encour-
age feelings of compassion on the part of the provider. On their part, fgd par-
ticipants from Rwanda acknowledged that in order to get away with bribing 
one needs to carefully plan in order to mask the bribe as a gift, or make sure 
the exchange never happens directly but rather through a mutual and trusted 
acquaintance, because one cannot even try to engage in any remotely suspi-
cious activity with strangers out of fear of being denounced.
An interesting example of camouflage among public officials in Rwanda oc-
curs when they resort to a practice known as ‘techniquer’. In Rwanda, to ‘tech-
niquer’ a report (‘gutekinika Raporo’) or statistics mean to falsify or present 
false reports or figures to one’s superiors (Baez Camargo and Gatwa, 2018). In 
a first instance, resorting to ‘techniquer’ may be used to hide corruption fa-
vouring individuals or percolating up (or down) the network. However, that 
may not be the only use of this practice as Baez Camargo and Gatwa found 
that public officials may also use such practices pre-emptively when they have 
not been successful in meeting their professional performance targets and fear 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Baez CAMARGO AND KOECHLIN94
<UN>
tough sanctions from above. Therefore, what is particularly interesting in the 
case of Rwanda is that these practices are not condoned by or led from the top, 
as is the case in the other East African countries. Rather, camouflage is used to 
hide such practices from the top leadership.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have sought to outline the patterns shaping social networks 
in three East African countries. Evidence from two related research projects 
shows that governance processes are informed by the norms and practices 
through which social networks are configured. The findings confirm that there 
are certain patterns that can be identified, each with a distinct set of prac-
tices and norms. Co-optation, camouflage, and control are all practised both 
to secure the moral economy from which the network draws its legitimacy and 
to enable the extraction of concrete material gains for individual members. 
These practices are ‘star-shaped’, so to speak, in that they radiate in all direc-
tions: bottom-up, horizontally, as well as top-down. The distinction between 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ governance becomes obsolete, as these practices draw 
on a diverse and contingent range of norms. Whereas certain practices may 
be more iterative and habitual, others emerge from calculated judgements of 
particular situations and contexts.
Some of the most interesting findings are emerging from ‘liminal’ contexts, 
where established patterns of locking into and reproducing networks are 
breaking down and new ones remain in the making. Such open-ended trans-
formations are likely present in all countries, even though in some contexts 
they may be happening within more circumscribed spaces than in others. Our 
findings suggest that these transformations are the result of changes of politi-
cal regimes—particularly in the case of Rwanda under Paul Kagame, where so-
cial networks have had to reconfigure and react to top-down sanctions against 
corruption in the public sector. Whereas in Tanzania and Uganda the networks 
are more fluid and are built instrumentally, in Rwanda there seems to be a 
trend whereby people are trimming rather than expanding their networks as 
formal rules and procedures are being vigorously enforced by the regime. Thus, 
while health workers continue to be subject to their networks’ expectations 
of preferential treatment, these are increasingly restricted to encompass only 
family and close friends.
Tanzania is also an important case to follow up on given that similar top-
down approaches to anti-corruption are being favoured by the government of 
John Magufuli, the president—for example—using personal discretion and 
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presidential authority to short-circuit ‘official’ procedures, albeit to sanction 
corrupt senior officials. In these cases, although at first glance it may seem as if 
the regime is imposing ‘official’ norms, the picture on the ground is somewhat 
messier. Although our findings may not be sufficient to make a strong argu-
ment, it seems as if new forms of camouflage are emerging that are not top-
down (as in the case of Uganda, for instance), but bottom-up. This could also be 
observed in Rwanda, where camouflage practices are being used to hide both 
inefficiencies and failures to achieve the centrally determined performance 
targets from the feared eye of the government. This raises important questions 
as to shifts in informal patterns: whether a unilinear move from greater trust 
in informality networks to formal rules and institutions is really underway in 
Rwanda, or whether the transformation process is more complicated, with 
new and different forms of informal practices emerging—one being new prac-
tices of camouflage. Our findings also highlight some significant side effects of 
enforcing anti-corruption measures in a strictly top-down manner, whereby 
social networks based on values of solidarity and reciprocity break down, the 
wider consequences of which in the long run are not yet clear.
From a political economy perspective, it is conventionally argued that the 
eradication of corruption hinges not merely on institutional reform, but on 
the political will to change norms and practices. However, our findings suggest 
a far more contextualised and complicated relationship. Firstly, leadership in-
deed matters. Ugandans refer to the scandalous behaviour of political leaders 
to justify their own acts of corruption. In Tanzania, on the other hand, Magu-
fuli sacked his close associates, even some who were known to be close friends 
of his. Shared images and ideas about social roles—including what constitutes 
being a ‘good’ politician, service provider and public official—influence how 
people come to expect themselves and others to behave in different situations 
(Kotzian, 2011). However, the evidence from our research projects suggests 
very strongly that leaders, even those at the very top, are not as autonomous 
and powerful as they are sometimes portrayed in the literature. Our focus on 
social networks carves out the many ways in which they are locked into con-
figurations from which they cannot easily or readily break away. All members 
of a network, including powerful actors, are tied into relations of reciprocal 
exchange through co-optation and control. These practices are all the stronger 
as they are frequently underpinned by social norms and values that are used to 
legitimise extraction and redistribution (Olivier de Sardan, 1999).
Furthermore, as indicated above, even in the cases where to all intents and 
purposes the strong political will of a president exists to enforce official norms 
and procedures, the effects on the actual patterns of governance are empirical 
questions. Whether and where new forms of ‘gaming the system’ emerge, or 
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indeed a Weberian public ethos is nurtured, is subject to specific contexts and 
networks. These effects are highly contingent upon the structuring of the soci-
ety in question, the patterns of the networks and the practices of governance 
(Koechlin 2013). These need to be understood in more detail if we are to shed 
light on the transformations effected by political will. In what way urbanisa-
tion and the transformation of urban spaces affect such processes is a further 
pertinent topic of future research.
What do our findings imply for anti-corruption policies? We join the large 
choir of scholars and practitioners who call for more nuanced and evidence-
based approaches to the anti-corruption field. Although our findings are still 
emerging, there are some pointers that can be drawn from the two research 
projects.
Social norms and values matter—and they can and do change. The pattern-
ing of networks is not just imposed by structures or by calculated self-interest; 
our findings show how actors orient themselves and their practices explicitly 
(i.e. not merely habitually) along particular norms and values, and seek to cre-
ate moral coherence by drawing on specific norms and values when legitimis-
ing or underpinning their practices. ‘Being part of a family’, ‘being one of us’ or 
‘looking after each other’ are frequent expressions that are employed by actors 
when they explain why and how they interact within social networks. In this 
sense, they are evidently also used to legitimise ‘corrupt’ practices, by draw-
ing on alternative normative repertoires that emphasise reciprocity or social 
obligations.
However, it is absolutely central to underline that these norms and values 
themselves are contingent upon context. Of course all actors draw on mul-
tiple repertoires that speak to different normative frameworks—we speak and 
act differently depending on the role we are playing and the situation we are 
in. But more pertinently for anti-corruption policies, the key point emerging 
from our research is that societal norms and values can and do change in in-
teraction with changes in the political and economic environment.
Our research findings underline that these changes need to be understood 
far better than has been the case to date. In Rwanda, for instance, such change 
is being effected by the regime, and enforced rigorously throughout the state 
and society. The effects may not be as coherent and consistent as some authors 
portray them—that is to say, as marching towards a rule-and-procedure-based 
state. But there is no doubt that actors are evaluating their practices in the 
light of these changes and that certain norms and values may indeed be chang-
ing fundamentally, the ultimate outcome of which remains to be seen. Also, 
the jury is still out with regard to the current situation in Tanzania; the effects 
of Magufuli’s very top-down and personal anti-corruption battle are yet to be 
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fully ascertained. One interesting insight is that, much like in Rwanda, new 
practices of camouflage seem to be emerging bottom-up.
To conclude, the three governance patterns identified in this chapter—
namely, control, co-optation, and camouflage, all play with the ambivalence 
of ‘formal’ or ‘official’ norms, on the one hand, and ‘informal’ or ‘traditional’ 
norms, on the other, depending on the context and the most promising strat-
egy for the intended purpose. In practice they cannot be separated, but are 
part and parcel of a range of repertoires at the disposal of the actors to ad-
dress specific problems and pursue specific interests. At the same time, our 
findings underline that ingrained expectations and social sanctions can 
lead to a situation in which actors are ‘locked’ into particular patterns. How-
ever, governance patterns are changing all the time, sometimes as a result 
of changing political regimes. The many ambivalences characterising these 
patterns and their dynamics may represent potential entry points to pro-
moting positive behavioural changes and advancing anti-corruption agen-
das if understood in-depth and by working closely with the social actors 
concerned.
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Chapter 5
Why is Co-management of Parks Not Working in 
Johannesburg?
The Difficult Reframing of State Mandate and Practices in the Post-
Apartheid Era
Claire Bénit-Gbaffou
Abstract
Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo (jcpz) has affirmed its strong redistributive objec-
tive in post-apartheid Johannesburg, with the rapid development of new urban parks 
in former black townships. However, its operational budgets have remained limited 
in the face of the many pressing housing and infrastructural needs. Many park users, 
especially in formerly white (and still middle-class) suburbs, have resorted to forms of 
neighbourhood or community management to compensate for jcpz’s absence. jcpz 
is attempting to rebuild its mandate with regards to these public spaces, developing 
various policy instruments in response to the involvement of park users in the man-
agement of urban parks, but also to formalise that involvement. This chapter traces the 
genealogy of these policy instruments in the making, caught between multiple logics 
where neo-liberal pressures and models, regular engagements with park users marked 
by contested legitimacies and racial tensions, and the broader municipal redistribu-
tive agenda shape the way in which the post-apartheid state redefines its mandate. 
The chapter argues that the specific social and racial configurations in which these 
partnerships are framed on the ground are used by municipal officials to resist trans-
forming their own practices towards more participatory and democratic processes of 
co-production of parks. The chapter reflects on shifting state mandates in urban gover-
nance in contemporary cities of the South and analyses policy instruments crafted for 
the complex task of formalising and regulating state–society co-production of urban 
services in the field of park management.
1 Preamble—A (Usual) Scene in a Nature Reserve Joint-Management 
Forum in Post-apartheid Johannesburg
In April 2017, I attended (as I have been doing for about one year) the monthly 
Klipriviersberg Nature Reserve Forum meeting in Johannesburg, which brings 
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together representatives of the several civil society organisations (csos) inter-
ested in the reserve and the one City Park official in charge of nature reserves 
in Johannesburg1. The meeting’s agenda seemed innocuous, with classic items 
(approval of minutes and management and security issues); there was a rela-
tively low attendance: about ten members of civil society (a majority of old, 
white, middle-class males, with a passion for and an interest in the environ-
ment and the reserve) and one (black, younger, male) City Parks’ official. Ten-
sions had been ongoing for several years between these cso members and City 
Parks (Baloyi et al., 2015; Mokgere, 2016), which had led to the establishment 
of the Forum—an exception in the management of parks and nature reserves 
as City Parks does not have the resources to commit its officials to monthly 
meetings with park users for the 2,500-odd parks and reserves falling under its 
responsibility.
The meeting turned aggressive, with members of the Forum pointing fin-
gers at the City official and publicly humiliating him with explicit accusa-
tions of dishonesty and lies. The conflict crystallised around two issues. The 
first was the presence of horses and their stables in the reserve. The stables 
had been  informally accepted by csos and City Parks a decade before, on the 
understanding that the horse owner would patrol the reserve and contribute 
to its maintenance in exchange for being hosted on site and allowed to offer 
horse riding in the reserve. This agreement was now contested by the csos as 
the previous owner had stopped patrolling the park and had sold his horses to 
a new owner. The official, however, showed reluctance to terminate the agree-
ment, and was accused of delaying the eviction process. The second issue 
was around the opening of a coffee shop at the main entrance of the reserve, 
in a City Parks’ facility that had so far been made available free of charge for 
csos’ meetings. The cso members accused the official of commodifying the 
park, and of acting by stealth as the matter had not been discussed within the 
Forum.
The official’s own view was that a coffee shop was important to render the 
facility more user-friendly, and to garner resources for the park’s management. 
He confided (to me) that several user groups had been selling drinks informally 
to visitors coming for guided tours and that he had approached each of them to 
ask if anyone was interested in manning the shop; so, in his view, everyone was 
1 This research is part of a broader research programme on ‘Practices of the State in Urban 
Governance’, funded by the South African National Research Foundation. It involves indi-
vidual research (interviews, participant observation in meetings, research-action through 
the facilitation of workshops with park user groups and City parks officials), as well as collec-
tive research (facilitating class projects, mentoring postgraduate research reports: these are 
referenced in the text), on the governance and management of parks in Johannesburg.
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aware of the move. Similarly, for him the horse riding activities were welcome 
in the reserve, making it more attractive and potentially generating income 
whilst opening access to a wider range of environmentally oriented activities. 
But the City Parks’ official never stated his opinions in the meeting. Rather, in 
the face of these accusations he remained silent, did not defend his views pub-
licly, and appeared to agree with all what was ‘suggested’ (that he was to write 
a letter in order to evict the horse owner and that the process of renting the 
space in question to an entrepreneur was to be revisited). After the meeting, 
though, he confided to me that he would do nothing of the sort. He would con-
tinue formalising agreements with the horse owner and the coffee shop owner 
as this was best for the reserve. When I asked him why he had not defended his 
views in the meeting and why he had not discussed these developments in the 
Forum, he replied that he was tired of seeing all his initiatives being blocked or 
torn down in these meetings. He would continue regardless, as he was confi-
dent he had the mandate and power to do so.
Throughout this meeting I felt deeply embarrassed by the public humili-
ation I was witnessing—no matter how right the park users’ representatives 
were about incorrect process and lack of dialogue. The tone of the accusations, 
the configuration of the argument (one single black man alone against a re-
sourced white collective), the finger pointing, the loss of face—all were almost 
unbearable, perhaps more especially in a post-apartheid context. I was also 
puzzled about the function of the meeting: the forum had become a space for 
‘problem-making’ rather than a problem-solving arena. Like the official, I saw 
the two contested initiatives as potentially beneficial to the reserve (if properly 
managed), and therefore potentially able to achieve consensus within the Fo-
rum. It did not seem impossible to formalise horse riding activities and a coffee 
shop to service an underused reserve and to negotiate their contribution to the 
maintenance of an undermanned reserve—especially as underuse and lack 
of management resources are constraints that the Forum acknowledges and 
struggles with. So, how was this joint management forum leading to the growth 
and consolidation of contention and the blocking of any initiative or develop-
ment, instead of collectively building on activities that could easily be framed 
as beneficial additions to the reserve?
The history of this conflict, the involvement of individuals from both sides 
in what have become personalised attacks, and the micropolitics of this fo-
rum (including deeply entrenched and tacit racial tensions that perhaps limit 
the ability to find a common language), have been documented elsewhere 
(Baloyi et al., 2015; Mokgere, 2016). Beyond the specifics of this case, I won-
dered why  the official did not feel an interest, the need, or an institutional 
motive to solve the issue, rather than leave the conflict to inflate, explode and 
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ultimately  destroy the forum. Why did he use an ‘exit’ rather than a ‘voice’ 
strategy (Hirshman, 1970)? Why did he act on his own, by stealth, rather than 
confronting the group and confidently asserting City Parks’ mandate: mobil-
ising  resources and increasing and diversifying access and use? I therefore 
sought to analyse the policy instruments guiding the practice of joint park 
management, and the resources officials could garner to respond to mobil-
ised, and at times demanding, park user groups.
More broadly, this chapter aims at assessing to what extent state prac-
tices are challenged and reframed through interaction with civil society in 
the provision of public services, in a context where parks and their manage-
ment are given low political and budgetary priority at the municipal level. 
Through an  interrogation with regard to how community engagement is 
framed as a municipal objective within City Parks, and how tools for guiding 
these  engagements are crafted, I wish to interrogate how the state’s mandate is 
 redefined in contemporary cities of the South. I will reflect on the challenges 
the state faces in its attempt to regulate what is by definition highly informal 
and unstable: community engagement in park management. The chapter’s 
ambition is therefore both theoretical and empirical—contributing to under-
standing contemporary statecraft (through the lens of officials’ practices in 
the joint management of urban parks), debating the challenges of governing 
public spaces in contemporary cities, and reflecting on the meaning of ‘post- 
apartheid’ today.
The first section of the chapter borrows from different theoretical fields 
(participation, neo-liberalisation and coproduction) to conceptualise how 
the study of the joint management of parks can lead to an understanding of 
the dynamics of statecraft. The second section reviews the policy instruments 
 developed by City Parks to frame community engagement around park man-
agement and reflects on the conflicting state rationalities they embody and 
they construct, in the context of post-apartheid Johannesburg.
2 Co-production of Park Management—Between  
Neo-liberalisation, Democratisation and Pragmatic Service 
Delivery in Cities of the South
This section considers a variety of theoretical approaches in order to make 
sense of the joint management of parks, as public spaces, in contemporary 
 cities. It discusses the relevance and limitations of theories around community 
participation, neo-liberalisation, and co-production of urban services in cities 
of the global South.
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2.1 Joint Management of Parks as Community  
Participation—Empowerment or Exploitation?
The involvement of park user groups in the shaping of public or collective 
urban spaces has long been studied and understood under the framework 
of community participation, as a right embedded in conceptions of urban 
citizenship, empowerment, and local democracy, where the public at large is 
 legitimately expected to be able to influence the design and management of 
the urban spaces it uses. This literature has for some time debated whether 
participation was a tool of empowerment and democratisation emerging from 
below, that should be advocated and nurtured, or a tool of oppression and ma-
nipulation in the hands of public authorities, that should be distrusted and 
rejected (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Williams, 2004). This dichotomy has some-
how been overcome, with attention paid to the multiple facets of participation 
(contrasting invented with invited spaces of participation: Miraftab, 2004), 
an emphasis on the unpredictability of outcomes (Cornwall, 2008), analytical 
tools for analysing the micropolitics of public meetings (Cornwall, 2007; Bénit-
Gbaffou and Mkwanazi, 2012) and an exploration of conditions for empow-
erment even in the most institutionalised participatory platforms (Williams, 
2004). A second debate marks this field of the literature, one perhaps less vis-
ible and resolved: how to measure the degree and nature of community partic-
ipation? Several tools have been developed, the most famous being Arnstein’s 
‘ladder of participation’ (1969), focusing on the degree of power vested in the 
citizens, starting from lower degrees (tokenism) and going towards higher de-
grees (full control) of citizen’s empowerment. But these tools mostly focus on 
processes of decision-making and are of lesser relevance when it comes to as-
sessing the outcomes of community participation and the difference that it 
makes with regard to the actual content of the policy, form of the urban space, 
or outcome of the project built.2 Besides, by normatively affirming the primacy 
of ‘citizens’ control’, the ladder is implicitly assuming the illegitimacy of the 
state’s vision, adopting a suspicious take on the State typical of the postmodern 
and postcolonial era. It is a contrario celebrating the legitimacy and intrinsic 
progressiveness of community views. This posture has been criticised theoreti-
cally and practically, in contexts where participation spaces are appropriated 
exclusively by middle-class groups to further their already existing privileges 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2007), where mass movements adopt exclusionary and violent 
behaviour against local social groups defined as ‘outsiders’ (Glaser, 2015), or 
2 This interrogation on outcomes is shared by social movement studies (Giugni, 1998), but it has 
possibly not led either to significant analytical progress, theoretically or methodologically.
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even more generally where a complex politics of scale opposes legitimate but 
narrow local claims to looser but broader public benefits (Purcell, 2006).
Coming back to the state’s assumed illegitimacy, participatory literature 
is generally entrenching a deep suspicion around public intervention. This 
suspicion stems from the postmodern critique of the state, assumed (or at 
least likely) to be oppressive; the united and obvious ‘antagonist’ or ‘enemy’ 
in  urban governance that needs to be constantly checked, tracked, resisted or 
challenged; or the machinery incapable of grasping the complexity and fluid-
ity of society, especially when it is developing multiple strategies of resistance 
(Scott, 1985). Participation theories are therefore often ill-equipped to unpack 
state practices. They fail to see the state not only as a heterogeneous and com-
plex organisation (Gupta, 2012), but also as a potentially developmental agent, 
with legitimacy not only in partnering but sometimes also in countering, or 
at least reshaping, claims emerging from not always progressive or visionary, 
at times parochial and conservative, local civil societies. However, this view 
of the state as potentially sinister in its agenda and control apparatus is start-
ing to be challenged, especially from intermediary countries, such as Brazil, 
India and South Africa—where states affirm, and resource with some capacity, 
strong redistributive agendas in highly unequal urban societies.
Some theoretical tools are more balanced in their understanding of civil 
society’s versus the state’s different objectives and rationalities when embark-
ing on community participation. Pretty’s typology (1995, adapted in Cornwall, 
2008) usefully places participation in a continuum between a managerial 
 objective (facilitating project implementation and public-space maintenance 
through community buy-in) and an empowerment objective (resourcing civil 
society to shape urban spaces and partake in decisions that affect its environ-
ment). Both objectives are legitimately shaping actual processes of participa-
tion, in a constant negotiation and balancing act. This approach can be found, 
usefully for our object of research, in Jones’ (2002) model of cycles of engage-
ment between municipal officials and user groups, expressed in his case study 
of joint park management in the UK. Jones writes from a policy context where 
British municipalities are required to partner with civil society organisations to 
lead projects and manage public assets (due to shrinking public funding and as 
a condition for accessing public grants). Based on observation of interactions 
between officials and park user groups (‘Friends of the Park’), Jones investigates 
what is required from officials to support both successful joint management of 
parks and interaction with those groups. He suggests different skills, resources 
and objectives in what he analyses as different steps in the  relationship (from 
complaints and distrust, to constructive relationships around small practical 
objectives, to enhancing autonomy and the ‘ responsibilisation’ of park user 
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groups). The limit of his approach is that he does not unpack the state much—
it is represented and encapsulated by one single municipal official in charge 
of community engagement, without placing this official in a set of policies, 
budgets, official norms and rules, specific policy instruments and their politics.
Beyond the field of participation studies, other layers of critique, stemming 
from similar conceptions of the state as potentially driven by a sinister and 
oppressive agenda, and of the state as relatively unitary, have developed in the 
vast array of theories critiquing processes of neo-liberalisation. This literature, 
inspired either by Foucauldian or by neo-Marxist analyses, helps ‘complexify-
ing’ the theorisation of the state in ways that are useful for our purpose.
2.2 Critical Theories of Neo-liberalisation—Joint Park Management as 
‘Rolled-Out’ State or as ‘Realist “Governmentality”’
Foucauldian-inspired analyses of neo-liberal governmentalities see participa-
tion as a relatively recent dispositif of power leading participants to internalise 
and naturalise the policy choices driven by other interests, and partly over-
lapping with theirs (Roy, 2009; Morange, 2015; Rosol, 2015). Rosol (2015) how-
ever departs from an assumed suspicion of the state, unpacking the recourse 
to participatory tools as a state strategy for overcoming residents’ opposition 
to its spatial planning objectives (densification and compaction of the city 
in Vancouver), without assuming these state objectives are illegitimate. The 
state’s intervention and use of dispositifs of governmentality (though sets and 
techniques of participatory engagements), she argues, have on the contrary 
assisted in overcoming and reshaping civil society’s conservatism and parochi-
alism. She usefully proposes the concept of ‘realist governmentality’ mingling 
deep participatory processes (where residents’ concerns are considered and 
answered, if reframed) with forms of neo-liberal governmentality (where resi-
dents are confronted with existing budgetary constraints and required to make 
choices in such contexts). Her focus on participation as a tool of government 
intervention, analysed as realist governmentality, is helpful for our unpacking 
of state practices of community engagement in parks.
Going further in unpacking policy instruments, MacKinnon analyses the 
effect of key performance indicators (kpis) on officials’ practices in the provi-
sion of public service (MacKinnon, 2000). He argues that while the kpis are an 
efficient tool of administrative control (in particular the control of the local 
level by the central level of the state), officials often retain a degree of agency 
and choice. This agency leads either to ‘colonisation’ (the reshaping of sets 
of practices alongside the kpis) or to ‘decoupling’ (the development of two 
 parallel sets of practices as resistance to control) in organisational responses to 
this neo-liberal management tool. Hibou (2012) is more pessimistic, showing 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Bénit-Gbaffou108
<UN>
how ‘public goods’ typically cannot easily be quantified, and how the control 
of officials’ practices, through a quantitative measurement of their outputs, 
 essentially marginalises and destroys the very spirit of public service.
Neo-Marxist analyses also interrogate state restructuring in several ways. 
They analyse the ‘rescaling’ of the state and the ‘geographies of actually exist-
ing neoliberalism’ in various parts of the world (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). 
They thereby enrich analyses of the state as a multi-layered, multi-scalar or-
ganisation with potentially competing agendas and dynamics that are locally 
embedded. These studies also nuance the hypothesis of the state’s ‘roll-back’ 
(withdrawal from certain functions and mandates that used to be public) 
with explorations of state ‘roll-out’ dynamics—where it delegates some of 
its functions to non-state agents, through a variety of agreements, to provide 
public service (see also Hibou, 1999). Research directions stemming from this 
 approach are multiple. Some critically analyse partnerships, unpacking the 
 effects of the privatisation of service provision on social and spatial equity for 
instance (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Others examine the blind spots of neo-
Marxist and Foucauldian perspectives on state practices, interrogating the cir-
culation of policy ideas across scales of the state and between state and society 
(Uitermark, 2005). Others interrogate service providers’ working conditions, 
rendered precarious under a multiplicity of scattered and temporary service 
provision schemes (Miraftab, 2004; Krinsky and Simonet, 2017).
Krinsky and Simonet, in particular, examine the question of ‘who cleans 
your park’ in contemporary New York. Through an ethnography of the various 
agreements with an array of temporary workers, social programmes, volun-
teers and interest group and ngo members, they show how these fragmented 
resources have come to replace the coordinated municipal service that used to 
manage public parks, to the detriment of service provision, workers’ rights and 
spatial equity. Rosol (2010, 2012) looks, rather, at the social dynamics leading to 
the consolidation of user groups for the management of neighbourhood parks 
(‘community gardens’) in Berlin. Coming back to classic debates within the 
participation literature on whether citizens’ involvement in the management 
of parks is the expression of alternative urban citizenry or the ultimate neo-
liberal tool with which the state withdraws from its responsibilities, she con-
cludes that both dynamics shape the new way in which neighbourhood parks 
are managed. She argues that temporary and locally constructed arrangements 
emerge as forms of citizens’ mobilisation, and then tend to become institu-
tionalised thanks to the broader (neo-liberal) acceptance that the state needs 
to delegate tasks of service provision to non-state agents (Rosol, 2012). She ad-
vises (Rosol, 2010), usefully for this chapter, that the fluid and ad hoc nature of 
these local arrangements require careful examination and tracking, and calls 
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for suspending the strong normative assumptions attached to both participa-
tion and neo-liberalisation theoretical approaches (the former being seen as 
progressive and desirable, the second as regressive and to be avoided). How-
ever, this tracking focuses more on community dynamics, their links to social 
movements and their forms of institutionalisation than it equips us with con-
ceptual tools with which to unpack state practices and the state’s changing 
mandate.
2.3 Joint Park Management as Co-production: Shifting State and 
Citizens’ Mandates through the Co-Production Process?
Understanding the shifting definition of statehood could be argued to be 
the  focus, although often implicit and intuitive, of the literature on the 
 co-production of public services. This concept stems from experiences of ser-
vice delivery in developing cities in the 1970s (Ostrom, 1996; Turner, 1976) and 
is re-emerging in contemporary debates attempting precisely to suspend for 
one moment the normative assumptions attached to notions such as partner-
ships, seen through the critical lens of neo-liberalisation theory. Ostrom (1996) 
interestingly conceptualises co-production as a process of joint production of 
public infrastructures or services, by state and non-state3 stakeholders. What 
is interesting in the cases she describes is the way in which both citizens and 
state officials transform their practices in the process of the production of ser-
vices. Both adapt their practices in order to coordinate with and complement 
the others’ in intertwined processes. Differently from the concept of partner-
ships (where each partner is generally defined with set resources and actions 
that they will bring to the deal), the notion of co-production emphasises the 
process of the joint and mutual redefinition of mandates. It allows for an open 
and dynamic definition of needs, claims and preferences (Stone, 2006), but 
also of skills, priorities, types of intervention and modes of action.
Joshi and Moore (2004), discussing Ostrom (1996) from the explicit per-
spective of the global South, interrogate the state more centrally. They argue 
that co-production, as ‘unorthodox public service delivery in challenging en-
vironments’, is the norm in most countries and cities of the global South. But, 
unlike Turner (1976), who contrasts self-help housing provision with state 
responsibilities, they unpack the interactions between state and non-state 
agents  engaging in service provision. Doing so, they avoid taking normative 
positions—in terms of governmentality (often seen as the manipulation and 
disguised oppression of society by the state) or in terms of neo-liberalisation 
(in terms of the subjugation of society to the logics of economic profit alone). 
3 She considers civil society as the main non-state co-producer in her paper.
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Bénit-Gbaffou110
<UN>
The authors argue that both framings are partly ill-fitting in Southern contexts, 
where the state actually never provided any services in certain areas or sec-
tors of society. Therefore co-production is rather seen as an extension, not as 
a shrinking, of the state’s intervention in society (Hibou, 1999; Jaglin, 2008). 
This is particularly relevant for this chapter, as the state never provided for 
urban parks in most of the urban areas (e.g. the black portion of South African 
 cities—the majority of its population) and the post-apartheid regime led to an 
extension of the scope and scale of state intervention. Co-production is also 
seen as the process of constructing practical and largely context-dependent 
collective solutions: not necessarily as driven or controlled by the state, at least 
not as an assumption, leaving some of the process open. This too seems rel-
evant for the purposes of this chapter, where—rather than a situation of state 
roll-back or even roll-out—the current situation would be more adequately 
described as the expansion of state authority. In Johannesburg, park users in 
middle-class areas in particular have taken over the actual management of 
parks since the turn of the millennium, and City Parks is looking for ways to re-
establish its mandate with regard to public-space management—with limited 
financial and human resources—and simultaneously attempting to capitalise 
on the mobilisation of civil society resources.
The benefit of this approach is double: it interrogates the shifting, contested 
and redefined mandates for the state in state–society relations understood as 
dynamic. And it analyses how these processes impact on the actual provision 
of services and production of spaces in the city, through an attention to the 
technicalities involved in the provision of services and their negotiation (Wat-
son 2014). In this way, it links the materiality of instruments (in their own, 
sector-specific, technical logics, responding to practical challenges but also 
caught in their own functional dynamics) to state rationalities and the state’s 
shifting, unstable and contested mandates. Focusing on the process of defin-
ing such instruments, as lenses illuminating both internal and external contes-
tations contributing to redefining the state (Uitermark, 2005), it borrows from 
a Foucauldian approach (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). But it also attempts 
to respond to frustrations with Foucauldian approaches by interrogating the 
effect of these techniques on the production of the city itself, the way they 
affect the making of urban services and spaces (here urban parks and their 
actual management) through their own functional and technical logics. This is 
in line with Stone’s suggestion (2006) to look at ‘power to’ (shape the city and 
produce urban spaces, along a vision that is built and shared by coalitions of 
actors mobilising resources for its implementation) rather than only at ‘power 
over’ (questioning forms and processes of influence and domination). In this 
respect, the co-production approach might assist in rejuvenating our thinking 
about the state, its practices and its mandate in the contemporary city of the 
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South. It helps us interrogate actual processes of production in relation to 
shifting mandates by twinning the study of technical instruments (that are 
sector-bound and produce specific effects on the city) and the analysis of the 
processes of state-making.
The risk with approaches in terms of co-production—and their suspension 
of the normative judgements brought about by the neo-liberalisation critique 
or the governmentality approach—is the marginalisation of the critical inter-
rogation of social and spatial inequality, on the one hand, and of power dy-
namics on the other (Watson 2014). Arguably however, adopting the lens of 
co-production does not prohibit an interrogation of inequality, nor an analysis 
in terms of power dynamics. The redefinition of state-versus-society mandates 
and prerogatives is a deeply political and contentious process in which these 
issues actually come to the forefront. As for urban parks in Johannesburg, the 
question of transformation (addressing past and present inequalities, espe-
cially in their socio-racial dimension) is at the forefront of City officials’ man-
dates, discourses and preoccupations; the contestations in the processes of 
 co-production are testimony to the deep political nature of these engagements.
The analysis of which rules are negotiated to regulate public spaces (parks 
in this case) and how they redefine the boundaries of the state remains under-
developed. Ostrom (1996) interrogates explicitly, analytically and normatively 
the rules to regulate ‘the commons’ (based on observations of a multiplicity 
of case studies), but she steers away from analysing the respective and shift-
ing mandates of society and state, focusing predominantly on rules negotiated 
within civil society to establish systems of self-regulation (less central to our 
objective here). We are still to theorise on how forms of the co-production 
of public services (rather than autonomous, citizen- or private-led provision) 
 affect, challenge and shift the practices, the mandate and the nature of the 
state in contemporary cities of the South.
3 Unpacking the Objectives of ‘the State’ through Policy Instruments 
for the Management of Parks: Rise or Marginality of Co-production 
as Form of Service Delivery?
This section interrogates the state’s practices and objectives through the lens 
of co-production in order to investigate why practices of the joint manage-
ment of parks fail to work in post-apartheid Johannesburg, in spite of what 
could be considered favourable conditions for their emergence and consolida-
tion. These favourable conditions are: firstly, the existence of park user groups 
with some experience in park management, at least in middle-class areas; and 
secondly, a policy framework for City Parks that seeks improved relationships 
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with users to address the negative image marking the municipal agency, and 
that aims at mobilising complementary human and financial resources in the 
context of scarce public funding for parks.
Through the analysis of various policy instruments, it is argued that genu-
ine engagement with communities to deepen the accountability and respon-
siveness of the state is not a priority objective for City Parks compared to the 
need to garner financial resources. Secondly, the mandate and responsibility 
to engage with communities is actually scattered across the agency and con-
tested between different units and officials, with a gap between those actually 
on the ground and confronted by user groups and those officially in charge 
of community engagement. Thirdly, developing actual partnership guidelines 
that foster the co-management of parks is seen as a challenge by City Parks’ 
officials—both technically and politically. It seems much easier to delegate 
the management task to non-state institutions or to build partnerships with 
the corporate sector, where the terms of exchange are simpler and clearer (for 
instance, where the corporate sponsor is branded, in exchange for its finan-
cial contribution); avoiding the legal and political issues of joint fundraising 
or staff management. These guidelines are all the more difficult to imagine 
and develop, given that where joint management forums do exist (and could 
provide an opportunity to experiment) they are mostly found in former white, 
middle-class suburbs without the political legitimacy necessary to act as real 
‘partners’ for the City. In these joint management forums, contentious and 
 vocal user groups are easily ignored by City Parks, which often considers them 
to be inspired by parochial attempts to reproduce racial and social privilege, in 
the (middle-class, suburban) areas that are not its priority.
3.1 Community Engagement—Framed Mostly in Neo-liberal  
Terms in Policy Instruments
The 2013 institutional restructuring of City Parks, a municipal agency reframed 
as Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo (merging a deficit-prone entity, City Parks, 
with a profit-generating one, Johannesburg Zoo), was also the occasion to 
align the  agency with new public management principles. This alignment (see 
Figure 5.1) illustrates the importance of auditing processes emphasising cost-
effectiveness and financial monitoring; it created a legal and contract man-
agement arm, and multiplied dedicated units aside from service delivery (still 
defined as ‘core business’): marketing, public relations, and new business de-
velopment inter alia.
Looking at community engagement within this organogram reveals how 
scattered the agency is (Bosaka, 2015; Bénit-Gbaffou, forthcoming). The official 
task of liaising with communities lies with Stakeholder Liaison Officers (slos) 
working in Stakeholder and Public Relations Management—and their main 
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objective is to defend and protect City Parks’ reputation and avoid conflict, bad 
publicity and reputational damage. The function of Customer Interface Man-
agement was never consolidated in a department; rather, it has been tasked 
to the regional managers (under Service Delivery and Core Business), whose 
Key Performance Indicators include measurement of users’ complaints and 
the rapidity of their responses to these complaints. Other officials in charge 
of community engagement are situated under New Business Development, 
which is about fundraising for the City or the agency through events organised 
in parks4 and partnerships established with donors, mostly from the corpo-
rate  sector. A third type of community engagement is effected by officials in 
charge of  Education and Awareness, who develop educational campaigns and 
 partnerships with township schools in particular, with regards to behaviour 
4 Which City Parks actually does not benefit from, as the event fee goes into City of Johannes-
burg coffers.
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Figure 5.1 jcpz organogram, 2013. Recommended level 3 positional structure.
Source: jcpz (2013a)
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management (respect for public assets and the park) but also to introducing 
environmental education to groups that have been deprived of access to 
green open spaces. The fourth type of engagement with the public falls un-
der the management of outsourced services and the distribution of minor jobs 
(Supply Chain Management, Enterprise Development, and epwp5). The  latter 
programme in particular (epwp) constitutes a key element of the interaction 
between jcpz and residents in townships and informal settlements, as it is 
used to distribute piece jobs and stipends to the unemployed in disadvantaged 
areas and groups.
Community engagement, or rather ‘Stakeholder Management’ is therefore 
mostly seen as a branding and marketing, public relations exercise— responding 
to crises when organised user groups become too vocal or threatening, but not 
addressing the fundamental causes of complaint: insufficient operational bud-
gets and human resources to cater for the 2,500-odd open spaces that jcpz is re-
sponsible for. The objective of mobilising resources is framed mostly in terms 
of garnering financial contributions from the private sector (rather than seeing 
community involvement in park management as a ‘resource’) and developing 
new business opportunities. This is done through big corporates branding them-
selves in exchange for financial contributions to events, infrastructure, or man-
agement, or through small emerging black enterprises and cooperatives given 
short-term contracts by City Parks. These contracts are actually a way for jcpz to 
mobilise financial resources from other branches of the state—the national state 
through epwp, or the municipality at large through Jozi@work programmes.6
This framing—which could be termed neo-liberal—however coexists with 
a strong redistributive discourse ( jcpz, 2013a) focusing on opening new parks 
in disadvantaged areas (former black townships and informal settlements) and 
bridging the ‘green divide’ between the ‘leafy suburbs’ to the ‘dusty  townships’. 
This discourse is not mere rhetoric and is matched by important capital bud-
gets that go each year to marginalised areas and the active development of new 
parks—with no increase, however, in operational budgets for the management 
of the agency’s growing assets and only low levels of community engagement 
5 The Expanded Public Works Programme (epwp) consists of stipends given to disadvan-
taged individuals for community work for a short period of time (one to three months). The 
 programme is funded by the national government and in Johannesburg is used mostly by 
municipal entities such as City Parks and Pikitup (waste management). Based on a critique 
of the limited developmental impacts of epwp, Johannesburg Mayor Parks Tau developed 
a  City-funded programme, Jozi@work, that organised service delivery contracts between 
 municipal entities and cooperatives (contracts for a period of three years, including training 
by the municipal entity contracting the cooperative)—distributing more stable employment 
on more collective terms. However, the programme was terminated during the tenure of 
Democratic Alliance Mayor Herman Mashaba in 2017.
6 See previous footnote.
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in contexts where there has been limited historical opportunity for the con-
solidation of local park user groups. The emphasis on the capital budget also 
means that funding for the outsourcing of various tasks (including manage-
ment ones) is easier to mobilise than that for hiring supplementary staff, for 
which operational budget is direly lacking in the agency.
Community engagement, even in its many ambiguous meanings and 
 dimensions, is therefore a rather marginal and certainly quite implicit policy 
objective, as illustrated by the ten strategic Key Performance Areas for the agen-
cy (see Table 5.1). However, it is also clear that the neo-liberal framings (lack of 
Table 5.1 Ten strategic Key Performance Indicators for jcpz
Ten Strategic Key Performance Areas Key Performance Indicators
1. Financial balance Value (rands) of external funding 
collected
2. Food security Number of community gardens 
created
3. Active citizenship Number of public workshops in 
environmental education
4. Sustainable city Number of projects linked to 
‘Corridors of Freedom’*
5.  Partnerships with external 
stakeholders
Number of service level  
agreements signed with external 
partners (other municipalities, 
universities, sponsors)
6.  Small Micro and Medium  
Enterprises (smmes)
Number of training workshops 
for smmes
7.  Small Micro and Medium  
Enterprises (smmes)
Number of epwp jobs created
8.  Small Micro and Medium  
Enterprises (smmes)
Number of cooperatives created
9.  Small Micro and Medium  
Enterprises (smmes)
Number of cooperatives trained
10. Green space development Number of hectares of green 
space created
*  The ‘Corridors of Freedom’ is a mayoral flagship programme that identifies four ‘corridors’ 
in the city where transport infrastructure and other public and private investments are to be 
concentrated in order to ‘re-stitch’ the post-apartheid city.
Source: jcpz, 2014.
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human and financial resources to manage parks) and discourse  (increasingly 
pressing requirement to raise complementary resources to manage parks) 
also open opportunities for various forms of community involvement in the 
management of parks—not principally through fundraising (although this is 
one dimension in the wealthier neighbourhoods), but mostly through human 
resources: voluntary work, individual or collective, addressing the everyday is-
sues of park management in the absence of dedicated municipal staff for each 
park. Indeed, each park manager has under his or her responsibility up to 70 
public open spaces (developed parks, undeveloped parks, conservancies, and 
nature reserves) for which he or she manages small teams of  between 15 and 
30 horticulturists, rotating them between parks according to a tight service 
roster.7
3.2 Engaging with Communities: Competing and Contested Mandates 
for Street-Level Officials
Park managers, as the only City officials regularly (if insufficiently) ‘on the 
ground’, serve as the de facto liaison between the agency and park users: every-
day operational challenges require a degree of interaction with surrounding 
communities and being onsite makes them the complaint desks for local users. 
How to have the team of horticulturists cut the grass in the park, when it has 
two hours to do so before moving to the next park, if there is litter on the grass 
that has not been collected by the municipal agency in charge of litter collec-
tion (Pikitup), or when that litter is regularly deposited by anonymous users in 
sections of the park that could be described as ‘border vacuums’ (Jacobs, 1961)? 
What to do when groups of homeless people sleep and live in the park, sort-
ing out the waste they want to recycle and sell and leaving litter in the park, 
when residents complain, and when police evictions only lead to these home-
less groups coming back a few days later? Park managers, in practice, engage 
regularly with users and user groups, but they have no mandate to do so, gen-
erally no professional training for such interactions (although they often have 
learnt by doing), and limited resources and back up with regard to the solving 
of issues. In the Klipriviersberg Nature Reserve Forum, for instance, the offi-
cial sitting in the meeting is the Head of Conservation; he has environmental 
 training and a passion for birds, and expresses an explicit dislike for the politics 
of community engagement.
Park managers report directly to regional managers, whose Key Performance 
Areas (kpas) relate—to a significant extent (45 per cent)—to the number and 
importance of park users’ complaints within their administrative region, as 
7 Parks get serviced between once a week and once a month depending on their status, size, 
and use, but also their spatial and political visibility.
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well as to the rapidity with which they solve the issues that led to the com-
plaints. However, the other kpas and the bulk of park managers’ job is to man-
age the scarce staff rotating between parks, track their movements and the time 
spent in each park, tick their scorecards and manage staff scarcity (Table 5.2). 
This leaves limited time to engage in solving the issues that lead to complaints, 
which generally have complex and structural causes and require long-term en-
gagement with users and local contexts rather than quick fixes.
Those with an official mandate, the Stakeholder Liaison Officers (slos), do 
not attend any user group, residents’ association or civil society organisation 
meetings, even if City Parks is officially invited to these meeting and its pres-
ence is crucial to respond to users’ issues. It is only when there are major crises, 
such as the one in Klipriviersberg Nature Reserve (involving the media and the 
Table 5.2 Summary of Key Performance Indicators for jcpz Regional Managers, 2017
Key Performance Area (kpa),  
park regional managers (2017)
Key Performance Indicator (kpi)
1.  Financial sustainability and  
resilience (20%)
Percentage of General Auditor’s findings 
responded toPercentage of operational 
budget spent
Number of epwp and Jozi@work jobs 
created
Number of cooperatives and smmes  
engaged in programmes (Jozi@work)
2. Customer perspective (45%) Annual Customer Satisfaction  
IndexPercentage of resolution of customer 
complaints
Number of complaints received over 
30 days
Targeted turnaround time per maintenance 
cycle, for various types of parks (flagship, 
developed, undeveloped parks, etc.)
3.  Internal business  
processes (23%)
Number of mature trees actively  
maintainedNumber of trees planted  
and maintained
Turnaround time of fallen tree removal
4. Learning and growth (12%) Quarterly performance assessment  
conducted for all direct reports  
Number of innovation initiatives
Source: Author’s own analysis, from jcpz documents, 2017a, 2017b and 2017c.
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possibility of litigation) that they intervene with user groups. Their Key Perfor-
mance Indicators (Table 5.3) are actually framed around engagement not with 
user groups, but with ward councillors, as the sole legitimate representatives of 
civil society at the local level.8
8 A ward represents around 20,000 registered voters, which could indicate between 60,000 and 
100,000 residents, depending on the ward.
Table 5.3 Summary of Key Performance Indicators for Stakeholder Liaison Officers, 2015
Key Performance Area (kpa), 
Stakeholder Liaison Officers
Key Performance Indicator (kpi)
1. Internal business process Internal engagement with other jcpz  
departments and number of meetings  
attendedInternal coordination and  
facilitation of departmental programmes 
such as environmental education,  
operations, and recruitment of  
community liaison officers (clo)
Monthly reports, responses to councillor 
queries
2.  External stakeholder 
perspective
Number of engagements with  
councillorsNumber of engagements and 
joint programmes and campaigns with city, 
provincial, and national government
Number of participants in engagement 
with organs of civil society, concerned 
residents, and political parties regarding 
service delivery challenges
Attendance at quarterly Councillor forum
Attendance at regional service delivery, 
Joint Organisation Committee, or Section 
79 meetings
3. Learning and development Training and development programmes in-
cluding workshops—one per financial year
Source: After Bosaka (2015), from jcpz documents, 2015a and 2015b.
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The narrow definition of ‘stakeholder engagement’ (defined as engagement 
with councillors as local brokers with communities) is explained first by the 
extreme lack of resourcing of the unit: only four slos for the whole metropoli-
tan area and 2,500 open spaces (not all of them having user groups9). There 
is  no way such a limited staff can attend extremely demanding community 
meetings, often occurring once a month at late hours and in generally remote 
and suburban locations where public transport is scarce and dangerous. The 
narrowness of slos’ mandate is also linked to the resistance of elected ward 
councillors, who protect and defend their prerogative as the only legitimate 
mediators between the City and residents—all the more so because the nation-
al legislation on municipal structure has deprived them of any real institutional 
power, out of fear of fostering racial fragmentation and predatory or  violent 
clientelism (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008). slos therefore complain that they are pro-
hibited from calling any public meeting without recourse to the mediation of 
ward councillors, whose mobilisation and interest is uneven across the city.
Beyond those street level officials, another area of contestation arises 
 between the official heading the ‘Stakeholder Management’ unit and the one 
in charge of ‘New Business Development’—the latter theoretically focusing 
on engagements and partnerships that involve financial transactions (spon-
sorship or event organisation). However, in practice the lines are blurred, as 
 financial contributions often require a prior process of informal engagement 
and the building of a relationship of trust, while engagement with commu-
nities might lead to fundraising initiatives that financially benefit the park. 
This institutional blurriness is aggravated by the different professional skills 
and trajectories of the two officials. The former is a loyal and long-standing 
parks official defending the image of the agency and its traditional mandate, 
and seeing communities mostly as a nuisance, a risk, or a challenge; the latter, 
meanwhile, coming from Johannesburg Zoo, is far more socially aware, builds 
networks, and is entrepreneurial in spirit.
Whilst there is merit in community engagement not being confined to one 
single unit or official and being mainstreamed in the institution where various 
forms of engagement with individual or collective users are acknowledged or 
encouraged, there is also a lack of clarity regarding roles and mandates on the 
ground as well as at the high bureaucratic level. This lack of clarity also leads 
to a lack of proper resourcing, both of those officially in charge of Stakeholder 
9 City Parks officials were unable to provide us with a number for (formal or informal) user 
groups, and had no consolidated list of such groups, dealing with them on an ad hoc basis 
depending on how vocal they were in their claims, and at times more regularly where user 
groups were more consolidated.
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Management and of those practically confronted by users and user groups on 
a daily basis. This might reflect the fundamental ambiguities of City Parks’ 
position on community engagement—a neo-liberal frame confronted with 
potentially democratising practices that have not been explicitly or actively 
embraced. The concept of co-production and the changing state practices it 
entails is still foreign to City Parks officials’ conceptions of themselves and 
their institution, even if co-production practices are developing on the ground.
3.3 Uncertainty Regarding How to Define and Consolidate  
the Rules of Co-management
This gap is visible in City Parks’ attempts to formalise partnerships be-
tween  itself, as the agency mandated for park management by the City of 
 Johannesburg, and park user groups actually involved in the management of 
specific parks. These attempts are studied through the development process 
of partnership guidelines as well as formal documents establishing different 
types of agreements and signed by City Parks and specific non-state agents.
The first document, initiated in 2013, is entitled ‘Framework on Stakeholder 
Partnership Agreement for Joint Natural Resources Management of Natural 
Areas’ and is being developed by the New Business Development unit ( jcpz, 
2013b). It attempts to provide generic guidelines for the establishment of joint 
management committees, bringing together City park officials and park user 
groups to manage nature reserves—areas larger than parks, less used, and more 
difficult to maintain due to the specific environmental conservation require-
ments that the status of nature reserve entails.10 This document is currently 
only a draft, and has not been finalised, consolidated or adopted four years 
after its drafting—neither has this draft been discussed with stakeholders; it 
remains blocked due to legal concerns. The first of these concerns is financial. 
Whilst the partnership is explicitly geared towards mobilising complementary 
resources for the management of nature reserves, and in particular financial 
resources, City Parks as a municipal agency is uncertain if it is entitled to en-
gage in fundraising activities jointly with park user groups. In particular, it in-
vokes the 2013 Municipal Finances Management Act as an important obstacle 
to the possibility of ring-fencing funding raised by the City for a specific park. 
This Act has been framed explicitly to avoid the local ring-fencing of financial 
resources for a specific space or territory, in response to the apartheid-era lo-
cal government structure, which separated resourced and tax-endowed white 
local authorities from impoverished and tax-deprived black local authorities. 
10 In particular, the legal obligation (not followed in parks) to regularly and repeatedly 
 destroy ‘invasive alien vegetation’, which is seen as a threat to water reserves and to indig-
enous species—work that is very costly in terms of human resources.
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The Act aligns with the construction of metropolitan institutions to govern 
cities, inspired by the political slogan popular in the 1980s—‘one city, one 
tax base’, rejecting the institutional fragmentation and resource ring-fencing 
that were central to the reproduction of racial and social segregation. South 
African municipalities therefore have recourse to various forms of delegated 
ring- fencing—as mechanisms for raising supplementary resources affected 
to  specific territories—such as City Improvement Districts, or here, park user 
groups. This delegation, however, means a loss of power for municipal insti-
tutions, which have no grasp of the amounts of resources actually collected 
by those groups, and no influence over how this funding is used. This is the 
case with park user groups, some of which have been able to garner a substan-
tial amount of funds for the parks in question (through events or campaigns) 
and have used these funds without necessarily informing or obtaining formal 
agreement from City Parks to upgrade or develop park facilities.11
The development of a joint management committee in the draft framework, 
therefore, prevents such a committee from actually leveraging funding for the 
reserve—a major impediment to the consolidation of such joint management 
in the draft framework. A possible technical solution could be to task the part-
nering stakeholders to fundraise and report to the joint management com-
mittee. But this would entail a degree of trust (that currently does not  exist), 
of reciprocity in disclosing resources available for the park (which grounded 
officials currently have no mandate for), and also a form of delineation of 
each partner’s mandate and role—currently not developed in the frame-
work. This issue is arguably, although less visibly, the second major obstacle 
to the  consolidation of the framework: uncertainty regarding the definition of 
the respective roles and mandates of each partner. City Parks indeed appears, 
in its practices of engagement with park user groups, extremely reluctant to 
give up sections of its mandate and share decision-making authority on issues 
affecting the park. How temporary staff (epwp and Jozi@work) are deployed 
and coordinated, what events are organised in the park and when, when public 
interventions are planned, and what budget is allocated for the year are areas 
of great contention between City Parks and park users, the latter complain-
ing that they are never consulted on nor even informed of these matters, even 
though they affect the everyday management of the park that they themselves 
are driving.
11 This has been the case in Zoo Lake, where the user committee has unilaterally revamped 
a sports field. City Parks has strongly criticised this initiative and frozen the commit-
tee for a few years, before the committee was revived with a less autonomous stance 
(Hadebe, 2015).
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A similar uncertainty is to be found in another, more ad hoc document, a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) jointly signed by one user group—the 
Friends of Kloofendal (FroK)—and City Parks ( jcpz, 2015b, 2017c). Interest-
ingly, the document was framed based on an existing interaction between the 
user group and the Education and Awareness unit. FroK accepted to participate 
in City Parks’ programmes of environmental education for township school 
children (in the form of ten tours they would provide free of charge annually 
for about 60 learners each) in exchange for the free use of a City Parks office 
on site. This agreement, supervised by City Parks’ legal department, is however 
silent on the subject of other management partnerships, in  particular  everyday 
practices of the conservation manager and the user group—in terms of inva-
sive alien plant destruction, the training and coordination of outsourced staff, 
the organisation of tours and events, etc. Although the conservation manager 
is on site, no provision is made for regular meetings between the two par-
ties; nothing in the MoA alludes to a division of labour or the coordination 
of tasks—something FroK is complaining bitterly about while the everyday 
relationship has soured and this tension has challenged the continuation of 
the agreement in 2017.
The distrust embedded in some sections of City Parks with regard to  users 
and community engagement is visible in another document, drafted by the 
Stakeholder Management unit. The Volunteers Policy ( jcpz, 2015a), which 
guides the way in which volunteers from civil society can apply for the status 
that enables them to assist City Parks in maintaining parks and open spaces. 
The policy not only makes it clear that volunteers are to fit within City Parks’ 
(undisclosed) existing needs, it also displays a high level of distrust of volun-
teers, required them to sign (three times throughout the agreement form) a 
commitment to the non-disclosure of any internal information on jcpz that 
they might be exposed to during their volunteer work. This policy clearly 
does not constitute co-production, rather reaffirming City Parks’ traditional 
mandate and dominance in what is not conceived as a ‘partnership’. It is City 
Parks using a voluntary workforce to complement its staff in pre-existing pro-
grammes or interventions—at its discretion, and accompanied by a degree of 
fear of indiscretion on the part of any outsider exposed to its inner workings.
In parallel, the New Business Development unit has developed ad hoc 
agreements (more or less formal—letters of adoption with user groups and 
residents’ associations; Memorandum of Agreement with the corporate sec-
tor) to formalise partnerships for the management of parks (Table 5.4). Con-
trasting with the complex and protracted processes of engaging with user 
groups around the joint management of nature reserves, the formalisation 
of partnerships with civil society organisations (homeowners’, community, 
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or ratepayers’ associations) for neighbourhood parks’ management has been 
straightforward. It has taken the form of ‘letters of adoption’ delegating tasks 
defined on an ad hoc basis, depending on what community organisations are 
willing to offer ( jcpz, 2016a, 2016b). Communities ‘adopting’ a specific park 
do so for a period of five years, and provide services from everyday park man-
agement (cleaning and grass cutting) to equipment maintenance (fixing and 
replacing facilities; repaving paths) to park development (new playground and 
security equipment, landscaping, tree planting, and the purchase of artwork).
Other, more elaborate partnerships have been developed with building 
owners or coalitions of property owners (in particular when they are working 
within City Improvement Districts) in inner city neighbourhoods as more for-
mal Memorandums of Agreement (MoAs). In these MoAs, specific services are 
provided by non-state partners: park security first and foremost (and the fund-
ing of permanent security guards in the park through the cid) ( jcpz, 2017a), 
but also park maintenance (cleaning and grass cutting) and even at times 
community-building through the organisation of events ( jcpz, 2016d, 2017b).
Formal agreements are not, however, limited to the corporate sector, and 
letters of adoption are not always restricted to civil society organisations. For 
instance, a suburban residential complex has also ‘adopted’ a park through a 
letter of adoption (jcpz, 2016c). More interestingly, a Service Level Agreement 
has been signed between City Parks and Blairgowrie Community Association, 
as well as the two main security companies patrolling the neighbourhood, to ex-
pand their security patrols to the park and regularly report to City Parks ( jcpz, 
2017a). City Parks has agreed to have monthly meetings with the security com-
pany and the residents’ association regarding these reports, therefore going 
beyond a simple delegation of security services and towards what might involve 
co-production. In practice, many residents’ associations have negotiated with 
local security companies to expand their services to neighbourhood parks, but 
few have actually formalised this arrangement with City Parks, and most there-
fore do not benefit from institutionalised or regular engagement with the agency.
This set of documents consolidates various kinds of partnerships. These 
range from what can be seen as co-production (entailing regular meetings to 
‘co-decide’ and co-manage, which can be understood as changing the state’s 
practices towards accountability and problem-solving in conjunction with the 
partner, community, or corporate) to what constitutes degrees of delegation 
(where non-state agents provide a service that is not provided by City Parks, 
in a semi-autonomous mode with some level of reporting to City Parks but 
no regular meeting or joint decision-making). What the chronology and di-
versification of formal partnership agreements show is a rise in partnerships 
with the corporate sector (building owners and City Improvement Districts), 
especially in the inner city (the locus of mayoral regeneration efforts); and a 
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shift away from complex and resource-hungry co-production towards more 
straightforward delegation.
The limits of the delegation model, however, are twofold. It effectively pri-
vatises park management, and does have social exclusionary effects, especially 
towards the more marginalised park users (Matubatuba et al., 2018). The most 
formal partnerships (slas and MoAs) have an explicit objective to evict the 
homeless from public parks, stating, for instance:
Unmanaged public space in Johannesburg inner city parks and open 
spaces makes them a haven for vagrants [sic], unemployed youth and 
criminals whose unlawful activities and anti-social behaviour render the 
essential and valuable recreational spaces in high-rise residential areas in-
accessible for general public use – social, sporting, recreational. 
jcpz, 2017b, 4
jcpz shall observe and be responsible for the following: […] To ensure 
illegal street vendors and vagrancy issues when reported by any of the 
parties will be addressed within a reasonable time-frame as required, 
 depending on the levels of urgency indicated. 
jcpz, 2017a
A second limitation is that these partnerships can only involve financially 
 resourced partners, such as CIDs, building owners or middle-class residents’ 
associations, which are able to fundraise. Less well-endowed communities, 
more fragmented ones, are unable to find the financial resources to sustain 
park management in the long run, but also therefore to demand accountability 
and service delivery from City Parks, unlike more resourced communities. The 
coordination of multiple but informal community contributions to the park, 
as they happen in less-structured communities, does require regular engage-
ment with City Parks’ officials, and forms of co-production, not delegation, of 
the management of public space.
3.4 City Parks’ Resistance to Co-production
What explains the relative failure of co-production arrangements and their for-
malisation in Johannesburg? The existing, informal processes of co-production, 
in nature reserves in particular, have proven complex and often conflict-ridden 
(Mokgere, 2016). This has led City Parks to tentatively reconfigure the platform 
for engagement. An example of this is Klipriviersberg nature reserve, where the 
Forum was created in 2016 to avoid the further mediatisation of issues by very 
vocal associations; the Forum was, however, disbanded in mid-2017, soon after 
the meeting reported above. The configuration of these platforms makes them 
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highly unequal, and renders debates implicitly racialised (Mokgere, 2016), 
with often one black, low-income City official confronted by groups of white, 
middle-class local leaders. The mutual and self-perpetuating racial prejudice 
present in these meetings has been used by some higher-placed City Parks of-
ficials to discard the issues raised by park users on this platform, and to dele-
gitimise them as partners as only being interested in reproducing their own 
(white) privilege.
What this understanding does not answer to is the issue of the capacita-
tion of park managers (here the head conservationist) to engage with and be 
resourced to respond to users’ claims, and to drive their collective and joint 
framing (Jones, 2002). Granted, putting more public resources into already 
privileged suburban spaces (capacitating municipal staff to efficiently engage 
in the co-production process requires resources) is clearly politically illegiti-
mate in post-apartheid South Africa. As the issue of co-production is framed in 
racial terms, and as existing practices have developed mostly in former white 
and middle-class areas, City Parks’ internal processes of reflecting on the con-
ditions for co-production and its institutionalisation, on changing the state’s 
practices and mode of provision of services in conditions of scarcity, have 
been effectively frozen. To some extent therefore, the racialisation of social 
relations between City officials and existing park user groups, prevents City 
Parks from learning lessons from these experimental and informal practices 
of co-production. The political delegitimisation of (white and middle-class) 
park user groups, and the reluctance of City Parks to share state power with 
and dedicate resources to groups with perceived structural (class, racial and 
spatial) privilege, leads City Parks (and some officials) to block needed reflec-
tion on the transformation of its own practices.
This is ultimately damaging both for service delivery and for City Parks’ 
key strategic objective—redressing the wrongs of the past, bridging the green 
divide, and developing universal access to and enjoyment of urban parks and 
the environment. Indeed, the absence of templates for agreements and tools 
for the co-management of parks, and the lack of reform of City Parks’ insti-
tutions and practices, is also and perhaps even more detrimental to lower-
income communities: in townships, informal settlements, and the inner city. 
There, partnerships with City Parks (in the form of delegation, the partnership 
that is the most formalised and the easiest) are unlikely, as local communities 
have not organised around parks. They have not done so for a multiplicity of 
reasons: because parks are a scarce or new urban asset, or are not seen as the 
most crucial issue for collective mobilisation; because residents have got used 
to open spaces being hazards rather than assets (see Hadebe, 2015; Mcetywa 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
129Why is Co-management of Parks Not Working in Johannesburg?
<UN>
et al., 2015); or because there is limited capacity or opportunity for fundraising. 
In these lower-income or less-organised areas, co-production championed by 
City Parks might be the only way to mobilise local residents, and garner local 
resources that might exist locally in the form of multiple uses and investment 
in the park, but remain fragmented and isolated.
Co-production remains a theoretical and practical frontier, worth analys-
ing beyond radical critiques of neo-liberalising or ‘governmentalising’ partner-
ships. Much work remains to be done to unpack the technical, existential and 
political challenges entailed by processes of framing new rules, institutions 
and practices if one wants to go beyond informal pilots that are flexible but 
under-resourced and under-recognised, yet mobilise needed resources and 
provide forms of public goods in challenging environments. The question of 
the uneven capacity for co-production, across segregated spaces and unequal 
communities, remains; but co-production in this respect might be a lesser evil 
than delegation—practically efficient in selected spaces and with resourced 
partners, but more directly reproducing metropolitan inequalities and local 
exclusions.
Co-production involves both an existential and a technical reflection 
within the state. An existential reflection on the definition of the state’s man-
date and the selection of what it can delegate versus what needs to remain 
core; on the nature of City Parks’ social and public objectives, and how they 
can be delivered, possibly by non-state agents, without compromising these 
 objectives; on the trade-offs between sharing power and control. A technical 
reflection on the tools—their legality and practicality; their cost and their 
benefits—needed to set up and institutionalise the space for co-production. 
Here, the current proliferation of formats of agreement (MoAs, MoUs, slas, 
letters of adoption…) shows innovation and experiment in framing locally 
adapted partnerships in the absence of a broader template to guide them—
an effort that City Parks has at least temporarily set aside. However, in these 
experiments, the temptation is to go for the simplest tools—delegation rather 
than co-production (which would imply not only resourcing from City Parks 
but also a change in practice, a prioritisation of engagement and community 
facilitation that has not (yet?) been adopted as a strategic priority by City 
Parks). As Stone (2006) suggests, it is probably much easier for the state to 
establish and monitor market-based exchanges than it is to frame and guide 
the blurred, shifting, complex and personalised relationships involved in com-
munity engagement—even if delegation, far more than co-production, con-
solidates inequality of public provision between resourced and un-resourced 
communities and spaces.
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4 Conclusion
Why is the co-management of parks not working in Johannesburg? A num-
ber of elements explain this challenge. Contextual elements—as City Parks 
has not prioritised community engagement in its strategic objectives and 
has  framed it in confused and often exclusively neo-liberal ways: as damage 
control, as income-generating, or as precarious job distribution. Organisa-
tional elements—as the mandate for community engagement lies in diverse, 
overlapping and competing administrative units marked by various profes-
sional and bureaucratic cultures that sometimes are resistant to change, still 
considering City Parks as the sole provider of services in line with its tradi-
tional public mandate, and in denial when it comes to its incapacity to deliver 
services on its own. But also, it needs to be acknowledged that the institution-
alisation of co-production is extraordinarily complex—technically and politi-
cally—and that this complexity fuels the conservative forces within the state. 
It seems much easier for City Parks to delegate park management to resourced 
partners (at no direct cost to City Parks, and involving little change in its 
practices, tools and self-representation) than to put City Parks resources and 
energies into  engaging in regular forums or committees of co-production, 
inventing new instruments and reshaping its own mandate, accepting the 
power trade-offs and skill reshuffling requested by such partnerships. These 
complex but productive (and possibly ultimately more efficient) paths are 
 being  experimented in  Johannesburg nature reserves; but they are being 
blocked by a degree of racialisation of state-user groups’ engagements that 
makes them easy to discard, and limits City Parks’ ability to learn from them, 
refine, and institutionalise them.
The reconfiguration of this section of the state (a municipal agency that is 
marginalised in strategic and budgetary terms in the Johannesburg City Coun-
cil) can therefore be understood as being reshaped by diverse and overlapping 
rationalities. The first is neo-liberal rationality and its solution set (external 
fundraising, use of temporary and volunteer workers, emphasis on partner-
ships, and protection of the brand) and modalities of bureaucratic control 
(quantitative kpis). But it would not on its own suffice to explain City Parks’ 
practices and their shift. There is secondly a degree of pragmatic rationality. 
Delegating park management to resourced user groups or corporates is an 
efficient and immediate response to a funding, staff, and skills shortage, and 
to the legal incapacity of the municipality to ring-fence locally raised fund-
ing (which is partly overcome through the recourse to such user groups’ ini-
tiatives). It can be done simply through ready-made contracts, more readily 
available than complex, negotiated community agreements requiring regular 
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interaction, legal innovation and joint problem-solving. Thirdly, besides the 
neo-liberal and pragmatic rationalities, there is still a powerful rationality con-
structed around the notion of ‘transformation’—actively addressing the racial 
and social inequalities inherited from the past. This post-apartheid rationality 
drives budgetary choices (the emphasis on the distribution of small service 
contracts to individuals and collectives), but also forms of delegitimisation of 
existing user groups: good enough to be delegated park management in some 
cases, but not deemed worthy of setting up deep engagement and cooperation 
with, which would entail increasing, or at least restructuring (Ostrom, 1996), 
the state’s human resources. Explicit redistributive mandates necessitating 
forms of centralised governance, together with racialised experiences of com-
munity engagements, therefore still strongly shape City Parks’ practices and 
policy instruments, in resistance to the potential dynamics of co-production. 
Together with the neo-liberal and pragmatic rationalities, they lead, however, 
to the delegated management of well-resourced parks to the private sector, 
on the one hand, and to the limited mobilisation of state as well as non-state 
 resources to manage parks in less-resourced areas, on the other, therefore para-
doxically reproducing forms of separate and unequal management in the post-
apartheid city.
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Chapter 6
Online Representation of Sustainable City 
Initiatives in Africa: How Inclusive?
Ton Dietz
Abstract
Africa’s rapid population growth, and even more rapid urbanisation, creates serious 
sustainability challenges. Like many cities in other parts of the world, African cities 
try to become ‘green’, and promote change in urban design and lifestyles to encourage 
more sustainable living. Many of these initiatives are supported by international agen-
cies and illustrated on agency websites. Studying these websites, we try to answer three 
related questions dealing with the inclusivity of those initiatives: the geographical cov-
erage (which cities?), the thematic coverage (how ‘holistic’?) and the social inclusivity 
(how inclusive in terms of social focus?). Both scholars and practitioners should be-
come more inclusive in their approaches to sustainable cities in Africa.
‘The challenge of achieving sustainable urban development will be 
 particularly formidable in Africa.’
cohen 2006, 63
1 Africa’s Urbanisation
Many scholars still regard Africa as a rural continent, with few and relatively 
unimportant megacities, compared to Asia, the Americas and Europe. In the 
world’s leading textbooks on urban geography, Africa has received very lim-
ited attention so far (e.g. Kaplan and Holloway, 2014; Knox and McCarthy, 2012; 
Hall and Barrett, 2012; Pacione, 2009). Things are changing, though, because 
Africa is changing, and it is changing rapidly, even if its demographic transition 
lags behind compared to all other continents. The lowering of Africa’s fertility 
 levels started only in the 1980s and demographers expect that Africa will have 
completed its demographic transition only in 2100. In the meantime, Africa’s 
population has grown from 300 million in 1960 to more than 1.2 billion in 2015, 
while it is expected to grow to between 3.3 and 5.6 billion in 2100 (with 4.4 
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billion given as the median figure). High fertility levels play a major role here, 
but improved health care, food availability and hygiene, which together result 
in much higher life expectancy figures, play a role as well. A rapidly growing, 
relatively very young and possibly very vibrant urban African population will 
become a major demographic factor in the world. The demographic expecta-
tion is that Africa will have close to 40 per cent of the world’s population by 
2100, probably more than Asia, and more than five times the figure for Europe 
(see Heilig’s website www.demographics.at).
Also in global terms Africa’s cities are becoming relatively more important. 
In a comparative study, Barney Cohen (Cohen, 2006), the former Chief of the 
Population Studies Branch of the United Nations in New York, presents inter-
esting data, which we summarise in Table 6.1.
Cohen noted with concern that around the year 2000 many urban Africans 
lacked piped water, flush toilets and electricity in their urban homes, particu-
larly in the smaller urban centres: in sub-Saharan Africa 50 per cent of the 
urban households lacked these amenities in cities with fewer than 100,000 in-
habitants, 40 per cent in cities of between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, 
35 per cent in cities of half a million to a million inhabitants, and 22 per cent 
in cities of more than one million inhabitants, unlike for instance North Africa 
(where these figures were only 5, 2, 4 and 6 per cent, respectively) or all other 
parts of the world (including Asia), where these figures were all much lower 
than in Africa. Cohen writes (2006, 75 and 77): ‘There is an urgent need to build 
and support the capacity of local governments to manage the environmental 
and social service problems that accompany rapid urban growth’. He adds: ‘An 
Table 6.1 Africa’s cities in world perspective
No. of cities 
>1 million in 
Africa
Total urban  
population in 
Africa
African urban 
population as % 
of world urban 
population
% of African 
population in 
cities
1950 2 33 5 15
1975 8 103 7 25
2000 35 295 10 37
2015 61 481 12 41
2030 (pred.) 748 15 54
Sources: Cohen (2006); data for 1950, 1975, 2000 and 2030 prediction: pp. 70, 71 
and 75. For 2015: calculated from World Bank Data and Statistics Times
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essential feature of current African urbanisation, is that unlike cities in much 
of Asia and Latin America, urbanization appears to have become decoupled 
from economic development. The vast majority of African cities are economi-
cally marginalized in the new global economy and most African cities are 
growing despite poor macroeconomic performance and without significant 
direct foreign investment’. This was written in the middle of that first decade 
of the new millennium, and based on statistics from around 2000, when it was 
not yet clear that Africa was about to enter an era of rapid economic growth 
that would last until 2015 and during which African cities (although not all) did 
become engines of rapid economic growth, and of social vitality. But it is obvi-
ously true, and it will remain true for many decades, that managing African 
cities, also in terms of sustainability, will be one of the major challenges of the 
twenty-first century.
In 2012, the African Studies Centre in Leiden produced a thematic map of 
‘Africa: From a Continent of States to a Continent of Cities’ (Dietz et al., 2012). 
Table 6.2 provides an update of this thematic map for all urban agglomera-
tions with currently more than two million inhabitants, based on data from 
the website citypopulation.de.1 Other sources use other definitions of urban 
areas or cities, and arrive at different, often lower figures. The most important 
of these are the statistical sections in the UN-Habitat ‘State of the African City’ 
Reports (e.g. the one for 2014) and the World Bank data on urbanisation, the 
annual World Urbanization Prospect reports (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2014). For the thematic map, and for Table 6.2 of 
this chapter, we used the agglomeration assessments, because they give a more 
useful indication of built-up areas.
In total, Africa in early 2016 had 32 urban agglomerations with more than 
two million inhabitants. Of Africa’s current 54 states, 36 have, today, at least 
one urban agglomeration with more than one million inhabitants, and the to-
tal number of African multi-million urban areas is 61. More than 150 million of 
Africa’s 1.2 billion people now live in these multi-million agglomerations, and 
soon there will be many more.
2 Online Representation of Sustainable City Initiatives in Africa
Urban areas in Africa have different political and economic functions (e.g. as 
capital cities or harbour cities) and their locational characteristics also dif-
fer: coastal or inland; in dry lands or more humid climatological conditions. 
1 More particularly the page ‘Major Agglomerations of the World’, http://www.citypopulation 
.de/world/Agglomerations.html (see Brinkhoff ’s website).
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Table 6.2 Africa’s major urban agglomerations in 2016a (cont.) Table 6.2 Africa’s major urban agglomerations in 2016a
Urban agglomeration Country Population in millions 
(1.1.2016)
Lagos Nigeria 17.1
Cairo Egypt 16.8
Johannesburg South Africa 13.4
Kinshasa DR Congo 10.6
Luanda Angola 6.8
Khartoum Sudan 5.6
Dar es Salaam Tanzania 5.3
Nairobi Kenya 5.2
Alexandria Egypt 5.2
Abidjan Côte d’Ivoire 5.1
Accra Ghana 4.6
Casablanca Morocco 4.2
Cape Town South Africa 4.1
Kano Nigeria 4.1
Algiers Algeria 3.7
Addis Ababa Ethiopia 3.5
Dakar Senegal 3.3
Durban South Africa 3.2
Ibadan Nigeria 3.2
Kampala Uganda 3.0
Bamako Mali 3.0
Abuja Nigeria 2.8
Douala Cameroon 2.8
Yaoundé Cameroon 2.7
Kumasi Ghana 2.7
Tunis Tunisia 2.5
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 Environmental conditions may determine perceptions of sustainability: coast-
al areas are prone to storms, flooding and sea level rise (UN-Habitat, 2014), 
while dry lands can face droughts and water stress. Political and economic 
conditions may determine the urge of national governments to deal with 
popular concerns, including living conditions, some of which are related to 
sustainability issues. So it is wise to look at the characteristics of cities if one 
wants to get an idea of their environmental challenges, and if one wants to 
understand the diversity of sustainable city initiatives. In this second part of 
the chapter we will present various representations of Africa’s sustainability 
experiences on relevant Internet sites. We will look at these representations, 
and ask ourselves three related questions, all dealing with the inclusiveness of 
sustainability: (1) what is the geographical coverage of these sustainable city 
initiatives (which cities are the ‘favourites’ of the various ‘African sustainable 
cities’ websites, and which ones are not?), (2) what is the thematic coverage? 
(how ‘holistic’ is the representation; what themes get most attention?), and 
(3) how do these websites present the social inclusiveness of ‘their’ sustainable 
city initiatives?
a  According to Brinkhoff ’s website, ‘Urban agglomerations include a central city and neighbor-
ing places mostly linked by (more or less) continuously built-up areas. Some agglomerations 
have more than one central city’. Compared to the 2012 data from the same source, two towns 
in Somalia (Mogadishu and Hargeisa) dropped below the two million threshold used here, 
while Pretoria had become part of Greater Johannesburg. Bamako, Maputo, Antananarivo, 
Lusaka, Yaoundé, Ouagadougou, Conakry and Port Harcourt had all crossed the two million 
threshold in those few years.
Source: Brinkhoff T., http://www.citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.
html
Urban agglomeration Country Population in millions 
(1.1.2016)
Harare Zimbabwe 2.3
Lusaka Zambia 2.3
Antananarivo Madagascar 2.2
Conakry Guinea 2.2
Maputo Mozambique 2.2
Ouagadougou Burkina Faso 2.1
Port Harcourt Nigeria 2.1
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3 The eiu/Siemens Project: African Green City Index
One of the most informative overviews of sustainable city initiatives in Africa 
is given in a report by The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu) (supported by 
Siemens) in 2010, the African Green City Index. Following comparable assess-
ments of cities in Europe, Latin America, Asia, the usa and Canada, the Unit 
carried out an extensive survey of 15 major African cities, and tried to apply 
eight different main assessment criteria together with 25 sub-criteria (eiu, 
2011, 31; Table 6.3 of this chapter presents the results). Some cities could not 
be included because of a lack of data; for example, Kinshasa, Khartoum and 
Algiers were explicitly mentioned and data availability and reliability was a 
major problem in almost all other cities as well.
For the fifteen major African cities selected by The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, the results of the assessment of environmental performance show major 
differences. The assessment was based on a combination of eiu judgements, 
Siemens judgements, and judgements made by a panel of six external, inde-
pendent experts, the last of which, however, did not include a single African 
(see eiu, 2011, 4). Table 6.4 gives the details, combining scores on a five-point 
scale (from ++ to --) with major and minor highlights mentioned in the text 
(H and h). Highlights show the most important recent initiatives (that is, be-
fore 2010) undertaken by city governments in any of the eight categories of 
‘major issues’.
Three South African cities lead the assessment, and they share eight of the 
24 highlighted examples among them, including attention to Cape Town’s en-
ergy policy, Durban’s overall environmental governance, and Johannesburg’s 
efforts to improve the city’s land use in a sustainable way. Two North African 
cities (Casablanca and Tunis) follow, as does Accra in Ghana, which gets a 
major highlight for its water and sanitation approaches, and a minor one for 
environmental governance. These six cities get a positive overall assessment. 
Five African cities receive an average judgement: one in West Africa (Lagos, 
with a special highlight for its waste management approaches), two in Egypt 
(Cairo, with a special highlight for its transport approach and Alexandria, with 
a special highlight for water and sanitation policies), one in the Horn of Af-
rica (Addis Ababa) and one in South Africa (Pretoria/Tshwane). Four cities get 
an overall negative assessment (Nairobi and Luanda) or even an overall very 
negative assessment (Dar es Salaam and Maputo). For Luanda, Nairobi and 
Maputo the report highlights some attempts to develop better environmental 
governance and for Dar es Salaam and Maputo minor highlights are presented 
regarding water and sanitation initiatives.
The scores on energy and CO2 reflect the major differences in energy con-
sumption and energy composition on the continent, on the one hand, with 
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Table 6.3 eiu criteria for the African Green City Index
Issues (main 
criteria)
Sub-criteria
Energy and CO2 Percentage of households with access to electricity.
Electricity consumption per capita
CO2 emissions from electricity
Measure of a city’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions
Land Use Population density
Percentage of population living in informal settlements
Green spaces per capita (sum of all public parks, recreation areas 
and ‘greenways’)
Land use policy
Transport Public transport network: length of superior transport network 
(bus rapid transit, trams, light rail and ‘subway’), and length of 
mass transport network
Urban mass transport policy
Congestion reduction policy
Waste Total annual volume of waste generated by the city
Waste collection and disposal policy
Waste recycling and reuse policy
Water Access to potable waterWater consumption per capita
Water system leakages
Water quality policy
Water sustainability policy
Sanitation Population with access to improved sanitation (share of the total 
population either with sanitation connections to sewerage or ac-
cess to on-site sources)
Sanitation policy: measure of a city’s efforts to reduce pollution 
associated with inadequate sanitation
Air Quality Clean air policy: measure of a city’s efforts to reduce air pollution
Environmental 
Governance
Environmental management: measure of the extensiveness of 
environmental management undertaken by the city
Environmental monitoring: measure of the city’s efforts to monitor 
its environmental performance
Public participation: measure of the city’s efforts to involve the 
public in environmental decision-making.
Source: eiu (2011, 31)
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Table 6.4 Assessment of environmental performance in 15 major African cities
City Energy  
and CO2
Land 
use
Transport Waste Water Sanitation Air quality Environmental 
governance
Total
Cape Town -H ++ + +h +h 0 + + +/6
Durban - + + +h +h + + +H +/6
Johannesburg + +H +h 0 0 0 + + +/5
Casablanca + +h 0 0 + + + 0 +/5
Accra +h 0 - 0 0H + + ++h +/4
Tunis - 0h +h + 0 + + 0 +/3
Lagos ++h - 0h +H 0 0 0 0 0/2
Addis Ababa ++ +h - 0 + 0 - - 0/1
Alexandria 0 - 0 ++h -H 0 0 0 0/0
Cairo 0 0 +H - 0h 0 0 0 0/0
Pretoria -h 0 +h -- 0 - + + 0/-1
Nairobi - 0h - 0 0 0 - -h -/-4
Dar es Salaam 0 -h - -- 0H -- - - --/-8
Maputo - - - 0h -H -- - -h --/-8
Luanda 0 -- -- 0 -- 0 - --h -/-9
Average +1 0 -1 +1 0 -1 +2 0 0/+2
Source: based on eiu (2011, 31). The last column gives the assessment by eiu/
Siemens (++ to --) and my own calculation of the number of plusses and 
 minuses given; the cities appear in order of best overall performance
South African cities surpassing all other cities by far (although mainly based 
on coal), but on the other hand also reflects efforts to address the so-called car-
bon footprint, where Cape Town is the continent’s pioneer, but examples given 
for Pretoria, Accra and Lagos (see lasepa website) also show that there are 
serious attempts to develop solar and wind energy sources, as well as to use the 
opportunities that carbon credit schemes give to lower carbon emissions. As 
the first African metropolis, Cape Town launched its Integrated Environmental 
Policy in 2003 and this was followed by a climate change strategy in 2006, while 
the Cape Town Energy and Climate Change Plan was launched in 2011 (City of 
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Cape Town, 2011). The city also took an initiating role in bringing African cities 
into the ‘Compact of Mayors’ that was launched in June 2016 (See Global Cov-
enant of Mayors for Climate & Energy website).
For land use, the main example that was highlighted dealt with the impres-
sive attempts of the Johannesburg Development Agency (which started in 
2001) to combine urban renewal, inner-city regeneration, transport improve-
ments and better security. These have attracted many private investors and led 
to the launch of a large number of initiatives in the form of public–private 
collaborations (See Johannesburg Development Agency’s website). Other ex-
amples of land use improvement given are a major reforestation effort around 
Addis Ababa as well as the renewal of the city’s parks, urban agriculture ini-
tiatives in Casablanca, the green line project to establish a perimeter forest 
around the Nairobi National Park and attempts to revitalise Swahili building 
styles in Dar es Salaam.
For transport issues, Cairo was chosen to highlight a combination of efforts 
to deal with heavy congestion problems on the city’s roads. This combines a 
major extension of the metro system, changing buses to ones that use com-
pressed natural gas, and a carbon finance vehicle scrapping and recycling 
project to replace old taxis. Additional smaller highlights were given regarding 
the Johannesburg–Pretoria high-speed rail link, the light rail project in Tunis, 
together with the creation of rapid bus corridors, and finally Lagos’s public– 
private partnership to develop rapid transit buses.
Waste management gets considerable attention. The major highlight is the 
way Lagos changed a very dilapidated system to a much more effective ap-
proach, through the creation of a new Lagos Waste Management Authority 
and its ‘waste-to-wealth programme’ (see the lawma website). With regard 
to Cape Town the report shows the importance of waste separation initiatives, 
an integrated waste exchange website, and the city’s Smart Living Handbook. 
For Maputo it shows the way that the city has introduced waste management 
into its informal settlements, for Alexandria a new mercury waste processing 
plant, and for Durban the way that the city has started to support informal 
waste pickers.
Water and sanitation issues were separately judged, but the highlights com-
bined them. Seven approaches were highlighted. Accra, with its strategic plan-
ning for urban water management and its 2030 vision for improved sanitation, 
Alexandria with its attempts to reduce water intake from the River Nile (‘Switch 
urban water’), Dar es Salaam with its campaign for water education and Mapu-
to for its city-wide sanitation strategy got the most attention. But Cairo’s reha-
bilitation project for water and sanitation in the old city,  Casablanca’s  private 
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contractor to manage the city’s water and sanitation, and Durban’s sewage 
education programme were also mentioned.
Air pollution received some attention in the scores: in five of the 15 African 
cities that were compared, air quality was below world average levels, despite 
the fact that the major reason for bad air quality—industrial pollution and ve-
hicle emissions—is (still) a less prominent problem in Africa than elsewhere 
in the world.
Finally, the issue of environmental governance received (very) positive 
scores in Accra and in the three South African cities that were part of the com-
parison. Major highlights were given for Durban and a minor one for Accra, but 
also for three cities with (very) negative overall assessments and also with neg-
ative assessments for environmental governance (Luanda, Maputo and Nai-
robi), probably to show that not all is lost. Durban’s case is the most interesting 
one. The city introduced its comprehensive ‘Imagine Durban’ approach,2 with 
a lot of involvement from civil society and citizen organisations. It also formu-
lated goals to become a zero-waste city in 2020 and a carbon neutral city by 
2050. For Accra the report mentions the greenhouse gas emission identifica-
tion efforts made in order to prepare for a climate change mitigation policy. 
Despite its negative position on the overall assessment scores, Luanda was 
highlighted as an example due to the establishment of an environmental da-
tabase focusing on the city (supported by the African Development Bank)3, as 
was Maputo for its environmental education programme in schools (with em-
phases on tree planting and beach cleaning approaches), and finally Nairobi, 
where the government was working on an online approach to enable citizens 
to monitor their water and energy consumption (see for example, World Bank, 
2015).
4 Institutional Landscape of (Online) Sustainable City 
Collaborations/Networks with African Participation
The institutional ‘landscape’ for sustainable city collaboration in Africa, and 
with other parts of the world, is quite complicated. One organisation that has 
been active since 1990 is iclei, the International Council for Local Environ-
mental Initiatives. Since 2012 it has had a separate Africa iclei Committee and 
2 See assaf’s website: http://www.assaf.org.za/files/2010/04/Imagine-Durban-LTDF-2009.pdf
3 See eiu (2011), and more particularly the Green City Index on Luanda: https://www.siemens 
.com/entry/cc/features/greencityindex_international/all/en/pdf/luanda.pdf (accessed on 3 
May 2018).
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there is also an African office in Cape Town (the organisation’s World Secretar-
iat is in Bonn). According to the Council’s website, 74 municipalities in Africa 
from a total of 18 African countries have joined, and 19 of these are ‘profiled 
members’ (plus two local government associations) from a total of 12 African 
countries4. South Africa is by far the most active country in this network, with 
eight cities participating as profiled members, including Johannesburg, Dur-
ban and Pretoria. Of the other megacities in Africa (> two million inhabitants, 
see Table 2) Dakar and Addis Ababa are ‘profiled members’ and Cape Town, 
Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Lagos and Port Elizabeth/Nelson Mandela Bay are 
ordinary members.
Another relevant global network is uclg Africa (United Cities and Local 
Governments, Africa Section) with its headquarters in Dakar.5 Together with 
iclei it partnered with UN-Habitat to produce the ‘State of the African City’ 
report of 2014 (UN-Habitat, 2014). The organisation’s website gives access to all 
relevant national associations of local government, including the important 
South African Association of Local Government Authorities6 and the Associa-
tion des Maires du Sénégal (ams).7 Its focus on sustainability is rather limited, 
though, with the exception of the attention paid to informal settlements, and 
their environmental problems, in the ‘Know Your City’ programme, with a spe-
cial focus on Ouagadougou and Lusaka.
A third network is Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities (http://
www.100resilientcities.org), with eleven participants from Africa, including a 
few surprising ones: Accra, Addis Ababa, Cape Town, Dakar, Durban, Enugu 
(in Nigeria), Kigali, Lagos, Luxor, Nairobi and Paynesville (in Liberia). On its 
website, the Rockefeller project states: ‘As of May 2016, the 100 Resilient Cities 
network has reached 100 members. The new group of cities spans five con-
tinents and is diverse in both its makeup and the challenges the cities face. 
The 100 Resilient Cities Challenge is the application process by which cities 
join our network. 100RC selected a first group of 32 cities in December 2013, a 
second group of 35 in 2014, and its final round of winners in May 2016 [includ-
ing six new ‘winners’ from Africa]. Members of the 100 Resilient Cities team 
and a panel of expert judges reviewed over 1,000 applications from prospective 
cities. The judges looked for innovative mayors, a recent catalyst for change, 
a history of building partnerships, and an ability to work with a wide range 
4 See iclei’s African Secretariat website: http://africa.iclei.org.
5 See uclg Africa website: http://www.uclga.org.
6 See salga’s website: http://www.salga.org.za.
7 See uclg Africa website: http://www.afriquelocale.org/fr/ams.
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of  stakeholders’. Africa is relatively well represented now, after North America 
(with 31 member cities), Asia (with 20) and Europe (with 17).
A fourth network, also with a major input from the usa (funded by three 
philanthropic organisations), but with offices in New York, London and Rio 
de Janeiro, is C40 (http://c40.org), for so-called climate action cities. It is con-
nected to the Clinton Climate Initiative. Nine African megacities are part of 
this network, and there is a separate directorate for Africa within C40, directed 
by economist and ‘environmental diplomat’ Hastings Chikoko, from Malawi. 
The participating African cities (so far) are Cairo, Accra, Lagos, Addis Ababa, 
Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Johannesburg 
plays a key role.
Canada has launched its own support programme for sustainable cities 
(http://sustainablecities.net/), based in Vancouver. It has three African partner 
cities: Dakar in Senegal, with three projects, Dar es Salaam with two projects, 
and Durban in South Africa, also with two projects. These are all part of the 
so-called plus network for sustainability learning.
The Fondation Africaine pour la Gestion Urbaine, a network that started in 
Senegal and that was based at the Institut Africain de Gestion Urbaine (iagu) 
in Dakar (iagu, 2008), mainly deals with cities in French-speaking Africa, with 
projects in Dakar, Thiès and Pikine in Senegal, but also (with an emphasis 
on urban agriculture) in Burkina Faso (Bobo Dioulasso), Benin (Porto Novo), 
Rwanda (Kigali) and Mauritania (Nouakchott). With the exception of Dakar, 
no other African megacity (defined as having agglomerations of more than two 
million inhabitants) participates.
In preparation for the climate conference in Paris in 2015 a lot of effort was 
mobilised to stimulate debates about Africa’s sustainability issues,8 and part of 
it was focused on issues of urban sustainability (see Dago, 2014). To create villes 
durables (sustainable cities) the focus should be on six elements, according to 
this approach: connect health and the environment, stimulate resilience, em-
phasise popular participation (through sensibilisation (sensitization)), diver-
sify finances to fund green initiatives, create stakeholder platforms (cerveaux 
collectifs), and adapt and readjust for every city, connecting environmental, 
social, economic and cultural specificities.
In 2016, partly as a response to the climate conference in Paris, many mayors 
of the world formed the Compact of Mayors (see Global Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate & Energy website). For all participating cities, the organisation’s 
website shows a map of the city, the name of the current mayor, mostly the cur-
rent population figure, and what the city has done in terms of commitment, 
8 See the AfriqueCroissanceVerte website: https://afriquecroissanceverte.com/.
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inventory, target formulation and planning for climate mitigation and adapta-
tion. It is the intention to also add data about greenhouse gas emissions and 
sectoral composition for each city. Almost all African cities are still in the ‘com-
mitment phase’, but Cape Town and Durban have completed all phases, and 
one can download the climate adaptation and climate action plans for these 
cities. The Compact of Mayors has so far managed to connect to 18 of Africa’s 
multi-million agglomerations and to 32 other African cities.
With growing privatisation and many public–private partnerships in en-
vironmental management it is also relevant to mention a site that provides 
a global overview of environmental companies, including of more than 1,500 
companies working in Africa: Environmental xprt.9 The large majority of 
these companies have their headquarters elsewhere in the world, but they also 
have an office, or are distributors, in Africa, and particularly in South Africa. 
But there are also African companies and ngos on the list (like the Water and 
Sewerage Company in Nairobi, and the Waste Management Society of Nigeria, 
based in Port Harcourt).
If we look at all those initiatives and focus on Africa’s multi-million agglom-
erations it is obvious that some of those urban areas are leading in many initia-
tives, and others are invisible (see Table 6.5).
9 See Environmental xprt, Environmental Industry Companies in Africa webpage : https://
www.environmental-expert.com/companies/location-africa (accessed on 3 May 2018).
Table 6.5 Summary of online networks/assessments of participating African megacities
Urban 
agglomeration
eiu C40 Rockefeller SSnet iclei 
[/uclg]
Compact
Lagos + + + + +
Cairo + +
Johannesburg/
Pretoria
++ + + +
Kinshasa +
Luanda +
Khartoum
Dar es Salaam + + + +
Nairobi + + + +
Alexandria +
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Table 6.5 Summary of online networks/assessments of participating African  
megacities (cont.)
Urban 
agglomeration
eiu C40 Rockefeller SSnet iclei 
[/uclg]
Compact
Abidjan +
Accra + + + +
Casablanca +
Cape Town + + + + +
Kano
Algiers
Addis Ababa + + + +
Dakar + + + +
Durban + + + + + +
Ibadan
Kampala + +
Bamako
Abuja
Douala
Yaoundé +
Kumasi
Tunis +
Harare +
Lusaka [+]
Antananarivo
Conakry
Maputo +
Ouagadougou [+]
Port Harcourt
Source: Author’s own analysis of the various websites mentioned in the text. 
Cities are listed in descending order of number of inhabitants, following 
the order used in Table 6.2
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5 UN-Habitat’s State of African Cities
UN-Habitat is the institutional flagship organisation within the UN system 
dealing with urban issues. It is based in Nairobi and can be expected to pay 
special attention to Africa. Since 2008 it has published three overviews of the 
state of Africa’s cities (UN-Habitat 2008, 2010 and 2014). In 2008, the report was 
published together with the United Nations Commission for Africa (uneca), 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (unep) and the International 
Development Research Centre (idrc) in Canada. In 2010 only unep stayed 
as a partner, and in 2014 the partnership changed to include both iclei and 
uclg. In 2008, urban environmental challenges were one of six major themes. 
In 2010, the report had a very geographical set up: with sections on the so-
cial geography of urbanisation, the economic geography of cities, the geogra-
phy of urban land markets and the geography of climate change. The report 
published in 2014 explicitly deals with urban sustainability in its sections on 
social and environmental challenges. In these reports UN-Habitat’s strongly 
geographical outlook means a strong emphasis on broad geographical and 
thematic inclusiveness, and a growing emphasis on the combination of sus-
tainability issues and social inclusion issues, particularly in sections regarding 
vulnerability to climate change and in those dealing with the health risks of 
pollution and waste management. In the UN-Habitat 2014 publication there 
are many references to the recent wave of ‘climate change and cities’ publica-
tions, including Rosenzweig et al. (2011). Another work referred to is the iclei 
study authored by Kemp et al. (2011): Sub-Saharan African Cities: A Five-City 
Network to Pioneer Climate Adaptation Through Participatory Research & Lo-
cal Action. These authors (some of them biologists) were based in Cape Town 
when they carried out the study. Cartwright et al. (2012) published another 
relevant study about Cape Town itself in 2012. One of its authors is a leading 
urban geographer in South Africa, Sue Parnell. Some of these studies connect 
issues of climate change with urban food security, as does the work of Frayne 
et al. (2013). Bruce Frayne and Gina Ziervogel are geographers, connected to 
the University of Cape Town. Sustainable city initiatives in South Africa have 
become an important, if not dominant, element in Africa’s sustainability ef-
forts, and we will therefore continue with a brief focus on South Africa.
6 The South African Cities Network
In South Africa, the South African Cities Network started in 2002, and has so far 
published four reports about ‘the state of South African cities’ (sacn). On its 
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website, the Network states: ‘The South African Cities Network (sacn) is an es-
tablished network of South African cities and partners that encourages the ex-
change of information, experience and best practices on urban development 
and city management. As both a research source and a catalyst for debate, the 
sacn covers the full scope of the urban management process, under the fol-
lowing thematic areas: city development, inclusive cities, sustainable cities, 
well-governed cities and productive cities’. And under the heading of ‘sustain-
able cities’ there are four major topics: sustainable energy, improving waste 
management, improving water management, and mitigating climate change 
effects. To date, there have been four ‘state of South African cities’ reports (see 
sacn, 2004, 2006, 2011 and 2016). From the start ‘sustainable cities’ was a major 
and recurrent theme. In 2016, there was also a ‘People’s Guide’.
The chapter about sustainable cities in the 2016 sacn document about 
South African Cities (sacn, 2016) was written by Sandiswa Tshaka, an energy 
and climate change expert who previously worked for the Danish Embassy, 
and by Gillian Maree, who had professional training as a spatial planner in the 
Netherlands and who has worked to support spatial economic policy and stra-
tegic environmental planning in South Africa. The key messages in this chapter 
come very close to a fully holistic approach: ‘The typical South African city is 
growing in a resource-intensive way and suffers from inefficiencies across all 
sectors (energy, food, water, waste and transport). The current silo approach 
to planning and delivery is inefficient and increases risks of exclusion. Cities 
should pursue spatial transformation, which encourages compact cities and 
sustainable neighbourhoods that value natural and open spaces. Sustainabil-
ity and growth are interdependent, and so sustainability must be fundamen-
tally embedded in a city’s development paradigm, and not just in its long-term 
visions and strategies. Cities need to tackle resource efficiency aggressively’ 
(sacn, 2016, 12).
One of the leading think tanks addressing Africa’s urban and urban environ-
mental issues is firmly connected to geography and urban planning: the Univer-
sity of Cape Town’s African Centre for Cities (acc). Many of its research projects 
and publications deal with Cape Town itself, but there is also a growing connec-
tion to other cities in southern Africa, cities in Africa more generally, and cities 
elsewhere, with a major attempt to connect African and Asian  experiences. The 
acc is a central player in major academic and think tank networks concerned 
with sustainable cities with a focus on Africa: UrbanAfrica.net (‘communi-
cating about African cities’), the Association of African Planning Schools,10  
10 See the Association of African Planning Schools (aaps) website: http://www.africanplan 
ningschools.org.za/.
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
155Online Representation of Sustainable City Initiatives in Africa
<UN>
the African Urban Research Initiative11 and the African Food Security Net-
work.12 The acc’s director, Edgar Pieterse (with a PhD from the London School 
of Economics) holds the South African Research Chair in Urban Policy at uct, 
but is also one of four African members of the Sustainable Development Solu-
tions Network13 (sdsn; based in Paris and New York as the UN’s think tank for 
sustainable cities).14 Among Pieterse’s most influential publications are City 
futures: Confronting the crisis of urban development (Pieterse, 2008) and ‘The 
“right to the city”: institutional imperatives of a developmental state’ (Parnell 
and Pieterse, 2010). A more recent work by Parnell and Pieterse is concerned 
with Africa’s urban revolution (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014). South Africa’s lead-
ing role in Africa’s sustainable cities ‘movement’ is very much assisted by the 
important role think tanks such as the aac play, but also by the way metropoli-
tan governments in South Africa use information databases to make informed 
choices on where to prioritise investments in better environmental services 
(see Sutherland et al. 2015).
7 Online Sustainability Representations and Social Inclusion
Looking at the various Internet representations of sustainable cities initiatives 
in Africa presented in this chapter one cannot escape the impression that most 
focus on well-to-do neighbourhoods that are part of planned city expansions 
or those developed by city development or housing companies. Also, demands 
for ‘better environmental care’ often come from middle-class (or upper-class) 
activists, with limited attention paid to the living conditions and major en-
vironmental issues in shanty towns and among the urban poor. As there is a 
11 More information on the African Urban Research Initiative (auri) on http://www.african 
centreforcities.net/programme/knowledge-networks/african-urban-research-initiative.
12 See the African Food Security Urban Network (afsun) website: http://www.afsun.org.
13 Other African members of the sdsn Network are Martin Oteng-Ababio, geographer at 
the University of Ghana at Legon, climate change expert Debra Roberts of the Ethekwini 
Municipality (Durban), and urban planner Rafael Tuts of UN-Habitat (with a degree as an 
architectural engineer from the University of Leuven, Belgium). The UN started this ini-
tiative in 2012 with a goal to “mobilize global scientific and technological expertise to pro-
mote practical problem solving for sustainable development, including the design and 
implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs)” (see the sdsn website, 
i.e. http://unsdsn.org/about-us/vision-and-organization/). Martin Oteng-Ababio’s most 
cited work is about waste management in Accra; see Grant and Oteng-Ababio (2012); 
Oteng-Ababio et al. (2013).
14 See the Thematic Network ‘Sustainable Cities: Inclusive, Resilient, and Connected’: 
http://unsdsn.org/what-we-do/thematic-networks/sustainable-cities-inclusive-resilient 
-and-connected (accessed on 3 May 2018).
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clear tendency for the urban poor to live in the most risky and vulnerable ar-
eas (in particular, marshy and flood-prone areas near coasts are noteworthy: 
areas where ever more urban poor start their urban lives), attention to urban 
sustainability should highlight these areas and people, but this often does not 
happen, and is not the highest priority for eager city planners and city admin-
istrators who want their cities to shine on prestigious websites. . The growing 
attention being paid to climate change (Bicknell et al., 2009; Carmin et al., 2012; 
Simon, 2013; Dodman et al., 2015; Wisner et al., 2015) and the inclusion of ‘sus-
tainable cities and communities’ as Goal 11 of the Sustainable Development 
Goals might change that bias: the highest social vulnerability to the effects of 
climate change can be found in the neighbourhoods with the most problem-
atic environmental conditions. Particularly in coastal cities many informal 
settlements can be found in high-risk locations with regard to storms, floods 
and disease outbreaks. Cities like Durban and Cape Town can probably be seen 
as useful and early cases of experimentation where a holistic approach to sus-
tainability has been combined with sincere attention to social inclusiveness 
from scholars and in some cases also from urban planners, although a lot more 
could have been done and could be done (see, e.g., Roberts and Nicci (2002); 
Sutherland et al. (2015) for Durban, and Cartwright et al. (2012) for Cape Town).
8 Conclusion
Although recently many initiatives have attempted to stimulate African cities 
to develop policies for more sustainable urban development, the geographical 
coverage of those initiatives is by no means complete, and websites devoted 
to these ‘sustainable city initiatives’ in Africa show a very unbalanced picture, 
with some South African and some North African cities getting a lot of atten-
tion, together with cities like Accra, Lagos and Nairobi, but with other cities 
enjoying much less, particularly those outside anglophone countries. In terms 
of thematic coverage for African cities as a whole, the websites show that all 
major aspects are covered, with particular attention given to waste manage-
ment and water management. However, for almost all individual cities (except 
for Cape Town and Durban), there is no ‘holistic approach’, and the institution-
al set-up of most metropolitan regions does not stimulate a holistic approach 
to integrated environmental management. And if we look at the third aspect 
of ‘inclusion’, social inclusiveness, the Internet representation of successful 
urban sustainability projects seems to favour well-to-do neighbourhoods and 
new neighbourhoods. We recommend that policymakers become more inclu-
sive, and that scholars—as well as scholarly informed international agencies 
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working to stimulate urban sustainability in Africa—become more focused on 
the three types of inclusion outlined in this chapter: wider geographical cover-
age, a more holistic approach, and attention given to the social inclusiveness of 
approaches and effects. We also recommend much more active participation 
by the urban poor, and their organisations where those exist. To enable such 
an approach, urban planners, environmental scientists and urban geographers 
should devote more energy to liaising with urban anthropologists, and oth-
ers for whom participatory observation, and long-term involvement with and 
among the urban poor, is a more natural habitus than for many current urban 
sustainability experts.
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Chapter 7
Incremental Dependencies: Politics and Ethics of 
Claim-making at the Fringes of Windhoek, Namibia
Lalli Metsola
Abstract
On the basis of a case study of informal residents’ claims over land, housing and basic 
amenities in Windhoek, Namibia, this chapter seeks to contribute to debates on the 
broad sociopolitical implications of claim-making dynamics between residents and 
public authorities. In contrast with antagonistic readings of such situations that focus 
on resistance, autonomy and rights, the chapter finds that both residents’ strategies 
and policies outline incremental paths of betterment and intersect in multiple ways. It 
ponders whether and how such incrementality produces institutionalised forms of re-
lations between citizens and authorities, and calls attention to the principle of mutual 
dependencies as a key aspect in them.
1 African Urbanities, Claim-making and Citizenship
Urbanisation is repeatedly identified as one of the key stories of our time. 
We have rapidly moved from a predominantly agrarian world into one where 
the majority of people live in cities and towns.1 It is common to associate 
this change with the grand teleological narrative of industrial development. 
However, anxieties related to perceived changes in the global economic struc-
ture and empirical observations of urbanisation without industrialisation in 
many Southern contexts, particularly in Africa, question this story. Rapid ur-
banisation thus appears both as a great promise, an incubator of creativity 
and new economic and social forms, and as a threat (Bekker and Fourchard, 
2013). On the one hand, there are visions of ‘world-class cities’ that are afflu-
ent, efficient and sustainable—these embody dreams of technologically and 
socially advanced, sustainable, clean and orderly futures. On the other hand, 
there are dystopian vistas of social and ecological decay, growing disorder and 
1 World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS (accessed on 13 
November 2017).
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unequal cities divided into gated communities and proliferating slums (e.g. 
UN- Habitat, 2008). While mainstream planning perspectives on urbanism 
see the latter as problems to be managed through social, administrative and 
technological  reforms and innovations in order to create sustainable, resilient 
and inclusive cities (UN-Habitat, 2016; Mitlin, 2014), critical urban theory sees 
them as more profoundly anchored in the very structures of the global politi-
cal economy (e.g. Brenner, 2009; Marcuse, 2010). These tropes of promise and 
threat are particularly pronounced in the case of debates and studies on ‘world 
cities’ (Robinson, 2015) or ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2005).
These perspectives are largely devoid of historical, cultural or political spec-
ificity. In contrast to such approaches, this chapter suggests that it is fruitful 
both to question the instrumental focus of planning perspectives and not to 
take it as given that urbanity everywhere converges toward similar forms and 
outcomes. It calls attention to the historical formation of particular African ur-
banities and the city as a lived space versus a planned space, and to what prac-
tices bridge the gap between planning ideals and the realities of simultaneous 
growth and shortage in Southern cities. In this perspective, the workings and 
failures of formal institutions of government, what kinds of plans they make, 
and how these are implemented are not all there is to governance. Equally im-
portant are the constant work towards survival and betterment by ordinary 
residents as well as the multiple mediations, negotiations and struggles be-
tween residents, governmental agencies and various other collective bodies, 
such as neighbourhood associations, social movements, companies, churches 
or informal networks. Everyday governance grows out of this meeting and 
negotiation of different interests, ideals and aspirations, often involving pro-
visional accommodations and solutions in both formal and informal spheres 
(Blundo and Le Meur, 2008; Cornea et al., 2017).2
In many postcolonial contexts, including Africa, modern institutions of gov-
ernance were initially built upon the colonial principles of exclusion and selec-
tive recognition (Mbembe, 2001; Mamdani, 2007; Hansen and Stepputat, 2005). 
With transitions to independence, emergent states increasingly framed the 
people living in their territories as citizens instead of subjects (see e.g. Hindess, 
2005; cf. Mamdani, 1996), but the extent to which people can transform their 
legal citizenship into tangible political and economic rights and benefits has 
remained uncertain and contested. Hence citizenship is better approached as 
a claim instead of a mere ascribed status (Das, 2011). In trying to make a living, 
2 This approach is closely related to the literature that focuses on state formation and state-
hood as a process of institutional centralisation and potential fragmentation; see Metsola, 
2015, 35–51; Steinmetz, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Clapham, 1998; Das and Poole, 2004.
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enjoy basic security and gain social acceptance, people seek to be recognised 
as deserving claimants vis-à-vis various authorities (Fraser and Honneth, 2003; 
Taylor, 1994; Englund, 2004; Metsola, 2015, 75–78) by resorting to the various 
material resources, social relations and discursive registers to which they have 
access (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010). Claims can take multiple forms including 
protests, polite requests, formal applications, accusations of corruption, court 
cases or acts of occupation. This process is relational; making claims to an-
other party, whether a political office holder, state agency, traditional leader, 
local Big Man, land board or a neighbourhood association implies (even if pro-
visionally) the recognition of their authority to grant what has been demanded 
(Lund, 2006; Lund and Boone, 2013). African claim-making environments are 
often institutionally plural, which means that claimants have to assess which 
authorities they can or should turn to. In turn, authorities may compete over 
who has jurisdiction to respond to claims, seeking out claimants in their bid 
for legitimacy. Because of this, claim and response dynamics are well suited for 
exploring the development of public authority, citizenship and institutions of 
governance.
One relatively common response to the uncertainties of belonging in 
contemporary Africa has been for claimants to try to ground entitlement in 
identity and seek to narrow down the circle of those sharing that identity and 
hence entitled to a slice of the cake. This is what the politics of autochthony, 
ethnonationalism and other exclusivist reformulations of belonging familiar 
from many current or recent African citizenship struggles and conflicts try 
to do (e.g. Dorman et al., 2007; Geschiere, 2011; Nyamnjoh and Brudvig, 2014). 
While these cases are significant and attract a lot of attention, they do not 
offer the full picture of contemporary African claim-making. In many cases, 
particularly in contexts with relatively well-functioning set-ups of centralised 
institutions—in other words, stronger states—claims may also take the form 
of negotiating vis-à-vis the existing regime without reference to supposedly 
primordial identities.
While claim-making can pivot around multiple objects, land is often 
 prominent due to its importance for many different purposes: for agriculture, 
residence, as a commercial asset and, often, as a symbolically charged entity 
(for example as a burial ground or a place of worship). The significance of ac-
cess to land, the overlapping claims related to it and the multiple institutions 
regulating it have often been noted as a major issue in African politics and 
development, particularly in rural contexts (e.g. Lund, 2011; Berry, 2009; Boone, 
1998). With rapid urbanisation, urban spaces are becoming more  pronounced 
as arenas for the articulation of various, criss-crossing claims over land (Koech-
lin 2017, 3). Claims are made by national and transnational capital, by the elites, 
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but also by the vast number of people living in various degrees of precarious 
existence—the so-called informals, squatters, or subalterns.  Additionally, 
 various authorities at different levels and agencies of government, and in tra-
ditional or religious institutions, mediate the claims of others but also of each 
other.
Based on a case study of informal residents’ claims over land, housing and 
basic amenities in Windhoek, Namibia, this chapter seeks to contribute to 
 debates on the broad sociopolitical implications of claim-making dynamics 
between residents and public authorities. Through a critical conversation with 
the literature on urban claim-making in Africa and beyond, the chapter dis-
cusses incrementality as a characteristic of both residents’ strategies and poli-
cies, and the interplay between the two. Contrary to both the policy- oriented, 
top-down accounts of African social problems and their governmental 
 solutions, and antagonistic accounts of claim-making dynamics, this chapter 
explicitly connects the study of claim-making dynamics with the themes of 
institutionalisation, negotiated statehood and everyday governance, with par-
ticular attention to the principle of mutual dependencies as a key ingredient 
in the relations between residents and authorities. The chapter provides an 
overview of the interplay between residents’ demands and official responses 
in Windhoek without going deep into the details of the different positions and 
actions of various kinds of residents, or into discussing the various other ac-
tors involved such as the central government, the Shack Dwellers Federation, 
the Affirmative Repositioning movement, or entrepreneurs. These will be the 
subject of future work.3
In what follows, I will first outline some influential ways in which urban 
claim-making has been previously discussed. In particular, I make a distinction 
between antagonistic and mutualistic readings, as well as between perspec-
tives that emphasise claimants’ efforts towards political autonomy and rights 
and those that stress relations of mutual dependence between claimants and 
authorities. I will then move on to present the case of claims and responses in 
the informal settlements of Windhoek, before returning to broader analytical 
3 The fieldwork on which this case study is based took place from June to August 2016. Field 
activities consisted of interviews and conversations with ordinary residents and ground-
level community leaders. The author also interviewed officials from the City of Windhoek, 
members of local and regional government, ministry personnel, representatives of organisa-
tions working on housing and squatters’ issues, and academics, and organised a focus group 
discussion with youth leaders. He also attended a number of relevant events, including a 
meeting between the municipality’s representatives and community leaders in one informal 
settlement, a community information meeting in another, and an Affirmative Repositioning 
book launch. These sources are complemented by grey literature and media stories.
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discussion in which I focus on distinctions between instrumental clientelism 
and a more general ethos of mutual dependence, and on the developmental 
implications of such mutualities.
2 Perspectives on Urban Claim-making
In the literature on claim-making, there is a divide between what can be called 
antagonistic and mutualistic perspectives on relations between  citizens and au-
thorities. Antagonistic readings operate through a focus on social  movements, 
struggles, resistance and ‘the right to the city’ and tend to pit the interests of 
the rulers and the ruled against each other. In this view, claims result from and 
make visible the lines between the powerful and the powerless, the rich and 
the poor, the privileged ones and the disenfranchised. David Harvey (2008, 37) 
provides a good example of writing in this vein: ‘Signs of rebellion are every-
where: the unrest in China and India is chronic, civil wars rage in Africa, Latin 
America is in ferment. Any of these revolts could become contagious.’ What 
should happen, he continues, is for social movements to focus on demanding 
‘greater democratic control over the production and utilization of the surplus’ 
in ‘a global struggle, predominantly with finance capital’ (Harvey, 2008, 37; see 
also Sassen, 2010).
Not all accounts of the urban condition and resistance within it are as gran-
diose. Mike Davis (2006), for one, is sceptical about such grand narratives. For 
him, ‘[p]ortentous post-Marxist speculations, like those of Negri and Hardt, 
about a new politics of “multitudes” in the “rhizomatic spaces” of globalisation 
remain ungrounded in any real political sociology. Even within a single city, 
slum populations can support a bewildering variety of responses to structural 
neglect and deprivation, ranging from charismatic churches and prophetic 
cults to ethnic militias, street gangs, neoliberal ngos, and revolutionary social 
movements.’ (Davis, 2006, 201–202.) Yet he still frames the responses of the ur-
ban ‘poor’ or ‘informals’ exclusively in terms of resistance to global capitalism: 
‘But if there is no monolithic subject or unilateral trend in the global slum, 
there are nonetheless myriad acts of resistance. Indeed, the future of human 
solidarity depends upon the militant refusal of the new urban poor to accept 
their terminal marginality within global capitalism.’ (Davis, 2006, 202.)
While this perspective captures a significant aspect of claim-making and re-
sponse dynamics, many such interactions are not captured by its interpretive 
lens. A more ethnographically oriented body of scholarship has moved beyond 
the focus on explicit (and globally oriented) resistance and added  nuance to 
our understanding of the political agency of informals (Das and Randeria, 2015; 
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Simone, 2013; Bayat, 2010; Holston, 2008). A number of important points from 
this literature could be raised, but as there is no room for extensive discussion 
I will highlight two that are most important for my purposes. First, many of the 
actions of informal urban residents do not take the form of conscious, collec-
tive political action but occur in the form of disconnected, mundane actions 
that have practical aims. Second, they are not necessarily antagonistic, but 
involve significant degrees of reciprocity, mutuality and negotiation. For ex-
ample, through studies on the daily realities of ‘urban poor’ in Egypt and Iran, 
Asef Bayat (2000, 2010, 2015) points out the shortcomings of perspectives that 
see the poor as merely surviving instead of having long-term dreams, plans and 
strategies, as well as of perspectives that tend to focus excessively on their or-
ganised collective action through the prism of resistance. Instead, Bayat high-
lights what he refers to as ‘quiet encroachment’, the multiple ways in which 
squatters engage in clandestine, piecemeal actions primarily aimed towards 
individual, family or other immediate group betterment, and how this may 
have systematic, unintended, collective—and hence political—outcomes. 
James Holston (2008), in turn, has focused on how poor urbanites in Brazil 
have staked claims through land occupation, auto-construction and legal ac-
tion, in the process gaining increasing traction as a political force and realising 
their citizen rights. However, later studies have observed that the movements 
that initially spoke about ‘rights to the city’ and took an antagonistic stance 
towards public authorities have since been demobilised as their demands for 
recognition and participation, and to some extent their agency, was co-opted 
into official doctrines and practices (Caldeira, 2015).
While both Bayat and Holston have produced richly contextualised re- 
conceptualisations of precarious existence in Southern settings, they retain 
the antagonistic focus that juxtaposes residents and state power and portrays 
increasing autonomy and citizen rights as the eventual objective of the former. 
In contrast, this chapter suggests that there may be a significant degree of mu-
tuality in the claim and response dynamics involving informal urban dwellers.
3 Claiming Residence, Welfare and Security at the  
Fringes of Windhoek
In Namibia, urbanisation is proceeding rapidly, both through population 
growth occurring in the city and continuous in-migration propelled by persis-
tent rural poverty and hopes of better opportunities. This strains the capacities 
of city and town administrations. Coupled with pervasive unemployment and 
rising land prices and housing costs, this has resulted in widespread precarity 
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among urban dwellers. At the same time, the country’s stability and relatively 
high administrative capacity and economic performance facilitate the  pooling 
of resources and significant redistributive mechanisms through state coffers. 
Together, these conditions help generate popular demands for translating 
the political inclusion of legal citizenship into social and economic inclusion 
through the provision of opportunities, jobs, health, education, housing and 
basic amenities.
3.1 Informal Settlements and Their Residents
Before Namibian independence, migration was severely restricted and ‘illegal’ 
settlement not tolerated. Independence set in motion a heavy influx of people 
from rural areas to cities and towns. Windhoek has grown from a city of un-
der 150,000 inhabitants at independence to one with over 400,000 now. High 
demand for residential land and housing, together with a complicated and 
costly process of surveying, demarcating and servicing has pushed the prices 
of houses as well as rents beyond what most urban residents are able to pay. 
Therefore, most urban population growth occurs in informal settlements on 
municipal land in the north-western and western fringes of the city, mostly 
in the constituencies of Moses Garoeb, Tobias Hainyeko, Samora Machel and 
Khomasdal North.
There are many kinds of informality. In the extreme outskirts of the city, 
new, relatively sparsely populated and completely unserviced areas constant-
ly spring up with more land becoming occupied. Older informal settlements 
have gradually become congested but have often been provided with basic ser-
vices like public prepaid water taps, communal toilets, and some paved streets 
and street lights. Yet other areas are still predominantly filled with kambashus 
(shacks) but have already been demarcated into individual plots that are usu-
ally fenced. Additionally, there are small tracts of informal residence in open 
areas within established townships, as well as shacks in people’s backyards, 
used for renting out. Many of the research participants had at some point 
moved from one informal area to another due to various reasons, including 
less noise and congestion, better location, available services, cheaper living 
 expenses, security considerations, avoiding problematic relations with rela-
tives, or acquiring more space in a newer area.
Likewise, the people who live in informal areas or conditions should not be 
seen as a single group of ‘squatters’. They consist of employed, partially em-
ployed, unemployed, students and pensioners; people with different levels of 
income, different social connections and at different stages of their life cycles. 
The sizes of their homes, mostly built of corrugated iron, as well as the ameni-
ties in them vary considerably. Some only consist of one room with next to 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
169Incremental Dependencies
<UN>
nothing inside, while at the other end of the spectrum there are homes with 
multiple rooms, electricity (either tapped illicitly from permanent houses 
nearby or powered by solar panels or a generator), fridges, stoves, windows 
and quite a lot of furniture, even inside toilets. These have often been built 
 incrementally over time, as resources permit. While people strive towards 
 better life through degrees of formalisation, changes can occur in the opposite 
direction too, with informalisation—moving to a shack—providing an outlet 
in a situation in which formal accommodation has become financially unsus-
tainable. In some cases, living informally is a choice that facilitates saving a 
larger portion of one’s incomes for other, longer-term purposes, such as pur-
chasing land or investing in property in rural areas (see also Niikondo, 2010; 
Kamminga, 2000, 51). Indeed, many research participants referred to existing 
links to their places of origin and to their wish to retire there. Furthermore, not 
all shacks are for residence—some are also for business; people may own more 
than one and rent them out, or use them as shebeens (informal bars).
3.2 Actors and Policies
Numerous actors populate the organisational landscape related to the issues 
of land, housing and services in Windhoek. These include the City, the central 
government, savings groups and their umbrella organisation the Shack Dwell-
ers Federation, and—more recently—the Affirmative Repositioning move-
ment (AR). I will provide a brief overview of this landscape before moving on 
to discuss the interplay between residential claims and the City.
The Shack Dwellers Federation is ‘a network of 605 saving schemes with 
20400 members throughout the country’.4 Savings groups, either independent 
ones or those belonging to the Federation, purchase or lease plots that the City 
then provides with a basic level of services on a collective basis. The groups 
subdivide the plot among members and each of them can develop their share 
incrementally (City of Windhoek, 1999; City of Windhoek, n.d. b). This model 
is not without its problems, for example related to the management of funds 
and collective services, but it has provided a significant avenue for many poor 
residents to achieve different degrees of improvements, including access to 
formal housing and basic services.
While the achievements of the Shack Dwellers Federation and independent 
savings groups are considerable, only a minority of informal residents have 
benefited from them. The persistent and growing land and housing short-
age led to the emergence of a new militant movement called Affirmative 
4 Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia, http://sdfn.weebly.com/ (accessed on 14 September 
2017).
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 Repositioning in 2014. Led by prominent young political figures with a history 
in the swapo Youth League, it started a high-profile campaign regarding urban 
land availability. Its rhetoric has been openly hostile to the established politi-
cal elite, with a mixture of radical socialist and Pan-African themes (AR book 
launch, 4.8.2016). In response to the pressure from the AR, the central gov-
ernment revitalised some previously problematic and hence inactive housing 
 programmes. These include the Build Together Programme, originally  started 
in 1992 and meant to provide housing loans for low- and middle- income house-
holds, and the Mass Housing Programme that provides subsidised ready units. 
Additionally, the government started a Mass Urban Land Servicing  Project 
with the promise of delivering 200,000 plots countrywide for residential pur-
poses. So far, progress in delivering these has been slow.
Neither of the abovementioned organisations is a mass-based popular 
squatters’ movement like for example Abahlali baseMjondolo in neighbouring 
South Africa. The Shack Dwellers Federation has considerable real presence 
on the ground, particularly among women, but has not adopted similar an-
tagonistic rhetoric and broadly political objectives as Abahlali base Mjondolo. 
Instead, it focuses on more immediate practical questions of housing and of-
ten cooperates with public agencies. Affirmative Repositioning, in turn, does 
speak a militant language that situates the issues of urban land, housing and 
services in the context of broader injustices. However, on the basis of my ob-
servations and discussions with Windhoekers of various walks of life it seems 
to draw much of its support from among the young middle-class and to not 
have an equally strong support base among informal residents.
While the above policies and organisations play a significant role, the inter-
action between informal residents and the municipality through immediate 
or low-level official channels is the primal node in the claim and response dy-
namics in Windhoek. This is, first, because informal settlements have mostly 
grown on municipal land, and second, because the City has considerable au-
tonomy over the generation of its own revenue and budget but is also expected 
to cater for its expenses without central government subvention, apart from 
specific, earmarked capital expenditures. Hence, my primary focus here is with 
the claims and responses between residents in various informal settlements 
and the City.
In day-to-day practice, the City is not a unitary actor and the approach of 
different agencies, or the line taken in regulating the use of municipal land, 
may vary at different moments and in different situations. Sometimes those 
working in the City structures stress that ‘we cannot condone illegal settle-
ment’ (as one of my City civil servant interviewees put it, and the Head of the 
City Police confirmed) while others accept the reality of rapid urban growth 
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and try to think of practical ways to address the situation. However, many City 
 employees dealing with ‘informals’ argued that they are ‘fighting a losing battle’. 
In practice, informal residence has been mostly tolerated since independence 
and as I shall demonstrate below, the City has, in principle, accepted that the 
problem should be addressed through constructive engagement rather than 
through harsh control.
The first response by the City to the heavy influx of squatters in the early 
1990s was to establish three ‘reception areas’ where new residents were given 
rental plots with rudimentary services. It was assumed that once the new resi-
dents had established themselves they would be able to find formal accom-
modation and move out. This did not happen. (City of Windhoek, n.d. a; World 
Bank, 2002, 17–18.) As the spread of low-income informal areas continued, the 
City outlined a new housing policy (City of Windhoek, 2000) and a concomi-
tant development and upgrading strategy (City of Windhoek, 1999). Drawing 
from such international precedents as Mexico and Botswana, as well as World 
Bank guidelines (City of Windhoek, n.d. a), these documents advocated a tran-
sition from seeing informal residents as lawbreakers and a mere problem into a 
participatory approach that sees them as active agents trying to improve their 
lives. As put in the City’s guidelines on informal settlements in the mid-1990s, 
‘[t]his should not be seen as yet another project to mend squatter problems 
in Windhoek, but rather a process proposed to positively accommodate and 
manage informal settlements in the City. In addition it must be realised that, in 
order for this process to succeed, traditional views (confine people to a specific 
area to exercise control over them) on informal settlement shall have to be 
discarded’ (City of Windhoek, n.d. a, 6).
The development and upgrading strategy combines in situ upgrading of 
existing settlements with establishing new residential areas under the sites-
and-services model (City of Windhoek, 1999; World Bank, 2002, 9). The strategy 
outlines seven development levels of upgrading that differ from each other in 
terms of resident income, tenure arrangements, service levels and payments 
(City of Windhoek, 1999, 4; World Bank, 2002, 10). Levels 0–3 consist of ‘ul-
tra-low income’ areas with gradually increasing levels of communal services. 
Tenure at levels 1–2 is primarily lease-based (City of Windhoek, 1999: Annex-
ure A). For most of the people (over 80 per cent in the early years of the new 
millennium) this was the only affordable level of officially recognised tenure 
(de Kock, 2006, 28–29; City of Windhoek, 2000, 4). Block layout at level 1 re-
mains informal, while levels 2 and 3 consist of demarcated erven (plots) that 
the residents lease or purchase. Levels 4–6 refer to low- and middle-income 
areas, with individually owned plots and individual service connections (City 
of Windhoek, 1999: Annexure A).
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The areas selected for upgrading tend to be heavily congested. This leads to 
the requirement that some move out to make way for the upgrading and new 
subdivision of plots. Who can stay is primarily decided on a first come, first 
served basis, with those who have arrived in the area first getting to stay. For 
this purpose, the City registers residents on a waiting list and numbers their 
shacks. In practice, most communities currently remain at the lowest three 
levels. Upgrading is slow and the situation of partial informality and partial 
formality may become a relatively lasting state. City officials and other observ-
ers give multiple reasons for this state of affairs. City representatives argue that 
they will not be able to solve the problem without central government subven-
tions. Other crucial resources noted as often lacking are land for resettlement, 
time, will and capacity.
3.3 Residents’ Claims and Their Negotiation
Participation and incremental upgrading have been the official policy for over 
15 years. The approach has permeated the lived experience and colonised the 
claim-making processes of informal urban dwellers to a considerable extent, 
so that their claims largely mirror the incremental upgrading strategy. In part, 
such residents always have to frame their demands in a way that is intelligible 
to those in a position to respond. However, the doctrine of incremental upgrad-
ing also offers a possibility to gradually transform non-tolerated practices into 
tolerated ones, illicitness into licitness, and informality into formality. It offers 
the residents a stepping stone via which to start actively working towards a 
more secure existence in the city.
Among my research participants, water and sanitation were usually the pri-
mary needs expressed, followed by electricity, and then paved roads and street 
lights. Additionally, a concern over security is a recurring theme. Finally, after 
these basic needs, having one’s own house under a secure tenure arrangement 
of some kind represents the eventual ideal. These aspirations seem to form a 
partially overlapping series, in which the focus of needs and demands would 
shift as the situation of provision changed. Claim-making over these needs has 
taken many forms: petitioning the authorities in public meetings or through 
community leaders and councillors, writing letters to officials, sending smss to 
newspapers, and in some rare cases, protests against evictions.
There are two kinds of community leaders. The first one includes a tier sys-
tem based on areas of residence that extends from the level of the regional 
councillor responsible for a constituency through community chairpersons 
responsible for different settlements within the constituency and consisting 
of a few hundred households, to block leaders responsible for about 20–30 
households each (City of Windhoek, 1999, 13–14; City of Windhoek, 2011). 
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This is in accordance with the City’s Development and Upgrading Strategy, 
which states that ‘[i]n Development Levels 1–3 […] or any other situation 
where a  community has access to communal services […] [t]he community 
(20 to 30 households sharing the same toilet block) must democratically elect 
a constituted formal neighbourhood committee and a chairperson […] The 
aim of such neighbourhood committees will be […] [t]o act as communica-
tion  channel with Council […]; To empower the communities to run their own 
 organisation, finances, maintenance, cleaning of services and problem solving; 
To lessen the burden on Council in terms of resources needed for community 
liaison, administration, credit control, maintenance, etc.; To facilitate a struc-
ture through which saving and self-help actions may be promoted; To create 
a structure through which education, training and capacity building may be 
effectively carried over to individual households’ (City of Windhoek, 1999, 13).
The other kind consists of constituency development committees. Each 
constituency has one of them and their membership is drawn from people who 
reside in the constituency and represent different walks of life. For example, 
in Moses Garoeb constituency in Northwestern Windhoek, the cdc members 
are classified as representing the following categories: community, youth, tra-
ditional authority, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, City of Windhoek, Family 
of Hope Services (an ngo assisting orphaned and vulnerable children), Youth 
Forum, businesses, The Evangelic Lutheran Church in Namibia, the Ministry 
of Defence and the Ministry of Agriculture (information obtained from the 
Moses Garoeb constituency office, August 2016; see also Republic of Namibia 
1998, Appendix ii).
These two kinds of leaders occupy a key position between informal resi-
dents and higher levels of authority. They live in the areas that they represent 
and are usually the first layer of administration to hear the residents’ concerns 
and are entrusted to campaign for them with regard to the City and other au-
thorities. At the same time, they are the main channel of news and directives 
in the other direction, from higher administrative levels to the communities. 
They also regulate land use and mediate disputes; they do not have any official 
policing or judicial capacity but are recognised as arbiters of less serious cases 
of disagreement or misbehaviour. Grass-roots local leaders are not remuner-
ated for their services but in practice such positions might offer them lever-
age with which to advance their own agendas of betterment, as some of them 
openly admitted, for example by enabling them to be among the first in line 
when improvements occur. In many respects, their role resembles that of a tra-
ditional headman, and indeed their blocks were often referred to as ‘villages’.
To give an example of the interactions between such leaders and  higher 
 administrative tiers, in one old informal settlement in Tobias Hainyeko 
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 constituency, the community leaders had long been sending letters to the 
City, and the Mayor in particular, requesting that the latter meet them and 
address their concerns. During my fieldwork, they eventually got their wish 
and a meeting between the Mayor, City officials, City councillors, the Regional 
Councillor and the community leaders from various informal settlements in 
that constituency was held. In the meeting, the community leaders were given 
room to air their concerns. These were primarily of a practical nature, focusing 
on the provision and maintenance of services as well as the desired alloca-
tion of erven. However, there were also more general, and critical, interven-
tions,  focusing on what was perceived as a lack of will or capacity of those 
responsible for delivering land and services. For example, an old man who was 
a member of the elders’ council in his area quite straightforwardly pointed out 
what he saw as the discrepancy between promises and actual delivery, stating 
that ‘promises made ten years ago hurt us. Why do you run when people in 
other areas ask you to come? Why are services not given here like in town?’ 
As the questions and comments were collected, there was no direct answer to 
these questions. In their responses to all the queries and pleas that were heard, 
the ceo of the City and the Mayor referred to their responsibility to cater 
for the needs of the whole city with limited funds. While basic services were a 
human right, said the Mayor, changes could not happen overnight. The Mayor 
and City representatives further pointed out that more efficient implementa-
tion aided by  community involvement and sharing of information would be 
key to making the most of available resources. In general, the principles of 
 affordability and cost recuperation recurred in my interviews with City repre-
sentatives. From the perspective of informal residents such principles might 
be a bitter pill to swallow, as they seem to embody new arrangements of privi-
lege that perpetuate the stark inequalities inherited from the racial hierarchy 
of settler colonialism.
The leadership structure described above is formally geared towards de-
velopmental aims (upgrading and services) but it has significant political 
effects. In principle, the structures of community leadership are administra-
tive, not political positions—as one of the leaders firmly asserted to me and 
as the City’s guidelines also stipulate (City of Windhoek, 2011, 4). In practice, 
however, swapo structures and government structures often overlap at the 
grass-roots level through the persons holding positions in them. While I did 
not systematically chart this issue, at least in the areas where I worked most of 
the leaders I met had previously been active in party structures or continued 
to be so (see also Kamminga 2000, 50–51). Furthermore, they closely cooper-
ate with regional and City councillors, which are politically elected positions. 
In Windhoek, all of the regional councillors for constituencies where there 
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are  informal  settlements belong to swapo and 12 out of 15 City councillors 
 represent the ruling party. In the eyes of such elected officials, issues of wel-
fare provision are of high political significance: ‘they elect us’, as one regional 
councillor put it.
Notably, in the context of Namibian urban residential politics, people are 
striving to become visible and recognised through various forms of claim-
making. They want to be registered and have their details recorded instead of 
resorting to tactics of invisibility or exit. This is because they mostly do not see 
the political and administrative authorities of regional and local government 
as a threat but rather as key in controlling access to secure residence in the city. 
Hence acceptance of their bureaucratic requirements is a precondition for be-
coming a beneficiary. Hence, they do not resist becoming subjects of the data 
generation exercises of the City but are, on the contrary, trying hard to enter its 
surveys, waiting lists and classifications; measures that constitute an integral 
part of biopolitical ‘legibility’ and control of contemporary postcolonial states 
(Das and Poole, 2004).
The above point should be qualified by noting a key moment when resi-
dents’ strategies concerning visibility change. In the past, the City used to re-
move at will ‘illegal’ squatters from sites designated for development. However, 
a few years ago, a group of squatters, assisted by the public law firm Legal Assis-
tance Centre, challenged this practice in court. Eventually, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the sections of the Squatters Proclamation of 19855 that authorise 
the demolition of squatters’ shacks are unconstitutional (Ellinger, 2015, 10–11). 
Since then, squatters cannot be removed without a court order and them being 
provided with an alternative place to settle. This has led to a game of cat and 
mouse in which the City Police tries to prevent people from establishing their 
presence in an area in the first place while the aspirant residents try again, of-
ten during the night, until they succeed. After this, they cannot be evicted and 
can start their incremental struggle towards formalisation. Obviously, the issue 
of whether one can be considered to already reside in a structure or not is not 
straightforward to assess and may lead to contested evictions.6
3.4 Summing Up the Situation in Windhoek
The antagonistic forms of claim-making, such as AR campaigning or sporadic 
movements to oppose evictions, have received the most media attention and 
are therefore visible to broader publics. Nevertheless, most claims over urban 
5 Proclamation AG 21; Official Gazette Extraordinary of South West Africa No. 5047, 7–17.
6 See the High Court case of Junias vs. The Municipal Council of the Municipality of Windhoek 
(A 35/2014) for an illustrative discussion of such assessment.
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land, services and housing have long taken the form of residents’ everyday tac-
tics to try to incrementally gain a foothold to reside securely in the city. They 
have combined this with campaigning towards the City and ‘the government’ 
through community leaders and councillors. These claims mirror a policy of 
participatory incrementality in the informal settlement upgrading strategy 
of the City of Windhoek, and resonate with the operating logic of the Shack 
Dwellers Federation as well as the provisions of the recent Flexible Land 
 Tenure Act. The slow rate of delivery has made room for land occupations that 
can be transformed into open claims after establishing oneself on a site.
Significantly, it is not one, straightforward demand that is made and re-
sponded to in this arena, but rather a shifting front line that moves from one 
aspiration to another through a series of claims and responses. In the process, 
residents’ strategies and official responses have increasingly converged. The 
former have gradually sought to improve their access to land, housing and ser-
vices, as well as their legal standing and security, while the latter have sought to 
transform informality into formality through step-by-step increases in tenure 
security, incremental provision of housing and services and the mobilisation 
of ‘self-help’ to facilitate such improvements.
Even though such incrementality works on practical questions it also pro-
duces relations of citizenship and authority. To give an example, let me refer 
to the requirement of the City, discussed above, for the residents of informal 
settlements to elect leaders to represent them vis-à-vis the authorities. While 
this arises from the practical needs related to communal service provision, it 
leads to residents of such areas having to align their interests and form or-
ganised communities—at least to some extent—instead of advancing their 
lot through disconnected strategies. At the same time, it leads the residents to 
invest their trust in and channel their aspirations through the agencies admin-
istering their affairs, thus reinforcing the authority of such agencies.
Contrary to what the proponents of formalisation through titling (most no-
tably de Soto, 2000) propose, formality and informality in such a context are 
not necessarily clear-cut, either/or conditions. Rather, through the emergence 
of informal markets in land and housing, gradual official accommodation 
through enumeration, service provision and upgrading policies, court deci-
sions against eviction, participation in savings groups and legislative instru-
ments that outline a gradual path towards formalisation,7 residents who start 
7 Namibia has recently passed the Flexible Land Tenure Act, which provides for a formalisa-
tion path that recognises the slow and incremental nature of informal settlement upgrad-
ing. It consists of a step-by-step model of tenure, with different grades of title schemes; see 
 Republic of Namibia (2016).
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out in a condition of nearly absolute informality may move towards formality 
as their claims are increasingly recognised. In the process the land that they 
occupy and the structures they erect on it increasingly gain the characteristics 
of property.8 However, the process also involves a simultaneous informalisa-
tion of formal regulations through repeated practical and tactical negotiations 
of rules of entitlement and precedence.
Importantly, such processes have been taking place at the fringes of Wind-
hoek for sufficiently long to have become incorporated in the tacit practical 
knowledge of the residents and hence to inform their actions. Thus, while the 
slow rate of improvement causes impatience, the prospects of gradual better-
ment and the public authorities’ significant role in facilitating it translate dis-
satisfaction into recurrent claims through officially accepted channels rather 
than into more antagonistic forms of activism. In other words, they serve the 
ends of stabilisation and pacification instead of immediate transformation.
4 The Logic of Mutuality
What kinds of insights does the above case of residential claims on the fringes 
of Windhoek offer for diversifying and clarifying the analytical vocabulary of 
claim-making dynamics? While the above observations concur with some of 
Bayat’s (2000, 2010, 2015) and Holston’s (2008) points on quiet encroachment 
and insurgent citizenship, there are also important differences. This is possi-
bly in part because of the dissimilarities between Namibia and, on the one 
hand, the more purely authoritarian settings of Egypt and Iran, and on the 
other, the firmer tradition of articulate social movements in Brazil. The rela-
tions between ‘the state’ (and ‘the City’) and the ‘informals’ in Namibia are 
not necessarily separate and opposite but may permeate each other, leading 
to co-optation and collusion. Informal residents in Windhoek do not always 
acquire what they need clandestinely, nor do they necessarily seek autonomy 
and legal rights. They often tap into formal political channels and processes to 
make claims to increased residential security and welfare through a combina-
tion of persuasion, pressure and cooperation in the form of requests, seeking 
media attention, threatening to withdraw their political allegiance from the 
ruling party, and the officially endorsed policy of participation.
At first glance, such relations would seem to fit the picture of clientelism as 
they mobilise vertical loyalties between particular local and regional govern-
ment representatives, community leaders and groups of residents, and involve 
8 For a closely related argument in the context of Indonesia, see Nurman and Lund (2016).
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the exchange of material and legal improvement for the informal residents to 
their compliance. In this sense, these relations reproduce the party–state at 
ground level and also involve the possibility of partial inclusions and exclu-
sions (see also, e.g., Patel, 2016; Hammett, 2017, 5). Indeed, clientelism is the 
explanatory model suggested by some authors for understanding urban Afri-
can claim-making dynamics (see e.g. Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2014; Mitlin, 
2014). While the above relations are very real and important to note, my analy-
sis suggests that the notion of clientelism might be inadequate for understand-
ing the dependencies involved. This is because of, first, its instrumentalism 
and insufficiently theorised agency, and second, the tendency of clientelist ex-
planations to associate mutual dependencies with inefficiency and stagnancy.
While the play of claims and responses in Windhoek may involve a con-
siderable amount of tactical consideration out of personal or partisan in-
terests, these are not the only set of rules that enter the game. Beyond their 
own immediate needs, the claims and statements of the residents repeatedly 
imagine a shared political community where everyone is entitled to basic 
welfare—housing, water, sanitation, electricity and basic security. There is a 
widely shared and firm belief that ‘the government’ should help those in need 
and that this is possible because of abundant national resources and a small 
population. Residents often told me that they will find a way to pay their bills 
and build their houses little by little if the government ‘meets them halfway’ 
with land, services and public assistance. Explanations for why this is not hap-
pening enough included the lack of funds and capacity within the structures 
of the City, but also lack of political will. High-ranking politicians and civil 
servants are said to be involved in urban land speculation, benefiting from in-
flated house and rental prices. Contractors and their frontmen (referred to as 
‘tenderpreneurs’) are said to utilise their networks to gain tenders at well above 
reasonable prices. Provision of affordable housing on a large scale would cut 
into these sources of income. In other words, the residents criticise particular 
leaders, but their criticism does not amount to questioning the relationship 
of mutual dependence as much as claiming that that relationship is not suf-
ficiently honoured. This ethos provides a ground for assessing the performance 
of leaders—whether they care sufficiently or not—and the leaders know this. 
In this context, the knowledge production related to upgrading, including sur-
veys, the enumeration of shacks, waiting lists, and meetings to share informa-
tion, serve as forms of impatience management and respond to the regularly 
expressed need of the residents to be heard by the authorities.
While the gradual, multiform negotiation between rulers and their subjects 
has been identified as crucial for the formation of ‘social contracts’ and insti-
tutions of governance (Hickey, 2010; Nugent, 2010), such negotiations do not 
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always occur in the same ways and yield similar results. Settings where the 
ethos of mutual dependence enjoys broad acceptance seem fundamentally 
different from contracts supposedly resulting from Hobbesian self-interest but 
also from the more procedural individualism of social liberalism (most nota-
bly Rawls (1971)). However, strategic bartering in which favours are exchanged 
for adherence might not offer a fully satisfactory explanation either. Rather, 
ideas of reciprocal, yet hierarchical dependence with an imperative of sharing 
have been identified as a significant component of the constitution of many 
southern African societies (see Ferguson, 2013, 2015; Englund, 2015; Friedman, 
2011; Gulbrandsen, 2012).9 They construct an ethos of a political community 
whose sociality precedes and is more fundamental than the individual aspira-
tions of its members. The exact origins of this moral universe may be multiple, 
and their extensive discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter. What seems 
likely, however, is that the particular form that African state formation took 
during the colonial and early postcolonial periods may have played no small 
part in contributing towards the centrality of such forms of authority and def-
erence. It formed a key part of what Mbembe (2001, 45) has called ‘the trinity of 
violence, allocations and transfers’ that combined coercion with the strategic 
recognition of key segments of the population and reciprocal chains of dis-
tribution and loyalty (see also Englebert, 2009; Bayart, 2000). Ideas of mutual 
dependence become embedded in subjectivities due to their long histories 
and social prevalence. Hence, they are ontological rather than purely ethical 
principles. Furthermore, such dispositions may have a significant aesthetic 
component in addition to the ethical one, directing assessments of what are 
intelligible and acceptable forms of making claims. Hence, for example, the 
ire that the rhetoric of Affirmative Repositioning has raised among those in 
power. Quite often, their angry reactions have related less to the content of 
AR’s demands and more to their form, which allegedly demonstrates a lack of 
respect towards figures of authority. Critical comments by ordinary informal 
residents almost invariably focused on the same issue, while they tended to 
agree with the expressed objectives of the AR. For them, the preference of AR 
leaders for antagonistic expression seemed to amount to a denial of the asym-
metrical, para-familial relationship of loyalty and care.
The other problem with clientelist (and more broadly, neo-patrimonialist) 
readings of African contexts is their association of mutualist politics with in-
efficiency and stagnancy. This overlooks the potential, unforeseen long-term 
9 As Ferguson (2013) points out, an Afrobarometer survey found that ‘a solid majority (60 per 
cent) of Africans see their government as a parent who ought to take care of them’ (Afroba-
rometer, 2009, 4–5).
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consequences of processes of mutual negotiation and recognition, possibly 
including prospects for social inclusion, material improvements and political 
participation. Claims of recognition and dependence are intimately related to 
resource politics. They may take the form of including some in, and exclud-
ing some from, resources and welfare through group-based criteria of merit. 
More positively, they may contribute to the reproduction of and reliance on 
the relatively immediate socialities of kinship, friendship, neighbourhood or 
religious community. However, it seems that they may also give rise to the 
 institutionalisation of broader, even universalist politics of distribution and 
welfare in contexts where the economic and administrative base permits this. 
For Kelsall (2013), ‘developmental patrimonialism’ refers to settings of suc-
cessful institutionalisation based on entrenching patrimonial authority in 
 structures broader and more durable than the reign of any particular ruler, for 
example those of the ruling party or the bureaucracy. What is significant is 
that in such a perspective the logic of mutuality is not necessarily opposite to, 
but is possibly compatible with development. Kelsall’s focus is on the agency 
of the elites, but gains added resonance when the implicit ‘social contract’ ex-
pressed in the ideal of mutuality and the demands it places on rulers are taken 
into account. From this perspective, could the growing urban settlements with 
their constantly moving, negotiated frontier of claims and responses over time 
provide a laboratory for the development of novel institutional arrangements?
Such cities do not seem to be incubators of the same kind of individuation 
that Weber wrote about in The City (Weber, 1978, 1212–1372). What we see in 
them, rather, is the increasing unmooring of distinct identities, but not neces-
sarily of the logic of mutual dependence. The latter may actually gain further 
impetus from the erosion of economic mediation through wage labour in Afri-
ca. For sure, this mediation never was as pervasive there as in Northern indus-
trial societies. Still, it offered a significant organising principle in postcolonial 
societies, particularly when linked to the loyalties and obligations of redistri-
bution through kin networks through which salaries lubricated welfare and 
social reproduction beyond their immediate recipients (Mbembe, 2001; Roit-
man, 2007). This is no longer the case, as changes in production technologies, 
coupled with the erosion of debt-driven development, austerity measures of 
structural adjustment, and the end of the Cold War support chains have ush-
ered in what many authors have identified as an era of jobless growth (Li, 2013; 
Ferguson, 2015; Englund, 2015). Such southern African states as South  Africa, 
Botswana and Namibia are heavily reliant on the capital-intensive extraction 
of minerals and a large part of their populations remain superfluous to the 
formal economy. In spite of this, they remain relatively stable and their econ-
omies and administrative institutions function relatively well. They do have 
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highly unequal patterns of income and wealth but have still taken  significant 
steps in tackling poverty and improving the welfare of their citizens. This has 
involved extensions in social policy, including broad-based cash grant schemes 
such as universal, non-contributory old-age pension disability grants, child 
support grants, war veteran benefits, and even experiments in basic income 
grants (Ferguson, 2015; Metsola, 2015; Devereux, 2013; Stewart and Yermo, 2009; 
Pelham, 2007).
5 Conclusion
Through a case of study of incremental and mutually constitutive claims 
and responses by Namibian residents of informal settlements and  public 
 authorities, this chapter has questioned the general applicability of such 
 interpretations of claim-making dynamics that focus on resistance, autono-
my or instrumental clientelism. In the Namibian context, claims rather tend 
to reflect and construct a relational ethics of mutual dependence. This high-
lights the importance of contextual specificity. Claim-making processes tend 
to be simultaneously about concrete goods, resources or benefits and about 
 inclusion. However, to understand the kind of political subjectivity and socio-
political  relationships imagined by this demand—for example, whether it is 
about  being recognised as rights-bearing individual citizens or as ‘children’ 
under the custody of the state—requires careful, context-specific exploration. 
Furthermore, it requires taking people’s dispositions and beliefs seriously in-
stead of deciding their veracity or value on their behalf.
Residents’ claim-making in Namibia does not represent an extension of 
rights or democratising politics directly. Rather, its modus operandi recon-
structs relations of reciprocal dependence. However, this negotiation does 
represent deep-seated desires for social and economic justice and inclusion 
in the national body politic. While the real advances related to residents’ 
claim- making and responses are limited and their durability is not certain, 
the policies and practices of participatory incrementality reflect and help re-
construct an ideal of responsive public authority that goes beyond immediate 
instrumental utility. Over time, this negotiation may offer a basis for endur-
ing institutional responses that generate broad-based legitimacy and stability. 
However, this is far from a self-evident outcome, as dependencies can be used 
strategically, in a measured way, to appease and pacify. The question, then, is 
whether the gradual responses necessary for tempering popular claims even-
tually make room for and encourage such forms of political consciousness and 
organisation that are more difficult to harness.
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Chapter 8
Towards an Integrative Approach to Spatial 
Transformation
Addressing Contextual and Spatial Indifference in Design,  
Urban Planning and International Cooperation: A Case Study  
from Addis Ababa
Sascha Delz
Abstract
This chapter draws from the author’s research on recent urbanisation processes in 
Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and its hinterland. It addresses two aspects that are 
often neglected but crucial when discussing how to adequately address urbanisation 
along economic development and structural transformation lines: the importance of 
contextual differences, and the impact of spatial formation. Along these lines, two 
observations are highlighted: first, that there is an obvious need for new concepts of 
urbanisation that are driven by, and appropriate for, African contexts; and second, 
that it is fundamental to reconsider the role of space for economic development and 
structural change. Addressing these issues, the author argues for a move away from 
simplistic and abstract models of transition—which have substantially influenced 
the outcomes of development policies, international development cooperation and 
spatial practices—and for the exploration of more integrative, contextually informed 
models of transformation. Using an example of road construction in Ethiopia’s capi-
tal Addis Ababa, the chapter firstly addresses particular issues related to policies of 
transition, and secondly, outlines an alternative approach that could address the com-
plex challenges of economic, social and spatial transformation in a more integrative, 
contextually relevant manner. Suggesting a more open, spatially conscious stance 
(i.e. dialogic design and planning) and a more collectively conceived planning pro-
cess (i.e. collective ground), the chapter thus advocates that when dealing with the 
 complex challenges of everyday spaces for urban dwellers, future urban development 
policies should rather enable a multitude of contextually adequate and integrative 
proposals than promote a restrained catalogue of universally applied solutions.
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“Transition” implies a transformation between known points in time, 
“transformation” a structural change into something yet unknown.
hettne, 2009, 30
1 Introduction
1.1 Contextual and Spatial Blind Spots in Urban Development and 
International Cooperation
As so many sectors within the so-called global South, urban development, 
 urban planning and urban design have been strongly intertwined with the 
global North’s interventions through colonisation, and, since World War II, 
through the international frameworks of technical assistance and develop-
ment cooperation. It is thus of no surprise that within the urban realm most 
of the concepts and methods for addressing urbanisation processes—in all 
 involved disciplines—have been dominated by approaches developed in 
and for Western cities (Okpala, 1990; Healey, 2010; Ward, 2010). Furthermore, 
 despite the emerging spatial turn within the academic fields of (mainly) the 
social sciences and the humanities starting in the 1970s (Low, 2014, 19–21), 
many development cooperation policies and projects appear to have repeated-
ly neglected such new perspectives and have thus maintained blind spots for 
the spatial realm in general, and the related effects on the built environment 
in particular. Intrinsically linked to the physical world however, urban configu-
rations shaped by both imported concepts and spatially indifferent develop-
ment policies have determined urban spaces of the everyday lives of urban 
citizens for better or—too often—worse. Thus, the general failure to genuinely 
accept locally evolved categories and criteria that could more suitably describe 
processes on the ground has been one of the key omissions with regard to ad-
equately engaging with the challenges of structural and urban transformation 
in the respective contexts.
Addressing these issues within the context of African urbanisation, as well 
as from a perspective of spatial design, urban design and spatial planning, this 
chapter will briefly introduce the so-called Ring Road project that has been 
implemented through a collaboration involving Chinese actors and British 
engineers in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. The Ring Road is one of the sub-
jects of the author’s recently finished dissertation, which follows an empiri-
cal bottom-up exploration structured along a methodological framework that 
combines case study research—as defined by Robert K. Yin—with a narrative 
inquiry as described within the methodology of phronetic planning research 
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by Bent  Flyvbjerg (Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2004).1 Within this set-up, the chosen 
 bottom-up trajectory has been a key method with regard to how to conduct 
the overall research: rather than beginning with the related theoretical frame-
works of political, spatial and economic perspectives, each case study’s starting 
point was an analysis of its physical manifestation. Following and unveiling the 
respective underlying processes that influenced these spatial results allowed a 
more precise introduction of the relevant theoretical, political and historical 
frameworks along the way. In summary—and as in the words of James Duminy, 
Nancy Odendaal and Vanessa Watson—applying a case study approach to the 
issues at hand is seen as a crucial methodology with regard to how to produce 
‘data and knowledge on African urbanisation, […] [because it] allows the in-
terweaving of qualitative and quantitative data in order to present nuanced 
explanations of how planning interventions intersect with everyday practices’ 
(Duminy et al., 2014, 197–198). It is clear that within the limits of this chapter it 
is impossible to trace the complete process of the applied bottom-up trajectory 
or recapitulate the entire case study. Rather, the presented argument directly 
starts with some aspects of the dissertation’s conclusion, shows parts of the 
empirical findings related to the respective case study, and ends with remarks 
that draw from—and extend—the original research’s closing arguments. Re-
flecting on the results of the author’s dissertation, and in accordance with the 
related introductory statements, the chapter will address following three as-
pects: a) the necessity of revisiting the underlying mechanisms of established 
conceptions of development cooperation, urbanisation and spatial planning; 
b) the importance of highlighting and re-conceptualizing the significance of 
the built environment and its physical impact on everyday lives; and c) a prop-
osition towards more pluralistic, context-based practices that allow spatial and 
structural change to be shaped in a more integrative and adequate manner.
1.2 Thinking in Transitions and Dialectic Thinking
At the core of the following discussion on why things happen the way they 
do, and how they could be changed for that matter, lies the crucial distinc-
tion between transition and transformation as phrased by Björn Hettne in 
the introductory quote. The prospect of linear progress has not only substan-
tially formed general discourse on development, it has also enduringly influ-
enced the simultaneously established, official frameworks of development 
1 The author’s dissertation investigates three different projects of international development 
cooperation within and around Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. Including various global ac-
tors (German, Chinese and Dutch), and covering the sectors of housing, road construction 
and export agriculture, the research critically analyses the interrelation between underlying 
cooperation approaches, the applied financial models, and the resulting spatial impacts on 
the ground.
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aid,  assistance and cooperation (Martinussen, 1997). Indeed, looking at the 
 origins of development thinking as framed by the establishment of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, a great majority of the introduced frameworks have been 
 construed, planned and implemented rather through a perception of a transi-
tion ‘between known points in time’ than along a transformation that results in 
‘structural change into something yet unknown’ (Hettne, 2009, 30). This focus 
can be mainly attributed to the influential modernisation theories that more 
broadly entered mainstream policies during the 1940s and 1950s (Martinussen, 
1997, 38-39). Presuming ‘[d]evelopment […] [to be] the process of transition 
from one situation to the other’, modernisation—through its main motor of 
economic growth and development—was seen as ‘a continuum stretching 
from poor to rich countries, which would allow for the replication in the poor 
countries of those conditions characteristic of mature capitalist ones’—such 
as ‘industrialization, urbanization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, 
increased provision of social services, and high levels of literacy’ (Escobar, 
1995, 38). Thus, the idea of development was clearly linked to a notion of a 
controllable, progressive transition from one stage to another.
On a more abstract level, the notion of a transition from A to B can be direct-
ly related to dialectic thinking, where a polar construct sets up a  directional 
path for both problem definition, and problem-solving. As Richard Sennett 
eloquently summarises this well-established approach, ‘in dialectic, as we 
learned in school, the verbal play of opposites should gradually build up to 
a synthesis […]; the aim is to come eventually to a common understanding’, 
and thus reveal ‘what might establish that common ground’ (Sennett, 2012, 
18–19). In other words, dialectic reasoning is driven by an iterative but ulti-
mately linear trajectory that converges oppositional suggestions into a synthe-
sis, compromise or common understanding. Since dialectic problem-solving 
has been a dominant conceptual framework within Western culture, it has 
been fairly typical within development discourse to review the status of, and 
define engagement with low-income environments through opposing con-
structs as well. It is here where the aspiration to encourage development as 
a transition from A to B usually converges with dialectic reasoning: using real 
or constructed counterparts has served as the basis for envisioning develop-
mental processes along linear paths. Harold Brookfield (1975), for instance, 
identifies major dichotomies, such as development and underdevelopment 
or tradition and modernity, as a crucial part of general development think-
ing. In his understanding, ‘dichotomies, or polarized constructs, are basic to 
the simplest structuring of human perception into comprehensible order’, and 
‘[i]nevitably […] grow into stereotypes’ where ‘[…] argument often turns to 
the simpler method—“as if” there were only two classes’ (Brookfield, 1975, 53). 
According to this statement, general thought often remains in simplistic, dual 
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categories. Likewise, and particularly focusing on the African context during 
the early 1980s, geographer Anthony O’Connor detects similar tendencies to 
use ‘crude dichotomies’ such as ‘developed v. less-developed’, ‘indigenous v. 
 colonial cities’, ‘formal v. informal sectors within cities’, or ‘urban v. rural’ when 
trying to both comprehend African cities and to find solutions to identified 
challenges (O’Connor, 1983, 21–22). Comparing such statements from the 1970s 
and 1980s to the contemporary critical accounts of, for instance, Jennifer Rob-
inson, Filip de Boeck, Edgar Pieterse or Garth Myers highlights how persistent 
the cultural paradigm of polar and dichotomic thinking has been throughout 
time,  disciplines, and geographies (Robinson, 2006; de Boeck and Plissart, 
2004; Myers, 2011).
Thus, while dichotomic set-ups and their methodological twin of dialectic 
thinking might satisfy specific arenas of logical and academic analysis, they are 
rather prone to providing simplistic approaches when it comes to formulat-
ing and implementing policies within the complexities of a specific context—
even more so if the target of analysis involves a foreign environment. While 
this presumably leads to set-ups that ‘crudely impose or emulate an idea or 
practice promoted as some kind of “universal” solution’, it also has an impact 
on how to engage with the physical environment (Healey, 2010, 6). As Brook-
field further states, although many such ‘dichotomies […] are not conceived 
or elaborated in any spatial context, […] they certainly have spatial implica-
tions’ (Brookfield, 1975, 53). In other words, the abstract nature of dialectic rea-
soning, dichotomic set-ups and linear transitional thinking very likely leads 
to a disconnect  between analytical thinking and its ramifications for physical 
environments, and thus ultimately incites a culture of contextual and spatial 
indifferences.
2 Contextual and Spatial Indifference
2.1 Shaping Addis Ababa’s Ring Road with Universal Planning and 
Design Principles
The following brief portrayal of the Ring Road project in Addis Ababa illus-
trates how simplistic, linear problem-solving leads to both contextual and spa-
tial indifference, resulting in many challenging outcomes for the city’s  spatial 
configuration, on the one hand, and citizens’ everyday physical environments, 
on the other. Involving state-owned Chinese financiers and contractors, lo-
cal authorities, as well as designs developed by Western engineers, the Ring 
Road can be seen as an exemplary case study on how economic development 
and cooperation—within the realm of road infrastructure—is conducted in 
contemporary Africa (Brautigam, 2009; Foster et al., 2008, 2009). It also serves 
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as an illustration of how the neglect of contextual specificities and  spatial 
 implications is fostered by aspirations based on supposedly controllable 
transitional  objectives—such as moving from traditional, underdeveloped 
street conditions to a modern, developed network of urban roads. Whereas 
the construction of the 33.4 km long road project started in 1998, was assigned 
to the China Road and Bridge Corporation (crbc) and was partially financed 
by a Chinese loan, the design, planning and tender drawings were executed 
in collaboration with the British planning consultant Parkman Ltd (Mo et al., 
2008) (see Figure 8.1). The circular road consists of both newly built and up-
graded road sectors: out of the total length of 33.4 km, 19.2 km were built from 
scratch, while the remaining 14.2 km were renewed and adapted according to 
the new Ring Road layout and standards (Mo et al., 2008). Apart from street 
Ring Road
1 2 5
Kilometres
N
10
Roads constructed after 2007
Asphalted Roads
All Weather Roads
Ring Road
section 2A/B
Ring Road
section 1A/B
Ring Road
Phase 3
Figure 8.� Ring Road sections and Addis Ababa’s road network as of 2010.
Source: Construction Ahead, �0�0 (colour adjustments and 
 annotations by author)
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 construction work, the project features an array of supporting structures: six 
flyovers (bridges), 23 pedestrian bridges and 12 culverts (Mo et al., 2008).2
Introducing the first urban highway to Addis Ababa, the adopted approach-
es to the planning and design of the Ring Road have been strongly influenced 
by global design norms established and conceived outside of Ethiopia and Af-
rica. Predictably, modern road and highway guidelines have been  dominated 
by American and British standards. While one of the most representative 
sets of American standards—namely the design policies published by the 
 American Association of State Highway and Transport Officials (AASHTO)—is 
mainly directed at the context of industrialised countries, the British Trans-
port and Road Laboratory (TRL) has additionally produced a series of so-called 
Overseas Road Notes (ORNs) specifically aimed at developing countries and 
mainly focusing on guidelines for interurban and rural roads (TRL [1981] 2003). 
Accordingly, the Ethiopian Roads Authority’s (ERA) guidelines on rural roads 
primarily use TRL codes, whereas the Addis Ababa City Roads Authority 
( AACRA) has compiled its Geometric Design Manual mainly along the lines 
of American and Australian standards (ERA, 2002; AACRA, 2003). AACRA’s de-
sign manual provides an overall planning and design framework, establishing 
procedural guidelines regarding urban road categories, road and intersection 
design, landscaping, pedestrian facilities, safety measures, etc.  Unsurprisingly, 
the combination of AACRA’s adoption of American and Australian design 
standards, the hiring of a British engineering company, and the use of a rela-
tively efficient set-up with Chinese finance and contractors fostered the use of 
global, ready-made concepts and designs rather than exploring alternative ap-
proaches derived from local circumstances, customs and necessities. This ap-
proach has been dominated by a fairly technical attitude, where vehicle flows 
and capacities are at the centre of considerations and the spatial or cultural- 
related issues of non-motorised actors are startlingly neglected. In a context 
such as Addis Ababa, this turns realities upside down: although the majority 
of traffic participants are pedestrians, road design uses vehicle flows as the 
main determinant, while pedestrian connections are treated as mere add-on 
elements. Such a top-down approach to planning inhibits a more systemic per-
spective that would allow a better understanding of cultural and local speci-
ficities: as Tefera Teshome reports in his investigation into the Ring Road, for 
example, many local citizens would have been willing to contribute their own 
2 Due to the currently ongoing construction of the Ring Road’s third phase, it is not possible 
to provide an account of the fully implemented project. Therefore, all quantitative data pre-
sented here are related to the completed, first and second stages, which represent approxi-
mately 70 per cent of the expected full contour, and were implemented from 1998 to 2004.
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experiences, resources and even funding—to build bridges, for instance—to 
the planning process (Teshome, 2011). Ignoring such inputs from local  residents, 
the planning actors involved opted for a rather one-sided typology comprising 
eight lanes on the same level, four high-speed lanes in the middle and two lo-
cal feeder lanes on each side, which results in a fairly large and  distinct spatial 
break of approx. 35 metres within the urban fabric (see Figure 8.2). Looking 
through the propositions of American standards with regard to how to design a 
street section within urban environments reveals that, indeed, the Ring Road’s 
section design has been directly adapted from a standardised American solu-
tion (see Figure 8.3). With no further adaption, this section has been subse-
quently extended along the whole perimeter of the Ring Road— regardless of 
the variety of existing spatial conditions (see Figure 8.4).
lane 3
2.5%
3.0
sidewalk sidewalksep. main line main line sep.
frontage road median
40.0
frontage road
6.6 1.7 7.2 3.0 7.2 1.7 6.6 3.0
2% 2% 2% 2% 2.5%
lane 4 lane 1 lane 2
new jersey barrier pedestrian guardrail
Figure 8.� Schematic diagram of road cross-section geometry.
Source: Parkman Ltd. / Ethiopian Association of Civil Engineers, 
�998 (retraced by author)
r.o.w r.o.w
through roadways
barrier with
glare fence
frontage road
Figure 8.3 Restricted cross-section for ground-level freeways.
Source: AASHTO, �004 (retraced by author)
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Using such simplified solutions has certainly been an effective method in the 
short term: the historically tremendous amount of road constructions (through 
and beyond the Ring Road) that Addis Ababa has been able to produce within 
a short amount of time presumably illustrates a potent transition from dusty 
roads towards an asphalted road network. Yet many of these projects display 
a clear deficit when it comes to qualitative spatial aspects that go beyond ma-
terial or technical properties. In the case of the Ring Road, well-established 
 procedural, planning, and design aspects were clearly favoured over a more 
qualitative, locally driven set of characteristics that could have made it possi-
ble to—at least partially—seek a new interpretation of what an urban highway 
could be in the particular social, economic and spatial context of Addis Ababa.
2.2 Creating Inadvertent Spatial and Social Side Effects
Looking at the various spatial and social effects that the design of the Ring Road 
has caused in Addis Ababa shows how spatially indifferent design features can 
produce challenging spatial set-ups beyond the abstract technicalities of site 
allocation, vehicle flows, curvatures and safety measures. The most influential 
and imminent spatial feature of the Ring Road is its schematic section design. 
Placing four high-speed lanes in the middle of the road creates a rather rigid 
spatial barrier not only in the form of the road as such, but also through the ap-
plied design itself. The resulting safety measure to place continuous guard rails 
and concrete partitions along the street and between the road lanes simulta-
neously produces an impermeable corridor for road users, and, more crucially, 
a critical obstacle for the pedestrians living in the adjacent neighbourhoods. 
Losing the different degrees of permeability that normal urban roads, and even 
arterial urban roads, usually offer, the Ring Road has physically segregated 
neighbourhoods along its whole perimeter. Closely related to this is pedestrian 
Figure 8.4 Ring Road tender drawings, selection of continuous road sections.
Source: FDRE & Parkman, �997
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mobility. The planners’ approach to pedestrian movement has been rather 
poor. Addis Ababa’s high proportion of pedestrians—half of all trips within 
the city are made by foot; only 66 vehicles per 1,000  inhabitants—would have 
justified a more direct integration of pedestrian issues into the centre of design 
considerations (World Bank and UNECA, 2002, 105). Yet the chosen strategy of 
installing a series of pedestrian bridges to supposedly fix punctual connection 
problems reflects a predominantly technical design attitude that considers 
pedestrians as an abstract number, and not as actors who behave according 
to their human, economic and social needs. This attitude is clearly exposed 
through the design and distribution of these pedestrian ‘supplements’, which 
are exclusively designed along the functionalistic paradigm of safely and ‘ratio-
nally’ crossing a street from point A to point B.
But the Ring Road corridor not only hinders pedestrians’ efforts to cross it 
conveniently, it also complicates vehicle drivers’ lateral movements: in order to 
get across the Ring Road, drivers have to take a ‘detour’ over the roundabouts 
and intersections (Bekele, 2012). Furthermore, the installation of a high-speed 
channel, which is, for most of the time, completely separated from connecting 
streets, has created challenges that are directly linked to specific local condi-
tions. Coming from a fairly Western understanding of transportation planning, 
such corridors are usually designed under the assumption of a steady and con-
sistent (high-speed) traffic flow. Even small disruptions of this flow can cre-
ate substantial traffic jams. Yet in the case of Addis Ababa, such  consistency is 
hardly a given factor. To mention just some examples: the poor material condi-
tion of many heavy-load trucks or buses slows them down significantly and of-
ten results in the blockage of one lane, or sometimes both lanes (see Figure 8.5); 
the roundabouts, where all the local modes of transportation come together, 
create congestion that extends directly into the high-speed corridor; the insuf-
ficient maintenance and quality of the Ring Road generate  obstacles—such as 
potholes or pools of water—that considerably slow down the intended consis-
tent flow within the high-speed corridor.
Another crucial spatial effect of the Ring Road’s schematic section design is 
caused by its rigidity. Combined with the overall planning process, the given 
layout seems to be fairly immune to situational adjustments that go beyond 
purely technical or functional means. By taking the chosen design as the given 
solution that accommodates the quite generally calculated capacities, even 
simple and minor possibilities for adjustments have not been considered. This 
can be shown, for instance, with the continuous implementation of the same 
section for the frontage roads. As it turns out, in densely populated more ur-
ban areas, these roads are often overcrowded by local vehicles, minibuses, and 
commercial activities. In contrast, the same layout is outsized in less populated 
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neighbourhoods, where all kinds of different spaces, such as agricultural land 
or industrial zones, adjoin the Ring Road.
Lastly, there is the issue of physical maintenance, which is related to design 
decisions for both road layout and materiality. On the one hand, there is the 
problem of property damage through both accidents and misappropriations. 
The instalment of relatively valuable elements, such as steel guardrails, incites 
many citizens to use the Ring Road as a free resource for construction materi-
als (Teshome, 2011). On the other hand, there is a major problem with the Ring 
Road’s drainage system, which has been designed according to British stan-
dards, but obviously (and somewhat surprisingly) did not take into account 
issues of local maintenance capacities, or climatic conditions, resulting in both 
constantly clogged and undersized drainage pipes. This repeatedly results in 
flooding (of the Ring Road and other newly built streets) during the rainy sea-
son (Bekele, 2012).
On an urban scale, one of the Ring Road’s basic justifications was to better 
regulate traffic and urban growth between the city centre and its peripheries 
(ORAAMP et al., 2002). Through its circular set-up, the project was supposed to 
firstly divert through traffic from the city centre and secondly distribute both 
traffic and urban growth efficiently to the city’s peripheries (Mo et al., 2008). 
Yet, looking at the changes along the project’s perimeter, the Ring Road has not 
only served as this link between centre and periphery, but has itself become 
Figure 8.5 Traffic jam, Ring Road.
Source: Image by author, �0��
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a zone for urban growth and development. Creating a first, better, or quicker 
access to different areas of the city, many of the plots adjacent to the Ring 
Road have experienced extensive spatial transformations. Rather than creat-
ing a distinction between a denser city core and dispersed expansion zones, it 
has accelerated the integration of remaining open territories into an ongoing 
pattern of suburban development (see Figure 8.6). While the general mecha-
nism of urban development along a new or better route of access is a common 
result and is practically unavoidable, the specific spatial effects and formations 
Figure 8.6 Industrial and housing development at Quarry Roundabout,  
2002 (upper) / 2013 (lower).
Source: Google Earth/Digital Globe, �0�4
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on the adjacent territories are often—as illustrated here—not a part of road 
design and road development. Performing road design from a more holistic 
perspective than described with the case of the Ring Road would thus impli-
cate that designing a road means simultaneously designing a region, a city and 
a neighbourhood as well.
As indicated above, the most direct and challenging impacts on citizens’ 
everyday lives caused by the Ring Road are characterised by aggravated cross-
ing conditions. Both the Ring Road layout and the installed overpasses—rigid, 
ready-made structures replicated along the whole perimeter—can deliber-
ately adapt neither to their immediate spatial surroundings nor to the exist-
ing cultural and social customs of Addis Ababa’s pedestrian context. Roads as 
well as the overpasses are often confronted with the realities of street vending, 
pop-up bus stations, providing shelter, or the presence of animals (see Figure 
8.7 and Figure 8.8).
The issue with animals illustrates quite specifically how both planning 
and design ignore the local context. Donkeys, for example, are still used as 
an important mode of transportation, especially within the peripheral ar-
eas and by people from the lowest income groups. The detours that the Ring 
Road  imposes on these non-motorised participants, directly affects their daily 
movements, time lines and incomes. Similarly, low-income households that 
generated a substantial amount of their income through informal petty trade 
Figure 8.7 Street vendors, Ring Road.
Source: Image by author, �0��
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in front of their houses thanks to walk-in customers (selling fire wood or home-
made injera bread, for example) have experienced problems due to both relo-
cation and spatial detachment from their immediate business environments 
(Teshome, 2011).3 Apart from these specifically business-related challenges 
caused by impeded road crossings, different conditions can be identified un-
der which the overpasses perform better or worse for general pedestrians. In 
more lively and urban surroundings, where the bridges are placed at closer 
intervals, they can become an almost casual part of the neighbourhoods’ daily 
used infrastructure. Here, the density and mixed activities on both sides of the 
Ring Road can partially compensate for the otherwise cumbersome crossing 
of the highway. In areas, however, where adjacent neighbourhoods are defined 
by mono-functional uses such as housing, industrial production or agriculture, 
the bridges are usually placed further apart, creating singular bottlenecks for 
3 The information compiled regarding such socio-economic issues was gathered in the form of 
a combination of data gained through personal observation, targeted interviews and studies 
produced by local researchers—such as Tefera Teshome (2011) or Gebreselassie (2012).
Figure 8.8 Animals, Ring Road.
Source: Image by author, �0��
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pedestrian crossings. While this generates an inconvenient detour for children 
or less agile pedestrians, many pedestrians ignore the overpasses and prefer to 
jaywalk than to add additional minutes or kilometres to their daily journeys 
(World Bank and UNECA., 2002) (see Figure 8.9).
Considering the already high number of accidents involving pedestrians 
in Ethiopia’s cities—according to the 2002 Scoping Study on Urban Mobil-
ity from the World Bank, Ethiopia has ‘one of the highest rates of road acci-
dent fatalities’ with 90 per cent of fatalities being pedestrians in cities—the 
Ring Road’s set-up clearly has not contributed to a substantial improvement 
(World Bank and UNECA, 2002, 40). Again, a sort of disconnection between 
the contextual realities and the design approach can be observed. Yet, whereas 
studies—such as the World Bank’s—usually reveal that many of these ac-
cidents are caused by poorly defined and marked pedestrian facilities, or by 
pedestrians’ erratic movements and behaviour in urban traffic, the proposed 
improvement measures mainly adhere to common notions of technical prob-
lem-solving. Apart from educational measures such as awareness campaigns, 
the Scoping Study on Urban Mobility, for instance, proposes the construction 
of additional bridges of a pedestrian-friendly design or even subways, and the 
installation of ‘taller pedestrian barriers […] to channel pedestrians to these 
facilities’ (World Bank and UNECA, 2002, 41-42). However, given the local social 
and economic context, it is rather unlikely that the observed challenges can be 
resolved just by applying more technical and educational procedures—which 
are, once again, chiefly conveyed by an approach developed for industrialized 
countries and cities.
A further aspect that links spatial transformations with the socio-economic 
realm is signified by resettlements. In the course of implementing the Ring 
Road, the city government had to relocate and compensate dwellers affected 
by the increased spatial needs of the respective designs. Some sources, such 
as Mo et. al., state that ‘local people forwardly assisted [the authorities] and 
were satisfied with the compensation for resettlements’(Mo et al., 2008, 7), 
while other sources report repeated challenges during these processes. Ac-
cording to Teshome’s investigations, for instance, house owners complained 
that  compensation for their demolished houses was too low because the ap-
plied formulaic calculations did not take replacement costs into account 
( Teshome, 2011). In the case of demolished Kebele housing units—the state-
owned, low-end housing stock—tenants were paid ETB 1,200 (USD 146) in 
cash, which was supposed to cover relocation to other rental units and addi-
tional rent costs for 12 months (Gebreselassie, 2012). Within and after these 12 
months, the government promised to provide alternative Kebele housing units. 
In view of the general housing shortage however, many inhabitants refused 
to take cash  compensation, and demanded alternative housing units right 
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at the outset. The administration eventually reacted by providing low-cost 
housing units on the periphery of the city, often incurring higher transpor-
tation costs for residents and disconnecting the affected citizens from their 
 communities within established neighbourhoods.4
3 Alternative Views on Urbanisation and Spatial Formation
3.1 Addressing Urbanisation Through a More Ordinary and Less 
Ideological Mindset
The approaches and results briefly illustrated by the examination of the Ring 
Road project show how rather simplistic and technocratic understandings of 
4 Connected with the resettlements caused by the Ring Road, Teshome (2011) further describes 
an important socio-economic issue that is omnipresent in any kind of relocation of Ethiopi-
an low-income groups: the dismantling of the so-called iqqubs and iddirs. Iddirs are burial as-
sociations and iqqubs informal savings associations, and both are strongly embedded within 
the social structure and spatial proximity of neighbourhoods.
Figure 8.9 Jaywalking, Ring Road.
Source: Image by author, �0��
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urbanisation foster contextual and spatial indifference through universally 
applied models. This, and a de facto ignorance of the impact of such inter-
ventions on spatial formation, clearly begs a critical rethink of the underlying 
theoretical and practical concepts—both regarding the exploration of urban 
processes and the development of a spatially conscious attitude.
With regard to reframing existing concepts of urbanisation and urban pro-
cesses as such, there is a series of critical, contemporary accounts that suggest 
a more reality-based, multifaceted, contextual attitude towards research and 
practice. Two important perspectives within this body of research and liter-
ature are briefly addressed here. Jennifer Robinson’s book Ordinary  Cities—
Between Modernity and Development (2006) is a foundational example of this 
position on a global scale. Based on a postcolonial critique that during the past 
century dominant strands of urban research and practice were directly influ-
enced by the overall discourse on modernisation and ‘under-development’, 
Robinson suggests an alternative vantage point when addressing cities all over 
the globe. Instead of ideologically labelling cities as modern and traditional, 
or developed and underdeveloped counterparts, Robinson demands ‘that the-
orising about cities should be more cosmopolitan, should be resourced by a 
greater diversity of urban experiences’, suggesting that this could ultimately 
lead to an understanding of every city as an ordinary entity in its own right 
(Robinson, 2006, 6). She further argues that this would require ‘an urban  theory 
substantially committed to comparative work’, which is generally ‘suspicious 
and cautious about deploying categories and hierarchies and eager to promote 
strategies for city improvements that build on their distinctive and individual 
creativities and resources’ (Robinson, 2006, 6).
Mainly focusing on the African context, the work of urban scholar Edgar 
Pieterse argues along similar lines. According to Pieterse, a thorough and ad-
equate understanding of particular urban realities and processes demands a 
broader base of fundamental knowledge and research: unfolding a multifacet-
ed pool of knowledge, cultural mindsets, ideas, concepts and disciplines would 
ultimately lead to a deeper and more genuine understanding of what consti-
tutes African cityness (Pieterse, 2010). To achieve this, he suggests that we 
‘cross-fertilise ethnographic texture, sociological patterning and topographies, 
spatial practices and registers and interpretive metaphors that stem from 
speculative philosophical enquiry and literary theory in the broad sense of the 
term’ (Pieterse, 2010, 217). According to Pieterse, this approach would not only 
foster necessary, more contextual and comprehensive knowledge on African 
cities, it would also offer a path ‘towards a more dispassionate approach’ that 
could level out many of the extreme ‘a priori moral assumptions about what 
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is good, moral and modern, and what is not, and therefore unworthy of study, 
or if studied, not to be valorised’ (Pieterse, 2013, 28). A dispassionate approach 
would therefore invest more energy in exploring ‘the real city, the real econ-
omy and the real social practices and identities of the majority of urbanites 
who are building our cities’ (Pieterse, 2013, 28). Pieterse (2013) further indicates 
the kind of strategy needed to perform such a research approach: converging 
multiple fields of expertise, such as quantitative and statistical data, literary 
descriptions of the urban experience, or relevant philosophical frameworks 
into one narrative could generate a multifaceted, reflective and critical propo-
sition that would engage with the given urban realities, and thus would clearly 
move beyond contextual indifference.
3.2 Acknowledging the Importance of Spatial Production  
and Spatial Agency
While the deliberations of Robinson and Pieterse represent seminal con-
tributions to starting re-conceptualising the study of urban issues on a 
 methodological and theoretical level, a comprehensive inclusion of what the 
role—and potential—of physical space might be is still rather restrained. Yet, 
intrinsically linked to spatial outcomes, an exploration of new conceptions of 
urbanisation and urban development would have to be accompanied by inves-
tigating new notions of what the role of physical space and the built environ-
ment might be. Usually within an environment of spatial indifference, spatial 
formations of territory and the built environment are serving as abstract ves-
sels that physically absorb economic progress. Territory and built structures 
therefore mainly represent the general, yet essential, substrate that serves to 
process the desired development—without consciously including the uncon-
ditional social practices that are part of everyday spatial production. Keller 
Easterling, for instance, convincingly describes the results of such overall pro-
cesses deriving from global networks of exchange and production as spatial 
products that are procedural by-products of financial flows and their under-
lying organisational patterns rather than deliberately planned physical envi-
ronments (Easterling, 2005). Under such premises, the physical environment’s 
function is based on a sort of spatial servitude, where space, territory and the 
built structures are mainly conceived as the necessary material translators of 
political and economic activities.
Seeking to depart from such a one-sided understanding of the physical 
realm, the theoretical work of sociologists Henri Lefebvre and Bruno Latour 
offer instrumental insights and potentials. When it comes to addressing the 
production of social and physical urban spaces, Henri Lefebvre’s writing on 
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cities has become a well-known and widely discussed reference. This has to do 
not only with his framework’s ability to adapt to different forms of social and 
political economies over time, but also with his model’s set-up as a more com-
prehensive, interrelated model of analysis that includes political, economic, 
social and spatial aspects of urban formation. The analytical tool provided by 
Lefebvre’s conceptual triad of spatial practice, representation of space, and 
representational space becomes particularly important within an environ-
ment of spatial indifference, since it forces one to think of spatial production 
as an interrelated process comprising various actors, sectors and disciplines. 
Lefebvre himself identifies the category representation of space—which re-
flects ‘conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, tech-
nocratic subdividers and social engineers’—as the usual ‘dominant space in 
any society (or mode of production)’ (Lefebvre, [1974] 1991, 38–39). Following 
Lefebvre’s analysis, this dominance is the outcome of a particular political 
economy where ‘the state and its bureaucratic and political apparatuses in-
tervene continually in space, and make use of space in its instrumental aspect 
in order to intervene at all levels and through every agency of the economic 
realm’ (Lefebvre, [1974] 1991, 378). Yet, while the analytical combinations en-
abled by Lefebvre’s model allow us to engage with spatial production more 
comprehensively, it can be argued that the conceptual triad is still grounded 
on a certain assumption of physical spatial subordination: although social, 
political and cultural spaces constantly produce, reproduce and appropriate 
the built environment, the role of physical space is still a proxy for the por-
trayed mechanisms rather than a deliberately recognised, active player that is 
not only filled, generated and adopted, but also initiates change and actions 
on its own terms. Thus, when recapitulating Lefebvre’s statement that space is 
instrumentally used—and therefore subordinated—to ‘intervene at all levels’ 
and ‘through every agency of the economic realm’, one would have to attribute 
agency to the various aspects of physical space as well (Lefebvre, [1974] 1991, 
378). In other words: pursuing the idea that the physical environment can be 
a decisive actor on its own terms within a social environment would require 
introducing a concept of spatial agency.
One of the most substantial impulses that non-human objects—for ex-
ample, the built environment—can participate in as actors within the social 
sphere derives from the so-called actor–network theory (ANT) as most promi-
nently formulated by Bruno Latour. Latour qualifies non-human elements 
as determining components of society, which, indeed, can feature inherent 
agency as well. Given the fact that for most social models agency is directly 
linked to intentionality, reflexivity or meanings—a condition only humans 
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can fulfil—Latour proposes a more abstract notion of agency that is based on 
the pure ability to change things as such. From this perspective, ‘any thing that 
does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor’ and therefore 
‘the questions to ask about any agent are simply the following: Does it make a 
difference in the course of some other agent’s action or not?’ (Latour, 2005, 71). 
Apart from these rather general considerations, Bruno Latour and Albena Ya-
neva give a brief glimpse of how the ANT’s perspective could be applied to 
architecture—and thus to the general built environment as well. Criticising 
traditional architectural theory’s distant way of discussing buildings as more 
or less neutral objects of the non-human sphere, the authors claim that—in 
reality—‘everyone knows that a building is a contested territory and that it 
cannot be [only] reduced to what is and what it means’ (Latour and Yavena, 
2008, 86). Rather, from their perspective, a built structure should be under-
stood in ‘the way it resists attempts at transformation, allows certain visitors’ 
actions and impedes others, bugs observers, challenges city authorities, and 
mobilises different communities of actors’ (Latour and Yavena, 2008, 86). In 
this sense, a particular typology can not only be seen as the physical product 
of respective practices: the mere availability of a typology basically makes it 
an actor on its own behalf and creates a situation where a clear line between 
supply and demand no longer exists. Thus, if a certain typology did not exist, it 
would be impossible to establish this specific high-speed urban road network 
in such a short amount of time—or it would not even be considered in the 
first place. Although partially altered and adapted, the archetypes, technolo-
gies and design processes available within the global toolbox of universal so-
lutions can be seen as active contributors to decision-making. Looking at the 
explored physical results and social effects of a system conceived by spatial 
servitude, it is, in fact, exactly along categories mentioned by Latour and Yav-
ena (2008, 86) where the built environment could become an agent for other 
conceptions and attitudes: with the ability to ‘resist attempts of transforma-
tion’, ‘challenge city authorities’, or ‘mobilize communities’, for example, built 
structures and spatial formations could be more deliberately designed and 
organised to actively and adequately engage with respective everyday spaces, 
rather than being a sole accomplice of translating economic processes into 
space. Whether this approach would better deal with critical side effects fos-
tered by economic agency is not entirely clear. What appears obvious though is 
that a more conscious attitude towards spatial agency could have the potential 
of introducing a crucial dimension of spatial real-life issues within economic 
development, development cooperation, urban planning and particular design 
practices.
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4 Dialogic Design, Dialogic Planning and Collective Ground
4.1 Moving Away from Linear Spatial Problem-Solving Towards More 
Adequate Spatial Practices
Driven by the similar aim to dissolve the rigid structure of dialectic discourse 
and thinking in opposites, Richard Sennett considers an alternative and more 
open framework for discourse. By referring to the Russian literary critic Mikhail 
Bakhtin, who conceived the expression dialogic discussion, Sennett reflects 
on this notion ‘to name a discussion which does not resolve itself by finding 
common ground’: although, in consequence, ‘no shared agreements may be 
reached, through the process of exchange people may become more aware of 
their […] views and expand their understanding of one another’ (Sennett, 2012, 
19). The deliberate set-up of a dialogic discussion, where a synthetic solution 
‘by a play of contraries leading to agreement’ is not the final objective, would 
allow ‘bouncing off views and experiences in an open-ended way’ (Sennett, 
2012, 24). What if Sennett’s differentiation of dialectic argument and dialogic 
discussion was extended to spatial planning, and design processes? A dialogic 
design and planning approach, as it were, that would automatically contest 
the notion of seeking transitions from A to B, or ideal, universal, and common 
 solutions at all costs. Dialogic planning would encourage  simultaneously test-
ing different prototypes, proposals and models. In doing so, it would more ad-
equately address the multitude of given real-life issues by contributing—in the 
words of Patsy Healey—to a ‘“pool” of knowledge’ that fosters an open, diverse 
collection of actors, ideas and approaches within the realm of physical spatial 
production (Healey, 2010, 6). But a truly dialogic  set-up would not only encour-
age a larger variety of possible ideas and  solutions; it would crucially alter the 
way that actors from different cultural, economic, disciplinary and geographic 
backgrounds could cooperate with one another. Dialogic design and planning 
would ultimately mean that all respective  stakeholders—neighbourhood rep-
resentatives, local and foreign experts, local authorities, designers and NGOs—
would have an equally important seat at the table from which to bring forward 
respective knowledge, concerns and proposals regarding how to conceive, de-
sign, implement and maintain the built  environment. It would also mean that 
such a group would not have to agree on one or two  common, overall solu-
tions, but could negotiate, for example, a set of  different approaches that were 
tailored for different social, economic and spatial circumstances. And finally, 
dialogic design and planning would inherently  include the  notion of spatial 
agency, since the produced proposals and prototypes embedded within par-
ticular built environments would induce a  direct discourse on  spatial impacts, 
challenges and performance as well.
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4.2 Using the Power of Collective Knowledge
Although the propositions and deliberations put forward in the previous 
paragraph might seem diverse, they nevertheless share some mutual crite-
ria that could, when associated with each other, offer a powerful integrative 
and comprehensive approach for spatial practices. Departing from abstract 
dialectic and transitional problem-solving, they all offer a) ways towards less 
universal but more reality-based solutions; b) more inclusive, open- ended 
planning and design processes; and c) a more comprehensive and inter-
related  understanding of policy and space. In contrast to an exclusive and 
conventional top-down arrangements of experts, models or methodolo-
gies, this  approach would consist of a collective body of knowledge, evolving 
from a bottom-up attitude and feeding its power from truly transdisciplinary 
( including local residents, neighbourhood associations, industry experts, 
 academics, public administrative staff, politicians, activists, etc.) and interdis-
ciplinary (including actors from the fields of design, urban design, urban plan-
ning, anthropology, sociology,  economics, engineering, cultural studies, etc.) 
set-ups.
In reference to the common ground sought by a dialectic argument, a di-
alogic discussion could thus aim towards a collective ground, where both a 
collection of ideas and a collective constellation of actors would aim at re-
solving complex urban issues with a heterogeneous, open, extendable and 
flexible set of different concepts, ideas and approaches. Dialogic modes of 
thought and exchange could eventually move away from oppositional set-ups 
that drive transitions towards precast solutions, and instead promote a plural-
ity of ideas and techniques. Intentionally configured as a productive ‘site of 
struggle’ (as suggested by Patsy Healey) an approach based on a dialogic dis-
cussion would further incorporate actors and aspects that are often excluded 
from such  processes—such as small-scale personal initiatives, cooperatively 
organised networks and locally-driven practices—and thus be more receptive 
to alternative takes, and more resilient towards unforeseen changes (Healey 
2010, 6).
Based on the above-mentioned propositions, the idea of a collective ground 
would act as a relational network of concepts that comprises a) an ordinary 
and dispassionate attitude towards urban studies; b) comprehensive spatial 
analyses and the awareness of spatial agency; and c) an open-ended dialogic 
approach towards problem definition and solution finding. With regard to the 
presented case of urban road construction, for instance, such an approach 
would start the planning and design process with some essential questions 
to be answered by all involved stakeholders (local citizens, local and interna-
tional experts from various disciplines, governmental representatives, NGOs), 
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 spurring participatory practice on a conceptional level: does Addis Ababa need 
an urban highway at all? If so, what is an urban highway in the context of Addis 
Ababa? How can a road adequately address the needs of the city’s pedestrian 
majority? How can a road address the spatial, social and economic realities on 
the ground? Can a road design do more than solely accommodate calculated 
traffic flows? And what are the aspired spatial and economic impacts on both 
the affected neighbourhoods and the city as a whole?
Ultimately, allowing a flatter hierarchy and a more basic array of questions, 
ideas, concepts and possibilities, seeking collective ground could not only—as 
Garth Myers imagines—‘point to the multifaceted urbanity in African con-
texts as a great value to global understanding of urbanism’, it could also begin 
to dissolve the notions of opposite, transitional set-ups for urbanisation, de-
sign practices, urban planning, and economic policies as mainly defined by 
Western standards (Myers, 2011, 7). From this perspective, structural change 
into something yet unknown would literally mean opening up the way for a 
multitude of contextual, inclusive and innovative spatial practices that could 
not have been solely imagined at the desks and in the minds of established 
experts, administrations or remote foreign actors.
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Chapter 9
Accra’s Decongestion Policy: Another Face of Urban 
Clearance or Bulldozing Approach?
Aba O. Crentsil and George Owusu
Abstract
Metropolitan local governments in Ghana, most especially the Accra Metropolitan As-
sembly (ama), have adopted and implemented a policy of decongestion of the large 
metropolitan cities of Ghana in the past decades. This policy has been implemented 
with the explicit aim of reducing informal activities and their operators in the central 
business districts (cbds) and other key areas of the cities. While the implementation 
of the policy in Accra, Ghana’s largest metropolis, has been ad hoc in character, ow-
ing to a combination of factors such as limited public support and political liability 
most especially in election years, the policy in both theoretical and practical terms can 
be described as representing another form of the much criticised classical ‘bulldozing 
or slum clearance’ approach. Bearing in mind the backlash against the bulldozing or 
slum clearance approach as an unsustainable means for promoting urban develop-
ment, city authorities have coined the term ‘decongestion’ as a simplistic approach to 
clearing areas of the city of Accra they perceive to be undesirable. This chapter reveals 
wide-ranging negative impacts of these bulldozing approaches on street traders, slum 
dwellers and other informal operators as well as the political liability of the policy. 
It also finds that the concept and practice of ‘Right to the City’ has, to a large extent, 
been ‘back-burnered’ as urban informal operators are regarded as not possessing any 
rights in public spaces, with serious implications for achieving inclusive and sustain-
able urban development as highlighted in the Sustainable Development Goals and the 
New Urban Agenda.
1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a renewed interest in questions of the future 
of cities and the extent to which cities can shape socio-economic development 
in general (see unfpa, 2007; McGranahan et al., 2001). However, nowhere have 
these questions received greater attention than in the global South, where 
rapid urbanisation has magnified the environmental impact of cities as the 
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process is occurring within the context of inadequate infrastructure and ser-
vices, poor planning and weak urban management and governance systems 
(Owusu and Oteng-Ababio, 2015). In addition, a remarkable feature of urban-
isation in the global South is the widening inequalities among the population 
and the segregation of urban neighbourhoods along economic and income 
lines (Grant, 2015; Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014).
While the causes of these widening inequalities are not the focus of this 
chapter, we note that this has ‘lately attracted a great deal of attention, both 
from academics, who have long engaged with radical urban theory, and from 
grassroots activists, who have been fighting on the ground for an alternative 
just urbanism’ (Kuymulu, 2013a, 924) and a more inclusive urban development 
that takes account of the needs of peoples with different socio-economic 
backgrounds. Kuymulu (2013a) adds that the concern for inclusive urban de-
velopment has also drawn considerable attention from several UN agencies, 
notably UN-Habitat, undp and unesco, as well as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (imf), all of which have formed policy outlines 
to advocate for inclusive urban development. Consequently, concepts such 
as ‘the right to the city’, ‘inclusive urbanisation’, ‘just city’ and more broadly 
‘sustainable urbanisation’ have come to dominate the policy space on urban 
 development, which has led to fundamentally opposing institutions and ide-
ologies (McGranahan et al., 2016; Mayer, 2012; Schmid 2012; Stanek, 2011; Fain-
stein, 2010; Harvey, 2008; Lefebvre, 1996 [1967]). This is because, in the view 
of Kuymulu (2013a, 2013b), concepts such as the right to the city are idealised 
political ideas with broad-based popular appeal in the face of structural ur-
banisation challenges and the alienation of a large section of the urban poor 
in respect of the benefits of urbanisation.
Ghana, a sub-Saharan African country undergoing rapid urbanisation, has 
largely bought into the idea of the right to the city and inclusive urbanisation, 
as captured in its national level policies. Indeed, Ghana’s national policies such 
as the National Urban Policy Framework (nupf) and Action Plan, 2012; Na-
tional Housing Policy (nhp), 2015; National Spatial Development Framework 
(nsdf), 2015–2035; and other related national-level policies strongly empha-
sise urban renewal and the upgrading of slums and other informal settlements, 
and the promotion of the urban informal economy. However, there seems to 
be a policy disconnection and a contradictory policy response between the 
national and city levels with the introduction of a policy at the city level re-
ferred to as ‘decongestion’ (Awumbila et al., 2014). Decongestion policy may be 
defined as the removal of what city authorities perceive to be ‘unwanted’ ac-
tivities and areas within cities in Ghana, or simply, the removal of informal set-
tlers and street traders from public spaces in Ghanaian cities (Onuoha, 2014). 
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Disguised as a form of slum clearance, the policy has been implemented, par-
ticularly in the Accra metropolis, the national political and economic capital, 
to deal with ever-growing slums and informal economic activities, especially 
street trading in inner-city areas. According to Awumbila et al. (2014), growing 
land scarcity and high land prices have resulted in situations whereby poor, in-
formal settlements are increasingly sited in ecologically sensitive, flood-prone 
areas and on vacant public lands. They further argue that these settlements de-
velop very quickly, and only attract the attention of city authorities at a much 
later stage. They add that in the Accra metropolis, a special task force or unit 
has been established, tasked among other duties, with clearing areas of the city 
(including slums) that city authorities see as ‘undesirable’—all under the con-
cept of city decongestion. Yet no national-level policy, including the National 
Urban Policy Framework and Action Plan, 2012, advocates city decongestion. 
All national policies recognise and support the urban informal economy and 
its operators as well as the need for the upgrading and prevention of slums 
rather than their removal from the urban landscape.
While the concept of decongestion has been analysed by a few researchers, 
many of these studies have seen it as a question of the forced eviction of street 
traders (Broadbent, 2012; Abrokwah, 2013). For example, writing on Accra as a 
case study, Broadbent (2012, 1) argues that ‘presented as a way of bringing order 
to a seemingly chaotic city centre, the mainstay of the [decongestion] policy 
debate surrounds the forced eviction of street hawkers from unsolicited spaces 
in the busiest areas of the capital’. While this assertion by Broadbent (2012) is 
partly true, we argue in this chapter that the decongestion policy as pursued by 
city authorities for the last two decades goes beyond mere forceful eviction of 
hawkers and street traders from central locations of the city of Accra and other 
major cities in Ghana. Indeed, a careful analysis of media reports, commentar-
ies by Ghanaian urbanists as well as various media communiques of the Accra 
Metropolitan Assembly (ama), the city government in charge of Accra, reveal 
that though pursued in an ad hoc fashion by city authorities, decongestion has 
been implemented for a wide variety of reasons. These include promoting the 
free flow of traffic and easing traffic congestion in inner-city areas, making the 
city fit to be a ‘21st Century’ city under the Millennium City initiative, beautify-
ing the city to attract tourists, businesses and investments, and making way for 
new flagship developments including roads and multistorey upscale market 
stalls/shopping malls. Other reasons cited by city authorities include dealing 
with perennial floods, as city authorities partly blame unauthorised structures 
(informal activities) for blocking waterways; reducing the growing incidence 
of crime, where poor, informal settlements are seen as a haven for criminals; 
and even, in some cases, dealing with the perceived spread of epidemics such 
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as cholera, as was the case with the demolition—in 2014—of Mensah Guinea, 
a poor, informal urban community in Accra (Arku, 2014).
Targeting informal activities and blighted areas of cities in Ghana, decon-
gestion and consequent evictions have not deterred street traders and infor-
mal economic activities nor the movement of poor migrants into poor, urban, 
informal settlements (Steel et al., 2014; Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). On 
the contrary, informal activities (including street trading) and the proliferation 
of slums and informal settlements have intensified. Indeed, in 2011, the ama 
and UN-Habitat identified as many as 78 settlements and pockets of slums 
within the Accra metropolis, with over 90 per cent of these in mature stages 
of development and accounting for around 38 per cent and 16 per cent of the 
total population and city area of Accra, respectively (ama, 2011). While the 
policy of urban decongestion has been implemented for the past two decades, 
not enough studies have been undertaken to assess the issues of the policy 
responses to informality. Using the existing literature, media reports and the 
authors’ previous, extensive study of Accra, this chapter attempts to fill this 
knowledge gap. It questions the policy of decongestion in both theoretical and 
practical terms as a means of promoting the sustainable and inclusive urban 
development of large Ghanaian cities such as Accra. The chapter is structured 
into five parts. Following the introduction, it situates urban congestion within 
urban theory, followed by an analysis of urban growth and the development of 
informality in Accra. This is followed by a discussion of the effects of decon-
gestion, and the chapter finally concludes with the policy implications of the 
study, particularly with respect to the right to the city and the promotion of 
inclusive and sustainable development in Ghana.
2 Situating Urban Decongestion Policy within Urban Theory
The decongestion policy as defined and practiced in major Ghanaian cities, 
particularly Accra, is at odds with and challenges recent international slogans 
on promoting inclusive urban development centred on the ‘right to the city’ 
theory. This is because, as Brown (2013, 957) notes, ‘the right to the city has 
evolved as a powerful rallying cry in the struggle against the exclusionary pro-
cesses of globalisation and the commodification of urban space, and in con-
flicts over who has claim to the city and what kind of city it should be’. Coined 
by the French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre in 1967 in 
response to the rise of capitalist urbanisation, the theory is described as a type 
of human right, a collective right of all city inhabitants to participate in the use 
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and production of urban space (Kuymulu, 2013a, 2013b; Harvey, 2008; World 
Social Forum, 2005). Decongestion thus represents an attempt by city authori-
ties to hold on to the status quo and to define who has claims to the city and 
how it should be produced and used, and what kind of city it should be—core 
issues that the right to the city challenges.
Although the concept of the right to the city has also been criticised and 
challenged for its normative development agenda, which lacks in-depth 
analysis of actual political, economic, social and cultural contexts (Centner 
and Rojas, 2011; Jenkins et al., 2007) and overlooks underlying economic pro-
cesses that perpetuate poverty and exclusion (Mayer, 2009; Fernandes, 2007), 
the concept has nevertheless created a vital platform for the introduction of 
a rights-based perspective on urban development (Brown et al., 2010). This 
rights-based perspective promoted by the right to the city concept holds sig-
nificant implications for informal urban economies, such as street hawking, 
and slum developments. This is because street traders and residents of slums 
are highly dependent on contested urban public spaces, and their frequent 
dispossession through decongestion exercises carried out by city authorities 
in favour of other interests arguably leads to social exclusion of this section 
of the urban population. Huchzermeyer (2010) in employing the right to the 
city notion demonstrates how, in South Africa, the shack dwellers’ movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban invokes a Lefebvrian notion of the right to 
the city while embarking on rights-based action as one of several approaches 
it employs. Walsh (2013) also demonstrates the use of the right to the city by 
social movements in South Africa as having a liberalising effect as well as sub-
verting the social antagonisms inherent in capitalism.
Some have argued that the concept of the right to the city has become in-
tractably (and contradictorily) intertwined with the advance of the neo-liberal 
agenda in recent years (Brown, 2013; Harvey, 2008, 2012), with negative con-
sequences for the urban poor. According to Harvey (2012, 13), the neo-liberal 
agenda has had a long-lasting and generally disastrous effect on the urban 
poor—the right to the city as it is now constituted is far too narrowly confined, 
in most cases in the hands of small political and economic elites who are in 
the position to shape the city more and more according to their own particular 
heart’s desire. It is within these arguments that objectives of the deconges-
tion policy and the right to the city concept tend to converge For example, 
neo- liberal policies introduced in Ghana and other sub-Saharan African coun-
tries in the 1980s as part of the World Bank/IMF’s Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes have led to increased competition for valuable and well-located land, 
in which the interests of affluent and powerful groups tend to prevail over 
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those of poor communities (Grant, 2009, 2015; Fumtim, 2010;  Huchzermeyer, 
2010; Owusu, 2008). These policies reflect the national and city governments’ 
desire to turn African cities into globally competitive cities. For that purpose, 
they tend to prioritise investments in ‘world-class’ infrastructure that is ex-
pected to attract foreign investors, international corporations, highly qualified 
professionals and tourists. These efforts to increase urban competitiveness 
materialise through ‘urban renewal’ or ‘beautification’ initiatives involving the 
demolition of informal settlements and the removal of informal street trade 
and unauthorised structures. Like many African capital cities, Accra has fol-
lowed the same pattern by adopting an entrepreneurial approach to urban 
governance in which the role of the state is to facilitate private sector growth 
(Gillespie, 2016a; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Grant 2009).
This view is asserted by the former mayor of Accra, Alfred Okoe Vander-
puije, who swore to transform Accra into a modern, business-friendly ‘Millen-
nium City’ (Obeng-Odoom, 2013), evident from his oft-quoted catchphrase: 
‘eyes have not seen, neither has it entered into the ears of men, what man is 
about to see in Accra’ (Okwuosah, 2012). Thus, in June 2009, when the ama 
launched the decongestion policy to remove hawkers, illegal structures and 
squatter settlements from the central business district (cbd), the mayor justi-
fied the exercise with the view that ‘all cities in the world are aiming at beauty 
and modernity so as to attract tourists, investors and other business activities’ 
and decongestion is necessary to prevent Accra being left behind in his race for 
excellence (Gillespie, 2016a, 2016b). However, it needs to be stressed that most 
right to the city advocates condemn forced evictions and any form of crimi-
nalisation of informal settlement dwellers. Instead, they strive for recognition 
of urban informality, be it in the area of housing or employment and the urban 
economy, as the best available option for millions of people despite its obvious 
imperfections (Afenah, 2010, 165; Parnell and Pieterse, 2010, 153).
Again, in Ghana and elsewhere in the developing world, most urban dwell-
ers, particularly the poor, have no legal rights in the ownership and commodi-
fication of urban spaces. The majority of them do not own land; they stay in 
‘encroached areas’ and dwell in rented shacks. In many cases, city authorities 
have been repetitively unwilling to upgrade these slums, because to the au-
thorities these urban residents are a nuisance in the urban space, and they 
thus deny them—especially street traders and slum dwellers—rights to space. 
This aligns with the Lefebvrian conception of the right to the city, wherein 
he argues that the right to the city is a call for the establishment of rights to 
include sections of the urban populace who have been denied, rather than pri-
oritising those who already possess power, such as key political and financial 
interests (Marcuse, 2012; Mayer, 2012).
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3 Urban Growth and the Development of Informality in Accra
A key feature of Ghana’s urbanisation process to date is the unbalanced and 
skewed distribution of the urban population in favour of large cities that are 
perceived to offer a variety of livelihood opportunities (Owusu and Oteng-
Ababio, 2015; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Grant, 2009). Although Ghana had an ur-
banisation level of almost 51 per cent in 2010, the administrative regions of 
Greater Accra and Ashanti regions, have urban population levels of 90.5 per 
cent and 60.6 per cent, respectively. These two regions host the two largest 
cities in Ghana—namely, Accra and Kumasi. Accra and its metropolitan re-
gion, referred to as the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (gama), was home 
to over 3.6 million people in 2010, representing around 15 per cent of Ghana’s 
total population (see Table 9.1). Table 9.1 gives the impression that the Accra 
Metropolis is de-urbanising. However, as strongly argued in Owusu and Oteng-
Ababio (2015), it has for the past two decades been fragmented into new, 
smaller local government areas. They add that ‘this is against the backdrop of 
increasing land and housing prices and the process of gentrification already 
underway in many parts of the city— which continuously push the popula-
tion to the surrounding municipalities. Under these conditions, census data 
are likely to give a false impression of a city undergoing depopulation’ (Owusu 
and Oteng-Ababio, 2015, 321).
Table 9.� Population of gama, 1970–2010
District
1970 1984 2000 2010
Pop. Growth 
rate (%)
Pop. Growth 
rate (%)
Pop. Growth 
rate (%)
Pop.
Accra Metropolis 636,667 3.0 969,195 3.3 1,658,937 1.1 1,848,614
Ledzokuku-Krowor - - - - - - 227,932
Ga District* 66,336 4.9 132,786 8.9 550,468 5.0 908,053
Tema Metropolis 102,431 4.4 190,917 2.8 298,432 3.0 402,637
Ashaiman Municip. 22,549 5.8 50,918 6.8 150,312 2.4 190,972
Adenta Municip. - - - - - - 78,215
Total 827,983 3.5 1,343,816 3.9 2,501,196 3.8 3,656,423
* Includes Ga East, Ga West and Ga South Municipalities.
Source: Derived from Population Census reports �970, �984, �000 and �0�0 (Owusu, �0�3)
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The concentration of population in the gama is directly linked to migrants’ 
strong perception that the urban centre offers better economic livelihood 
opportunities relative to other urban centres (Awumbila et al., 2014). Once 
a small coastal settlement in Ghana (then called Gold Coast), Accra became 
very prominent following the relocation of the national administrative capital 
from Cape Coast to the town in 1877 by the British colonial administrators. In 
the view of many analysts (Asamoah, 2001; Konadu-Agyemang, 2001; Songsore, 
2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2011; Owusu and Oteng-Ababio, 2015), the relocation of 
the national capital to Accra, followed by significant and continuous public 
and private investments in its infrastructure and services throughout the colo-
nial and postcolonial periods, has served to enhance the development of the 
city by attracting population, businesses and capital (including direct foreign 
investments).
According to Owusu and Oteng-Ababio (2015, 320), the high concentration 
of population in the national capital has resulted in a spillover of its popula-
tion to the surrounding districts and the rapid conversion of once rural settle-
ments into one, big, contiguous urban agglomeration referred to as the gama. 
This rapid transformation of the gama region has occurred with jobs and 
other economic opportunities such as markets and public services remain-
ing largely within the Accra metropolis and the surrounding municipalities 
largely serving as dormitory centres. Consequently, there is a large demand on 
the services and infrastructure of the Accra metropolis, which in addition to 
its resident population is estimated to attract, daily, a daytime population of 
over 3.5 million for various socio-economic activities (Owusu, 2008). Unable 
to provide adequate formal housing and employment to both its permanent 
resident population and migrants, informality has become the order of the day 
for Accra. Consequently, the informal sector is the largest provider of housing, 
employment and other socio-economic opportunities in Accra and a critical 
sector for the survival of individuals and households within the city. However, 
the large informal sector of the city has evolved within the context of urban 
planning and a governance regime that are both weak, and city authorities 
have come to largely regard the sector as a nuisance in terms of location and 
operation (GoG/MLGRD, 2012). As a city, planning has failed to adequately 
deal with informality, and much housing and many informal businesses have 
tended to be haphazardly located and not in conformity with any planning 
regulations. This situation has largely formed the basis for the implementation 
of the decongestion exercises in Accra and other major cities of Ghana. Never-
theless, Accra remains the city where the decongestion policy has been widely 
practiced by city authorities, possibly as a result of the magnitude of urban 
challenges and the intense process of urbanisation (see Figure 9.1).
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4 Effects of the Urban Decongestion Policy in Accra
The implementation of the decongestion policy in Accra has taken what 
this chapter describes as a bulldozing approach, where a violent and impul-
sive stance is taken with regard to slum dwellers and workers in the informal 
economy, especially street hawkers. To implement the policy in 2009, the ama 
passed a by-law outlawing street trading and established a Special Task Force 
to deal with recalcitrant street traders. The Special Task Force is also mandated 
to deal with all activities relating to ‘illegal’ occupation of space in the city. In 
recent years, the ama has gone further, deploying state security agencies— 
especially the police—to deal with slum clearance and unauthorised occupa-
tion of public spaces (isser, 2014). To date, the policy of decongestion has 
been exercised by razing and burning unauthorised structures and chasing 
hawkers away from streets and sidewalks where a large number of informal 
economy operators eke out a living. The approach of dispossessing the infor-
mal proletariat suggests in explicit and implicit terms that certain categories of 
the city’s workers and residents have no place in Accra to scratch out a living—
an approach that advocates of the right to the city theory are very strongly 
critical of. For instance, stalls at the Spintex Road in Accra were set ablaze by 
officials from ama as part of the city authorities’ measures to beautify the city 
2’500 2’500
Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (gama)
Congested areas and roads
Central Business Districts (cbd)
Decongested area
5’000 units0
Figure 9.� Map of the gama showing the cbd and decongested areas. (Even though decon-
gestion occurs almost everywhere in the gama, we focus on areas where such 
activities are rampant.)
Source: Author, with Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority data
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of Accra ahead of the visit in 2009 of the former US President Barrack Obama 
(Obeng-Odoom, 2011).
A number of researchers have also elaborated on how the implementation 
of the decongestion policy in Accra has been found to be tantamount to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, particularly when carried out with violence 
or with discriminatory intent (Onuoha, 2014; Steel et al., 2014; Abrokwah, 2013; 
Broadbent, 2012). During forced evictions, people are frequently harassed or 
beaten and occasionally subjected to inhumane treatment. For example, based 
on his interview with a street hawker, Gillespie (2016b, b974) explains how a 
trader’s refusal to let the Special Task Force confiscate his stock resulted in his 
being beaten and sustaining severe injuries leading to him falling into a coma. 
Indeed, the Ghanaian media is replete with reports of the abuse of street trad-
ers and informal operators by the Special Task Force1
The decongestion of Accra’s cbd also causes substantial losses for people 
who work in the informal economy, who usually lose goods, property, and in-
come and suffer various inconveniences. According to Bob-Milliar and Obeng-
Odoom (2011) in their study ‘The informal economy is an employer, a nuisance, 
and a goldmine: Multiple representations of and responses to informality 
in Accra, Ghana’, almost all traders interviewed claimed that they had lost 
‘something’; however, when the authors asked them to quantify their losses, 
they could not do so, preferring rather to stress the qualitative aspect of the 
loss, such as this inability to pay for their children’s education. This assertion 
by traders of the loss of their capital and goods is thoroughly corroborated 
by other researchers (see Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008; Broadbent, 2012; 
Abrokwah, 2013; Onuoha, 2014; Steel et al., 2014) as well as media reportages.
While forced evictions have a detrimental impact on all, women often tend 
to be disproportionately affected and must withstand the worst of the abuse 
during forced evictions. This is because women tend to have a special place 
in the Ghanaian informal sector, a place that predates the contemporary era. 
According to Owusu and Lund (2004), though Ghanaian women have long 
been active in informal trading, the effects of economic reform programmes 
beginning in the mid-1980s have pushed more women into the informal sector, 
either as the sole providers or as supplementers of household incomes within 
the context of rising prices with regard to basic needs, growing unemployment 
1 See photo archive : ‘ama used “crude tactics” to eject traders— Accra mayor’, http://www 
.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/AMA-used-crude-tactics-to-eject-traders 
-Accra-mayor-518311?gallery=1 and the article (2010) ‘My men did not attack trader— ama 
Boss’, Ghana Web, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/My-men 
-did-not-attack-trader-AMA-Boss-195269 (accessed on 3 September 2017).
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and underemployment of male partners, declining real incomes and the grow-
ing need to meet local levies on social amenity provision in the form of user 
charges. Robertson (1995) adds that under these conditions, the necessity for 
households to have female supplementary income has become imperative and 
women’s income-generating activities have become indispensable for family 
survival. This is illustrated in the work of Gillespie (2016a, 71), in the form of re-
marks made by one hawker, Oboye, who observed bitterly that obeying the by-
law of the ama that forbids street trading is simply not possible when one has 
a family to feed. Gillespie (2016a, 71) further explains that hawkers complain 
that the Special Task Force prevents them from making a living, vandalises 
their possessions, extorts bribes and sexual favours and tends to be excessively 
violent with traders who disobey the by-law on street trading.
Finally, the implementation of the decongestion policy has come with some 
political costs for both city and national leaders because of the ad hoc nature 
of the exercise and the lack of focus regarding the results. It is therefore no 
wonder that the exercise tends to be suspended during election years and 
only resumes after elections. In many cases, opposition parties tend to side 
with the informal operators while ruling national governments side with their 
appointed city mayors.2 There is also evidence to show that even within the 
ruling party tensions tend to rise when city mayors embark on decongestion 
exercises. A case in point is the recent suspension of the ruling party’s Member 
of Parliament Carlos Ahinkorah by the Tema Metropolitan Assembly following 
his criticism of the decongestion exercise ordered by the Assembly.3 Similar 
criticisms have been levelled against former mayors of Accra, as the incum-
bent government sees their actions as detrimental to the election campaigns 
and as the potential cause of lost votes in the national polls. Within this po-
litical context, street traders and slum dwellers have mobilised against forced 
evictions using various strategies, including demonstrations and disobedi-
ence. For example, according to Brown et al. (2010), the Ghana trade union 
movement is collaborating with StreetNet International, a global network of 
informal workers’ membership organisations, to organise traders’ associations 
into a coordinated network that is capable of lobbying the state for the right 
to space in the city. These developments demonstrate how Accra’s informal 
proletariat is taking collective action to claim its ‘right to the city’ (see Lefebvre 
2 See the article (2009) ‘Don’t politicize Accra decongestion exercise—ama boss’, Ghana Web, 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/Don-t-politicize-Accra-deconges 
tion-exercise-AMA-boss-163014 (accessed on 9 May 2018).
3 See the article (2017) ‘tma suspends Carlos Ahenkorah over alleged misbehavior’, gbcghana 
.com, http://www.gbcghana.com/1.11288767 (accessed on 10 September 2017).
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1996 [1967]) by defending its collective access to urban space. However, the 
implementation of the decongestion policy has had mixed success in keeping 
the informal proletariat off the streets and away from the slums. For example, 
the Joy FM 6 p.m. news of April 21, 2011 reported that hawkers were back on the 
streets doing business less than a day after a decongestion exercise was carried 
out. And in cases where evictions have been successful, such as the demolition 
of slums, evictees have moved to other squatter settlements on undeveloped 
land in the city. A typical case is the slum that has recently sprung up along 
the Accra–Tema highway—many of its inhabitants were previously residents 
of a section of the Old Fadama slum destroyed recently by the city authorities.
Gillespie (2016b, 989) is of the view that ‘the ama is engaging in violent 
processes of dispossession in order to enclose the urban commons and expel 
the informal proletariat’. The use of task forces in urban development exhib-
its a sizable level of authoritarian control in urban management as discussed 
above. Indeed, the use of force to dispossess the informal proletariat of urban 
space illustrates the influence of powerful elites in urban management, which 
needs to be taken into consideration in the process of urban management. We 
therefore are of the view that the decongestion policy in Accra is simply a dis-
guised policy formulated and pursued by city authorities as a form of bulldoz-
ing approach of the slum clearance to undermine the presence of the poor in 
the city and to determine who lives and stays in the city of Accra.
5 Conclusion
Across many parts of the developing world, countries are undergoing rapid 
demographic transformation involving the shift of the population from rural 
to urban areas (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). In these countries, the pace 
and the recent character of the process have overwhelmed national and city 
governments. Consequently, in the absence of adequate preparations to ca-
ter for new and old residents of cities, individuals and households respond by 
addressing their needs—such as the need for housing, employment, health, 
education and other service delivery—by adopting a ‘do-it-yourself-approach’ 
(isser, 2014). However, many such approaches adopted by urban residents 
do not conform to city regulations and laws transplanted from the planning 
regulations of colonial governments, such as Ghana’s antiquated Town and 
Country Planning Ordinance, passed in 1945, which is drawn from the pages 
of the British Town and Country Planning Act Ordinance of 1932 (Konadu- 
Agyemang, 2001, 541). This planning ordinance (cap 84) centred around plan-
ning schemes, layouts and (more importantly) minimum plot sizes has guided 
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the planning of Ghanaian towns for decades, and was only revised recently 
with the passage of the new Spatial Planning Bill in 2016.
For Accra, city authorities have conceived decongestion as a measure for 
addressing some of the ills of the urban development of the city. It needs to 
be stressed that in reality the measure is a simple attempt to conceal the inef-
ficiencies of the city authorities as well as the poor planning and governance 
of the city over the years. In other words, with the probable backlash against a 
slum-clearance approach firmly in mind, city authorities have coined the term 
‘decongestion’ as a simplistic approach to clearing areas of the city of Accra 
they perceived as undesirable. In simpler terms, there is only a rhetorical dif-
ference between a decongestion policy and slum clearance, but no difference 
in practical terms. Yet it is important that city authorities understand that the 
informal economy is not an irregularity but linked to the urban space.
In the absence of proper urban planning, largely due to weak institutions 
and weak enforcement of development controls, informality has come to be 
seen as a nuisance to urban development. Yet, this is the sector on which many 
urbanite Ghanaians depend for jobs, housing and other livelihood opportuni-
ties. Decongestion seems to have in some sense facilitated a hijacking of the 
right to the city concept by a few individuals located within the confines of the 
ama who determine whose priorities and interests require attention and what 
the future of Accra should look like. We share the view of Brown (2013) that 
although the slogan ‘the right to the city’ seems to appeal to a broad-based con-
stituency, transforming it into practice will remain tentative until it is embed-
ded in the national and local systems of spatial organisation and social justice 
of a developing-country city such as Accra.
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Chapter �0
The Africa Problem of Global Urban Theory:  
Re-conceptualising Planetary Urbanisation
Garth Myers
Abstract
This paper works to address what I consider the enduring ‘Africa problem’ in global 
urban theory. I engage and critique selected relevant urban thought from the Glo-
balization and World Cities research group, from Henri Lefebvre and from the new 
wave of urban theorisation inspired by Lefebvre’s (1970) idea of ‘complete, planetary 
urbanisation’. I argue that urbanisation in Africa, largely absent from Lefebvre’s works, 
presents new twists that are better understood from outside a Eurocentric framework. 
I propose the possibilities of urban comparativism built from theories and conceptu-
alisations that emerge from the global South and that can be utilised to compare non-
Western cities’ urbanisation processes. I use case studies from Dakar and Zanzibar to 
examine the production of what Chinese urbanists detail as a ‘village’ in the city, on 
the edge of the city, and in the suburbs over the last half-century and the complexities 
and comparability of urbanisation processes in these settings. I end with reflections on 
the implications of these cases for any claims for universalising the twenty-first cen-
tury’s processes of urbanisation and urbanism across the planet. My main finding for 
urban policy and planning practice is the documentation of the relevance and value of 
South–South comparisons of urbanisation processes for development.
1 Introduction
Urban theory still has an Africa problem, despite two decades of sustained 
critique of Euro-Americanism in theories of urbanisation. I contend that we 
can see this both in the work produced by the Globalization and World Cit-
ies (GaWC) research group and in ostensibly more Africa-aware work influ-
enced by the recent push towards analysis of ‘planetary urbanization’. The 
problem may be a different one in these two schools of thought, but it leaves 
us with an enduring lacuna where global South intellectual understandings 
and conceptualisations of urbanisation processes as they intersect with glo-
balisation would otherwise drive scholarly analysis. My goal in this chapter is 
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to explore an urban comparison across the global South, from southern China 
to two urbanisation processes in Africa (Dakar and Zanzibar), conceptualising 
from outside global North frameworks. I assess the utility of the intertwined 
Chinese ideas of a ‘village-in-the-city’, a ‘village-on-the-edge’ and a ‘village-in-
the-suburbs’—in scholarship analysing processes of rapid urbanisation in the 
Pearl River Delta over the last fifty years—for the analysis of similarly rapid 
processes in sub-Saharan Africa over this same time period. In the first seg-
ment, below, I argue for thinking beyond global North theorisation. In the sec-
ond, I make a case for the value of ‘unexpected’ comparisons like this (Myers, 
2014). Thirdly, I turn to the case study comparison.
2 The Global South and ‘Africa Problems’ in Urban Theory
One can see an increasing interest in urban Africa across the social sciences in 
the global North recently. Although the list of exceptions may be growing, there 
is still little in this work that attends carefully to insights from African urban 
studies or from the global South more generally. Two very significant arenas 
of global analysis in urban studies, arenas that ought to have more emphases 
on African processes of urbanisation, are the works of the Globalization and 
World Cities (GaWC) group and the scholarship on planetary urbanisation.
The GaWC research group has developed important, data-rich empirical 
assessments of interconnections between cities in the world economy. I be-
gin with its work, because it is arguably the place where most urban studies 
scholars start in attempting to come to grips with the interwoven impacts of 
globalisation and urbanisation. They have filled out previously intimated hi-
erarchies and links resulting from competition between elite enclaves striving 
for economic command and control (Beaverstock et al., 1999 and 2000; Taylor 
et al., 2012). GaWC scholars have an ever-widening map of cities—but it is still 
a map dominated by select global North cities, albeit with a scattering of global 
South cities beginning to rise. The GaWC group ranks cities ‘in terms of their 
advanced producer services using…[an] interlocking network model. Indirect 
measures of flows are derived to compute a city’s network connectivity – this 
measures a city’s integration into the world city network’ (The World Accord-
ing to GaWC1). Cities are scored on a scale using the Greek letters Alpha, Beta 
and Gamma, and both plus and minus signs—the highest scores, for the most 
integrated or globalised cities, are Alpha ++, and the listing continues through 
1 The World According to GaWC, http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/gawcworlds.html (accessed on 
3 November 2017).
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to Gamma - cities; an increasing number of cities are ranked in two sorts of 
‘honourable mention’ categories, High sufficiency and Sufficiency, below the 
‘lettered’ cities.
Table 10.1 documents the history of Africa’s cities in the GaWC rankings, 
where I abbreviate the rankings’ letters with the English rather than the Greek 
alphabet’s first three letters (A, B and C) and the ‘honourable mention’ cat-
egories as HS and S (for High sufficiency and Sufficiency, respectively). As the 
Table documents, Africa’s proportional share of cities listed at all from 2000 
through 2016 hardly changed. The 2016 table lists a few more African cities 
than in previous years, but on a scoreboard with more cities, and almost all the 
raw total increase is in cities newly listed in the lowest category of global sig-
nificance, ‘Sufficiency’. In 2016 and 2012 the lone African city in the top ‘Alpha’ 
levels (A ++, A +, A or A −) was Johannesburg, and there were no Alpha cities 
on the continent before this. Some massive African cities do not appear at all.
Table �0.� Cities in Africa according to the GaWC ranking
CITY 2016 2012 2008 2004 2000
Johannesburg A A − B + B + B +
Cairo B + B + B B B
Cape Town B + B + C + C C
Lagos B + B − C HS HS
Casablanca B B C + HS C −
Port Louis B − B − C − C − C −
Tunis B − B − HS HS HS
Durban C + C + S S HS
Kampala C + HS S S
Accra C C − HS HS S
Dar es Salaam C C − S S S
Lusaka C HS S HS
Abidjan C HS S HS
Harare C S S S HS
Luanda C S S
Gaborone C − HS S S S
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Source: created by author from data available on the website of the  
Globalization and World Cities Research Group—http://www.lboro.ac.uk/
gawc/gawcworlds.html (accessed on �7 April �0�8)
CITY 2016 2012 2008 2004 2000
Douala C − HS S S
Dakar C − HS S
Maputo C − S S
Windhoek HS S S S
Pretoria HS S S
Abuja HS S
Nairobi S B − C + S C
Libreville S S
Kigali S
Port Elizabeth S
Blantyre S
Tripoli S
Kinshasa S
Lomé S
Antananarivo S
African Cities in the…
Alpha rankings 1 1 0 0 0
Beta rankings 6 7 2 2 2
Gamma rankings 12 3 5 2 4
High sufficiency list 3 6 2 4 6
Sufficiency list 9 6 8 9 8
Total Number of African 
cities
31 23 17 17 20
Total cities actually listed 359 293 246 225 225
Percentage African in list 8.6 7.8 6.9 7.6 8.8
Cities in the database 526 526 525 315 315
Table �0.� Cities in Africa according to the GaWC ranking (cont.)
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Even where African cities appear, there are oddities that seem inexplicable 
to African studies scholars. Between the 2012 and 2016 rankings, for example, 
Nairobi dropped from Beta+ to the lowest (‘Sufficiency’) category, when very 
little of the story of Nairobi in those years would indicate to any scholars 
of Kenyan urbanisation any reasons for a slip in global significance (Myers, 
2015). The GaWC database is about office networks for advanced producer 
 services—a very narrow economistic understanding of globalisation, even if 
more recent lists include data on advertising, accounting and law firms. Yet 
even so it is an inexplicable oddity that the ranking for Nairobi—which any 
urbanist of Africa would recognise against any measure of globalisation as 
consistently one of the continent’s most globally networked cities for financial 
services—has fluctuated radically in the GaWC’s calculations and plummeted 
in those four years. One might claim that the map of GaWC in 2016 has im-
proved on its Africa problem from the 2000 map, but largely by volume, not by 
intellectual veracity.
That earlier map shaped a critique of the GaWC approach from global 
South and Africa scholars (e.g. Robinson, 2002 and 2006; Bunnell, 2017). Rob-
inson (2002 and 2006) contended that the GaWC neglected the cities ‘off 
the map’ and assumed globalisation and urbanisation to be universal, global 
North- driven and economistic, and worked out from a game plan of terms 
that missed key dynamics of globalisation and urbanisation across ‘ordinary’ 
cityscapes in the whole world. All this set policymakers in cities on mistaken 
paths of development that short-changed glaring basic needs for most urban-
ites and largely ignored histories and specificities, extending the ‘unequaliza-
tion’ of cities internally as well (Carmody and Owusu, 2016, 69). The drive to 
make cities ‘global’ seems to have had particularly negative consequences in 
cities in Africa (Myers, 2015).
Criticisms from Robinson and others led the GaWC researchers to expand 
somewhat their criteria for globalisation, but also to push back (Smith, 2013; 
McNeill, 2017). This counter-critique often centres on the ‘absence of evidence’ 
in the work of ‘ordinary cities’ scholars (Smith, 2013, 2301) and the vagueness of 
concepts in ‘Southern’ urban theory. Yet there is still much to criticise with the 
GaWC group, despite claims that its scholars have incorporated or surpassed 
the postcolonial critique, and most notably for urbanists who focus on Africa. 
Globalisation’s impacts go far beyond the range of cities in Africa that GaWC 
includes in its surveys, to secondary and much smaller cities (Mainet and Ra-
caud, 2015; Choplin and Pliez, 2015). GaWC scholars Caset and Derudder (2017) 
analyse the ‘cultural’ manifestations of global-and-world-city status, but their 
criteria for cultural significance are completely global-North driven. No city 
in Africa surfaces either in the top 30 of their statistical index or among their 
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51 global arts ‘financial centres’ (Caset and Derudder, 2017). Urban Africa’s ab-
sence is a result that any globally minded comparative understanding should 
find implausible, given the central importance of Africa for urban culture in a 
long historical–geographical arc (Simone, 2010). Here, the GaWC framework 
for research into what constitutes urban culture does take note of the rise 
of Chinese cities as ‘cultural’ centres, but the framework cannot see African 
urban culture, or globally significant cultural institutions in Africa (or through-
out the global South) that do not adhere to European criteria of culture.
A smorgasbord of more genuinely global urban studies building from Lefe-
bvre has productively sidestepped debates between GaWC and global South 
scholars (McNeill, 2017). The Lefebvrean concept that the world has entered 
an era of ‘complete, planetary urbanization’ has gained great traction in urban 
studies (Lefebvre, 1970; Brenner and Schmid, 2014 and 2015; Merrifield, 2013; 
Ruddick, 2015; Millington, 2016; Soja, 1989, 2000 and 2010). The phrase itself is 
at least a half-century in the making, stretching back to Lefebvre’s (1970) hy-
pothesis of it in The Urban Revolution. Lefebvre, though, was writing from the 
vantage point of France. When he discussed the urban outside of Europe in 
The Urban Revolution it was with brief vignettes and broad strokes—Africa did 
not appear at all, and his analysis of China in 1970 became irrelevant in the era 
of economic reform there.
The contemporary push to conceptualise a stage of planetary urbanisation 
is more genuinely planetary in its reach, and more aware of Africa and global 
South urbanisation. Brenner and Schmid (2015), for example, offer seven the-
ses on planetary urbanisation, the most relevant of which here is thesis three: 
that ‘urbanization involves three mutually constitutive moments’, which they 
call concentrated, extended, and differential urbanisation. They argue that in 
this era ‘the city’ is no longer the only or the central concern—concentrated 
urbanisation, essentially the production of cityness, is but one of three pro-
cesses of urbanisation taking place. Extended urbanisation and differential ur-
banisation are occurring in still-under-examined processes across the planet 
(Murray, 2017). Through theses four through seven, which emphasise the ‘mul-
tidimensional’, ‘planetary’, ‘variegated’ and ‘contested’ character of these three 
processes of urbanisation, respectively, they invite exploration of the diversity 
of processes in both global North and global South urban regions.
As Schmid (2016, 30, 33) acknowledges, the ‘classic model of urbanity […] 
has long been overtaken by worldwide urbanization processes’ and ‘we are liv-
ing in a completely different urban world’ than Lefebvre in 1970. Brenner and 
Schmid’s (2015, 162) work to address that completely different urban world en-
gages with postcolonial urban theory, but they emphasise the ‘urgent task of 
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deciphering’ the way ‘contemporary forms of neoliberal capitalist  urbanization 
are unfolding across the North/South divide’. They argue that postcolonial or 
‘Southern’ urban theory’s emphasis on thick descriptions of everyday life and 
unique global South specificities leaves out or over-generalises urbanisation 
processes in global North contexts.
Eurocentric and universalising tendencies in older world/global cities 
studies were not eradicated with this strong new enthusiasm for Lefebvre 
(Sheppard et al., 2013; Shaw, 2015). The dominant voices and perspectives of 
this discussion still belong to the global North, and efforts to reach into the 
global South for analysis are not aimed at relocating conceptual starting places 
there. Many global South-oriented scholars have different emphases in mind 
when exploring the ‘planetary’ (Jazeel, 2011; Mbembe, 2017). A caution re-
mains for postcolonial, global South and African urbanists with the possibility 
that ‘the universalizing force’ in Western thought might ‘reduce everything to 
“the same”’ through the Lefebvrean analytical lens of planetary urbanisation 
(Britton, 1999, 12; Glissant, 1989, 97).
3 Towards an ‘Unexpected’ Urban Comparativism
There are ways of rethinking the entire discussion that build from outside of 
global North urban theory, and from an approach that foregrounds postcolo-
nial understandings. Like GaWC scholars, Storper and Scott (2016) and Rizzo 
(2017, 5–7) criticise postcolonial urban studies for overgeneralising, for selec-
tively criticising modernism, or for weak methodology that make the resulting 
studies ‘woefully vague’, lacking in ‘empirical data’ and ‘lacking in [Marxist] at-
tention to the economic and political structures in which the poor are located’. 
Some of these criticisms may have some validity, but even Storper and Scott 
(2016, 1121) agree that ‘urban theory must now range over the entire world for 
its sources of data and evidence while remaining fully open to new conceptual 
insights generated out of the experiences of the cities of the Global South’. 
There is still much ranging across Southern thinking needed, and openness to 
its insights for developing global urban studies, to challenge the conceptual 
assumptions that remain embedded in the field. This need may be felt in many 
contexts, but it is surely evident for the study of both Chinese and African ur-
banisation. As the United Nations has noted in outlining Goal 11 (making cit-
ies ‘inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’) in the Sustainable Development 
Goals, ‘95 per cent of urban expansion in the next decades will take place in 
the developing world’, with China and sub-Saharan Africa very prominent in 
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this expansion process.2 It is completely logical to begin from analyses and 
conceptualisations of processes there to attempt to build an understanding of 
contemporary ‘planetary urbanization’.
Processes in China and Africa leading to planetary urbanisation go far back 
in time, well before this contemporary age of neo-liberal globalisation (which 
is also too often understood only from the perspective of the global North). 
There is ample latitude for detailing the specificities of globalising processes 
over many centuries (Meier, 2016; Prestholdt, 2008). Global South approaches 
give us tools to see the making of globalised cityscapes differently, from the 
margins and shadows that run parallel to, connect with or contest Northern 
understandings of urbanism and urbanisation.
I build on Robinson’s broad rubric for global urban comparativism here. 
Robinson (2016 and forthcoming) proposes remaking comparative global ur-
ban studies as multiple variations on ‘thinking cities through elsewhere’ or 
‘thinking with elsewhere’ (Robinson, 2016). She provides elaborate means for 
developing robust, historical–geographical comparisons. Comparisons, in her 
schema, can be genetic or generative, and scholarly tactics can involve tracing, 
composing or launching these comparisons (Robinson, 2016). This chapter is 
an exploration of the ‘launching’ of a comparison that is at once genetic and 
generative, in Robinson’s terminology. The genetic launching starts with a sin-
gularity, the southern Chinese idea of a village-in-the-city, but includes ‘insert-
ing analysis of this case into wider conversations’. It is generative, too, in that I 
take a concept out of China that I ‘put to work elsewhere’. Since ‘a revised com-
parativism would seek to deliberately stretch concepts’ even to the point of 
breaking them, the experiment here is ‘highly revisable’, and I have conducted 
it with what I hope is a ‘modest authorial voice’ (Robinson, forthcoming).
A vital aspect of my approach to comparison also relies on Glissant’s postco-
lonial Caribbean discourse of ‘Relation’. At root, for Glissant, Relation is a form 
of comparison reliant on ‘equality with and respect for the Other as different 
from oneself ’ (Britton, 1999, 11). Glissant’s vision of comparison is ‘nonhierar-
chical and nonreductive’, avoiding a ‘universal value system’ and acknowledg-
ing the ‘particular qualities of the community in question’ (Britton, 1999, 11). 
This is a comparativism that makes use of the thick descriptions of particulari-
ties in the global South by testing their relation to one another. In Glissant’s 
(1989, 98) vision, comparison celebrates ‘diversity […] without universalist 
transcendence’, where postcolonial societies exist ‘no longer as objects to be 
swallowed up, but with the intention of creating a new relationship’. Glissant 
2 UN Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 11: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustain-
able, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities/, accessed on 18 January 2018.
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(1990) resists the colonisers’ determination to subsume and excise the ‘roots’ 
of other peoples beyond the global North or the West into the ‘mono-root’ of 
Western thinking.
To counter any potential criticism that this leads to another ‘vague’ and ‘con-
voluted’ postcolonial approach to urban studies, I put an empirically grounded 
emphasis into the dynamics of this comparison. To that end, I examine the 
 Chinese terms, chengzhongcun, chengbiancun and chengwaicun—translated 
as a village ‘in-the-city’, ‘on-the-city-suburb-edge’ and ‘in the suburb’—in terms 
of their potential relevance in Africa. They arose as means of describing and 
analysing what is happening to the small settlements (cun) swallowed up all 
over the Pearl River Delta’s megacities as they grow exponentially following 
China’s explosive industrialisation over the last forty years (Al, 2014; Altrock 
and Schoon, 2014; Chen, 2007; Chen and de’Medici, 2012; de Meulder and Shan-
non, 2014; Roberts, 2013; Schoon, 2013; Wu et al., 2012). In the Pearl River Delta 
(prd) in 2018, hundreds of villages remain inside, on the edges of and in the 
outskirts of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Dongguan and other megacities in the 
region.
The distinctions between the three terms are subtle. The vast majority of all 
pre-existing villages in the prd were what are called ‘lineage villages’, mean-
ing that their residents shared ancestral lineage (Cenzatti, 2014). What hap-
pened to the villages with urbanisation partly depended on where they were 
in relation to industrialisation or urbanisation projects. On one hand, there is a 
simple spatial distinction: villages that are encased within a fully urban setting 
are chengzhongcun, those which lie firmly outside the urban boundaries are 
chengwaicun, and those in between are chengbiancun. This goes together with 
a continuum of density in both population and structures, from the densely 
populated built environments of chengzhongcun outward to the lesser density 
of the chengbiancun and the least dense chengwaicun. As megacities expand 
in the prd, though, the spatial separation and density gradation have become 
more difficult to identify. The implicit assumption of the inevitability of the de-
velopment of all villages into chengzhongcun, villages-in-the-city or urbanised 
villages, and then their destruction and reconstruction as regularised ‘proper’ 
sections of urban areas, ultimately proves problematic. Some chengwaicun sta-
bilise as important agricultural producers for the urban cores (Cenzatti, 2014), 
some chengzhongcun reinvent themselves to retain some vestiges of their pre-
existing character (Crawford and Wu, 2014; Jun, 2014), and some chengbiancun 
seem to remain in between in both density and urban character (Hao, 2014). 
Despite the tendency to resort to calling all three types chengzhongcun, or ren-
dering all three types in English as urbanised villages, and despite the difficulty 
occasionally of differentiating the three types, it remains worthwhile to sort 
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them as distinct, both in spatiality and density, and in terms of the intensity at 
which processes of urban development transpire along the gradient that con-
nects the three.
These concepts of villages in-the-city, on-the-edge, or in-the-suburbs are 
fascinating for comparative purposes in Africa. As cities have grown through-
out the world historically, they have swallowed up the farmlands and hamlets 
within and around them. In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre (1970) wrote that 
‘in many places around the world, and most certainly any place with a history, 
the existence of the city has accompanied or followed that of the village’. He 
was certainly identifying something akin to what the Chinese terms aim to 
explain, but within his ultimately Eurocentric framework. One is left to won-
der what would have met his definition of a ‘place with a history’, for example, 
since the history of cities in Africa did not attract his attention. He does cri-
tique the ‘ideology’ that he associated with the representation here of ‘slowly 
secreted urban reality’, but not really for the fact that it ‘generalizes from what 
took place in Europe’. The processes and pathways by which villages evolve 
into cities or become enmeshed in urban realities have varied tremendously, 
as has their pace, around the world.
As we look at the urban world of the early twenty-first century, nearly every-
where in the rapidly urbanising portions of the global South we can see places 
that look like villages in the city, on its edge, or in its suburbs. The literature 
on South Asian or South-East Asian urbanisation, for instance, has long high-
lighted these phenomena (Hust and Mann, 2005; McGee, 1997). Here, I take a 
focused approach of using these types from the Chinese literature and apply 
them to two urban regions, Dakar and Zanzibar, with the task of comparing 
how their ‘urban villages’ have come to be. Example ‘villages’ like Ouakam, 
Thiaroye and Keur Massar in and around Dakar, and Kikwajuni, Fuoni and 
Mwera in Zanzibar are parallel with the three Chinese settings, respectively, as 
we move out from the city boundary. I am arguing that perhaps this tripartite 
conceptualisation about the spatiality and pace of the urbanisation process 
from China, rather than Lefebvre’s ideas for ‘complete, planetary urbanization’, 
might be of more relevance to the similarly rapid pace and broad sprawl we 
see in sub-Saharan Africa. In the interest of brevity, I concentrate on the cases 
of Thiaroye and Fuoni, as villages-on-the-edge (chengbiancun) in the Dakar 
region and Zanzibar, respectively. I compare these with prd examples in terms 
of land development, governance and participation in housing and urban de-
velopment. I contend that, while these two African cases are different from 
each other and from the prd cases, the comparability is more enlightening 
than an attempt to shoehorn either African case into Western-defined process-
es of globalisation or of planetary urbanisation.
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4 Comparing the Edge Urbanisation Processes in the prd and  
Sub-Saharan Africa
As Förster (2016, 7) has put it, in Africa ‘urbanites make their cities in ways 
that scholars have yet to comprehend’, especially in, around and across the city 
edges. Might the Chinese concepts take us towards such comprehension? The 
tripartite division of Chinese processes has the potential to do so, even if there 
are notable differences. First, however, let me make a more basic case for com-
parability between the prd, Dakar, and Zanzibar, particularly in these edge 
settings. The logic of utilising Dakar and Zanzibar arises not simply because I 
have conducted fieldwork in urban and peri-urban ‘villages’ of both contexts. 
These are also deliberately chosen for being much smaller cities than the prd’s 
megacities, and therefore representative of cities often left out of the analy-
ses of GaWC or of Lefebvrean planetary urbanisation; but they are also ones 
which—like the Pearl River Delta region—have been defined around their 
‘planetary’ relationships for centuries. As slave-trading ports and entrepôts of 
global trade from the 1500s (in the case of Dakar) and 1600s (for Zanzibar), 
links with Europe, Asia, the Americas and the rest of Africa were crucial to the 
formation of the urban identities of both cities. These global histories make 
Zanzibar and Dakar well situated for illustrating different starting places for 
something we may call ‘planetary’ urbanisation.
More immediately, all three urban regions (the prd, Dakar, and Zanzibar) 
have experienced rapid urbanisation in the last half-century. Within the prd, 
the most profound narrative of rapid urbanisation thus far arguably belongs to 
the megacity of Shenzhen. Shenzhen’s urbanisation and industrialisation was 
transformed by the 1978 decision to establish China’s first special economic 
zone there (Chen and de’Medici, 2012). Shenzhen had a population of around 
30,000 people at the time, with the many surrounding villages containing at 
most 300,000 people. The overall metropolitan area is now around 60 times 
larger than it was 40 years ago. Much of the growth has been in the population 
moving to Shenzhen for industrial employment, but with rural hukou (registra-
tion). People lacking urban hukou comprise almost 80 per cent of Shenzhen’s 
population. Many of them reside in urban villages because the lack of urban 
hukou makes obtaining housing elsewhere more difficult; the lower regulation 
and cost in urban villages produce a market that is available for low-income 
migrants. However, as urban villages are demolished or gentrified, many of 
Shenzhen’s floating population are pushed farther out to the edge villages or 
suburban villages (Tian, 2008; Zhang et al., 2016).
Dakar and its satellite city of Pikine have experienced a similar phenom-
enon, at a relatively slower pace and smaller scale. Dakar’s population is 
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 currently estimated to be just above 3 million, more than nine times its size 
at independence in 1960 of around 350,000. The area that is now part of the 
city of Pikine at its initial establishment in 1952 was home to about 8,000 
villagers, in several farming settlements. Thiaroye was the largest of the pre- 
existing  villages. Pikine’s population is more than 1.2 million now, and Thiaroye 
has more than 225,000 inhabitants—around 40 times its size in 1952. Thiar-
oye has grown largely as a result of displacements due to rising housing costs 
in Dakar, in combination with rural-to-urban migration caused by stress on 
Senegal’s agricultural economy—rather than as a result of a massive wave of 
industrialisation.
Zanzibar has also experienced a relatively rapid urbanisation of its edge, in 
places like Fuoni. The small city proper had a little more than 49,000 inhabit-
ants on the eve of independence in 1958, 115,000 in 1978, and 223,000 in 2012. 
But West Districts A and B, the edge communities that are now thoroughly 
morphological and functional parts of urban Zanzibar, grew from a set of rural 
farming villages with less than 20,000 people in 1958 to 370,678 in 2012 (Myers, 
2016). Fuoni went from a tiny village of less than 1,000 people in the 1970s to 
a village-on-the-edge of 34,774 as of 2012, now subdivided into two enumera-
tion areas. I remember bicycling through coconut plantations and python-rich 
swamps in Fuoni in 1991, and by 2017 it is essentially the new downtown of 
the Zanzibar metro area. Fuoni, as with Thiaroye, owes its growth to the high 
costs of housing in Zanzibar city in combination with rural-to-urban migra-
tion, rather than to the Shenzhen sort of industrial explosion.
The reasons for focusing in on Thiaroye and Fuoni are as follows. The 
most thoroughly studied of the three Chinese categories (chengzhongcun, 
the village-in-the-city or urbanised village) is self-explanatory: these are the 
pre-existing villages that become quickly surrounded by dense urban devel-
opment. But it is also the least like most urban African cases. This is because 
colonialism’s restrictions on migration and urban residence caused most cities 
on the African continent to grow slowly until the waning days of European 
rule. In that context, pre-existing urban villages either were demolished, slow-
ly eroded away, or ossified. Only very recently, with for instance Huruma in 
Nairobi, Ouakam in Dakar, or Kariokoo in Dar es Salaam, do we see processes 
in  Africa that might more precisely mirror the chengzhongcun of the prd, 
in the form of extremely dense, high-rise and low-rent apartment develop-
ment that  accompanies—and forms an intrinsic part of—rapid urbanisation 
of land and population (Myers, 2016; Huchzermeier, 2011; Seifert, 2011). Mas-
sive, nearly instant processes of urbanisation are more common straddling or 
outside municipal boundaries in Africa, what is often termed the peri-urban 
zone, and they occur along the two broadly distinct trajectories identified 
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by Chinese scholars as chengwaicun and chengbiancun—villages on the city 
edge and villages in the suburbs—but most intensely right along the urban 
edges.
To go anywhere with this comparison, though, we must recognise that there 
are important differences. Two overwhelming differences noted already are the 
overall numbers between the prd and African urban cases as well as the ab-
sence of massive industrial employment growth in the latter. A third lies in the 
built environment, in the housing stock—the ‘handshake-houses’ and ‘thin-
line sky’ characteristic of the three ‘village’ types in China (Roberts, 2013; Al, 
2014; de Muelder and Shannon, 2014) are less common in Africa. Handshake-
houses are tall, narrow apartment buildings built so close to one another that 
people say one could reach out a window and shake hands with a resident of 
the next building. The closeness of these towers leaves an observer in the alley 
a view of only a thin line of sky above, hence the ‘thin-line sky’. Again, there are 
the beginnings of high-rise developments of a comparable density in African 
chengzhongcun, but far less in the chengbiancun or chengwaicun.
Still, all three edge-village (chengbiancun) settings have experienced rap-
id urbanisation for at least some comparable reasons, like overcrowding in a 
nearby city and in-migration from both city and countryside. All three edge-
village areas, then, experience overcrowding in substandard housing. All 
three are full of highly underserviced neighbourhoods. All three have socio-
cultural tensions and rising inequalities between villagers and newcomers —
and within indigenous village societies—that sometimes spill over into 
politics. In housing terms, the parameters are similar even if the physical 
housing stock differs. Even greater commonalties can be found in land de-
velopment, in the fluid and variable roles of ‘village’ participation in gover-
nance, and in the development processes in these edge areas, as I examine 
below.
In the prd, the urbanisation of land starts with the appropriation of agri-
cultural areas by the government—often the local or municipal government 
(Shin, 2014)—and private interests allied to it, for factories and formally de-
veloped urban areas. This ‘entrepreneurial push for urban redevelopment’ 
through state-led ‘strategic planning’ uses land as an accumulation strategy 
(Shin, 2014, 269). However, because villagers retain the rights to their housing 
stock, when confronted with the subsequent loss of farming livelihoods many 
village development committees of residents seek investors to build larger 
structures for rental to migrants on their housing areas. Villages thus typically 
retain somewhat the morphological structure of the pre-existing village, with 
much taller structures (Wiethoff, 2014, 336). Open spaces that passed for a sort 
of public space between villages steadily disappear at a rapid pace of ‘everyday 
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urbanization’ (Wiethoff, 2014, 341). This is not a uniform or predictable pace for 
land urbanisation, and it has a potent mix of ‘formal de jure permissions’ and 
‘informal de facto reactions’ embedded in it (Wiethoff, 2014, 341).
There are striking parallels here to West District of Zanzibar around Fuoni, 
and even to some extent with Pikine. The morphological structure of Fuoni 
and Thiaroye still retains, in segments, a relationship to the built environ-
ment of the pre-existing villages. The ‘everyday urbanization’ in both settings 
 contains a mix of state-led order in the distribution of land and informal reac-
tion. For Fuoni, the 1964 nationalisation of land—here, initially, for a social-
ist ideological development policy rather than the financialisation of land as 
an  investment—eventually played a part in the urbanisation pattern, but in 
a manner that is quite relatable to the prd cases. The long, drawn-out imple-
mentation of the 1982 Chinese Master Plan for Zanzibar included develop-
ment of planned and ordered neighbourhood units (NUs) in Fuoni, but few of 
these grew in a manner anything like that proposed by the plan. In the 1960s, 
many properties had been allocated to revolutionary cadres in the govern-
ment’s three-acre allotments, and these were frequently the first areas to be 
informally  urbanised—a process often led, in Fuoni, by the informal plans of 
three-acre plot holders themselves (Myers, 2016). Land control steadily slipped 
from a central government intent on allocating it in new, planned NUs into an 
informal system where land rights became instruments of benefit in the hands 
of local party officials. Thiaroye experienced no strictly socialistic nationali-
sation, but it nonetheless developed as a complex mixture of formally and 
informally organised and controlled urban lands, with segments of state-led, 
grid-like development surrounded by haphazard construction, particularly in 
marginal zones.
The participatory governance dynamics in relation to the state in these 
three contexts may present contrasts, but there is still room for comparability. 
In the Pearl River Delta, and perhaps especially in Shenzhen, there is a degree 
of local government autonomy rare in much of urban China. This gives rise to 
flexibility in hukou, for instance, so that Shenzhen’s government has been able 
to grant certificates of residency that amount to a quasi-legal urban hukou for 
many rural-hukou residents. The villages in the city, the edge and the suburbs, 
while varying in the capacity for implementation of planning or governance 
initiatives in them, also contain governance units with effective opportuni-
ties for action, in the form of village development committees. Some are just 
meant to serve as tools for state actions, such as in Shin’s (2014) case study 
of Enning Road in Guangzhou, where the old village area was scheduled for 
demolition. Many village committees have more effectively organised villages 
for collective development action; even in Enning Road, sustained residents’ 
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 resistance slightly reduced the scope of demolitions and displacements (Shin, 
2014, 279; Zhang and Li, 2016). Often, the process has resulted in the devel-
opment of mid-rise and high-rise apartment buildings on the land formerly 
occupied by single-story village houses. In some cases, officials cite claims of 
extraordinary wealth flowing to village development committees (which is oc-
casionally the case) as a way of suggesting that a stand-in for the villagers are 
benefiting; but in reality most villagers have seen few gains from the process, 
and migrant residents even less. Inequalities long seen in chengzhongcun are 
now also beginning to rise in edge and suburban villages (Zhang et al., 2016). 
In Xiaohong and Schoon’s (2014) case study of Guangzhou’s Liede village, the 
villagers leading its ‘joint-stock company’ held the upper hand, but ordinary 
residents worked hard to participate in decision-making during the redevelop-
ment. There is a high degree of heterogeneity in the capacity for negotiating 
powerful roles—and the incoming migrants have even less power or capacity 
than lower-status villagers (Wiethoff, 2014). Still, there are numerous examples 
throughout the prd of attempts at more participatory planning of village ur-
banisation dynamics, variations on what Zhiqiang (2014, 221) refers to as ‘gam-
ing’ in the decision-making process. A few smaller urban villages stabilised by 
developing a peculiar economic niche; these include Dafen, the ‘Oil Painting 
Village’ of northern Shenzhen. In others, wholesale demolition has taken place 
or is scheduled for the future. In Hubei, a religious minority community has 
maintained just over half of its neighbourhood of single-story, closely built 
humble homes in the shadow of a fancy new shopping district. The local gov-
ernment has long scheduled Hubei for complete demolition. But the recent ef-
fort to showcase the vibrancy of chengzhongcun and chengbiancun— ironically, 
by having villages host the 2015 Shenzhen architectural biennial—has helped 
local planners and activists to navigate towards a plan that may preserve ap-
proximately one fourth of the original residential space of the village (Fu, pers. 
comm., 2017).
Local government and developers in the prd, along with the local media, 
use the poor physical conditions of villages and their alleged association with 
unsavoury or even illegal activities as discursive tactics to push for village de-
molitions. Perhaps the most interesting example of this for this chapter is in 
Guangzhou, where the chengzhongcun of Xiaobei, derided in the local press 
as ‘Chocolate City’ for its considerable African population, faces intense pres-
sure for redevelopment (Badgley, pers. comm., 2017; Li et al., 2009; Su, 2016). 
And in the Pearl River Delta, the forces for demolition and redevelopment al-
lied with and often led by the state, eventually win almost all the battles over 
chengzhongcun, which then leads to the further growth of chengbiancun and 
chengwaicun.
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On the surface, Thiaroye and Pikine/Dakar present something very differ-
ent in governance terms. First, the framework for governance is built around 
a lively multiparty democratic system, rather than China’s single-party Com-
munist system. Since the 1998 reorganisation of local government, Pikine 
has been a city in its own right in the Dakar Region, divided into three ar-
rondissements, Dagoudane, Niayes, and Thiaroye. Below this are 16 communes 
d’arrondissements, five of which are in Thiaroye. Each commune has a chef de 
quartier. But there are elements of confusion and varying degrees of incapac-
ity for this governance structure. For example, the chef de quartier of Thiaroye 
Gare in 2013 was at pains to point out that he considered himself a chef de 
village, both in naming the pre-1998 designation of Thiaroye as a village and 
citing his long connection to the village itself as its chef. Yet whether it is in 
quartiers or villages, collective action has a strong foothold in Dakar and Pikine 
politics and governance (Brown, 2015; Fredericks, 2014).
The local state is strangely both more responsive and sensitive to the ordi-
nary people of Thiaroye than the local governments of the prd are in relation 
to urban and edge villages, and less capable, largely because of a staggering 
lack of resources, of meeting their needs. While a major new toll road was 
built, with Chinese engineers, through Thiaroye without compensation being 
given to the residents of sixty or so houses that were demolished, the com-
munity suffers from near-annual disastrous flooding, an absence of solid waste 
management, chronic shortages of electricity and water services, a severe en-
vironmental health crisis, and haphazard construction. Yet it is, as its chef de 
village put it in 2013, ‘the heart of Pikine’. Its largely informal market is one of 
the largest in Senegal. Politicians, local officials and mosque leaders share with 
ordinary people a sense of pride in Thiaroye for its welcoming, cosmopolitan 
character balanced with Lebou village traditions. While a form of gentrifica-
tion has certainly established a foothold, in the commune d’arrondissement of 
Thiaroye sur Mer, which is technically a part of Thiaroye arrondissement but 
quite geographically distinct on the opposite side of the new toll road, it is 
nonetheless hard to imagine Thiaroye becoming like Hubei. It might, on the 
other hand, have more in common with Dafen, as its artists and musicians, 
such as those based at the artists’ cooperative Africulturban, become genu-
ine engines for the populist development of many Pikine neighbourhoods like 
Thiaroye (Mbaye, 2014). There is much that is parallel to Zhiqiang’s (2014) no-
tion of residents’ ‘gaming’ the dynamics.
In Zanzibar, the local government structures lie somewhere in between the 
more controlled hierarchy of the prd and the more open democracy of Dakar. 
Since 1995, Zanzibar has had a multiparty system, but the ruling Revolution-
ary Party has manipulated all five national elections to stay in power, while 
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bleeding away the powers intended for elected local government into central 
government-appointed units (Myers, 2016). Zanzibar’s 2000 restructuring of lo-
cal government re-introduced a colonial-era local government representative, 
called a sheha, as an appointment from the central government working under 
the appointed District Officer. Masheha (pl.) have been principal agents of the 
continued chaotic urbanisation of West District, particularly in the wards of 
Fuoni and other edge communities. The edge villages of West District, along 
the line of the official boundary with the municipal government, had by the 
late 1990s earned the local nickname of the Gaza Strip, as a hotbed of some-
times violent opposition to the Revolutionary Party. In 2012, the government of 
Zanzibar subdivided West District into an A and a B, but its efforts to provide 
services in either district have been meagre, just like in Thiaroye, in every sec-
tor other than road-building (Myers, 2016). Fuoni in 2016 and 2017 witnessed 
the massive widening of its main road, replete with the largely uncompensated 
demolition of its small businesses, and the paving of many of its side streets. 
It lacks other basic services, but widening the main road greatly enhanced the 
central route to Zanzibar’s southern and central east coast tourism zone and 
provided an aesthetic mask for tourists over the conditions inside neighbour-
hoods like Fuoni. That the Revolutionary Party remains one that was modelled 
on the Chinese Communist Party is clearly reflected in its similar lack of allow-
ance for oppositional voices in planning processes in edge villages. Yet even 
here there are pathways for the expression of non-compliance, such as in what 
I have discussed elsewhere as spatial discourses of fitina (discord) ( Myers, 
2016). For instance, in Fuoni and other parts of both West A and West B dis-
tricts, one often finds, deeper in the alleyways, the light blue-white-and-red 
banners and insignia of the opposition Civic United Front hanging, tattered, 
years after an election campaign.
5 Conclusion
Globalisation in cities, the globalising of urban areas or regions, and the ‘plan-
etarization’ of the urban are all themes that have preoccupied many urbanists 
over the last four decades. These global North-driven discussions have been 
late in coming around to urban Africa, and when the attention does come, it 
is not generally seeking to build from existing African scholarship or Southern 
analyses or frameworks, instead attempting to fit them into Northern frame-
works. One way to address urban theory’s enduring problems with Africa, such 
as what I’ve argued may be found in the work of the GaWC or Lefebvrean ap-
proaches to planetary urbanisation, is to build South–South comparisons that 
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utilise concepts or frameworks designed for explaining Southern urbanisation. 
The highly comparable rapid urbanisation processes for previously rural vil-
lage land on the edges of cities provide one empirical context for testing this 
premise.
In these villages on the edge, we see ‘planetary’ histories and futures. The 
processes have great variability and fluidity within and between the settings of 
this study, but there is much to compare—so much that, in fact, I have merely 
scratched the surface. For instance, while there is no hukou registration system 
for Senegal or Tanzania, new migrants to Pikine or West District find them-
selves similarly situated in a divided landscape of insiders and outsiders with 
varied capacities for belonging. Land development has resulted in notably 
different urbanising forms, yet through comparably complex pathways that 
 involve variations on limited capacity for local participation and gain from 
‘gaming’ mixed and corrupted systems.
One might counter my examples by saying they are just variegated cases of 
the ‘extended urbanization’ of Brenner and Schmid’s (2015) Lefebvre-inspired 
theses on ‘planetary urbanization’. But the paths of these ‘extensions’ are mark-
edly distinct in China, Senegal or Tanzania, respectively, and from global North 
cases. It is precisely towards thick description of the difference that we must 
turn, especially if critics of postcolonial or Southern urban studies continue 
to speak of an absence of evidence or of conceptual vagueness. The ordinary 
cities that are still too often ‘off the map’ are telling stories that should change 
the narrative. After all, if the narrative is about the rapid urbanisation of the 
planet, that is a narrative that, in the twenty-first century, clearly belongs to 
South Asia, South-East Asia, China and sub-Saharan Africa. Countries like Sen-
egal and Tanzania have rates of urbanisation that have topped the world for 
many consecutive decades now.
In thinking with these urban elsewheres, putting the three  village-in-the-city 
concepts to work in African cities, I have certainly stretched the concepts. I 
have attempted to do so while remaining mindful of Glissant’s goal of non- 
hierarchical, mutually respectful comparison that rejects universality and 
makes productive use of particularities in the differences. Obviously, there is 
much more that could be discussed regarding the potential comparability of 
these neighbourhoods—let alone the comparability of all three of the prd 
types. The point is, again, that there are in fact so many realms of compara-
bility. One might just as well start the story from the African settings and use 
conceptualisations of urbanisation from Senegal or Zanzibar to see how they 
might help to explain urbanisation in the prd. I contend that this approach, 
too, would likely be more enlightening than an effort to apply Lefebvre’s ideas 
about planetary urbanisation from France nearly a half-century ago to these 
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rapidly expanding urban edges in global South contexts. It is through explo-
ration of these seemingly unexpected South–South comparisons that policy 
makers ought to find more cogent pathways to more sustainable and just 
urbanisation.
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Urban Identities and Belonging: Young Men’s 
Discourses about Pikine (Senegal)
Sebastian Prothmann
Abstract
Suburbs in many parts of the world fall victim to discriminating assessments from 
the outside. Pikine, an urban area within the Dakar region of Senegal, which was one 
of urban Africa’s major government restructuring projects, is no exception. The fre-
quently evoked and generalised narratives of urban lifeworlds often fail to describe the 
heterogeneous characteristics of neighbourhoods in precarious large agglomerations 
throughout the world. In particular, the youth in this urban quarter are important driv-
ers of economic growth and means with which to combat poverty and strengthen so-
cial cohesion. This chapter, based on 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Pikine 
between 2011 and 2013, will illustrate how resourceful young men organise their lives. 
On the one hand, they have equipped themselves with distinct identities and switch 
them depending on the situation. On the other hand, they have resurrected their feel-
ings of solidarity, courage and local pride in the notion of Pikinité as a ‘self- revaluation-
standard’. Because of increasingly precarious realities and rising unemployment, 
individualistic tendencies—combined with the aspiration of self-realisation—have 
gained ground and challenge these stratagems.
1 Introduction
African urban agglomerations are mostly analysed through the narrow lens 
of developmentalism, which tends to focus only on lack, making them appear 
‘as imperfect, stunted, and underdeveloped versions of what they ought to be’ 
(Myers and Murray, 2007, 10). These agglomerations come up short if indica-
tors from the global North are applied (Myers, 2011). Also, if the overlapping 
interconnections of different cities in the world were taken into account, the 
analyses would look very different (Robinson, 2011). Therefore, alternative 
readings of the African urban cityscape can help us understand urbanity in 
all its diversity and productivity by taking the power of disorder into consider-
ation (Myers, 2011).
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When reading urban Africa, we also have to be aware of its huge youth 
population that is trying to make a living within unfavourable and limited so-
cioeconomic structures (Honwana, 2012). This population, which only faces 
murky prospects of finding work in these inequitable, growing towns, pri-
marily has access to informal structures (the informal employment market, 
informal property rights, informal transport, etc.). However, for a long time, 
urban spaces in Africa functioned as ‘integration machinery’, offering work for 
graduates of formal education, often in the public sector, although opportu-
nities here have declined. Youth of today, though comprising a much higher 
proportion of graduates of formal education, are exposed to various forms of 
marginalisation, exclusion and lack of work. Thus, young people are emerging 
as a new social group whose common characteristic is that of social depriva-
tion. Because of this, new ways of dealing with problematic situations are also 
emerging, and these are not necessarily linked with the social expectations of 
society.
In the 1990s Bayart et al. (1992) posited that young people had shown a great 
willingness to oppose political regimes but that their power had not sufficed 
to achieve political revolution. For this reason, assumptions long circulated 
about the ‘lost generation’—weak, marginalised youths debarred from politi-
cal decision-making processes (Cruise O’Brien, 1996). But earlier the historian 
Mamadou Diouf had emphasised the pivotal role of the youth (1992; 1996; 
2002). In 2018 after the Arab Spring, which has essentially been described as a 
youth rebellion, and the ‘awakening’ of urban youth before and during the 2011 
elections in Senegal, the power of the young needs rethinking. Nonetheless, in 
postcolonial debates youths are still viewed as the epitome of both violence 
and change. If they are, on the one hand, interpreted as offering great hope for 
the future, on the other they are seen as agents of government instability and 
protest (Benga, 2001; Diouf, 2003; Durham, 2004). Scholars working on youth 
have stressed the heterogeneity and ambivalence of youths, depicting them 
as ‘vanguards’ and ‘vandals’ (Abbink and van Kessel, 2005, 22), as ‘makers’ and 
‘breakers’ of society (de Boeck and Honwana, 2005, 2) or as being ‘between 
Jerusalem and Babylon’ (Benga, 2001), drawn from taxonomies between recog-
nition and disparagement.
In general, youth in Africa cannot be determined as a biological entity. They 
are a cultural construction (Honwana, 2012), one that might easily encompass 
people who are thirty or even forty years old (Baller, 2010). Youth is, moreover, a 
fluid category that depends very much on historical, social, cultural and politi-
cal circumstances (Baller, 2005b). The perception of youth as a time of transi-
tion, a constituent element of the concept of youth itself, hinges on the idea 
of a move from a period of dependency (mainly within the family unit) to the 
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attainment of financial independence through a fixed job and the beginning 
of one’s own family. In the precarious financial context of urban Senegal there 
is much concern regarding delayed entry or possibly even the impossibility of 
entry into the labour market. This refused entry and other complications entail 
a prolonged phase of waiting, resulting in a complex interplay of negotiations 
between social realities and representations (Baller, 2010).
Based on 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the neighbourhoods of 
Wakhinane II Quartier Mballo Der and Sadio Guissé (Guinaw Rail Nord) in 
Pikine, a city in the département (administrative district) of Pikine within the 
Dakar region of Senegal, this contribution examines the strategies that young 
urban men use to deal with their marginalisation and with globalisation. The 
empirical data will give insight into how young men oscillate between different 
identities and negotiate urban and religious belongings and thus live urbanity 
in a productive way. The research shows how local youth in unsteady everyday 
lifeworlds display their inventiveness by creating stratagems with the help of 
refined techniques that permit them to cope with constraints and to weave 
new ideas of being and becoming into their lives. In a broader perspective, this 
chapter attempts to tackle the question of how young men in the global South 
approach issues of belonging and identity creation in a globalised world.
2 Dakar and the Infrastructural Vision of a President
For many people, a symbol of the failure of Abdoulaye Wade’s regime is the 
fifty-two-meter-tall bronze statue in socialist realist style that is highly visible 
from different parts of the Cap Vert Peninsula. Perched on top of one of the 
Collines des Mamelles, the twin hills in the suburb of Ouakam, geographically 
the westernmost point of Africa’s mainland, overlooking the Atlantic Ocean 
and dominating the horizon of Dakar, the statue depicts a family: a muscular, 
half-naked man with broad shoulders and six-pack abdominals holds a nude 
baby and points resolutely ahead, accompanied by a woman wearing a short 
skirt. The statue is about half a metre taller than the Statue of Liberty in New 
York and as such is the tallest sculpture outside of Asia and Eastern Europe 
( Roberts, 2013). It was meant to symbolise Africa’s rebirth after centuries of 
slavery, colonialism and political domination from the outside (Grabski, 2017). 
Interestingly, according to official publications from the Senegalese govern-
ment, the African Renaissance Monument cost nothing. It was built by a com-
pany from North Korea (Mansudae Overseas Projects) in exchange for a prime 
area of land belonging to the Senegalese government (Ritter, 2011). But rumours 
of a cost of usd 27 million (Arieff, 2012) have provoked a huge controversy on 
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the extravagant and wasteful use of state finances on high-profile architectural 
and urban projects (Grabski, 2017). It is also alleged that ex-president Abdou-
laye Wade claims 35 per cent of the entrance fees to the statue’s interior and 
its museum.
However, in spite of its original intention to mark the rebirth of the conti-
nent and to point towards a bright future, in reality little has changed: decay, 
mismanagement, nepotism, corruption and poverty still abound in Senegal 
(Gilley, 2010; De Jong and Foucher, 2010). Emblematic of Wade’s vision of mo-
dernity and the nation and his strategic alignment with foreign investors, the 
monument therefore represents for many people the ‘disjuncture between 
governmental initiatives and on-the-ground crisis in infrastructure’ ( Grabski, 
2017, 198). It is a glimmering daily reminder of state failure, especially the 
squandering of public funds and the preferential treatment afforded to select 
areas of the city.
The Sopi1 election campaign of Abdoulaye Wade in 2000 was perceived as a 
watershed moment by young people all over Senegal. Although he was almost 
seventy-four years of age during the election campaign, he succeeded in con-
necting with the youth of the country. His campaign events were attended by 
masses of young people. His unctuous speeches, which focused mainly on em-
ployment, were warmly welcomed by young people tired of forty years of the 
inefficient economic policies of Senegal’s socialist government. Many youth 
felt as if Abdoulaye Wade took the words right out of their mouths. He styled 
himself as their saviour, able to make their biggest unfulfilled wishes come true, 
by promising universal access to education and greatly increased chances of 
becoming productive members of society. The time of sitting around passively, 
drinking endless cups of àttaaya (a sugary green tea), was supposed to come to 
an end. He painted a very rosy picture of Senegal as an emerging country, de-
picting the youth as the most important actors of his promoted politics of sopi 
(change). Thus, he directly addressed young people’s profound lack of societal 
recognition and self-worth, which was caused by their lack of integration into 
society due to widespread unemployment and resulting poverty (Sene Absa, 
2011; Nelson, 2014; Osmanovic, 2017).
Wade succeeded in creating a feeling of ‘legitimate expectation’ (Ferguson, 
1999) that the precarious situation of the youth would improve, and a feel-
ing of hopefulness and optimism soon spread among Dakar’s youth. After his 
interventions failed to pay off for the young generation, his former supporters 
1 Sopi literally means ‘change’ and was used as a strategy to transform Senegal. ‘Change’ en-
compassed a complete remaking of political as well as the moral standards of Senegalese 
society.
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felt betrayed. These youth had grown up with higher expectations due to his 
populist speeches, but after some years the majority of them still did not have 
steady jobs. They grew increasingly frustrated and fed up with the government, 
and they talked of an unsuccessful deal (Sene Absa, 2011) and of broken hopes. 
In January 2011, one year before Abdoulaye Wade confirmed that he planned 
to run for a third term, artists, intellectuals and activists created the movement 
Y’en a marre2 (had enough).
Economic redemption was partly translated into large-scale public works3 
mostly funded by foreign capital, but it failed to impact the masses, especially 
the still-marginalised youth. Wade’s concentration on private sector invest-
ment in infrastructure instead of in education and social programmes left the 
young population at the mercy of the neo-liberal free market, in contrast to the 
forty years of government by the Socialist Party of Léopold Senghor (1960–80) 
and Abdou Diouf (1981–2000) (Galvan, 2001). On the one hand, Wade’s inter-
ventions were inflected by globalisation, and he focused on the ‘construction of 
professedly globalized spaces of consumption and circulations […] detached 
from histories and shared struggles of the past decades’ (Melly, 2013, 386) with 
the help of foreign expertise, capital and international organisations. On the 
other hand, he engaged in constructing physical manifestations of nationalism 
in Dakar, such as the Millennium Gate and memorials like the statue Demba 
and Dupont, where a Senegalese infantryman beside a French soldier symbol-
ises the support of Senegal for France during World War II (Diop, 2012). Wade’s 
government’s negligence of the periphery across its large-scale urban projects 
was striking, as was its overlooking of the economic heart of the capital, the 
Plateau (Grabski, 2017).4 The Plateau’s architecture, which for a long time was 
redolent of southern France, had become more and more dilapidated, and to-
day it is suggestive of a neglected urban quarter in France to the European 
2 Y’en a marre is a collective comprising members of the civil society, rappers such as the Ka-
olack rap duo Keur Gui, Fou Malade, Simon, and Djily Bagdad, among others, and journalists, 
particularly Fadel Barro. In January 2011 it was launched to oppose political developments, 
especially around the despotic arrangements of incumbent Abdoulaye Wade. For further in-
formation see Savané and Sarr, 2012; Prause, 2012.
3 Projects included the construction of multistorey buildings, roundabouts, ramps and tun-
nels, which became signs of the modernisation of the city of Dakar. This vision of Abdoulaye 
Wade’s modernisation was crowned by the construction of the Dakar–Diamniadio toll high-
way and the new airport Blaise Diagne International Airport in Diass, as well as the renova-
tion of the Corniche Ouest (Diouf and Fredericks, 2013).
4 With the construction of new government buildings, museums and monuments, the Plateau 
was the heart of the postcolonial capital after independence and was shaped by Senghor’s 
idea and vision of postcolonial nationalism and his literary and ideological trend of Negri-
tude (Melly, 2013).
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 observer. With its throbbing market, Sandaga, at the end of the Avenue Georg-
es Pompidou, referred to as Ponty, and its banks and service companies around 
Independence Square, the Plateau serves until today as the main artery of daily 
life in Dakar. The street markets and shops here, which are mostly in the hands 
of religious brotherhoods, were completely absent in Wade’s ‘soaring oratory 
about economic emergence’ (Melly, 2013, 393) and modernisation.
Many people in Pikine expressed frustration at Wade’s exclusive focus on 
streets and populations in Dakar and his relative neglect of Pikine, which 
produced further inequalities rather than eradicating them. Furthermore, 
numerous rumours circulated asserting the embezzlement of resources by 
Wade’s government and the enrichment of plutocrat ministers who siphoned 
off resources of all sorts. While the political and economic elite enjoyed well-
maintained infrastructure along the Corniche and in the neighbourhood of 
Almadies, the average citizen continued to face an unpredictable future in 
flood-prone and neglected neighbourhoods with ailing infrastructure and 
ramshackle houses.
Even today, the glittering manifestations of aggressively promoted modern 
and globalised ‘materiality’ scattered throughout the city in the form of new in-
frastructure, new residential areas, modern supermarkets and other shopping 
facilities, new gas stations, fast-food restaurants, night clubs, leisure facilities, 
and so on serve as a constant reminder that the fruits of progress are  reserved 
for a lucky few. When an individual enters Dakar from Pikine via Castor, he 
or she passes the clean showrooms of emg Universal Auto (Voitures de Pres-
tige, Americains, Allemandes), which display luxury cars in pristine condition. 
Transnational connections and longings are also symbolised by commercial 
booths with painted signboards sponsored by international companies. This 
signage is part of Dakar’s own ‘language’ (Guibbert, 1983). Barbers, garnished 
with photographs and painted images of bald heads from 50 Cent, 2Pac and 
other African-American celebrities, and with mural paintings and sophisticat-
ed, colourful glass paintings (so-called suweer) featuring portraits of famous 
religious persons, also contribute to the sensory regime of this cluttered ‘urban 
cacophony’ (Mustafa, 2001, 49) that shapes a landscape of global and religious 
longings. Despite their visual prominence, these urban facets are not represen-
tative of the experience of the majority of the population of the Dakar region. 
Or, as Jean and John Comaroff said, here ‘the millennial moment has passed 
without a palpable payback’ (1999, 284). The incoming ‘neo-liberal logics of 
global capital flow’ (ibid, 396) that shaped Wade’s vision of the city’s future, 
and thus that powered the relocation of global city allure from the Plateau as a 
statement of the post-independence time to the Corniche and Almadies, can 
also be seen as a brusque rejection of the immediate present with its concrete, 
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precarious and known realities, which are not altered in any respect by these 
futuristic visions.
3 Pikine, Dakar’s Largest Suburb
The city of Pikine was built in the 1950s, as housing problems became more 
and more urgent on the Cap Vert Peninsula and slums began to appear in 
neighbourhoods such as Dakar Fass and Colobane, and as the density of the 
central neighbourhoods of Médina increased. To curb these phenomena the 
state eventually decided to relocate illegal residents of these areas to outside of 
the city, in Pikine (Chenal, 2013), which was created under French colonial rule 
in 1952 and stood about 13 kilometres away from Dakar on a former military 
site covered with sand dunes (Baller, 2005a, 2007).
At the outset, the site of Pikine was a vast and remote area that was sup-
posed to serve as a dormitory town for those who were relocated from the 
shanty towns of inner Dakar. Over time, many people started to settle outside 
the boundaries of Pikine, resulting in rapid urban growth that soon exceeded 
urban planning (Baller, 2010). During this time, the majority of investments 
were focused on Dakar, and Pikine and Guédiawaye were not granted the same 
opportunities and means (Chenal, 2013). Infrastructure—or more explicitly 
the absence of it—has therefore always been a serious problem in Pikine, and 
severe problems with sanitation, unemployment, informal uses of space, rapid 
population growth and an essentially young population (with 60 per cent un-
der the age of twenty-one by 2004) are characteristic of the city.
While only a few years ago the geographer Gérard Salem saw Pikine as a 
‘city of nothing’ and a city ‘without a real history’ (1998, 271), today Pikine is a 
vibrant, cosmopolitan satellite town of Dakar, with 1,170,791 inhabitants (esti-
mation for 2015) (ansd/srsd, 2015) from a mosaic of different ethnic commu-
nities. Pikine is characterised by a diverse conglomeration of formal low-cost 
housing developments, multi-family abodes, small cement housing blocks and 
self-constructed multistorey apartment blocks.
3.1 Pikinité
The 1990s saw, in particular, the emergence of new forms of juvenile self-
identifications. It was during this time that the Bul Faale movement5 started, 
5 ‘Bul Faale’ was a song, released in 1994 by Positive Black Soul, one of the first hip-hop groups, 
founded in Dakar in 1989. Bul Faale served as an empowering slogan that can be translated as 
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 encapsulating the attitude of young Senegalese trying to succeed through ef-
fort and work. The most prominent notion for young men in Pikine was Piki-
nité, a term used to describe a feeling of solidarity.
Pikinité is first and foremost dignity. It is to share your own life and to give 
everything of you, to respect your locality in all its social and professional 
classes. It is to know to forget and wish only the progress of your fellows.
Lamine,6 Wakhinane II Quartier Mballo Der
Pikinité reveals the awakening, in young people, of pride, and their identifica-
tion with their locality. In the past, Pikine’s negative reputation proved sub-
stantial and persistent, even impacting the attitudes of its residents. But it 
took local figures to overcome residents’ denial of their origin. One of the first 
people who spread a positive message about Pikine was the wrestler Tyson, the 
nickname of Mouhamed Ndao, a reference to the American boxer Mike Tyson. 
Previously, successful artists from Pikine had hidden their origins. Eventually 
reversing this trend, young men started to develop pride and to use the Pikinois 
sense of community as social capital. Artists like Ndongo Lô, Pape Diouf and 
Ive Niang contributed to improving the reputation of Pikine.
Today young people wear T-shirts with slogans such as I love Pikine, AS 
Pikine,7 Deuk Pikine Mo Neex (living in Pikine is cool), Pikine mo xeew (Pikine 
is on top) and I am from Kinpi, which can be seen as young men’s territorial 
inscriptions on the city (Lefebvre, 1967). On a more local level, namely on the 
neighbourhood level, the nawetaan soccer clubs convey a strong sense of  local 
connectedness. Pikine also has many wrestlers who participate in làmb bi (tra-
ditional wrestling).
Today many young people in Pikine attribute to themselves perseverance, 
smartness and skills of hustling, locally voiced as esprit banlieue (suburban 
mind):
‘don’t worry’, in the sense that despite an ongoing economic crisis you have to keep on living, 
enjoying life and taking it as it is. You have to work hard and progress (Havard, 2001).
6 The names of informants have been changed in order to protect the anonymity of persons 
who contributed to this study.
7 AS Pikine is a nawetaan football club. In Senegal, youth organised football tournaments dur-
ing the rainy season (called nawetaanes). The Wolof word nawet translates as ‘rain’ or ‘rainy 
season’. In its grammatical form nawetaan means ‘the one who passes the rainy season’. Ini-
tiated in the 1950s, nawetaan championships subsumed all neighbourhood teams. By this, 
more than 2,000 sports and cultural associations (asc—Association Sportive et Culturelle) 
were formed, which involved not only football but also theatre and local social initiatives 
(Künzler, 2010).
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If you have a suburban mind, you will have many opportunities, you’ve 
seen, you can cope with it, good, quickly-done, what. If you have the 
strength to move forward, you will have a lot of things. You will persevere, 
what, because we say Bul faale […], you will have the spirit of coping.
Moussa, Sadio Guissé
Speaking in general, for young men the notion of Pikinité brings the residents 
of Pikine together. The residents help each other; they are solidaric. Also, 
though residents face many challenges in terms of lack of infrastructure, dif-
ficult access to education and high youth unemployment, Pikine stands out as 
one of Senegal’s most dynamic fronts of urbanisation and as a very active city 
with popular urban initiatives. Through the term Pikinité, vivid attributions 
have elevated an urban neighbourhood famous for its bad reputation.
Part of Pikine’s wealth is unquestionably its prolific hip-hop scene, mainly in 
the form of underground hip-hop. This rebellious style actively condemns the 
poor conditions of Pikine, allowing for the expression of otherwise dormant 
indignation about an unjust socioeconomic distribution system. Through per-
formative styles, hip-hop provides the youth in Pikine new forms of authority 
to reinvent and alter their marginal position (Shipley, 2010). The artists Gokh-
Bi System featuring Ndongo Lô, Section Jaxanama, Pétaw bi and Nomila fea-
turing Backa have written songs entitled ‘Pikine’. These and others, including 
Pinal Gang, Balvada, Tigrimbi, Wa bmg 44, Matador, Wagëblë, Coalition Nia-
mu Mbaam, J Xaar Under and Sall Ngaary, have contributed to the establish-
ment of a booming local hip-hop scene. Babacar Niang, alias Matador, is one 
of the most prominent underground rappers in Pikine and a founding member 
of Wa bmg 44, a hip-hop group hailing from the suburb Thiaroye between Pi-
kine and Rufisque. While performing around the world, he has called attention 
to the youth of Senegal and the problematic situations faced in its periphery. 
In 2006 he founded an education centre in Pikine Ouest called Africulturban, 
which today has about one thousand members and is dedicated to empower-
ing underprivileged youth via a wide range of activities that centre on music 
production and urban culture.
4 Hustling, ‘Killing Time’ and Improvising in Pikine
As a result of neo-liberal policies and the gradual withdrawal of the state, hus-
tling has become a means of trying to make a living for young men coping 
with the emerging social dislocation in Pikine. The phrases ‘tey yi ni, town 
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bi dafa metti’ (today, the town is difficult), ‘damay gerer’ (I’m managing) and 
‘ñépp  dañuy taqale’ (everyone hustles) all describe a sentiment best summed 
up in the Senegalese expression of xoslu. This expression has become an all- 
encompassing term that describes the day-to-day lifeworlds of young men 
in Pikine. Anthropologist Suzanne Scheld (2008) traces the term back to the 
English word hustle and the Wolof word xoos (to scratch, to scrape). In 1995, 
the well-known Montreal-based Senegalese Mbalax8 musician Oumar Ndiaye, 
alias Xosluman, released the album Hoslu. In a personal communication on 
Facebook, he told me that initially the phenomenon was described by Gambi-
ans using the word ‘hustle’. He claimed to have wolofised the term as xoslu and 
used it as an album title, which popularised its use in Senegal. Xoslu describes 
the socio-economic predicament of male youth trying by all means to make a 
living. By the same token, the term xosluman, meaning a seasoned struggler, 
carries connotations of respect and even admiration for an ability to fight one’s 
way through adverse circumstances. It is a very masculine ascription, because 
the fervour displayed by these men in striving to get by stands in sharp contrast 
to the helpless passivity of ‘effeminate’ men in the face of adversity. Xoslu there-
fore suggests empowerment, achieved through living by one’s wits and proudly 
rejecting dependence. Young men describe their daily resourcefulness with a 
powerful youth vocabulary that demonstrates that members of this genera-
tion in urban Senegal are trying their best to manage their lives in pursuit of 
a (better) living (Honwana, 2012), and also that they do not give up easily on 
their hopes and aspirations. The choice of this jargon around fighting, survival, 
physical pain and anxieties moreover exalts a certain ethos of toughness that 
allocates valence and meaningfulness to their lives.
In reality, however, there is a paradox: while work is vital for the economic 
well-being and for the status of an adult in Pikine, many work opportunities 
are considered to be beneath these young men’s social class. Most of my in-
formants considered notions of social class, dignity and their own position in 
the neighbourhood to be very important when making choices about pursuing 
certain income-generating activities in Dakar. Thus, behind the narratives of 
hard work, suffering and hustling, many urban small-scale activities in the in-
formal sector were associated with a lower rank and therefore with failure and 
non-advancement. And as occupation indexed a certain rank within the social 
hierarchy, and many young men were assured of sources of income from other 
8 Mbalax is syncretic popular music—made world famous by Youssou N’Dour—that com-
bines popular Western music elements with singing in the Wolof language and dances influ-
enced by soul, Latin, jazz, rock and sabar.
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members of the family, or in some cases from family members abroad, many 
work opportunities were not accepted. Most young men I spoke to considered 
working as a street seller or doing other menial jobs demeaning, and they often 
thought that physical labour indicated a backwardness inherent to poor and 
uneducated people; this work was usually referred to as liggéeyu baadoolo (the 
work of the poor). However, young people often taunted other young people 
for being a beugge lo yomb, meaning that they wanted to achieve something or 
acquire material gain without doing anything for it, dodging responsibilities 
and hardship (Prothmann, 2017). This tendency resonates with Comaroffian 
comment on millennial capitalism’s ‘allure of accruing wealth from nothing’ 
(2000, 313).
One of the most important words among young men was the verb lijjanti, 
which was used to cope with personal and societal demands. The term de-
scribes using shrewd and opportunistic scheming to overcome obstacles. For 
example, lijjanti was used when speaking about acquiring or ‘organising’ a cer-
tain sum of money at short notice, or about ‘arranging’ something. With lijj-
anti, the end—usually—justifies the means. Or, more precisely, the verb serves 
to obscure the manner in which the end is achieved. Even though it does not 
necessarily mean transgressing the boundaries of socially and legally accept-
able behaviour, it carries the connotation of cunning. As hidden procurement 
of financial means, it implies a nifty social negotiation, one that is also made 
in order to circumvent social obligations of sharing. Politicians and sports stars 
have contributed to the success of the concept of lijjanti. Especially influen-
tial was the conspicuousness of ministers who posed with their new off-road 
vehicles and pricey villas. These were people who had nothing before enter-
ing politics. Young people started to claim that ‘Xaalis ken du ko liggéey danu 
koy lijjanti’ (money is not gained by the fruit of labour, but by resourceful-
ness). In a newspaper interview, the psychologist Lahbib Ndiaye characterises 
the Senegalese as people who want to get rich, but who do not want to put 
any effort into it. He speaks of the philosophy of kheweul (godsend), of coup 
(trick), of wërsëg (chance) and of ‘Yàlla waxul kenn dara’ (only God knows 
what will happen tomorrow). According to him, this philosophy does not em-
bolden individual efforts or recognise the value of work. He quotes histories 
of fake visas, magical fructifications of businesses and the Senegalese convic-
tion that one can get rich because of a marabout’s prayers and occult forces 
(Le Soleil, 2010).
I also frequently encountered the term nandité among young men. With 
this, young people voiced various forms of intelligence, pointing out people 
who know how to cope with life. Nandité normally refers to a Boy Town or a 
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‘gentleman’ who both represent a connoisseur: a young man who is clever, 
well informed, and who knows how to cope with life and is able to manage. 
He is an urban citizen capable of projecting an image of success. This in-
cludes a certain degree of independence and the ability to manage things 
on one’s own.  Furthermore, nandité status can also be achieved in relation 
to the female sex—in this regard, a nandité is somebody who is able to go on 
dates with beautiful young women, which is considered to be very costly and 
demanding.
The expressions ruse and muus indicate the use of savvy tactics to gener-
ate financial gains. Many young men in Pikine tried to survive with téq deal 
in an informal economy. Commodities sent by relatives were often hawked, 
or articles were bought and immediately sold in an attempt to make a quick 
profit by inventing stories about the article. As such, articles like laptops or 
mobile phones can be seen as assets that can be expeditiously sold. This 
makeshift economy of barter deals can be found among many young males 
in Pikine. Some of them have developed refined tricks and networks con-
necting them to the ‘right’ people; they call themselves téqat deal (makers of 
deal) and use their connections to make a considerable profit by huckstering 
commodities of inferior quality. During a night interview with an informant 
in Médina, my interlocutor did not mince matters; he spoke of the cunning 
stratagems of young men, leaving the specifics of such techniques fuzzy: ‘No, 
but that’s it. They rip off. They are scammers. (…) Or they have a brother or a 
father who is in Europe, who sends materials and they sell them. Most peo-
ple are like that’. It is through these techniques of hustling that many young 
men try to navigate through volatile informal economies in order to make a 
living.
Walking through Pikine, I was often astonished to see young men and wom-
en dressed up very fashionably but not holding any formal employment; I won-
dered where the financial means for these clothes might derive from. As most 
people were reluctant to admit what they did for a living or felt ashamed to 
admit that they received financial support from their families, I was not able 
to gather sufficient data in response to this question. The frequent disguise of 
income-generating activities also contributed to this vagueness. In any case, 
most of these strikingly dressed young men spent the whole day among their 
circle of friends and acquaintances, doing nothing more than talking, some-
times with humorous mischievousness, and eyeing girls walking along the 
unpaved roads. They sat on makeshift chairs, sharing roasted groundnuts and 
drinking tea. Young men referred to this as rey temps bi or kill temps bi (killing 
time) (Ralph, 2008).
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5 Pikine and the Baay Faal Identity Among Young Men:  
Contrasting Visions
Many young men I met in Pikine blindly admired Baayfaalism, a type of a men-
dicant suborder of the Murīdiyyah brotherhood9 and its sheikhs. For young 
people, torn between their own expectations and those of their kin, ensnared 
in fickle and problem-ridden secular lifeworlds of reneged promises, the 
Murīdiyyah and especially Baayfaalism, becomes a rewarding collective iden-
tity, based on a glorious past and offering a clear conception of the world and a 
positive vision of the future. Baayfaalism allows young men to express their re-
ligious identity through a ‘rudimentary understanding of a “Muslim life”’ (Sim-
one, 2010, 148), simplifying for them the concept of a godly life and bolstering 
their self-esteem.
Thus, among young men the category of the Baay Faal becomes a vessel 
for aspirations towards goodness. Following the unwritten laws of harmoni-
ous outward representations, young men in Pikine display characteristics such 
as patriotism, sympathy and openness towards other persons, modesty, non-
consumerism, humbleness, industriousness, cunning, independence, spiritu-
ality, respect and solidarity. Baayfaalism can be considered a moral guide that 
shepherds young males through the ‘ambiguity-filled dilemmas of everyday ur-
ban life’ (Simone, 2010, 145) and as ‘synonymous with personal quest, inner im-
provement and renunciation, and love of God’ (Popovic and Veinstein, 1996, 9). 
Baay Faal morality re-establishes individual agency and further provides the 
individual with a meaningful and morally unobjectionable identification.
Baay Faal adherents experience recognition among their peers. Thus, being 
a Baay Faal means being someone, having a social role and especially being a 
man of God. A Baay Faal is also authorised to take on menial jobs, liggéeyu baa-
doolo. All this is considered as the opposite of an individualistic, urban version 
of the self in inner Dakar, which is characterised by a sense of superiority and 
a blasé attitude. Thus, among marginalised, unemployed young men who han-
ker for positive change, affiliation to Baayfaalism appears as an emancipating 
force and enjoys great popularity (Pezeril, 2008). Xavier Audrain (2004) writes 
that Baayfaalism provides the sense of an alternative moral economy where 
young men can find their place.
9 Sufi refers to Sufism or in Arab taṣawwuf, which is ‘the generally accepted name for Islamic 
mysticism’ (Schimmel, 2011, 3). In Senegal the Sufi orders (turuq) the Tijāniyyah, the Qādirīya, 
the Murīdiyyah and the Layennes are commonly associated with Islam. In total 92 per cent 
of Muslims are said to be affiliated with Sufi brotherhoods (Pew Research Center, 2013). For a 
presentation of these brotherhoods see Mané, 2012, 7–22.
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6 Pikine and the Boy Town Identity Among Young Men
Tshikala Kayembe Biaya (2001) talks of a ‘geography of pleasure’, referring to 
tourist sites on the Senegalese coast and certain Dakarois nightclubs. He as-
serts an emasculation of young men, especially concerning their virility. On 
the other hand, young women, well aware of their own value in this economy, 
in which shallow appearances and sexualities prevail, know how to exploit this 
situation for their own benefit, resulting in economic and sexual frustrations 
among young men. In this economy of appearance, social status is in a Bour-
dieuian sense an economic variable. Thus, to conceal the humble realities of 
destitution, profits of any kind are immediately invested in what the Senega-
lese label the paraitre ([sag] appearance), which actually hampers opportuni-
ties for sustainable accumulation.
The Boy Town like the ease. They don’t like to work. They consider them-
selves as children from, they behave like Parisians, like rich people.
Laye, Wakhinane II Quartier Mballo Der
This excerpt from an interview shows the negative perception that my Pikinois 
informants had of this term. The Boy Town is seen as lazy, as a cosmopolitan 
who knows European etiquette and as a rich person who has had everything 
handed to him on a silver platter. However, many young men I talked to val-
ued particular characteristics of Boy Town culture, such as having access to 
luxurious nightclubs, casinos and expensive restaurants in the most sophis-
ticated parts of town. By identifying with these places, the individual trans-
forms himself from an inhabitant of a dilapidated suburb to an inhabitant of 
a ‘hedonopolis’ or a ‘city of joy’ (Ndjio, 2007, 104). This underscores the youth’s 
notion of modernity, as these lifestyles are considered to be progressive (Bahi, 
2010). Many of Pikine’s youth go to these places, yielding to the temptations of 
a world of conspicuous consumption and practicing beugge addina (living life 
to the fullest). This life involves going out, enjoying nightlife in discotheques 
and bars, eating in restaurants, consuming fast food, and so on.
The Boy Town therefore also counts as a prime example of the individual-
ism à la sénégalaise. In lieu of family and neighbourhood solidarity there is a 
new, though partially hidden, attitude of bopp-sa-bopp (everyone for himself), 
a tendency of ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson, 1962) proffered by the 
neo-liberal regime, infused with values that come from the outside and turn 
antiquated values upside down. These individualistic tendencies point in the 
direction of self-realisation and stand in conflict with community- and family-
oriented values. The result is expressed in the phrase ‘kenn talatul sa mbokk’ 
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(nobody has time for neighbours). This can be seen as an adaptation borne 
from circumstances where urban lifeworlds harshly limit the realisation of 
solidarity and masculine ideals in the conventional sense. Such circumscrip-
tion stimulates the formation of a ‘singularized, autonomous manhood’ (de 
and Plissart, 2006, 244), which stands in opposition to the identity of the so-
cially responsible male who contributes to a wider social network, such as a 
kinship network.
However, when asked to characterise Pikine, young men generally refer to 
solidarity rather than to the individualism often displayed in residential areas 
and middle-class neighbourhoods. Solidarity thus seems to be highly regarded, 
although it is mostly displayed when ulterior motives are at play, such as for 
purposes of personal gain. Nevertheless, it is a prized trait, and visible violation 
of solidarity norms is viewed unfavourably. Far too often the notion is reduced 
to antiquated customs around lekk (eating) that hold that a guest always eats, 
regardless of which household they enter. Despite this, solidarity is frequently 
regarded as the basis of everything and as a value exclusive to Pikine:
You know, the difference made between us, we the suburbanites and 
they, that’s the difference. We, we have solidarity. And I assure you, from 
now to any time, if you enter a household and you want to eat, you eat. 
We don’t ask for money. […] That is what we know. And this is what dif-
ferentiates us from them. It is the solidarity. It is the basis of all. […] It is 
what we live here, and you will find nowhere. […] Only here in Pikine, 
there is solidarity. I assure you, there is solidarity here.
Djibril, Wakhinane II Quartier Mballo Der
7 Conclusion: Pikine Read by its Young Men
Situated at the margins of Dakar and therefore in many aspects fairly isolated 
from the economic activity of the capital city, the inhabitants of Pikine have 
managed to create different forms of self-organisations, which also foster 
various forms of urban self-identification and feelings of belonging. The most 
important notion among young men is Pikinité, which provides a feeling of 
solidarity, courage and local pride. As such, in recent years Pikine has seen a 
prolific emergence of small-scale initiatives and associations, and Pikine is to-
day the origin of many musicians and sports stars. Pikinité offers Pikinois youth 
the opportunity to put their stamp on urban socialities and correct the unilat-
eral and stigmatic image of Pikine. With recourse to antiquated values such as 
solidarity, the Pikinois bring their locality back into a discourse of village-like 
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convictions, but at the same time they are deeply embedded in negotiations 
of participation and are actors of globalisation. While the first president of 
Senegal, Leopold Senghor, dreamed that Dakar would—in the year 2000—be 
like Paris, the question is no longer whether Dakar is like a European city, such 
as Paris or Berlin, or a North American city, like New York, but how the urban 
actors themselves experience urban realities and make them fit their needs, 
and how they negotiate global flows and might say ‘We are from Pikine, but 
just as well we can be inhabitants of Paris or New York!’ Through their choice 
of clothing, young men escape from grim economic realities; more specifically, 
they transform their outward appearance to convey symbolic representations 
of what they consider the successful self and to evoke feelings of global belong-
ing (Scheld, 2007, 2008). However, this all is overshadowed by a challenging 
complex of problems embedded in very weak infrastructure, which includes 
annual floods and a lack of work opportunities for the young population.
During the administration of former president Abdoulaye Wade, Pikine was 
marginalised. Wade, with his urban-centric politics, fostered the development 
of certain urban neighbourhoods and initiated many flagship construction 
projects, especially ones that served his vision of Dakar as a ‘showcase capital’ 
and a global capital city (Melly, 2013, 2017). At the same time, he neglected 
many problem-afflicted parts of Dakar and failed to tackle the problems of 
Senegal’s youth. In particular, many young men in Pikine felt excluded. An in-
creasing gap between the rich and poor resulted from Wade’s neo-liberal eco-
nomic policy. This has made young males unite to speak out against rampant 
corruption and rising unemployment and has led to a growing mistrust of the 
government. It has created an awareness among young males that they are the 
architects of their own futures and that they cannot depend on the state for 
this. But this situation also impedes young men from advancing in their lives 
and becoming social adults who want to start a family and shoulder respon-
sibility for themselves and their kin. However, even if these social conditions 
speak a very different language, the prevalent urban disorder should not per se 
be seen as negative; it is the precondition for the young men’s spaces in which 
to manoeuvre.
To survive in this city, young male Pikinois show resourcefulness, embed-
ded in an adapted competence for inventing coping strategies that might take 
surprising or even incomprehensible turns. They have equipped themselves 
with distinct identities and have cultivated the ability to inhabit the identity 
that a given occasion requires. Young men switch their identities depending 
on the situation—for example, a young man may be a pious Muslim in tra-
ditional raiment on a religious feast, or a Baay Faal wearing ragged motley 
garments known as Baye Lahat, or a Boy Town dressed up in fancy clothes in 
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line with American trends on a Saturday evening. Thus, in line with Ferguson’s 
‘performative competence’ (1999, 104), young men in Pikine use their attire, 
consumption practices and also their speech and discursive practices to posi-
tion themselves in different fields. This helps them to participate in processes 
of modernity and globalisation, to be in the world, not as passive spectators 
but as cosmopolitans with the ability to improvise and ultimately take part in 
building the nation.
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The City and Its Ways of Life: Local Influences on 
Middle-Income Milieus in Nairobi
Florian Stoll
Abstract
How is it possible to study the ‘cityness’ of cities, their particular character and the 
locally specific actions of their residents? One crucial aspect that distinguishes cities 
from one another is how social phenomena are embedded in a particular city’s built 
environment, its economy, and particular horizons of meanings.
To analyse a significant example of this embeddedness, this chapter examines 
 Kenya’s Nairobi through the lens of social milieus in the middle-income stratum, the 
so-called ‘middle classes’.1 Moreover, the milieu concept enables the identification of 
social groups that share sociocultural features such as specific ways of life,  professional 
and leisure activities, and forms of consumption and investment. The text studies 
which local aspects are significant for milieus in Nairobi in comparison to Mombasa 
and other Kenyan cities. And using two case studies, the Christian Religious Milieu and 
the milieu of the Young Professionals, it illustrates how the particular city modifies 
these milieus.
Such an approach not only allows for a better understanding of the ‘middle classes’ 
in African cities as comprised of different identifiable milieus, it also yields a method 
for analysing the local particularities of a city, whether in Africa or other parts of the 
world. The chapter is significant for policy and practice because it introduces with 
the concept of social milieus a nuanced alternative to (middle) class approaches that 
distinguishes lifestyles, aims in life and forms of consumption. Also, the chapter dis-
cusses, using the example of Nairobi, how milieus are bound to specific structures of a 
city and might offer—from the perspective of basic research—suggestions for practi-
cal use.
1 Parts of this text refer to the working paper How to be Middle Class in Nairobi (Stoll, 2018). The 
sections that overlap are indicated by references at the beginning of the section.
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How to spot a Nairobian:
You should see Nairobians leaving the City. Once past Ruiru or the 
Great Wall,2 it is all systems go. Ask any “ocha”3 dude or dudette about 
Nairobi dressing and they will probably tell you girls wear hot pants and 
the boys are forever in vests and shorts and that clothing is never com-
plete without an alcoholic drink in hand.
We are never like that here. The girls are always struggling to walk in 
heels and the dudes with their protruding bellies are always testing the 
limits of buttons. […]
We are not loud, no, not when we are looking for money to go splurge 
in some other “ocha” county and show others how well we are living. 
When someone lands in Nairobi for the first time, expecting the good life, 
they are met by a people who are always in a hurry and very unfriendly.
Someone will collapse on the streets and people will give him bad 
looks, like how dare he fall in front of us, can’t he go somewhere deserted 
and fall there?
‘How to spot a Nairobian’, Philip Mwaniki in Daily Nation, 3.10.2014
1 Introduction
Some of the most iconic images of cities come from classical songs. Frank 
Sinatra sings about New York as the city that never sleeps; Dean Martin makes 
‘Volare’ (to fly) a unique experience of Rome; Andre Filho honoured Rio de 
Janeiro as the ‘Cidade Maravilhosa’ (wonderful city) and contributed thus to its 
myth as a place for all kind of pleasures. These and many other songs construct 
vivid images of what it means to participate in the life of a particular city. Like-
wise, it is a matter of common knowledge that Lagos is very different from 
Cape Town and that the inhabitants of both cities vary in their everyday life 
routines. Looking at residents of Nairobi, there are also local particularities—
but why is this the case? And how is it possible to go beyond stating merely dif-
ferences and to study, instead, the ‘cityness’ of cities, including their character-
istic features and the specific actions of their residents? This text contributes 
to a conceptual discussion about the urban in Africa and is, therefore, more 
than a case study.
2 Ruiru and ‘the Great Wall’ are both districts on the outskirts of Nairobi.
3 ‘Ocha’ is a common expression in the Nairobi slang, Sheng, and refers to a rural area or some-
one’s rural home.
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The starting point for this chapter are two developments that have taken 
place in many parts of Africa over recent decades and that overlap to a high 
degree. The first development is the increasing significance of cities and a ten-
dency towards urbanisation. The second aspect is the rise of millions of fami-
lies out of poverty as a result of economic growth. In the shadow of debates on 
‘Africa Rising’ and ‘Lions on the Move’ (McKinsey, 2010), the middle-income 
group was coined in a rather popularising manner as ‘the African middle-class’ 
(AfDB, 2011; Ncube and Lufumpa, 2015).4 Such research focused on quantita-
tive income and consumption rates but resulted in a poorly defined concept 
of economic class. In spite of the substantial critique of the use of the middle-
class concept in Africa (Lentz, 2015; Melber, 2016; Darbon and Toulabour, 2013), 
there are few alternatives for studying middle-income strata.5 The majority of 
contributions are either ethnographic case studies of micro-groups (Spronk, 
2012; Budniok and Noll, 2016) or large-scale quantitative studies on ‘middle 
classes’ that primarily look at the national level (AfDB, 2011).
Therefore, the starting point of this chapter is the large-scale critique of 
the debate on ‘middle classes’ in Africa that the author developed in several, 
partly co-authored publications (Neubert and Stoll, 2015; Daniel et al., 2016; 
Stoll, 2018; Neubert and Stoll, 2018). Transferring the term ‘middle class’ from 
the Euro–American context to Africa suggests that individuals in these income 
groups have sociocultural attributes such as typical values but also a financially 
stable position. While these attributes are considered essential characteristics 
of the ‘middle class’ in Europe and North America, they are often missing in 
the African middle-income strata. In contrast to the widespread characteri-
sation of individuals with a daily consumption rate over the poverty level as 
‘the African middle-class’ (AfDB, 2011), this text uses the terms ‘middle-income 
strata’ and ‘middle strata’, which are more precise characterisations than the 
well-established but weakly defined ‘middle classes’ in the social sciences.
4 The definition of the African Development Bank (AfDB) considers individuals with an aver-
age income of between two and twenty US dollars per day as ‘middle class’, with the stratum 
between two and four US dollars as an insecure floating class. Like other quantitative defini-
tions of ‘middle class’ (see Neubert and Stoll, 2018), this economic range gives an orientation 
of who is neither poor nor rich. However, this text aims to elaborate qualitative aspects of 
diversity and the local embeddedness of middle-income strata and will therefore not discuss 
margins of economic definitions.
5 An exception is the concept of ‘moderate prosperity groups’ proposed by Andrianampiarivo 
(2016), who develops a multidimensional approach referenced by Darbon and Toulabour 
(2013) for middle-income strata. An interesting case study with the potential for a conceptu-
alisation of middle-income groups is Claire Mercer’s (2014) study on different types of living 
rooms in Tanzania.
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As an alternative to class, we have also introduced the milieu approach 
developed by German sociologists since the 1980s (Keim, 1979; Hradil, 1987; 
Grathoff, 1989; Schulze, 1993; Vester et al., 2001). The study of milieu allows 
us to distinguish meso-groups according to their particular priorities in life, 
such as ties to the rural and ethnic community, individual advancement, or 
religion (Neubert and Stoll, 2015; Stoll, 2016). The argument is that there is not 
one homogenous African or even Kenyan ‘middle class’ but that it is necessary, 
instead, to consider socio-culturally differentiated middle-income strata that 
are to a high degree locally embedded. As the chapter demonstrates using the 
example of Nairobi and other Kenyan cities, there are local differences in the 
composition of the milieus that can be linked systematically to a city.
The author will not only use milieu studies to provide a more nuanced pic-
ture of social groups and lifestyles in urban Kenya but will also investigate how 
these milieus are locally embedded in a particular setting and demonstrate 
how milieu studies also offer the possibility to consider particularities of a spe-
cific city. Comparisons are very helpful to identify general and unique local 
aspects of milieus and cities. We have considered in our research Nairobi and 
Mombasa, and to a lesser degree other Kenyan cities. This text focuses, howev-
er, on Nairobi and takes references to other cities only as points of comparison.
Recently, Jennifer Robinson (2006) made a major statement with regard to 
the study of urban African contexts when she claimed that it is necessary to 
treat them as ordinary cities and not just as the underdeveloped other of Euro–
American urban settings. Robinson criticises the hegemonic developmental 
view in Urban Studies because it suggests the existence of a shared quality of 
African urbanity, without or even against empirical proof. She emphasises that 
it is crucial to investigate the local conditions of African contexts, instead of 
making assumptions based on an untenable theory. As such, Robinson set a 
new standard in the study of the urban in Africa by stressing that it is neces-
sary to research cities on the continent in a similar way as anywhere else in the 
world. Robinson’s approach thus encourages a localised approach, for it would 
be problematic to assume that the same or very similar ‘classes’ or milieus ex-
ist in African cities as many stratification theories tacitly assume for European 
states (e.g. Vester et al., 2001, for Germany).
Similar to language, which is always highly localised through dialects, slang 
and typical phrases, other aspects of social life are also bound to the economic, 
symbolic, political and historical environment of a city. The literature on Nai-
robi and other Kenyan cities shows how elements of the environment deter-
mine the lifestyles of members of specific milieus or the city in general. For in-
stance, one volume (Charton-Bigot and Rodriguez-Torres, 2010) gives insights 
into different aspects of life in Nairobi, such as public politics, group identities, 
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and spatial structures. Other research focuses on Young Professionals and their 
sex lives (Spronk, 2012), elite clubs (Connan, 2015) or the local dialect Sheng 
(Beck, 2015). Similarly, research on Mombasa has sought to establish the ele-
ments that influence city life using the methodology of the distinctiveness of 
cities (Berking, 2012).
A further strand of research emerged in the last decade (for an overview see 
Parnell and Pieterse, 2016; Ricci, 2016, 11–16; Werthmann, 2014) and conceptu-
alises cities in Africa beyond isolated case studies. Authors from this field of 
study oppose the dominant negative characterisations of urban African con-
texts, which focus on supposed ‘deficits’ or the lack of order. Such attributes fo-
cus mostly on the weak organisation or bad performance of cities (Ricci, 2016, 
13 f.). The author of this chapter also aims at developing an understanding of 
the urban in Africa that describes and analyses cities on the continent through 
empirical research and not as ‘negative’ or deficient in comparison to models 
of Northern cities.
Therefore, this chapter provides a case study with the milieu approach, 
which clarifies how local particularities modify group structures and interact 
with the space of the city. The highly diverse local precolonial, colonial, and 
postcolonial influences make it necessary to think of urban Africa in the plural, 
in a similar way as we differentiate contexts in Europe, the Americas and Asia. 
Accordingly, the composition of middle-income strata differs significantly due 
to local influences. Firstly, this chapter discusses why it is thus useful to exam-
ine milieus in the middle-income stratum and not ‘middle classes’. Secondly, it 
provides an overview of the methodology of the research and the data. Thirdly, 
the chapter discusses Nairobi’s ‘middle strata’ in the context of the city. For a 
better understanding, the text zooms in on the milieus of the Christian Reli-
gious and Young Professionals as case studies.
2 Why Milieus and not ‘Middle Classes’
Other publications by the author have criticised the use of the concept of mid-
dle class in Kenya and other African countries because this approach does not 
consider the diversity of sociocultural groups in the middle-income stratum 
(Neubert and Stoll, 2015; Stoll, 2016; Stoll, 2017; Neubert and Stoll, 2018). This 
chapter adds a related critique that studies how the differentiation of social 
groups is bound to a certain place and its particularities. Following this argu-
ment, this section introduces milieu study as an alternative to class and the 
next sections demonstrate how a conceptualisation of cities can improve re-
search on milieus, describing two milieus in Nairobi.
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In contrast to class, milieu study builds on shared cultural orientations, 
structures of meaning and characteristics (for this chapter cf. Stoll, 2018, and 
Neubert and Stoll, 2018). Class concepts aggregate vertical groups that are 
supposed to have similar structural characteristics such as income, occupa-
tions and lifestyles. In contrast, the idea of milieu is to identify horizontally 
differentiated groups with similar values, actions and aims in life. Milieu does 
not presuppose similar income and occupations but focuses on sociocultural 
elements. Class, and more particularly ‘middle class’, evokes ideas of a stable 
future and the possibility of saving and consumption. It is not clear, however, 
if it is possible to describe African societies in general and urban Kenya in par-
ticular with a vertical concept like class. According to Dieter Neubert, class is 
not an adequate analytical tool to study social groups in Africa as influences 
such as ethnicity, economic relations to the extended family, and urban–rural 
ties transcend a vertical analysis (cf. Neubert, 2005, 182–189). Studies of ver-
tical class structures with clearly separated poor-, middle-, and high-income 
households of nuclear families do not describe social relations in African soci-
eties convincingly. In many African countries, complex forms of urban–rural 
connections and ethnic differentiation exist, which do not necessarily overlap 
with socioeconomic boundaries. The class concept implies more than being 
part of a certain income stratum. Since Karl Marx, class has been described as 
a group in the same socioeconomic position that shares certain interests but 
also cultural characteristics such as values, typical habits, and political views. 
In particular, in English-speaking academia, the term ‘class’ is not only used for 
group definitions but also for economic strata without acknowledging the cul-
tural implications of the class notion sufficiently. Moreover, the class concept 
is not a flexible approach to studying groups but is bound to a vertical analysis. 
It is appropriate to studying forms of stratification that focus on high, middle 
and low strata but has difficulties to include horizontal forms of differentia-
tion. The conceptual limitations of class affect research that is committed to 
examining also different lifestyles and sociocultural factors. Famous studies 
such as Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984) or Leela Fernandes’ (2006) work on mid-
dle classes in India analyse also sociocultural aspects and lifestyles. However, 
they do not introduce an alternative conceptualisation that goes beyond verti-
cal group analysis.
Due to conceptual flaws of class, German sociologists have, since the 1980s, 
begun to discuss alternatives. It had become more and more evident that an 
analysis of vertical classes is not sufficient to understand social structure and 
lifestyles in late capitalism. In European societies of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, socioeconomic positions, professions, and lifestyles  mostly 
overlapped. However, since the 1960s, the impacts of  deindustrialisation, the 
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rise of post-materialism and other developments such as the dissolution of 
previous forms of class solidarity have led to new lifestyles in Germany and 
other Western democracies. Therefore, German sociology developed new con-
cepts to examine sociocultural groups that share values, aims in life and leisure 
activities. These aspects do not necessarily correlate with income levels or pro-
fessions, as the class concept assumes. While these approaches are very com-
mon in German social sciences, they are unknown in international contexts 
and it is necessary to introduce them here. The milieu concept and the more 
flexible notion of Lebensstile (lifestyles) are the most common tools for socio-
cultural analysis (for an overview on milieus see Isenböck et al., 2014; Rebstein 
and Schnettler 2014; Neubert and Stoll, 2015, 11 ff.; for lifestyles see Otte and 
Rössel, 2012).
While Pierre Bourdieu’s study of culture in Distinction (1984) has been im-
portant for this debate, milieu theorists refer to Bourdieu and other vertical ap-
proaches in very different ways. Michael Vester et al. (2001) see for Germany a 
strong connection between class and the realities of life. They assume that mi-
lieus correspond strongly with vertical differences in the same income stratum 
including structure, values or leisure activities. Other versions of milieu have a 
stronger empirical orientation and study sociocultural elements like attitudes 
or forms of leisure activities with a stronger horizontal than vertical concep-
tualisation (cf. Hradil, 1987; Schulze, 1993). Likewise, the development of the 
milieu concept is closely linked to social and market research, for instance by 
the sigma-Institute (cf. Ascheberg, 2006) and the sinus-Institute (cf. Flaig 
et al., 1993; Sinus, 2015). All versions of milieu analysis mentioned here aim 
to study lifestyle groups of a significant size in a certain setting. While milieu 
perspectives include ethnographic descriptions, they generally focus on the 
meso-level of reconstructed groups who share crucial sets of characteristics. 
Consequently, the analysis is situated between city, society or nation-state as 
possible macro-level and the individual at the micro-level.
This text puts more general conceptions of milieu into dialogue with local 
particularities. Due to the focus on milieus and specific elements of Nairobi, 
the chapter does not discuss the conceptualisation of cities and other elements 
of urban theory in detail. It is, however, possible to develop a more elaborated 
framework for the study of social milieus. Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift stress, in 
Seeing Like a City (2016), that cities consist of multiple networks, from every-
day routines to politics and the economy, and thus assume a particular shape. 
Daniel A. Bell and Avner de-Shalit (2011) discuss the particularities of different 
cities under conditions of accelerated global connections in The Spirit of Cit-
ies. Why the Identity of a City Matters in a Global Age. A recent systematic ap-
proach is also offered, for instance, with the distinctiveness of cities/Eigenlogik 
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der Städte (Berking, 2012; Löw, 2012),6 which studies how an understanding of 
the everyday knowledge and locally specific structures of meaning by residents 
can explain differences between urban settings. This research programme fo-
cuses on the question of how a city influences the ways of thinking, acting, and 
grouping that are crucial to the life of its inhabitants. Other works that study 
‘the cityness’ of cities include Ulf Hannerz’s Exploring the City (1980) or Janet 
Abu-Lughod’s New York, Chicago, Los Angeles (1999). As the disputably most 
important theory of space and urbanity, it is also possible to consider cities as 
multidimensional constructs in the line of Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of 
Space (1991 [1974]). In particular, Christian Schmid’s (2005) interpretation of 
Lefebvre contextualises and clarifies the framework in such a way that it be-
comes possible to study cities as socio-spatial conglomerates. Another, already 
classic work is Doreen Massey’s (2005) For Space, which develops a dynamic 
approach to space and place because she considers the concepts in a relational 
understanding as the outcome of contextual influences ranging from global 
impacts to economic policies and particular local forms of meaning making.
This study applies a descriptive version of the milieu concept that does 
not presuppose a vertical stratification (Hradil, 1987; Sinus, 2015). ‘Descriptive’ 
means the reconstruction of milieus results from empirical research, instead 
of deducing it from theory. The advantage of such an empirical focus is that 
it can integrate African, Kenyan, and specific local characteristics such as the 
importance of the extended family or religion for certain milieus.
3 Methodology and Data
The data was gathered mostly during nine months of fieldwork by the author 
in Nairobi and Mombasa. During five field stays between 2013 and 2016, the 
author conducted observations in significant places such as churches, restau-
rants and private homes, and carried out 97 biographical interviews in both 
cities. This data collection aimed at identifying groups with distinctive socio-
cultural orientations in life: social milieus. The research followed a contrastive 
approach that aims at differentiating milieus with distinctive traits. For this 
purpose, the study began examining publicly visible groups and contrasted 
them with a revised multilayered matrix developed by the sinus-Institut 
6 There are two English translations for the German Eigenlogik der Städte. While ‘distinctive 
logic of cities’ (Löw, 2012) emphasises the emergence of phenomena from a particular set-
ting, the other translation, ‘distinctiveness’ (Berking, 2012), stresses rather the particular 
character of a city.
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that covers the most significant areas of life (Flaig et al., 1993, 71; Neubert and 
Stoll, 2015, 8 ff.): demography/social position, space and places, aims in life, 
work/performance, ideals and role models, image of society, family/partner-
ship, leisure/communication and everyday aesthetics. In the next steps, the 
research examined more difficult to access groups that spend, for example, 
most of their time in family circles or closed ethnic networks. Also, data from 
media reports or other studies (Spronk, 2012) contributed to constructing the 
milieus.
The methodology of this study considers milieus in the middle-stratum as 
particular to Nairobi and Mombasa. It also contrasts the differentiation of mi-
lieus to distinguish between identical and unique elements. The differences in 
size, density, heterogeneity of the population and city type are no obstacle for 
the comparison as they can be part of specific features of a city. With milieu 
studies, it is possible to interpret the particular ideas and actions of a milieu in 
relation to a city. In the case of the Young Professionals, these actions include 
visits to certain clubs wearing typical outfits. Thus, the milieu of the Young 
Professionals depends on an urbanised youth culture and club scene, which 
exists in Nairobi but not in Mombasa. It is important that the milieus have 
their starting point in the middle-income stratum but are not limited to it as 
sociocultural commonalities are the defining criterion.
The reconstruction of milieus and their particular local embeddedness 
methodologically builds on two combined analytical foci. Whereas both foci 
are in the research intertwined, an analytical separation clarifies the process of 
milieu generation. The first focus concentrates on the construction of milieus 
and uses field data to identify characteristics and elaborate milieus in Nai-
robi and Mombasa. The second focus combines these results with a study of 
Nairobi as a multidimensional space that influences the size and also certain 
characteristics of milieus. Such aspects range from the significance of clothes 
as markers of membership in a milieu to a particular career orientation that 
distinguishes Nairobi from Mombasa. Many other aspects such as job oppor-
tunities, the relation of religious communities or the proximity to the home 
areas of certain ethnic groups influence city structures and the composition 
of milieus as well. The description of milieus presents the results in Sections 3 
to 5 in a more readable way and not according to the foci of analysis.
Focus I opposes the widespread, mostly implicit assumption that there is a 
culturally uniform African or Kenyan ‘middle class’, an assumption that eco-
nomic definitions seem to make when they ignore sociocultural influences 
(AfDB, 2011; for the critique see Neubert and Stoll, 2018). The study examines 
in the first focus to which degree groups of significant size differ in their ori-
entations in life, values, and consumption habits. For highlighting differences, 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Stoll�84
204221
the research referred to the matrix mentioned earlier (Neubert and Stoll, 2015, 
8  ff.). The data collection aimed at identifying milieus by sets of distinctive 
characteristics such as values, orientations and activities in comparison with 
other milieus. The process of milieu construction does not concentrate on 
 local particularities, but it can also consider features and mechanisms that are 
unique to Nairobi or Mombasa, locally adapted to a city, or identical in both 
cities.
Focus II links the empirical data on milieus from Focus I systematically to 
particularities of Nairobi and Mombasa. This part examines how milieus relate 
to existing structures of a city and adds more information from historical and 
other sources that explain continuities and new developments. The study ex-
amines characteristics such as typical beliefs and practices but also the demar-
cation lines between milieus. Also, this part considers historical influences and 
events in a diachronic perspective that is still significant today. In the best case, 
it would be possible to identify routinised patterns as the outcome of historical 
paths. For instance, the emergence of a new urbanised part of Nairobi’s middle 
stratum during the last two decades resulted from the growth of the city, the 
emergence of a new generation of urban-born Kenyans, and new opportuni-
ties for migrants from other cities.
4 Middle-Income Milieus in Nairobi
Nairobi is Kenya’s economic centre, the seat of the national government and 
the preferred destination for work migration (for this chapter cf. Stoll, 2018). 
The city is a place for all kinds of industrial labour, trade and businesses of 
different sizes. It hosts several universities and government institutions that 
attract many ambitious young people. Nairobi is also home to thousands of 
international companies and non-governmental organisations that offer well-
paid jobs in internationally connected fields. With more than three million 
inhabitants, the city is by far Kenya’s biggest urban agglomeration. Nairobi is 
a classic example of the rapid growth of an African city that lacked sufficient 
industrialisation to include the rising number of rural migrants. The Metro-
politan region constantly grew from its beginnings as a small settlement in 
1900, counting 510,000 inhabitants in the year 1970 and 1.35 million in 1980. 
Even though official statistics vary, the city may at present have a population 
of more than three million, and between 4.5 million (UN-Habitat, 2016) and 
six million (Amis, 2006, 173; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009) may live 
in the Metropolitan area. While statistics are unreliable, international organ-
isations estimate that up to 60 percent of the city’s population live in slums 
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(UN-Habitat, 2013) and that about half of its residents are poor (Oxfam, 2009; 
UN-Habitat, 2013). This also means that a considerable share of its popula-
tion lives above the poverty line, with around one-third in the middle-income 
stratum.
For decades, migrants from all parts of Kenya lived in Nairobi as ‘Peasants 
in Cities’ (Mangin, 1970). People earned money in urban occupations and re-
invested in their rural home areas. Today, this is no longer the dominant mode 
of living but one of many possibilities. In the last two decades, a generation of 
‘middle class’ Nairobians emerged with different basic orientations in life. For 
instance, some members of this middle stratum have a highly urban and oth-
ers a stronger rural focus. The only feature that they share is a similar income 
above the poverty line. These economic opportunities leave space for different 
forms of consumption, according to specific priorities in life.
While not everyone in the statistical middle-income stratum has sufficient 
means to purchase costly goods, consumption and investment preferences 
show central orientations of milieus. Some members of the ‘middle class’ pre-
fer to buy land in the countryside, whereas others invest in business activi-
ties and again others prefer to buy stylish clothes and smartphones. Members 
of the middle-income stratum differ in their lifestyles, which include values, 
future orientations, and many other aspects. It is crucial, nevertheless, to 
consider all milieus as part of contemporary, modern Nairobi. In particular, a 
common distinction between modern and traditional is misleading because 
all  milieus are in many ways modern as their members use digital communica-
tion, participate in global discussions and are highly mobile.
Through empirical fieldwork, Dieter Neubert and the author have identified 
six milieus in Nairobi (cf. Neubert and Stoll, 2015, 8; see also graphic 1):
– Neo-traditionals7 have close ties with members of their extended family and 
their rural and ethnic community. This includes a strong emotional bond 
but also sharing of finances. Also, members of this milieu often take politi-
cal positions that favour their ethnic group.
– Social Climbers focus on saving to advance individually and to improve 
the situation of their nuclear family. Many of them work long hours and 
save a high percentage of their income for investing in a business or for 
studying.
7 It is crucial that there is no distinction between more or less modern or traditional milieus. 
We call this milieu ‘Neo-traditionalists’ as they refer in a particular way to traditions. This 
does not mean that these traditions have existed for a very long time. The crucial point is the 
subjective orientation towards such values and their significance for the conduct of life in 
this milieu.
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– Members of the Stability-Oriented Pragmatic milieu try to maintain their 
current position and have fewer aspirations than members of other milieus. 
This includes moderate consumption with their family with whom they 
spend most of their time out of work at home.
– Characteristics of the Cosmopolitan-Liberal milieu are a clear stance for civil 
values and against corruption and tribalism, combined with career ambi-
tions. Members of this milieu often work in non-government organisations 
and are active in human rights or environmental groups.
– Members of the Christian milieu (also Christian Religious) regularly partici-
pate in church-related activities and spend a large part of their leisure time 
away from their families with other parish members. Their orientation in 
life focuses on religion, the church, and economic success.
– Young Professionals are between 20 and 35 years old and come mostly from 
privileged families in upper or upper-middle strata. They combine hedonis-
tic consumption, an international orientation and career ambition in eco-
nomically well-paid fields.
In addition to the listed milieus, there are also Muslim and Hindu micro- 
milieus in Nairobi for which there are not sufficient data. These micro-milieus 
are, however, considerably smaller than the Christian Milieu. The Young Profes-
sionals and the Cosmopolitan Liberals are limited to Nairobi and do not exist as 
milieus of a significant size in other Kenyan cities.
The composition of milieus in Mombasa’s middle-income stratum differs 
significantly due to economic, cultural and other factors. Mombasa is Kenya’s 
access point to the Indian Ocean and also a hotspot for global tourism. It is a 
port city with a long history of overseas trade to the Middle East and to India, 
and a large Muslim community. There are divisive lines between Muslims and 
Christians that overlap often with ethnicity. Members of ethnic groups such as 
the Swahili and Michikenda have been in Mombasa for generations; they are 
Muslims and are also bound by lifestyles to Mombasa’s old town. In contrast, 
members of other ethnic groups such as Kikuyu or Luo are mostly Christian 
migrants to Mombasa of the first or second generation. These migrants usually 
come for work at touristic spots or the port.
There are partly different milieus in Mombasa’s middle-income stratum but 
also the size of certain milieus varies. In contrast to Nairobi, there is a Swahili 
milieu with a distinctive lifestyle that is limited to Mombasa. The Christian 
Milieu is considerably smaller and there is no milieu of Young Professionals be-
cause Mombasa has neither the professional opportunities nor the club scene 
and cultural life that attracts the ambitious members of this milieu.
Figure 1 visualises the milieus in Nairobi. The size of the bubbles does not 
represent the actual size of milieus as there is not sufficient data. There is also 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
�87The City and its Ways of Life
204221
not enough information to determine the socioeconomic positions of milieus 
precisely but it is possible to give an idea which milieu is limited to one vertical 
stratum and which milieu comprises several strata. The y-axis describes based 
on estimates basis roughly the socioeconomic position of the milieus. There is 
no linear x-axis as it is not possible to reduce the different qualitative orienta-
tions of milieus to one linear continuum (such as more or less socioeconomic 
resources on the y-axis). Not everyone is clearly a member of only one milieu 
but may draw on two or even more groups. The overlapping areas of milieu 
circles express these possibilities. However, the two-dimensional figure cannot 
cover all possible overlaps between milieus.
This text reconstructs the Christian Religious and the Young Nairobi Profes-
sionals as empirical examples. Both milieus show different city-specific influ-
ences. The Christian Milieu can be found in all Kenyan cities, but apart from 
general characteristics it shows particular influences of Nairobi. For instance, 
the importance placed on the display of material prosperity is typical for in-
habitants of Kenya’s capital. Demonstrations of wealth are less important 
among Christian Religious in other cities like Mombasa where a large part of 
the population consists of Muslims and where the author found less competi-
tion for members among Christian communities. This competition includes 
Christian Religious
Stability-Oriented Pragmatics
Neo-Traditionals
Social Climbers
Cosmopolitan Liberals
Young Professionals
Figure ��.� Milieus in Nairobi’s middle-income stratum.
Source: Author
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spiritual programmes but also the promise of material wealth as the next sec-
tion on the Christian Religious Milieu demonstrates.
5 Case Study i: Christian Religious Milieu in Nairobi
This section describes first general characteristics that the Christian Milieu 
(also Christian Religious) (cf. Stoll, 2018) in Nairobi, Mombasa and Eldoret 
share (Niechoj, 2016). The second part elaborates which features are unique to 
Nairobi and how they are related to the city’s distinctive character. Being reli-
gious is part of almost every Kenyan’s self-definition, and only a tiny minority 
do not consider themselves as part of a Christian, Muslim or other community. 
Religion and church activities have, therefore, a high significance in the social 
and symbolic order of Kenya. It is, however, crucial to remember that this sec-
tion does not study religious groups such as Pentecostals or Catholics but de-
scribes individuals with a similar lifestyle that differs from the lifestyles among 
other milieus. Moreover, the case study is limited to the Christian Milieu, as the 
author does not have enough data on Muslim or Hindu groups in Nairobi to 
make reliable categorisations.
In contrast to many Kenyans who would call themselves Christians, mem-
bers of this milieu are more dedicated to their church and follow religious rules 
in a more consequent way (cf. Neubert and Stoll, 2015, 11f.; Stoll, 2018). Christian 
Religious are active in their church community and engage in several meetings 
per week, such as Bible study, the counselling of troubled church members 
and service-based worship. Apart from with their families, members of this 
milieu spend a large share of their leisure time in religious networks and often 
have close friends in church. Frequently, work or business are intertwined with 
religion. Another distinctive trait is that members of this milieu follow norms 
of their community with greater consequence than less dedicated Christians. 
For example, members of the Christian Milieu distance themselves in inter-
views from premarital sex and say they avoid places that sell alcohol. Another 
characteristic is that they regularly pay the tithe, ten percent of their income, 
to their parish. The foundation for their actions is—in contrast to the Neo-
traditional milieu for example—the Bible and not the values of their ethnic 
community. In spite of the existence of connections to the extended family in 
the countryside, these ties are not the main orientation in the life of Christian 
Religious.
By their religious convictions, most members of this milieu have strong ca-
reer ambitions. Economic success is, unlike in the majority of European Chris-
tian denominations, not interpreted as materialism or a lack of spirituality. 
Rather, it is common in many Kenyan churches to display financial well-being 
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by wearing expensive clothes, driving prestigious-brand cars and donating to 
the community. All of these actions can raise a church member’s status. In 
spite of differences between Christian groups in Kenya, the milieu analysis fo-
cuses on the commonalities in the lifestyle of committed church members—
as they are distinct from members of other described milieus.
The previous part elaborated general elements of Christian Religious that 
are common in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Eldoret. The next sections give 
examples of unique influences in Nairobi. Information from interviews and 
observation shows that the ambition and the business focus of many Chris-
tian Religious are on the average more intense—or, in the language of many 
Nairobians, ‘more aggressive’, with a positive connotation—than those of their 
counterparts in other Kenyan cities. This will to obtain economic success is a 
local meaning structure that is also very strong in most other middle-income 
milieus in Nairobi. Individuals perceive Nairobi as a place that offers economic 
opportunities and a good environment for life but is also competitive and ex-
pensive. The city attracts individuals from all parts of Kenya and East Africa 
with its promise of social advancement by economic success and the oppor-
tunity to study at a university. Residents of Nairobi and Mombasa perceive Ke-
nya’s capital as much faster and higher paced than Mombasa, which people in 
both towns describe as a relaxed beach town.
Correspondingly, expectations of prosperity are essential parts of church 
programmes and are more important than in Mombasa. Many churches in 
Nairobi are strongly affected by the competitive atmosphere of the city as they 
are often much bigger than the churches in other cities and they try, with very 
particular programmes, to attract new members. Another aspect is the com-
paratively higher acceptance of changing one’s church affiliation as a life re-
form in Nairobi. A number of churches offer not only spiritual guidance but a 
life plan for social advancement, although this is especially true of Pentecostal 
churches (for Pentecostalism in Nairobi see Droz, 2010). This focus on success 
is particularly visible in some Pentecostal communities in Nairobi, commu-
nities whose idea systems combine an intense spiritual programme with an 
appreciation of personal development and economic improvement. These 
Pentecostals, and to a lesser degree many other communities, interpret profes-
sional success as an expression of God’s favour. In some big churches, pastors 
even ask their congregants to be dressed well, and in this way exclude poor 
people from attending.8 Some pastors receive so many donations from church 
members that they build mansions and buy private jets.
8 There is a debate about the head of the Jubilee Christian Church Parklands, reverend Kathy 
Kiuna, who has made comments about dressing and the economic status of church members.
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Obviously, individuals in Nairobi are expected not only to be successful but 
also to show this in a particular way. While members of church programmes 
for individual advancement do not always succeed in improving economically, 
they are, nevertheless, supposed to demonstrate status by good looks, high-
brand cars and huge donations. In certain churches, showing one’s good situa-
tion can even overcome the moral boundaries of sexual restrictions; at Sunday 
services, young women wear short skirts to display, by their good looks, their 
elevated social position. Such a proof of God’s favour would not be acceptable 
in many churches, especially in other cities. Here, the emphasis on prosperity 
has become stronger than the control of sexuality. With their entanglement 
of faith and success orientation, these churches are bound to  Nairobi: it is a 
 locally embedded norm in Nairobi to demonstrate status through appearance, 
exclusive clothing, and conspicuous consumption. The Sunday services of 
many church communities in Nairobi are known as catwalks with a spiritual 
background, for instance in Parklands, Westlands or Kilimani. Such visual dis-
plays of well-being also have the aim of illustrating the dominance of Chris-
tians in Kenya’s capital. Another important aspect is that many churches in 
Nairobi demand considerable donations. The contrast to Mombasa with its 
higher share of Muslims is a good point of comparison. For instance, in Mom-
basa clothes do not mark social differences to the same degree as they do in 
Nairobi. Also, interviews with members of church communities in Mombasa 
reveal that many of them do not feel as secure as their counterparts in Nairobi. 
In 2014, attacks by Al-Shabaab on churches in Mombasa produced consider-
able uneasiness among Christians. Additionally, witchcraft was a more fre-
quently mentioned topic in interviews in Mombasa than in Nairobi.
One result returned by the research is that in Nairobi different areas of life 
frequently mix although they are rather separate in other cities. For instance, 
members of the Christian Religious Milieu in Nairobi frequently work in areas 
where they come into contact with behaviours that show little respect for cen-
tral Christian norms. The consequences for life are illustrated by the example 
of Jennifer, a religious, 24-year-old student who sings not only in church but 
also as a professional backing singer for bands. Many situations in the music 
business are related to sex:
‘Yeah, it’s the popular music in Kenya is about that. Basically like […], it’s 
about party life and women, and all those things. […] Yeah, ’cause you know be-
ing like a background vocalist, for some people they want to dictate what you’ll 
wear, they want to dictate how you should dance on stage, they can even push 
you to dance with someone. I have seen it happening in concerts. […] And 
that for me is something I really didn’t look forward to being or doing, cause 
I really—first impressions are everything. Yeah. So, I may, today you’re maybe 
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somebody’s background vocalist, but tomorrow you may want a job in a good 
organisation. And maybe somebody saw you dancing in a, in an otherwise, not 
so proper manner with someone. And this happens to be a director of a com-
pany and he’d have problems hiring you. ’Cause he feels like you would change 
the company’s imagination’. (Interview with Jennifer, 13.09.2013)
To earn money, Jennifer is often at places where she must interact with peo-
ple who consume much alcohol and where casual sex is normal. She does not 
drink and emphasises in the quote above, that she does not want to dress pro-
vocatively or dance with men because concert organisers ask for it. However, 
Jennifer not only draws a moral boundary, she is also worried about spoiling 
her future employment prospects if someone sees her. Many members of the 
Christian Milieu in Nairobi face similar problems because they work in envi-
ronments where drinking, partying and one-night stands are usual. In a similar 
way to the music scene, many companies in Nairobi have an after-work cul-
ture of going out together and celebrating until late into the night. Religious 
Christians such as Jennifer must develop particular strategies to deal with such 
situations. In comparison, despite large amounts of club life and prostitution 
in Mombasa, there seem to be fewer overlaps in the everyday situations of 
inhabitants in the coastal town, by and large. In Mombasa, clubs and places 
for prostitution are concentrated in parts of town such as Mtwapa and Nyali, 
which are far away from the homes and jobs of most inhabitants, including the 
Christian Milieu. Professional areas and clubs are socially and spatially more 
separated than in Nairobi, possibly also as a result of the connection to domes-
tic and international tourism present in Mombasa.
6 Case Study ii: Young Nairobi Professionals
Nairobi is the only city in Kenya where Young Professionals exist as a milieu 
of considerable size (cf. Stoll, 2018). The emergence of this milieu is no coin-
cidence but is closely related to the city’s special character as a national and 
regional economic and cultural hub for Kenya and even neighbouring coun-
tries. The milieu of the Young Professionals has taken shape in the last two de-
cades and is an expression of new urbanisation processes that are significant 
for present day Nairobi. To many young adults, Nairobi promises individual 
success and a hedonistic urban life without subordination to the extended 
family or to ethnic or religious community. Young Professionals are between 
20 and 35 years old and grew up mostly in middle-income or even rich families 
from Nairobi or other cities. Nevertheless, there are also members of this mi-
lieu from rural areas who migrated to Nairobi. As ‘Young Nairobi  Professionals’ 
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(Spronk, 2009, 501—emphasis added), this group of well-educated young em-
ployees, entrepreneurs or students (cf. Spronk, 2012) differ—mostly in their 
financial possibilities and their everyday lives—strongly from the poor major-
ity of the city.
The Young Professionals are often self-employed in areas with good finan-
cial returns such as finance, information technology or resource trading. They 
work in globally operating firms and institutions such as non-governmental 
organisations, the United Nations or multinational companies. Many of them 
travel regularly to Europe or North America. Young Professionals are famous for 
forms of conspicuous consumption, with colourful clothes, the newest elec-
tronic gadgets such as the latest phones, and partying in clubs and bars. Mem-
bers of this milieu must have the financial means to pay for elegant clothes, for 
drinks in bars and clubs, and for restaurants in the city centre or districts like 
Westlands or Kilimani. Moreover, members of this milieu attend events such 
as the monthly ‘Blankets and Wine’ Festival, the ‘Koroga’ Festival, the Nairobi 
fashion market and shiny parties or art festivals. The role models of those in 
this milieu are successful business people and celebrities. In public, the life-
style of Young Professionals sometimes clashes with the ideals of other milieus. 
As an example, since 2014 groups of men have attacked, on several occasions, 
women and tried to strip them naked in public places because they wore, in 
their opinion, too short skirts and acted in an immoral way.
Young Professionals have a weaker affiliation to rural and ethnic communi-
ties, and to their extended families, than members of most other milieus. A 
considerable number of them try to cut the ties to their extended families to 
escape social control and financial obligations. In this way, they distance them-
selves from the moral economy of rural villages and avoid forms of mutual 
solidarity.
Structural and cultural factors make Nairobi attractive for Young Profession-
als. The milieu is bound to the city because the well-paid jobs in international 
companies and non-governmental organisations are located here. Similarly, 
Nairobi has a uniquely vibrant nightlife. Style and looks are crucial for mem-
bers of this milieu. They are the spearheading group of Nairobi’s specific form 
of visual boundary-making by aesthetics. To be ‘hip’ in Nairobi it is not enough 
to merely have money for the latest style and mobile phone. It is crucial in this 
environment to also know what to wear, how, and when and where to wear it. 
Their well-paid jobs—but also money from their well-established families and 
from bank loans—give Young Professionals economic opportunities and allow 
them to display exclusive taste. This is a privileged situation that distinguishes 
them from the majority of Nairobi’s young inhabitants. All these aspects pro-
duce symbolic economic and cultural boundaries (cf. Lamont, 1992, 4). High 
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economic and cultural hurdles make it difficult for migrants from rural loca-
tions and for Nairobi’s poor to become part of this milieu.
Rachel Spronk (2012) has written a comprehensive study of this milieu and 
its members’ sex lives. According to Spronk, the rise of the Young Professionals 
is intertwined with the economic growth and the new job opportunities that 
have emerged since around 2000. She also shows how these young Nairobians 
maintain their gender-specific identities by going to popular places. Part of 
typical interactions is having certain types of relationships, including those 
that enable casual sex. In spite of possible conflicts with social conventions, 
sex has—for many yuppies—an important psychological and social function: 
‘Sex, which is central to self-expression, is somehow associated with “being 
modern”, while at the same time it feels “natural”. In their self-expression, their 
notions of self are “African”, “non-Western”, “nontraditional”’ (Spronk, 2012, 14). 
This quote shows that sex can bridge, at least partly, the contradictions that 
young people feel as they become part of a globally integrated Kenya and when 
they fear they might lose connection to their African background.
Biographical data show how Nairobi’s urban environment gives Zara, a 
31-year-old business consultant and owner of a small travel booking company, 
freedom from the moral and monetary expectations of her family. She does 
not own a car or even a fridge, probably to hide her good financial situation 
from relatives. For instance, she not only goes to clubs and restaurants but also 
travels to lodges in the Masai Mara and to European countries. Her individu-
alised lifestyle not only gives her financial opportunities, she can also hide her 
love life from her family and avoids questions about marriage and children. 
Although Zara does not mention it in the interview, she has—according to 
friends—successive and sometimes multiple boyfriends.
Another interviewee, Adrian, is a 27-year old graphic designer who grew up 
in Karen, one of Nairobi’s best areas. He is a co-owner and co-director of a 
small marketing and event company, which he founded together with a friend 
three years before the interview. After attending expensive schools and secur-
ing a diploma as a graphic designer, he started working for a Chinese pay-TV 
company in Nairobi. With some years’ work experience, he decided to bring his 
knowledge of photography, advertising and digital marketing to his own com-
pany. Adrian is well-dressed in colourful outfits or, if necessary, more formal 
business clothes. He wears his hair in well-kept dreadlocks, exercises several 
times a week at the gym and goes regularly to popular bars and festivals. As a 
graphic designer, he owns a MacBook and a digital camera with several lenses. 
Additionally, he often goes on holidays in various places in Kenya.
In contrast to members of other milieus, Young Professionals follow a gen-
erational, individualised lifestyle that focuses on hedonistic consumption and 
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career, not on church-related activities as is the case for the Christian Milieu. 
Most Young Professionals leave this milieu or reduce, at least, their visits to bars 
and festivals before they reach 35 years of age. Usually, the reason is that they 
get married and have children.
7 Conclusion: Nairobi’s Distinctive Middle-Income Milieus
This chapter has examined middle-income milieus (sociocultural groups with 
similar lifestyles) in Nairobi to demonstrate how such a conceptualisation can 
include specific local aspects. The milieu concept is an alternative to the popu-
lar but not very nuanced concept of the ‘middle class’ and considers the most 
significant aspects of life in order to construct social groups. Moreover, due to 
their focus on empirical findings, milieu studies are able to consider, likewise, 
particular aspects of a city, such as local subcultures, economic branches or 
particular forms of global connections.
By examining middle-income milieus and their relation to Nairobi as an 
example, the text contributes to the debate on cities in Africa. It has become 
widely accepted that it is necessary to study African cities as ‘ordinary cities’ 
(Robinson, 2006) and not as the ‘other’ of cities in the global North as devel-
opmental views suggested for a long time. Robinson (2006) stresses that we 
must approach each city as a particular constellation, and build on empirical 
research and not on untenable theory from ‘EuroAmerica’. It is necessary to 
study cities in Africa without assumptions that have no empirical proof, such 
as underdevelopment as an alleged commonality of urban Africa. Similar to 
Robinson’s claim, milieu theory demands we consider social groups according 
to local findings and study them, therefore, in forms other than vertical, eco-
nomic strata or ‘classes’. In particular, the concept of the ‘middle class’ has so 
many, often contradictory connotations that its transfer to Africa invites one 
to make assumptions before one has even begun to learn anything about the 
groups that lie between the poor and the rich. From a typical ‘middle class’ 
lifestyle to a financially stable situation and moderate political views, there are 
many attributes that are not necessarily found in the middle-income strata of 
African countries. Moreover, it is doubtful if vertical categorisations such as 
‘middle class’ or ‘working class’ can grasp the most distinctive realities of life in 
twenty-first century Kenya and other African settings. Including sociocultural 
aspects in the process of group construction is, on the African continent, par-
ticularly important because many features such as ongoing urban–rural con-
nections, the affiliation to the extended family but also the emergence of new 
urban lifestyles are frequent there but missing in class studies and Northern 
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 social theory in general. These aspects influence individuals’ lives on a horizon-
tal level that income distribution has difficulties analysing. In contrast to class, 
milieu refers to the most significant sociocultural characteristics and may offer 
an alternative. Also, due to their empirical perspective, milieu studies are open 
to local particularities and do not transfer the same model of stratification to 
each city in a certain country or region.
This chapter illustrates how the Christian Milieu and the milieu of Young 
Professionals are bound in specific ways to Nairobi. But what do these de-
scriptions of milieus in the middle stratum tell us about Nairobi as a city? The 
Christian Milieu in Nairobi is different from its counterparts in other Kenyan 
cities in terms of its greater orientation to economic success and its degree of 
organisation. The Young Professionals exist as a milieu of significant size only 
in Nairobi, where many companies and non-governmental organisations, an 
entrepreneurial environment and a lively club scene attract young, well-edu-
cated Kenyans. In Kenya’s capital they can follow their career paths and live a 
hedonistic, individualised lifestyle.
The text has portrayed Nairobi as an ‘ordinary city’, without deductive theo-
retical assumptions about a specific African urban quality—admittedly, from 
a particular sociological perspective with a focus on lifestyles, meanings and 
culture. Likewise, the study of middle-income milieus provides particular in-
sights into aspects such as urbanism and urban–rural ties, which are crucial 
parts of most African cities but may manifest themselves there in ways very 
different to those found in Nairobi. A short discussion with a focus on urban-
ism and urban–rural ties demonstrates the usefulness of the milieu approach. 
As a result, the differentiation of milieus in the middle stratum results from 
Nairobi’s unique form of urbanism.
For instance, the Young Professionals’ highly individualised lifestyle cannot 
be explained merely by structural conditions such as the size of Nairobi or the 
job opportunities and good salaries. Rather, the cultural importance of entre-
preneurial success and the material display of wealth provide the symbolic 
 basis for the existence of the Young Professionals as a milieu. A strong entrepre-
neurial attitude and a tendency to display visible symbols of one’s success are 
characteristic of many residents of Nairobi, also among the Christian Religious. 
Because the Young Professionals do not exist as a milieu in Mombasa and even 
members of the Christian Religious Milieu, by and large, do not show similar 
career ambitions in Mombasa, it is highly plausible to consider the strong ori-
entation towards economic success and demonstrations of well-being as char-
acteristics of Nairobi. For the inhabitants of most cities in sub-Saharan Africa, 
urban–rural ties are significant, but the way in which milieus relate to them is 
revealing with regard to specific forms of urban life. There are different ways in 
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which residents of Nairobi relate to their extended families and the rural com-
munities of the countryside. Young Professionals focus on their individual lives 
in the city, and they either have few connections to their extended family or 
even try to escape the financial obligations attached to kinship. For members 
of the Christian Religious Milieu, strong relations with the extended family and 
rural community are possible, but they are—mostly—less important for their 
lifestyle than the activities that take place in their church. In contrast, ties to 
the extended family and ethnic group in their rural home form a central part of 
life for another milieu, the Neo-traditionals. They share a considerable propor-
tion of their income with relatives, and the development of their local commu-
nities is also crucial to them. Urban–rural ties are one significant aspect that all 
milieus deal with, but they do so in very different ways.
The milieu perspective demonstrates how urban–rural ties are enacted on 
the level of meso-groups in Nairobi and how this relates to their lifestyles. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to study other significant aspects of African cities by a 
focused research into milieus, from economic practices to movement patterns, 
and the use of infrastructure in a wide sense that includes housing, educa-
tion or forms of social security. Many new developments have deeply changed 
lives in African cities over the last two decades, and the milieu perspective may 
help us to study these. For instance, such different aspects as growing digitali-
sation and changing global–local relations, but also gender, affect individuals 
in specific ways according to their lifestyles. How and for which purpose do 
members of a milieu use smartphones, social media and messengers in a cer-
tain city? Which specific global influences affect members of which milieu in a 
certain city? From new Chinese economic activities to mass tourism, there are 
many aspects on the global level that change the realities of life on the local 
level. Nevertheless, field research is necessary to understand how global devel-
opments are being integrated into the routines of cities.
Further, gender relations are a very important topic that differs significantly 
across different cities. The milieu approach widens scope and allows one to 
study gender relations in certain groups and with respect to particular features 
of places. As an example, gender roles and related ideas differ strongly between 
the Christian Religious Milieu and among the Young Professionals in Nairobi. 
Relations to aspects such as sexuality and expectations with regard to women 
and men, but also attitudes towards homosexuality, differ strongly between 
these and other milieus. Finally, milieu studies can increase our understand-
ing of certain cities for future comparative research. Also, comparing ways of 
life among middle-income milieus in selected African cities will reveal local 
particularities. Which milieus exist in Lagos and Cape Town, which similarities 
and differences are there in comparison to Nairobi, and how do these findings 
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relate to the general characteristics of these cities? Furthermore, comparisons 
of milieus in different parts of the global South and North may provide new 
forms of knowledge—for example, with a focus on selected topics such as the 
use of digitalisation and gender. The milieu concept can be a fine bedfellow for 
the study of the urban. In Africa, but even elsewhere in the world.
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Chapter 13
Urbanisation and the Political Geographies 
of Violent Struggle for Power and Control: 
Mining Boomtowns in Eastern Congo
Karen Büscher
Abstract
This chapter addresses rural–urban transformations in the Kivu provinces, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (drc), and more particularly focuses on the complex rela-
tionship between dynamics of violent conflict and the emergence of urban mining 
‘boomtowns’. Mining towns offer fascinating sites from which to investigate the socio-
economic and spatial effects of a protracted history of violence, displacement and 
militarisation. They are the spatial outcomes of dynamics of the transformative power 
of violent conflict. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates how they also offer interesting 
spatial as well as analytical starting points from which to study the political geogra-
phies of war dynamics in Eastern drc. It will be argued that the reason why these min-
ing towns evolve into strategic ‘resources’ in violent struggles for power and control is 
to be found in their urban character as much as in the presence of natural resources. 
As such, this chapter analyses the process of mining urbanisation in the Kivu prov-
inces as part of (armed) elites’ spatial politics of power and control. As demographic 
concentrations and economic nodes, mining towns represent important political, eco-
nomic and social resources for ‘big men’, armed groups and the Congolese state in 
their broader political struggles for power, legitimacy and authority. In a context of 
fragmented and multi-scalar governance, the urbanisation process of these towns is 
the outcome of a complex interaction and contestation of different forms of agency. 
Based on three ethnographic cases of mining towns that emerged from diverse dynam-
ics of artisanal mining activities and forced displacement, this chapter contributes to 
broader academic and policy debates on the political nature of mining urbanisation in 
a context of conflict and fragmented governance.
1 Introduction: Mining Towns as Critical Locations of (Violent) 
Political Struggle in the drc
On June 19, 2014, a local radio station Amani (‘peace’ in Swahili) was inaugu-
rated in Rubaya, a mining town situated in the hills of Masisi, North Kivu, in 
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Eastern Congo. The inauguration ceremony, which took place in heavy rain, 
was widely attended, not least by a big delegation of Congolese government 
representatives. As part of a larger project on community peace consolidation 
set up by the American ngo Search for Common Ground, Radio Amani was 
financed by the Japanese government and launched in cooperation with the 
United  Nations Development Programme (undp) and the UN peacekeeping 
force United  Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (monusco). In front of the cameras and microphones docu-
menting this mediatised event, donors, provincial ministers, as well as local 
 inhabitants expressed their hopes that this ‘intercommunity radio’, an ‘apolitical 
radio of proximity’, would bring together people from different communities to 
overcome distrust and violence and to build together on the consolidation of 
peace in the region.1
The event is informative of the general image of the mining town of Ruba-
ya, a site of interethnic land conflicts, rebel rule and a militarised economy 
of natural resources. It presents one of those local sites at which the broader 
 dynamics of violent conflict characterising Eastern Congo’s Kivu provinces 
come together and are being translated into local precarities, conflicts and vio-
lent livelihoods. The choice of Rubaya as one of the stations for the intercom-
munity peace-building radio project is further informed by the fact that this 
mining town presents an ideal site for a broad reach: in contrast to its rural 
surroundings, Rubaya is marked by a dense demographic concentration and 
a relatively well-developed radio and mobile data network. With its estimated 
70,000 inhabitants, this mining town is a crowded centre, where miners, trad-
ers, state officials, idps (internally displaced persons) and taxi drivers from 
very different places and ethnic backgrounds meet in search of livelihoods, 
protection or leisure. Further, the event also points at the position of this min-
ing town on the map of international humanitarian, development and peace-
building interventions. The presence of idp camps in the vicinity of the town, 
but especially the militarisation of artisanal mining activities, has attracted 
the attention of several international actors. In recent years, several ngos, 
advocacy organisations and activists have engaged in the struggle against so-
called conflict minerals. Since it is the first North Kivu ‘sector’ in the so-called 
traceability process,2 Rubaya has been put on the international map by a wide 
variety of researchers, activists, journalists and ngo staff. Rubaya’s appearance 
1 See Radio Okapi (2014) ‘Nord-Kivu: Création d’une radio communautaire à Rubaya’ https://
www.radiookapi.net/regions/nord-kivu/2014/06/20/nord-kivu-creation-dune-radio 
- communautaire-rubaya (accessed on 1 November 2017).
2 Organised by International Tin Association (ita) Ltd. See Verbrugge et al. (2011) and Geenen 
(2016) for more information on this supply chain traceability initiative.
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in US campaigns, for example, has largely reproduced the dominant narrative 
of ‘blood minerals’ and interethnic conflict (Vogel and Radley, 2014).
As the presence of Congolese state representatives at the inauguration cer-
emony shows, it is not only on the international level that Rubaya is clearly on 
the map. The presence of important economic and military ‘big men’ (own-
ing, for example, much of the land on which Rubaya is developing) with ties 
in Goma as well as in the capital city, Kinshasa, makes this place less  ‘remote’ 
than it seems and it actually becomes a nodal point in politico-military net-
works of power and control. At the same time, the presence of state repre-
sentatives at the ceremony is contradictory. Despite the state’s economic 
and political interest in the town, not even the minimum in terms of state 
investment has been made in Rubaya’s development. As is the case for other 
mining boomtowns (and any other form of urbanisation) in the region, the 
Congolese state is rather absent from processes of urbanisation, planning or 
infrastructure provision. Inauguration ceremonies, performed with grotesque 
grandeur by Congolese ministers who have never invested one single dollar in 
projects or places like this, have become painful moments of magnification of 
state failure and the transfer of the state’s legitimacy to other actors, such as 
international donors (Trefon, 2011). Instead of being the result of a state-led 
urbanisation process, mining towns like Rubaya are the outcome of a com-
plex interaction of different kinds of agency, in which non-state actors play an 
 important role.
Rubaya’s development is not unique in the region. It is one of several urban 
centres that developed around artisanal mining sites and were transformed 
into boomtowns during the early 2000s. Rising market values of minerals such 
as cassiterite and coltan attracted many people to dig in the mines; at the same 
time, violent clashes between different armed groups pushed idps into these 
centres in search of security and a livelihood. Increasing economic activity 
has transformed the town into a vibrant commercial centre, with its packed 
houses, its colourful shops and its noisy bars standing in sharp contrast to its 
rural surroundings. Boomtowns such as Rubaya illustrate the profound recon-
figuration of the Kivu landscape in a context of war, violence, repeated dis-
placement and transforming livelihoods. Over the past twenty years, Eastern 
drc has  become increasingly urbanised, strongly affecting local economies, 
administrations, landscapes, cultures and identities (Büscher, 2015, 2016).
When places like Rubaya, Kamituga, Numbi or Nyabibwe are mentioned in 
the academic and policy literature on Eastern drc, the focus is put on their 
artisanal mining activity and its role in the broader political economy of natu-
ral resources (Cuvelier, 2010; Geenen, 2014; Radley and Vogel, 2015; Vogel and 
Raeymaekers, 2016). While a lot of attention has been given to local livelihoods 
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and the different forms of agency behind the natural resource economies and 
networks, the dynamics of boomtown urbanisation around these artisanal 
mines have gone largely unstudied. Instead of the mine itself, mineral extrac-
tion and the mine’s artisanal miners, this chapter focuses on the town that 
has developed around them. Its urbanisation will be perceived as a dynamic, 
transformative process in its own right. In the current Congolese context of 
a  confusing, half-implemented decentralisation law, the expansion of the 
 centre itself becomes a highly political process, involving different state and 
non-state actors at the local, provincial and national levels. It will be argued 
that in this political context of war, the establishment, expansion and admin-
istrative recognition of these centres represent important political, economic 
and social resources for multi-scalar alliances of elites, customary authorities, 
armed groups and the Congolese state in their broader political struggles for 
power, legitimacy and control. Mining boomtowns represent, for example, sig-
nificant bases for taxation, electoral politics and ethnic mobilisation.
By presenting mining towns as not only spatial but also analytical start-
ing points from which to study dynamics of power and (violent) control in 
the Kivu provinces, this chapter speaks to both academic and policy debates. 
For both debates, this chapter wishes to add an urban dimension to the study 
of  the relationship between conflict and mineral extraction. Academically, 
the chapter contributes to discussions of urbanity and its ‘critical significance’ 
in  settings of war (Beall et al., 2011). In Congo’s Kivu provinces, urban sites 
 embody ‘safe’ spatial environments for idps or refugees, at the same time be-
ing safe havens or strongholds for rebel movements, strategic targets, econom-
ic hubs, or hotspots for the humanitarian industry (Büscher, 2016). Further, this 
chapter adds a missing spatial and particularly urban element to the current 
debates on violent conflict and the production of public authority in Eastern 
drc (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, 2014). As complex ‘laboratories’ (Robinson, 
2006; Simone, 2004), urban centres embody the spatial, political, social and 
economic agency of a wide range of actors (state and non-state, formal and 
informal, public and private, civil and armed). As the chapter illustrates, the 
distinction between these categories is in reality extremely blurred. With re-
gard to policy debates, the chapter draws attention to the crucial political char-
acter of these places as well as of their urbanisation process. Different actors 
involved in their regulatory frameworks are in fierce competition over power 
and control, a competition that is often violently mobilised along ethnic lines.
This paper is based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork carried out (by 
the author and/or by Congolese colleagues) between 2010 and 2017 in Numbi, 
Nyabibwe (South Kivu) and Rubaya (North Kivu). Fieldwork in these different 
sites consisted of in-depth interviews with key stakeholders (administrative 
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and customary authorities, members of local civil society, heads of mining and 
commercial associations, representatives of the Congolese security forces 
and ngo staff), focus-group discussions with different target groups (such as, 
for example, miners, traders and transporters), social mapping exercises, the 
consultation of local administrative reports, observational walks and informal 
discussions.
2 Mining Urbanisation in the drc
It is only recently that in academic writings special attention has been paid to 
the complex relation between mining and urbanisation in Africa. While much 
has been written on mining and land use/conflicts, mining and mobility, as 
well as on mining and human settlement patterns, the connection between 
mining and urban transformation has been largely ignored. Yet both processes 
make an important contribution to Africa’s current transformation of local 
 societies in a global era, as they both produce fundamental demographic, eco-
nomic, spatial and sociocultural changes. The first attempt to bring together 
specific studies on the intersection of mining and urbanisation in Africa was 
made by Bryceson and MacKinnon (2012): from a collection of case studies on 
Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and the drc, the edi-
tors centred their analysis around what they call ‘mineralised urbanisation’, or 
the influence of mineral production cycles and commodity chains on urban 
growth and settlement patterns at local, regional and national levels. On the 
one hand, these studies present a clear picture of the diverse settlement trajec-
tories, livelihoods and welfare paths of mining towns; on the other hand, they 
make an important attempt to examine the current sense of ‘mining place’ 
(Bryceson and MacKinnon, 2012, 514).
The issue of mining urbanisation also occupies a central place in the broader 
theoretical debates on the interaction between global markets and rural– 
urban dynamics and shifts. In their edited volume, Agergaard et al. (2010) anal-
yse trends of mining urbanisation within the context of the ‘frontier’, being a 
region where linkages to global markets are dominated by one particular eco-
nomic product. Just like other frontier economies (such as cash crop econo-
mies linked to the world market), mining frontiers are particularly dynamic 
spaces characterised by rapid changes in demographic structure, economic 
basis, occupational opportunities, settlement patterns and land use, where 
one observes livelihoods being transformed through the establishment of 
new commercial activities (Agergaard et al., 2010, 3). These dynamics strongly 
 impact rural–urban linkages and processes of urbanisation,  metamorphosing 
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from remote ‘deep rural’ to pulsating urban centres of goods and services 
provision (Bryceson and Mwaipopo, 2010, 158). The concept of frontier urban-
isation enables us to investigate mining towns in Eastern drc as distinctive 
political, economic and sociocultural spaces (Werthmann and Grätz, 2012) as 
well as spaces of intense transformation. It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to fully engage with the frontier literature on Eastern drc, but it reinforces 
our understanding of frontier towns as spaces marked by fierce (often violent) 
contest over control and authority in the geographic periphery of the state, yet 
often at its political centre (Raeymaekers, 2014). Further, the literature enables 
us to see those places as nodes within the political projects of a wide range of 
actors, such as miners, mining cooperatives, all sorts of local, national and for-
eign corporations and governments, ngos, and numerous middlemen, all of 
them negotiating local governance (Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016).
A number of researchers has been inspired to ethnographically study the 
unique environment of these boomtowns and the identities, cultures and life-
styles that they develop (De Boeck, 2001; Werthmann and Grätz, 2012). The case 
studies of Numbi, Nyabibwe, and Rubaya largely correspond with the findings 
of this research and of the literature on mining urbanism in general. Attrac-
tive because of their ‘frontier mystique’ (Agergaard et al., 2010) and as centres 
of rapid in-migration, these settlements have served as ‘destinations of desire’ 
(Bryceson and Mwaipopo, 2010, 168), setting in motion dynamics of change, 
rapid growth and expansion. With a few exceptions, (see, for example, Büscher 
et al., 2014; De Boeck, 2001; Kabamba, 2012; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004; 
Vwakyanakazi, 1992), mining urbanisation in the drc has not been explicitly 
documented. Yet the academic interest in artisanal mining in the drc is well 
developed, and several researchers have extensively studied the ways in which, 
in the context of state crisis and civil war, artisanal mining has become a live-
lihood strategy for very different civil and military actors (see, for example, 
Ansoms and Marysse, 2011; Bashwira, 2017; Geenen, 2013). The Kivu provinces, 
where this research is located, are extremely rich in natural resources such as 
gold, colombo-tantalite (coltan) and cassiterite (tin). At the same time, these 
provinces have been characterised by a protracted situation of violent conflict. 
The dwindling power and role of formal state institutions have been the result 
of a profound economic and political crisis that was already set in motion in 
the mid-1990s at the end of the Mobutu era. A civil war that started in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s has evolved over the last 20 years into a complex jumble 
of dynamics of violence and conflict and a proliferation of armed groups in the 
Kivu provinces. During the different episodes of the war, mining towns have 
been strongly influenced by dynamics of forced displacement, violence and 
militarisation. The massive arrival of Hutu refugees in 1994, fleeing Rwanda 
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 (after the political changes following the end of the genocide), strongly im-
pacted on such towns’ demographic composition, local economies and politi-
cal constellations. As has been extensively documented, these 1994 dynamics 
set in motion the start of a series of violent conflicts in the broader region 
(see, for example, Turner, 2007), and throughout the war towns like Numbi 
and Nyabibwe have been an operational ground for multiple armed groups.
Dynamics of violence and conflict have produced social transformation and 
generated a number of important shifts in the socio-economic sphere (Vlas-
senroot and Raeymaekers, 2004, 14). These shifts, with regard to issues such 
as access to land and the structure of public authoritym for example, should 
not be explained as temporary effects of a context of violence and war but as 
elements of a general transformation of local society. In earlier works I have 
argued that rural–urban shifts and the emergence of boomtowns in the Kivu 
provinces should be understood as a spatial aspect of this transformative pow-
er of violent conflict (Büscher, 2011, 2016). This transformation of peripheral 
rural mining sites into urbanised centres of (largely informal) accumulation 
and survival has resulted in a profound socio-economic, spatial and political 
reorganisation of local society.
The thriving forces behind the fast expansion of these mining agglomera-
tions are multiple, and a combination of structural processes and people’s 
agency. Like booming mining towns elsewhere, not only does the arrival of 
large groups of artisanal miners gave a considerable boost to local economic 
activity (Cuvelier, 2010; Walsh, 2003; Werthmann, 2003), these boomtowns also 
serve as a place of refuge for people seeking to rebuild their lives after having 
been marginalised in their communities of origin (Fisher, 2007; Grätz, 2009; 
Werthmann, 2009). Kivu’s mining towns have attracted important numbers of 
rural poor and urban unemployed in search of their fortunes, but at the same 
time the ongoing violence has pushed large parts of the rural population to 
the same centres in search of physical security (Vlassenroot and Raeymaek-
ers, 2004, 143).3 Mining towns often form attractive ‘safe havens’ for refugees 
(coming from Rwanda) and idps (coming from Kivu’s rural hinterlands), who 
settle in camps or in the town itself. The more these centres grow and develop, 
the more miners and idps have been followed by an influx of all kinds of other 
‘migrants’ seeking to integrate into and invest in these emerging semi-urban 
3 Urban centres providing a haven in civil conflicts is fairly common (Beall et al., 2011). The 
urban features of inclusiveness, freedom, global connections and cosmopolitism mark the 
attractiveness of cities. In the Kivu provinces, urbanised areas have become attractive poles 
for idps because of their ethnically more diversified demographic profiles (compared to sur-
rounding villages), the higher presence of ngos or humanitarian agencies, and the higher 
presence of Congolese (as well as UN) security forces.
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economies. This has led (in some cases more than others) to the creation of 
an ethnically and economically diverse demography, the development of 
new markets, increased circulation of money and goods and the spontaneous 
 development of infrastructure and services. Traders, transporters, hotel and 
bar managers, butchers, pharmacists, etc. gradually settle and start their busi-
nesses in these highly populated spaces. Although much of the mining extrac-
tion itself is largely carried out by men, these boomtowns are far from being a 
‘man’s world’, and women play important roles in local economies and occupy a 
variety of positions (Bashwira et al., 2014).4 In a short time, these former villages 
transform into booming agglomerations with an increasingly ‘urban’ character 
(Büscher et al., 2014; Mususa, 2012). What makes these places ‘urban’ or ‘semi-
urban’ is not only a matter of demographic size and density; it is also a matter 
of demographic composition, economic accumulation, livelihood diversifica-
tion, public service provision, settlement patterns and political organisation 
(Dobler, 2009; Werthmann, 2009).
A fact that is often overlooked in academic debates is that the process of 
mining urbanisation is not only a demographic, administrative, spatial and 
economic process, but is a political process as well. This chapter, analysing 
mining boomtowns in a context of violent conflict, will contribute to the un-
derstanding of the politics of mining urbanisation and boomtown urbanisa-
tion in general. Through a long history of political and economic crisis and war, 
mining urbanism came to involve particular types of stakeholders—formal 
and informal, civilian and military. This particular setting generates distinctive 
patterns of urbanisation, settlement, governance and livelihoods, generating 
an urbanisation process that is often of a highly unstable and conflictual nature 
(Büscher, forthcoming).
Further, this urbanisation process is inevitably interwoven with agendas of 
political, military and ethnic mobilisation. To recognise mining urbanisation 
as a political process, it is important to understand the mining town as the spa-
tial arena of political constellations and to understand the process of urbanisa-
tion as a part of political mechanisms. A case illustrative of the political aspect 
of the urbanisation of these boomtowns is the process of their administrative 
transformation from the status of a ‘centre’ or village, towards the status of a 
‘commune’. According to the decentralisation law of the drc,  agglomerations 
4 A study undertaken by the gender section of monusco in 2010 in six Congolese provinces 
found that women mostly work in the processing of mineral tailings (e.g. sieving, sorting, 
transporting and washing), followed by activities related indirectly to mineral exploitation 
(e.g. as small goods traders, housewives or prostitutes) (monusco, 2010, cited in Bashwira, 
2017, 109).
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change administrative status according to their demographic statistics. With, 
for example, more than 20,000 inhabitants, a village can be recognised as a 
‘commune’. From our cases, it will become clear how this process is more than 
an administrative mechanism: it is a highly political issue, creating fierce pow-
er contestation and conflicts.
3 The Case of Nyabibwe and Numbi (Kalehe, South Kivu)
Kalehe territory in South Kivu has served as a case study to look at a vari-
ety of  conflict dynamics that have become hot topics in the literature and 
in knowledge production with regard to the war in Eastern drc, such as the 
proliferation of armed groups (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, 2014), the struggle 
over citizenship (Vlassenroot, 2013), land issues (Ansoms et al., 2012) and the 
political economy of natural resources (Jackson, 2006; Cuvelier, 2010). Until 
the present, the region has been characterised by the mobilisation of armed 
groups, strong ethnic tensions, violent struggles over public authority and mili-
tarised land conflicts. In the early years of the new millennium, during the 
rcd rebellion5 that coincided with the global boom in demand for coltan and 
cassiterite, several boomtowns emerged around artisanal mining sites in Kale-
he. Both Nyabibwe and Numbi have experienced spectacular growth over the 
last two decades, transforming from small villages into extended ‘urbanised’ 
agglomerations.
Nyabibwe, with approximately 25,000 inhabitants in 2015,6 is situated on 
the main road that runs along the shores of Lake Kivu and connects the two 
main cities in the Kivu region: Goma (capital city of North Kivu province) and 
Bukavu (capital of South Kivu province). The town emerged in proximity to 
the Kalimbi mines, which were exploited from the mid-1970s on, in an indus-
trial manner. From the end of the 1980s, detrimental economic nationalisation 
policies in Zaire, and further economic decay throughout the 1990s, resulted in 
the gradual informalisation of mineral extraction. The ‘big boom’ occurred in 
2000–01, when the war pushed, and global mineral prices attracted, thousands 
of miners to the town, resulting in a quadrupling of its population. The town 
distinguishes itself from its rural surroundings by its ‘cosmopolitan’ character, 
including the different ethnic groups to be found in the region. Hutu comprise 
5 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (rcd), a Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebel 
movement that controlled large parts of Eastern Congo between 1998 and 2004. For more 
information see Tull (2003) and Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004).
6 Statistics provided by the local health centre of Nyabibwe.
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the largest group, and other well-represented communities are Havu, Tembo, 
Bashi and Tutsi. A historical friction between, on the one hand, Hutu and, on 
the other, Tembo and Havu has been reinforced by dynamics of conflict and 
militarisation. Administratively, Nyabibwe is governed by two layers of author-
ity: customary (traditional) authority in the form of a customary chief, and 
state (administrative) authority in the form of a chef du poste. The former is 
traditionally the realm of the Tembo and Havu community, while the latter 
is locally elected and thus represents the Hutu majority. In light of regional 
(violent) ethnic politics, this fragmented leadership has been often conflictual. 
Mining activities have had an important impact on the local leadership; the 
mining cooperatives Coopérative Minière de Kalimbi (comika) and Coopéra-
tive Minière du Bien-Être Communautaire de Kalehe (coombecka), who 
control and govern these activities, have an important stake in local politics, 
and are in their turn strongly influenced by regional and national elites in the 
larger cities of Goma and Bukavu (Cuvelier, 2013).
Numbi, with an estimated number of inhabitants between 10,000 and 11,000,7 
is situated in the highlands (Hauts Plateaux) of Kalehe, some 30 km from the 
main road that runs along Lake Kivu. Compared to Nyabibwe (which is located 
on the main road) and because of almost non-existent road access (most of 
the time it inaccessible to cars), Numbi is an extremely isolated place. It is 
surrounded by huge pasture concessions, owned by influential Tutsi elites that 
emerged during the rcd rebellion (1998–2004). As we observe in other min-
ing towns, the involvement of such politico-military elites, connected to local, 
provincial, national and even trans-border power networks, strongly contests 
the ‘isolated’ nature of the place. Administered under the status of a ‘village’, it 
is headed by a customary chief from the Tutsi community and a state author-
ity from the Tembo community. As is the case in Nyabibwe, a fierce conflict 
between these two layers of authority over the control of the town (and crucial 
mechanisms such as land distribution or taxation revenues) has known very vi-
olent episodes. During the rcd period, as part of the group’s efforts to  establish 
its parallel administration, Numbi was administratively ‘upgraded’ and came 
under the control of a Tutsi chief close to the rebel movement. In 2006, after 
the peace process and the country’s reunification, this chief was replaced by a 
Hutu chief. In 2012, the former Tutsi chief, by influencing provincial political 
and ex-rebel elites in Bukavu, regained control thanks to the  appointment of 
his own brother as the new chief. The local Hutu population, who perceived 
7 In 2014, the figure of 8900 inhabitants was provided by the local health centre. According to 
Numbi’s local authorities, the actual number was around 11,000 or 12,000 inhabitants (inter-
views with village chief and chef de poste, Numbi, April 2014).
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this as an orchestrated Tutsi coup d’état, strongly opposed his rule, a situation 
which created strong ethnic tensions.8 Further, Numbi is known for its violent 
land conflicts, which are being significantly politicised by elites (urban-based 
elites in Goma, for example) through the political and military connections of 
the landowners (Ansoms et al., 2012). As was equally the case for Nyabibwe, 
mining activities in the nearby pits had been informalised since the 90s, and 
were very small scale. Also similarly, a mining boom occurred at the turn of the 
new millennium.
Much of its urbanisation process initially unfolded in an organic, spontane-
ous and unplanned way, yet various actors have increasingly tried to incorpo-
rate the process, as a spatial mechanism of control, into their own political 
or economic ambitions. In Numbi, local elites have, on the one hand, tried to 
invest in a minimum of infrastructure (to anticipate an administrative upgrade 
within the decentralisation process—see below). On the other hand, rumours 
circulate about other elites at the provincial and national level blocking in-
vestments in urban expansion (such as the road, which is in a perpetual state 
of disrepair), to prevent external actors, including the Congolese state, from 
interference.9
Numbi and, to a lesser extent, Nyabibwe are situated in areas that have 
 experienced significant levels of armed mobilisation for at least two decades. 
Both ‘autochthonous’ militia (such as Mai-Mai groups in the second Congo 
war and Raia Mutomboki factions thereafter) as well as different trajectories 
of Congolese Hutu mobilisation (branches of the Coalition of Congolese 
 Patriotic Resistance (pareco) and, more recently, different Nyatura groups) 
deploy a degree of influence to these urban centres and their surroundings. 
Violent and militarised struggle for control over these centres of course needs 
to be  understood in the light of their strategic significance as mining towns. 
From 2010 onwards, Nyabibwe was selected as one of the first pilot cases for 
the ‘traceability process’ organised by the International Tin Research Institute 
(itri).10 In Numbi, which is far less state controlled and more isolated, armed 
groups like Nyatura were, until 2012 involved in taxation mechanisms applied to 
8 For example, the local chief of a nearby village, put in place by the Tutsi chief, was mur-
dered a couple of days after his appointment, allegedly by members of the armed Hutu 
franchise group Nyatura (‘hit hard’ in Kinyarwanda). Interview with an entrepreneur 
(Numbi, April 2014); interview with a mineral buyer (or middleman (négotiant)) (Numbi, 
April 2014). See also Pole Institute (2012).
9 Focus group with mineral buyers/middlemen (négociants) (Numbi, April 2014); interview 
with an entrepreneur (Numbi, April 2014).
10 Since February 2018 known as International Tin Association (ita) Ltd. For more informa-
tion on this supply chain traceability initiative, see Verbrugge et al. (2011) and Geenen 
(2016).
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mining incomes, although not present in the mines themselves. Until the pres-
ent day, despite the different disarmament initiatives, the circulation of arms 
remains an important challenge, and local, everyday conflicts often  escalate as 
violence remains an important means in daily livelihood strategies.11
The urbanisation process of these towns was further shaped by the vast 
influx of internally displaced people. In both Nyabibwe and Numbi, idps 
settled within the mining agglomeration. Many of them went to work in the 
mines, others integrating into other economic sectors. In Nyabibwe, for ex-
ample, idps coming from Masisi introduced ‘new’ commercial activities such 
as the exploitation of small cafeterias where people can consume milk and a 
small breakfast. Apart from mining, inhabitants of Nyabibwe and Numbi are 
engaged in a number of secondary activities, such as small trading in staple 
goods, transport, trading in wood, and—of course—in the proliferation of very 
lucrative activities catering for the food and entertainment needs of the mine 
workers. With a purchasing power far in excess of farmers in the surrounding 
countryside, the presence of miners in these towns has resulted in the emer-
gence of a highly profitable ‘entertainment infrastructure’ and a sharp increase 
of the numbers of bars, cinemas and restaurants since the start of the new 
millennium.12 It is this proliferation of secondary activities (butchers’ shops, 
hairdressers, other shops), services (pharmacies, hotels) and entertainment 
infrastructure (cinemas, bars) and the large diversity of traded products that 
shape these mining towns’ semi-urban character. As local traders in Nyabibwe 
told me: ‘today in Nyabibwe one can find almost everything one can find in 
the city’.13 One example of an economic sector that spectacularly expanded 
due to the process of mining urbanisation was the transport sector. Operating 
motorcycle taxis is a lucrative livelihood option for many youngsters and idps, 
as well as an attractive market for investment because of its high returns.14 
This economic transformation went hand in hand with a material reconfigura-
tion of the villages’ landscapes, increasingly evolving towards ‘urbanised’ set-
tlements (with ‘durable’ housing materials, multi-storey houses and relatively 
extensive infrastructure).
The expansion of these dynamic mining towns did not only attract armed 
groups, miners, traders and idps; it also encouraged the Congolese state to set-
tle at these sites, presenting—as they do—interesting economic and political 
11 Focus group discussion with miners (Numbi, April 2014); interview with a village chief 
(Numbi, April 2014); author’s own observations.
12 Interview with the manager of a Nganda or ‘popular bar’ (Nyabibwe, May 2013).
13 Focus group with traders (Nyabibwe, May 2013).
14 Focus group with motorcycle riders and interview with an fec representative (Nyabibwe, 
May 2013). Since the purchase price of a motorcycle in Goma is only usd 1,500, not only 
urban-based elites but also local miners and middlemen can easily invest in this ‘market’.
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opportunities. In Nyabibwe, from around 2005 onwards, state offices increas-
ingly installed themselves in the town, opening local branches of the Divisions 
of Hygiene, Tourism, Urbanisation, etc. In fact, these branches are often no 
more than a barely equipped ‘office’ (often a small wooden room) run by bad-
ly paid staff. The official discourse of ‘better coordinating and organizing the 
town’s expansion and urbanisation’15 masks the real desires to get a piece of 
the massive cash flows and financial interests generated by these boomtowns. 
In Numbi, not only established elites but also new big men (most of them with 
high ranking positions in the Congolese army) have heavily invested in real 
 estate. Most of the houses and hotels are owned by colonels, captains, and oth-
ers in the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (fardc)—
investments that somehow ‘assure’ the local population of a stable future.16
In 2013, in the context of the decentralisation reforms,17 Nyabibwe was in 
the process of being recognised as a ‘commune’ in a decree from the central 
government. On June 13, the First Minister of the central government and 
the  Minister of the Interior signed the decree, fixing the geographic limits 
of the agglomeration.18 The transformation of Nyabibwe into a commune is 
the direct consequence of its growth. The law, on paper, grants an important 
degree of autonomy to the decentralised entity, in terms of its governance of 
human, economic and financial resources (Englebert, 2012). One consequence 
of this shift was that the customary authorities would lose administrative con-
trol to an elected state agent or a ‘bourgemestre’. Afraid he would lose the right 
to collect fees, taxes and royalties on mining and other commercial activities 
in the most important economic centre of his chieftaincy, the customary chief 
undertook various steps to preserve his influence. Büscher et al. (2014) have 
described in detail how, by for example influencing ‘connected’ politicians on 
the provincial level or by strategically selling off his land and intervening in the 
local political economy of the town’s mining activities, the chief ’s strategies of 
maintaining power and authority have laid the basis for further local political 
15 Interview with an official from the Division of Urbanisation and Habitat (Kalehe, May 
2013).
16 Interview with an entrepreneur (Numbi, April 2014).
17 These reforms were launched in 2006 to improve governance and accountability, under-
mine predation, corruption, and personal rule, bring government closer to the people, 
and promote local development. However, as Englebert and Kasongo Mungongo (2016, 1) 
have argued: ‘As of 2014, despite some regional variations, Congolese decentralisation had 
instead increased the degree to which the state extracts the resources and incomes of its 
citizens’.
18 Décret n°13/029 du 13 juin 2013 conférant le statut de ville et de commune à certaines agglom-
érations de la province du Sud-Kivu.
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conflicts. In the meantime, the decentralisation law has been suspended. Since 
2014, Numbi has been waiting to also be granted the status of a ‘commune’, yet 
until this day this process has not been further implemented as local elections 
are repeatedly postponed. As I will further demonstrate through the case of 
Rubaya, this half-implemented decentralisation law creates confusion, offering 
room for manoeuvre that enables the state and other actors, such as economic 
and military big men, to exercise their power over these places. Urbanisation 
is in itself a process characterised by contestation; these political mechanisms 
have strongly reinforced these conflicts.
4 The Case of Rubaya (Masisi, North Kivu)
Rubaya, a town currently estimated to have a population of 70,000,19 is situated 
in Masisi (North Kivu), a region known for its violent history of identity poli-
tics. Originally, Rubaya emerged around a transit point for Rwandan labourers 
 ‘exported’ into Congo (Hutu and Tutsi; today locally referred to as ‘Banyar-
wanda’) by the Belgian colonisers in the 1930s and 40s to sustain the colonial 
plantation economy in the Masisi highlands. Ethnic tensions between these 
Banyarwanda and the so-called autochthonous populations (status claimed by 
people from the Hunde and Tembo community) rose in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide, when hundreds of thousands of Hutu sought refuge in the 
Kivu provinces. Their arrival in Rubaya caused many Tutsi and Hunde to flee,20 
and in parallel with the wider region had a general destabilising effect.
Rubaya knew its real ‘boom’ phase during the rcd period, when coltan had 
been discovered three kilometres from the town’s centre. Local big men from 
the Hutu community saw their positions reinforced by the political–economic 
Hutu elite that was installed in the North Kivu province under the provincial 
governor Eugène Serufuli, controlling the main administrative posts and key 
economic sectors.21 In this period of rapid expansion, several neighbourhoods 
were constructed and the reconfiguration of Rubaya’s landscape was also 
 visible in the transformation of wooden shacks into constructions in more 
durable housing materials and the erection of multi-storey buildings. In 2001 
Rubaya was administratively recognised as a commercial centre and a chef de 
19 Activity Report of a local health centre; local electoral inscription centre.
20 Interview with a former chef de poste (Rubaya, June 2017).
21 Focus group discussion with Rubaya mineral buyers and middlemen (négociants) (Goma, 
May 2016).
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centre was appointed from the provincial administration. Eugène Serufuli him-
self invested in the centre with the installation of a radio mast.22
The National Congress for the Defence of the People (cndp) rebellion intro-
duced a new phase of military conflict in Rubaya, with heavy clashes between 
the cndp and the Congolese army as well as the pareco armed group. As one 
of the cndp’s strongholds, mining activities were controlled by the Congress 
and the town of Rubaya was governed through a parallel rebel administration, 
which ‘elevated’ it to the administrative status of a ‘cité’ (resulting, amongst 
other things, in more power and autonomy for rebel-appointed officials over 
customary authorities).23 Even today, armed groups such as Nyatura and the 
Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (apcls)24 remain active 
in Rubaya’s immediate proximity (United Nations Security Council, 2015). This 
complex history of violent conflict, in which the town has occupied different 
positions, from rebel stronghold to a safe haven for idps, has generated a pro-
cess of urbanisation that is highly militarised. Now that armed groups are no 
longer physically present in the town itself, a heavy presence from police and 
soldiers has taken over.25 Rubaya, just like Numbi, suffers from a vast prolifera-
tion of arms among its inhabitants. This results in a constant fear of violence 
and casualties in the case of (even very banal) conflicts.26 Rumours regarding 
the creation of a new rebel movement in Rubaya are illustrative of this volatile 
situation.27
More than Numbi and Nyabibwe, Rubaya’s evolution has been marked by 
processes of forced displacement and an influx of idps and refugees. Through 
the different phases of the violent conflict, idps and refugees have installed 
themselves in camps around the centre and in the centre itself. In 2016, the last 
idp camp inside the town was closed by the provincial governor and today two 
camps remain, at four and seven kilometres from the town, respectively. Their 
22 Interview with a teacher and interview with a priest (Rubaya, June 2017).
23 Interview with a former chef de poste (Rubaya, June 2017).
24 Essentially Hunde; emerged in 2008. Like many of these other militias, it mobilised its 
forces on the basis of popular resistance to the return of Tutsi refugees, the defence of 
traditional Hunde land rights, and defence against the expansion of the influence of Ban-
yarwanda in Masisi territory.
25 This presence is not constant however, and fluctuates with periods of tension.
26 See, for example, Radio Okapi (2016) ‘Nord-Kivu : 9 blessés dans une fusillade à Masisi’, 
https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/01/14/actualite/societe/nord-kivu-9-blesses-dans-une-
fusillade-masisi (accessed on 1 November 2017).
27 Radio Okapi (2014) ‘Nord-Kivu : soupçons d’une présumée reconstitution du M23 à Ruba-
ya’, https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/08/30/nord-kivu-soupcons-dune-presu-
mee-reconstitution-du-m23-rubaya (accessed on 1 November 2017).
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inhabitants (mainly Hutu) represent a pool of cheap labour for employment in 
cultivating the land surrounding Rubaya.28
Rubaya’s big man is Robert Habinshuti Seninga—a Hutu and a much- 
discussed figure in the region’s recent history. As one of former governor 
 Serufuli’s close allies during the rcd period, he has remained in power and 
has continued to use his influence (Cuvelier et al., 2014). He is the president of 
COOPERAMMA, the mining cooperative in Rubaya, and just like in Nyabibwe 
and Numbi, the cooperative is a major player in local governance. It has an 
 important stake in local politics and is itself significantly influenced by region-
al and national elites (Cuvelier, 2013). One several occasions COOPERAMMA 
has engaged in the physical development of the town. In 2014, the organisa-
tion bought a large piece of land, baptised it quartier COOPERAMMA, and 
put together its own commission (with Seninga himself at its head) to parcel 
it out. In 2015, under the same commission, two more neighbourhoods were 
developed on land belonging to a fardc general.29 These neighbourhoods are 
generally referred to as the ‘best developed’ in town, with more or less good 
roads, a health centre and spacious parcels. Further, COOPERAMMA also 
regularly invests in road repairs and maintenance, and in 2014 it installed a 
small hydropower plant to provide the town with electricity (a project that 
largely failed, partially because the Congolese state imposed heavy taxes on 
the electricity produced).30 COOPERAMMA’s involvement in Rubaya’s devel-
opment is again illustrative of an urbanisation process that unfolds outside 
formal state planning and is the outcome of the agency of different non-state 
actors. Furthermore, the involvement of big men as key actors in this develop-
ment illustrates that it is a political process, used in strategies of legitimacy and 
control. The position of these key actors within political and military networks 
reaching the provincial and national levels reinforces this political character. 
This is further illustrated in the struggle for administrative control over the 
town in the current context of the controversial decentralisation process.
Rubaya is a town with a mixed ethnic profile, with Tutsi, Hunde, Tembo, 
Shi and Kano, but with a strong Hutu dominance. With its considerable size 
and number of inhabitants, Rubaya is in the process of becoming a ‘commune’ 
in the context of the decentralisation law. Although customary power is less 
strong in Rubaya than it is, for example, in Nyabibwe, this would still  influence 
28 Interview with a customary chief (Rubaya, June 2017).
29 Focus group discussion with Rubaya middlemen (négociants) (Goma, May 2016); interview 
with a cooperamma representative (Rubaya, June 2017).
30 Focus group discussion with Rubaya mineral buyers/middlemen (négociants) (Goma, 
May 2016).
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the balance of power in the area. Within the complex history of violent conflict 
in Masisi, this balance of power is heavily coloured by the continuous power 
struggles between the so-called autochthonous population and the Banyar-
wanda, and internally between the Hutu and Tutsi communities. In the first 
place, it was Rubaya’s chef de poste (a Hutu), who made the ‘commune’ request 
to the provincial government, believing he would be appointed as the head 
of the new administrative entity.31 The demand was further encouraged by 
the town’s economic Hutu elite.32 However, the ‘postes de territoires’ were be-
ing abolished in North Kivu, and shortly after any further implementation of 
the decentralisation law was suspended. In the context of this administrative 
vacuum, a ‘provincial delegate’ was appointed by the provincial governor. To 
this day, this delegate, Bihami Serkali (a former administrator from the rcd 
period) is the only official administrative representative in Rubaya, yet he has 
very little legitimacy given his unclear mandate and his equally unclear juridical 
status. Because Serkali is a close ally of Seninga, his appointment is generally 
viewed as a result of Seninga’s political lobbying efforts and mechanisms of 
control.33 Especially among the local Hunde and their customary chief, there 
is strong resentment regarding his appointment, as they perceive it as a Hutu 
strategy to seize control over resources, such as land and taxes, from the cus-
tomary authorities.34
5 Conclusion
These current political struggles over mining towns point to a number of 
 dimensions of mining urbanisation in a context of violent conflict that are of 
crucial academic as well as policy importance.
First of all, they underline the fact that these places represent strategic nodes 
in the dynamics of development and accumulation, as well as in the dynamics 
of political and military control. These towns attract huge numbers of people 
from rural as well as urban environments in the Kivu provinces and they grow 
at great speed. As attractive poles of investment and livelihood  diversification, 
31 Interview with a former chef de poste (Rubaya, June 2017).
32 Interview with a representative of the Federation of Economics and Commerce (fec) 
(Rubaya, June 2017).
33 Focus group discussion with miners (Rubaya, June 2017); focus group discussion with 
Rubaya mineral buyers/middlemen (négociants) (Goma, May 2016). We see the same 
 dynamics in other urbanising and fast-growing towns in North Kivu, including in Kitchan-
ga (Mathys and Büscher, forthcoming).
34 Interview with a customary chief (Rubaya, June 2017).
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for researchers as well as for policy makers, it is crucial to look at these places, 
given their transformative power in processes of development, social change 
and stability. The ‘urban’ has for a long time been largely ignored in academic 
and policy studies on conflict and development in Eastern Congo. Second-
ary urban centres in particular have received only minor attention, yet as this 
research demonstrates, they may play a central role in dynamics of conflict 
and peace. An urban reading of wartime economic, spatial as well as political 
transformation is necessary if we are to understand current processes of rural–
urban development as well as the production of order and public authority in 
Eastern drc.
Second, what this chapter has demonstrated and what should further  inform 
academic and policy engagement with this topic is that these boomtowns rep-
resent attractive resources to tap into for a wide range of actors. Mining urban-
isation involves intense interaction between an extremely varied set of actors 
(political, economic, humanitarian, civil, military, formal, informal, state and 
non-state) and offers extensive room for manoeuvre for their diverse agencies. 
This applies not only to the rural migrants or displaced people seeking security 
and income opportunities, but also to armed groups integrating into ethnic 
groups for the purpose of violent mobilisation, or to the Congolese state prof-
iting from tax benefits, or to political and economic elites tapping into eco-
nomic resources such as land or mining activities, or political resources such as 
electoral bases. These attractive spaces of rural–urban transformation display 
interesting governance arrangements between customary authorities, state 
institutions, state and non-state military actors, big men and idps.
Third, given the fact that these governance arrangements are part of multi-
scalar alliances involving actors in Goma or Kinshasa or abroad, the socio-
economic and political dynamics emerging from mining urbanisation are 
less local than they may appear at first sight. Many of these alliances are the 
outcome of a historical process of armed conflict, state fragmentation and 
the ethnic logics of protection.35 In ethnic struggles for access to political and 
economic resources, these political and military alliances are easily mobilised. 
In a setting where mining cooperatives have major stakes in urban planning 
and urban governance, the local regulatory framework of this boomtown pro-
cess is influenced by the political stakes of external elites. Conflicts arising from 
the transformation of rural villages into mining boomtowns are as such easily 
 politicized at different levels, reinforcing the towns’ larger regional influence. 
This has influenced the political character of mining urbanisation. The case 
studies of Numbi, Nyabibwe and Rubaya have underlined the importance of 
35 On these historical processes, see for example Raeymaekers (2010) and Tull (2003).
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understanding the rapid development of these towns not only as a demo-
graphic, economic and spatial process, but as a political process as well.
The effects of the decentralisation reforms that change the administrative 
status of these boomtowns uncover broader violent struggles for power and 
control, often fought along ethnic lines. They also illustrate that interventions 
in these places can trigger existing tensions and render them more violent. 
To  capitalise upon the transformative capacity of these places, a profound 
 understanding is indispensable regarding their position and role in the com-
plex political geography of the Kivu region.
 Acknowledgements
This research has been carried out with the financial support of the Flanders 
Research Foundation. The data was collected in collaboration with our Congo-
lese partners from apc (Action pour la Paix et la Concorde) in Bukavu. I would 
like to thank Christoph Vogel for his critical input on this paper.
References
Agergaard, J, N. Fold and K. Gough (eds.) (2010), Rural-urban dynamics: Livelihoods, 
mobility and markets in African and Asian Frontiers (London: Routledge).
Ansoms, A., K. Claessens and E. Mudinga (2012) ‘L’accarpement des terres par des élites 
en térritoire de Kalehe, RDC’, in F. Reyntjens, S. Vandeginste and M. Verpoorten 
(eds.) Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire, 2011–2012 (Paris: L’Harmattan), pp. 205–226.
Ansoms, A. and S. Marysse, (2011) Natural resources and local livelihoods in de Great 
Lakes Region of Africa; a political economy perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan).
Bashwira, M.R. (2017) Navigating obstacles, opportunities and reforms, woman’s lives 
and livelihoods in artisanal mining communities in eastern DRC, PhD Dissertation 
(Wageningen: Wageningen University), http://edepot.wur.nl/413901.
Bashwira, M.R., C. Cuvelier, T. Hilhorst and G. Van der Haar (2014) ‘Not only a man’s 
world: women’s involvement in artisanal mining in eastern DRC’, Resources Policy, 
40, pp. 109–116, DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.11.002.
Beall, J., T. Goodfellow and D. Rodgers (eds.) (2011) Cities, Conflict and State Fragility, 
Working paper, 85 (London: LSE), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136064/wp852.pdf 
(accessed on 28 May 2018).
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
321Mining Boomtowns in Eastern Congo
<UN>
Bryceson, D. and D. Mackinnon (2012) ‘Eureka and beyond: mining’s impact on African 
urbanisation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 30(4), pp. 513–537.
Bryceson, D. and R. Mwaipopo (2010) ‘Rural-urban transitions in Tanzania’s northwest 
mining frontier’, in J. Agergaard, N. Fold and K. Gough (eds.) Rural-urban dynamics: 
Livelihoods, mobility and markets in African and Asian Frontiers (London: Rout-
ledge), pp. 158–173.
Büscher, K. (2018) ‘War, displacement and rural-urban transformation: Kivu’s boom-
towns, Eastern D.R. Congo’ (manuscript submitted for publication).
Büscher, K. (2016) ‘Reading urban landscapes of war and peace: the case of Goma, 
DRC’, in A. Björkdahl and S. Buckley-Zistel (eds) Spatializing Peace and Conflict; 
Mapping the production of places, sites and scales of violence (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan), pp. 79–97.
Büscher, K. (2015) ‘On-Going Crisis in Eastern DR Congo: The Need for an Urban 
 Perspective’, Urban Africa, 11 August, https://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-voices/ 
on-going-crisis-in-eastern-d-r-congo-the-need-for-an-urban-perspective/ (accessed 
on 5 November 2017).
Büscher, K. (2011) Violent conflict, state weakening and processes of urban transforma-
tion in the Eastern Congolese periphery; the case of Goma, unpublished PhD disser-
tation (Ghent: Ghent University), https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/2092391/
file/4335807 (accessed on 28 May 2018).
Büscher, K., J. Cuvelier and F. Mushobekwa (2014) ‘La dimension politique de 
l’urbanisme minière dans un context fragile de conflict armé; le cas de Nyabibwe’, 
in M. Verpoorten, S. Vandeginste and F. Reyntjens (eds.) Annuaire de l’Afrique des 
Grands Lacs, 2013–2014 (Paris : L’Harmattan), pp. 243–268.
Cuvelier, J. (2013) ‘Conflict Minerals in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: planned 
interventions and unexpected outcomes’, in T. Hilhorst (ed.), Disaster, Conflict and 
Society in Crisis (London: Routledge), pp. 132–148.
Cuvelier, J. (ed.) (2010) The complexity of resource governance in a context of state fragili-
ty: the case of Eastern DRC, Report International Alert (London: International Alert) 
http://www.international-alert.org/publications/complexity-resource-governance 
-context-state-fragility-case-eastern-drc (accessed on 6 November 2017).
Cuvelier, J., S. Van Bockstael, K. Vlassenroot and C. Iguma (2014) Analyzing the Impact 
of the Dodd-Frank Act on Congolese Livelihoods, CPPF Conflict Prevention and Peace 
Forum Report (New York: SSRC), https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/5766410/
file/5766411.pdf (accessed on 6 November 2017).
De Boeck, F. (2001) ‘Garimpeiro Worlds: Digging, Dying and “Hunting” for Dia-
monds in Angola’, Review of African Political Economy, 28(90), pp. 549–562, DOI: 
10.1080/03056240108704565.
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Büscher322
<UN>
Dobler, G. (2009) ‘Oshikango: The Dynamics of Growth and Regulation in a 
 Namibian Boom Town’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 35, pp. 115–131, DOI: 
10.1080/03057070802685601.
Englebert, P. (2012) ‘Incertitude, autonomie et parasitisme : les entités territoriales dé-
centralisées et l’état en République Démocratique du Congo’, Politique africaine, 125, 
pp . 169–188, DOI: 10.3917/polaf.125.0169.
Englebert, P. and E. Kasongo Mungongo (2016) ‘Misguided and Misdiagnosed: The 
 Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo’, African Studies Review, 59(1), 
pp. 5–32, DOI: 10.1017/asr.2016.5.
Fisher, E. (2007) ‘Occupying the margins: labour integration and social exclusion in 
artisanal mining in Tanzania’, Development and Change, 38(4), pp. 735–760, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00431.x.
Geenen, S. (2016) African Artisanal Mining from the Inside Out; Access norms and power 
in Congo’s Gold Sector (London: Routledge).
Geenen, S. (2014) ‘Dispossession, displacement and resistance: artisanal miners in a 
gold concession in South-Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo’, Resources Policy, 40, 
pp. 90–99, DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.03.004.
Geenen, S. (2013) ‘Who seeks, finds: how artisanal miners and traders benefit from gold 
in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, European Journal of Development 
 Research, 25, pp. 197–212, DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2012.19.
Grätz, T. (2009) ‘Moralities, risk and rules in West African artisanal gold mining com-
munities: A case study of Northern Benin’, Resources Policy, 34(1), pp. 12–17, http://
hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0011-92C3-8.
Hoffmann, K. and K. Vlassenroot (2014) ‘Armed groups and the exercise of public 
 authority: the cases of the Mayi- Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu’, 
Peacebuilding 2(2), pp. 202–220, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2014.910384.
Jackson, S. (2006) ‘Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of Autochthony 
in Eastern D.R. Congo’, African Studies Review, 49(2) pp. 95–123, DOI: 10.1353/
arw.2006.0107.
Kabamba, P. (2012) ‘A tale of two cities: urban transformation in gold-centered  Butembo 
and diamond-rich Mbuji-Mayi, Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Journal of Con-
temporary African Studies, 30(4), pp. 669–685, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2012.724870.
Matthys, G. and K. Büscher (2018) ‘Violent conflict, displacement and urbanisation 
in Eastern Congo: the case of Kitchanga’ Journal of Eastern African Studies, 12 (2), 
pp. 232–253.
Mususa, P. (2012) ‘Mining, welfare and urbanisation: the wavering urban character if 
Zambia’s Copperbelt’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 30(4), pp. 571–588, 
DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2012.724873.
Pole Institute (2012) Numbi: Entre richesses potentielles et carences réelles de l’Etat en 
territoire de Kalehe/Sud Kivu (Goma : Pole Institute, Institut Interculturel pour la 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
323Mining Boomtowns in Eastern Congo
<UN>
paix dans la Région des Grands Lacs), http://pole-institute.org/article/numbi- 
entre-richesses-potentielles-et-carences-réelles-de-l’etat-en-territoire-de-kalehe-
sud (accessed on 6 November 2017).
Radley, B. and C. Vogel (2015) ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo? The ambiguous 
impact of the “conflict minerals” movement’, The Extractive Industries and Society, 
2(3), pp. 406–410.
Raeymaekers, T. (2014) Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo: 
Power to the Margins (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Raeymaekers, T. (2010) ‘Protection for sale? War and the transformation of regulation 
on the Congo-Ugandan border’, Development and Change, 41(4), pp. 563–587, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01655.x.
Robinson, J. (2006) ‘Inventions and Interventions: Transforming Cities - An Introduc-
tion’, Urban Studies, 43(2), pp. 251–258, DOI: 10.1080/00420980500495812.
Simone, A. (2004) For the City Yet to Come. Changing African Life in Four Cities (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press).
Trefon, T. (2011) Congo Masquerade: the political culture of aid inefficiency and reform 
failure, (London, New York and Kampala: Zed Books, Fountain Publishers).
Tull, D. (2003) ‘A reconfiguration of political order? The state of the state in North Kivu’, 
African Affairs, 102(308), pp. 429–446, DOI:10.1093/afraf/adg046.
Turner, T. (2007) The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality (London: Zed Books).
United Nations Security Council (2015) Rapport Final du Groupe d’Experts sur la Répub-
lique Démocratique du Congo, S/2015/19, (New York: United Nations).
Verbrugge, D., E. Francq and J. Cuvelier (2011) Guide to current mining reform initia-
tives in Eastern DRC, IPIS report, https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/1863693/
file/1864032 (accessed on 6 November 2017).
Vlassenroot, K. (2013) South Kivu: identity, territory and power in Eastern Congo ( London: 
Rift Valley Institute).
Vlassenroot, K. and T. Raeymaekers (2004) Conflict and social transformation in Eastern 
D.R. Congo (Ghent: Academia Press).
Vogel, C. and T. Raeymaekers (2016) ‘Terr(it)or(ies) of Peace? The Congolese Mining 
Frontier and the Fight Against “Conflict Minerals”’, Antipode 48 (4), pp. 1102–1121.
Vogel, C. and B. Radley (2014) ‘In Eastern Congo, economic colonialism in the guise of 
ethical consumption?’, Washington Post, 10 September, https://www.washington 
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/10/in-eastern-congo-economic- colonia 
lism-in-the-guise-of-ethical-consumption/?utm_term=.49b40ef128c1 (accessed on 
6 November 2017).
Vwakyanakazi, M. (1992) ‘Creuseurs d’or et crise socio-économique au Nord Kivu en 
République du Zaire’, Africa, 47(3), pp. 75–391.
Walsh, A. (2003) ‘ “Hot Money” and daring consumption in a northern Malagasy sap-
phire-town’, American Ethnologist, 3(2), pp. 290–305, DOI: 10.1525/ae.2003.30.2.290.
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
Büscher324
<UN>
Werthmann, K. (2009) ‘Working in a boom-town: Female perspectives on gold-mining 
in Burkina Faso’, Resources Policy, 34, pp. 18–23, DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.09.002.
Werthmann, K. (2003) ‘Cowries, gold and bitter money: gold mining and notions of 
 ill-gotten wealth in Burkina Faso’, Paideuma 49, pp. 105–124.
Werthmann, K. and T. Grätz (2012) Mining Frontiers in Africa. Anthropological and 
 Historical Perspectives (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag).
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
<UN>
Index
administration (See also ‘governance’)  
8–11, 13, 15–16, 33, 36–39, 41–45, 62, 65, 
79, 81, 105–131, 163, 167, 173, 175, 180, 203, 
206, 210, 269, 304, 314–316
bureaucracy 37–38, 43–45, 79, 119, 130, 
175, 180, 206
city administration 11, 15, 105–131, 167
decentralisation (See ‘governance’)
municipalities 62, 105–131
state administration 10, 107, 269
tax administration (See also ‘fiscal issues 
and taxes’) 10–11, 13, 33, 120–121
Africa North and Middle East (mena) 7, 12, 
167, 142, 144, 146–147, 150–152, 156, 167, 
177, 233
Algeria 142, 144, 152
Algiers 142, 144, 152
Egypt 7, 142, 144, 146–147, 150–151, 167, 
177, 233
Alexandria 142, 144, 146–147, 151
Cairo 7, 142, 144, 146–147, 150–151, 233
Israël 12
Iran 167, 177
Morocco 142, 144, 146–147, 152, 233
Casablanca 142, 144, 146–147, 152, 233
Palestine 12
Tunisia 7, 142, 144, 146–147, 152, 233
Tunis 7, 142, 144, 146–147, 152, 233
Africa sub-Saharan 3–20, 26–48, 55–71, 
78–97, 101–131, 139–157, 162–181, 
188–210, 213–225, 231–249, 254–270, 
275–297, 302–320
Angola 142, 144, 146, 148, 151, 233
Luanda 142, 144, 146, 148, 151, 233
Benin 9, 150
Porto Novo 150
Botswana 171, 180, 233
Gaborone 233
Burkina Faso 143, 149–150, 152
Bobo Dioulasso 150
Ouagadougou 143, 149, 152
Cameroon 142–143, 152, 234
Douala 142, 152, 234
Yaoundé 142–143, 152
Côte d’Ivoire 142, 152, 233
Abidjan 142, 152, 233
Democratic Republic of Congo 7, 20, 
142, 144, 151, 234, 303–320
Bukavu 310–311
Goma 304, 310–313, 315, 317, 319
Kinshasa 7, 142, 144, 151, 234, 304, 319
Kivu provinces 20, 303–320
Ghana 18, 142, 144, 146, 147–149, 150, 152, 
155–156, 213–225, 233, 306
Accra 18, 142, 144, 146, 147–149, 150, 
152, 155–156, 213–225, 233
Kumasi 142, 152, 219
Ethiopia 18, 29, 142, 144, 147, 149–150, 152, 
188–210
Addis Ababa 18, 29, 142, 144, 147, 
149–150, 152, 188–210
Guinea 143
Conakry 143
Kenya 15, 55–58, 61–77, 142, 144, 146–151, 
153, 156, 234–235, 242, 275–297
Eldoret 288–289
Mombasa 275, 278–279, 282–288, 
290–291, 295
Nairobi 58, 142, 144, 146–151, 153, 156, 
234–235, 242, 275–297
Kisumu 15, 55–58, 61–77, 289
Liberia 149
Paynesville 149
Madagascar 142–143, 234
Antananarivo 142–143, 234
Malawi 150
Mali 142–143, 152
Bamako 142–143, 152
Mauritania 150
Nouakchott 150
Mozambique 143
Maputo 143
Namibia 17, 162–182
Windhoek 162–182
Nigeria 7, 9, 50, 57, 63, 70, 142–147, 
149–152, 156, 160, 233–234, 276, 296
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
326 Index
<UN>
Abeokuta 70
Abuja 142, 152, 234
Enugu 149
Ibadan 7, 142, 152
Lagos 7, 50, 57, 142, 144, 146–147, 
149–151, 156, 160, 233, 276, 296
Port Harcourt 143, 151–152
Rwanda 16, 78–97, 149–150, 234, 307–308, 
310, 312, 315
Kigali 149–150, 234
Senegal 19, 142, 149–150, 152, 231–232, 
234, 240–246, 248, 254–270
Dakar 19, 142, 149–150, 152, 231–232, 
234, 240–246, 254–270
Pikine 19, 150, 241–242, 244, 246, 248, 
254–270
Sierra Leone 306
Somalia 143
Hargeisa 143
Mogadishu 143
South Africa 7, 9–10, 15–16, 27–29, 
67, 101–131, 142–157, 170, 179–180, 217, 
233–234, 276, 296, 306
Cape Town 15, 28–29, 142, 144, 
146–147, 149–156, 233, 276, 296
Durban 142, 144, 146–152, 155–156, 
217, 233
Johannesburg 7, 16, 101–131, 142–147, 
149–150
Pretoria 143–144, 146–147, 149, 151, 234
Sudan 142, 144, 151
Khartoum 142, 144, 151
Tanzania 9, 16, 19, 66, 78–97, 142, 144, 
146–147, 149–151, 231–233, 240–242, 244, 
246–248, 277, 306
Dar es Salaam 66, 80, 142, 144, 
146–147, 149–151, 233, 242
Zanzibar 19, 231–232, 240–242, 244, 
246–248
Uganda 16, 78–97, 142, 149, 152, 233, 310
Kampala 89, 93, 142, 149, 152, 233
Zambia 143, 149, 152, 233, 306
Lusaka 143, 149, 152, 233
Zimbabwe 143, 152, 233
Harare 143, 152, 233
African Development Bank (AfDB) 28–29, 
34, 63, 148, 277
African Union (AU) 29, 32–33, 36, 40, 44
agriculture and farming 7, 18, 34–35, 65–67, 
147, 150, 164, 173, 190, 201, 240, 242–243, 
313
urban farming 18, 65–67, 147, 150, 201
America Latin and Caribbean 84, 106, 139, 
141, 144, 166–167, 171, 177, 279, 241
Brazil 84, 106, 167, 177
Mexico 171
America North 11, 108, 139–140, 144, 150, 153, 
155, 194–195, 269, 276, 241, 261, 269–270, 
277–278, 282, 292, 303
Canada 144, 150, 153
United States of America (US) 11, 108, 
140, 144, 150, 155, 269, 276, 282, 303
New York 11, 108, 140, 150, 155, 269, 
276, 282
Asia 12, 19, 34, 106, 139–141, 144, 150, 154, 
166, 177, 189–194, 231–232, 236–239, 
240–244, 246–248, 256, 279–280, 286, 
293, 296, 303
Asia East 19, 34, 166, 189–194, 231–232, 
236–239, 240–244, 246–248, 256, 293, 
296, 303
China 19, 34, 166, 189–194, 231–232, 
236–239, 240–244, 246–248, 293, 296
Chinese enterprises and banks 34, 
189–194, 244, 246, 293, 296
Japan 303
North Korea 256
Asia South 12, 106, 166, 240, 248, 280, 286
India 12, 106, 166, 280, 286
Asia South-East 177, 240, 248
Indonesia 177
central business districts (cbds) and modern 
centres 9, 13, 18, 57, 60, 198, 213–223, 
236, 284, 292, 305
clientelism 16, 44, 88, 119, 166, 177, 178–181
civil society 28–29, 40–42, 55, 59–60, 64, 
68, 71, 102, 104, 106–128, 148–151, 154, 
165–167, 169–170, 173, 176, 203, 208–210, 
255, 258, 306, 308
civil society organisations (csos) and 
non governmental organisations 
(ngos) 28–29, 55, 60, 64, 68, 71, 102, 
106–126, 148–149, 151, 154, 165–166, 
169–170, 173, 208–210, 308
social mobilisation 59, 108, 110, 119, 124, 
128, 165–167, 169–170, 176, 203, 255
Africa sub-Saharan (cont.)
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
327Index
<UN>
colonial, colonisation 6–8, 13, 32–33, 38, 61, 
68, 163, 174, 179, 192, 220, 224, 242, 247, 
256, 260, 279, 315
consumption 4, 20, 30, 145, 148, 267, 270, 
275–294
corruption 5, 16, 62, 69, 78–97, 164, 248, 257, 
269, 286, 314
demography 17, 34–35, 57–58, 139–140, 224, 
284, 303, 306, 308–310
development cooperation and technical 
assistance 3, 7–8, 12–13, 16–17, 28, 42, 
55, 59, 60–64, 92, 113, 156–157, 188–210, 
214, 235, 249, 303–304, 319
donors 8, 42, 63, 92, 113, 303–304
elders 13, 63, 173, 181
elite, upper class and high-income 6, 38–39, 
43–45, 79, 84, 86, 88, 90, 155, 164, 170, 
180, 217, 224, 232, 245, 259, 275–297, 302, 
305, 311–320
employment and labour 9–10, 14, 26, 31, 
33–37, 44, 57, 59, 63, 66, 85, 89–90, 
108, 114–115, 117, 127, 130, 167–168, 180, 
214–218, 220–226, 241–243, 254–258, 
260–262, 264–266, 269, 283–284, 
291–295, 315, 317
illegal 9–10, 63, 127, 214–218, 221
labour market 26, 33–35, 37, 180, 256
legal and regulated labour 9, 44, 180, 
256, 284
unemployment and under-
employment 31, 167, 180, 222–223, 
254, 257, 260–262, 269
enterprises and private sector 5, 9–12, 17, 31, 
33–36, 55, 58–60, 63, 66–69, 71, 79–80, 
84, 86–88, 93, 111–115, 131, 147, 151, 165, 
168–169, 173, 176, 192, 200–201, 213–225, 
241, 243, 246–247, 255, 258, 264–265, 
284–286, 288–293, 295, 305–306, 
308–310, 312, 314
business and trade 33–34, 36, 55, 59,  
63, 66–67, 69, 71, 79, 84, 86–88,  
112–115, 169, 173, 200–201, 213–224,  
241, 246–247, 264, 284–286, 288–293, 
306, 309
informal 9–12, 35, 55, 63, 66, 68–69, 71, 
169, 176, 192, 200–201, 213–225, 246, 255, 
265, 293, 305, 308, 310
public-private partnerships and 
dichotomies 58–60, 80, 93, 111, 115, 
131, 147, 151
environment, pollution and ecology 17–18, 
30–31, 34–36, 39, 41, 44, 59, 65, 101–131, 
139–157, 162, 213, 215, 286
impacts 31, 35, 143, 148, 213, 215
policies 17, 30–31, 34, 36, 39, 41, 44, 59, 
65, 101–131, 139–157
Europe 4, 17, 31, 57, 79, 106, 108, 139–140, 144, 
150, 155, 189, 193–194, 198, 216, 220, 224, 
236, 240–242, 248, 258, 260, 265, 267, 
269, 277–281, 288, 292, 293, 315
Belgium 155, 315
France 155, 216, 236, 248, 258, 260, 267, 269
Paris 155, 267, 269
Germany 108, 269, 278, 281
Berlin 108, 269
United Kingdom (UK) 57, 79, 106, 189, 
193–194, 198, 220, 224
fiscal issues and taxes 9–11, 13, 33, 38, 63, 
66–67, 113, 120–121, 305, 311–312, 314, 
317–319
foreign investment 14, 141, 218, 220, 257–258
global policy frameworks and agendas  
4–5, 15–16, 26, 28–33, 36–37, 39–40, 44, 
61, 63–64, 70, 120–121, 150, 155, 189, 191, 
213–215, 217, 231–232, 236, 238, 240
Millennium Development Goals 
(mdgs) 30–32
New Urban Agenda (Habitat iii) 15, 26, 
28, 36–37, 40, 213
Paris Agreement (cop 21) 28, 30, 37, 150
Sustainable Development Goals 
(sdgs) 4–5, 16, 28–31, 37, 155, 237–238
governance 4–5, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 26–48, 
55–71, 78–97, 101–102, 104–131, 140, 
144–153, 157, 163–167, 171–178, 180–181, 
193–195, 208, 210, 213–225, 240–248, 
254, 257, 260, 268, 278, 285, 288, 290, 
302–307, 309, 311–320
accountability (See also ‘corruption’) 32, 
38, 40, 59–62, 81, 84, 92, 112, 126–127, 314
authoritarian development state 18, 43, 
177, 224
local governance and decentralisation 12, 
36, 40, 42, 44–45, 55–71, 80, 105–131, 140, 
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
328 Index
<UN>
149, 165, 175–177, 208, 213–225, 243–248, 
305, 307, 309, 311–312, 314–320
multi-level, multi-scalar 26–27, 29, 37, 
41, 44, 70–71, 108, 302–305, 319
participatory and collaborative 
approaches 5, 15–16, 42, 55–56, 70–71, 
104–109, 118, 145, 148–153, 157, 167, 
171–172, 176–177, 180–181, 210, 216, 240, 
243–245, 248, 285
rules and regulations 11–12, 26–27, 33, 
38–39, 44–45, 58, 65, 67, 69, 83–84, 88, 
90–96, 107, 120, 129, 166, 175, 177–178, 
180, 220, 224, 241–242, 260, 288, 303,  
312
standards and norms 31, 40, 44, 46, 58, 
61, 69–70, 78–80, 83, 89–97, 105–107, 
109, 193–195, 210, 217, 254, 257, 268, 278, 
288, 290
traditional and customary 
authorities 55, 60–63, 65, 81, 164, 
305–306, 311, 314–319
housing 5–6, 8–11, 17, 40, 57, 59, 101, 109, 
126–127, 155, 162, 165, 167–173, 175–178, 
190, 199, 201–203, 214, 218–225, 240–246, 
255, 259–260, 268, 296, 313–315
low-cost 203, 260
residential areas 126–127, 259, 268
rights (See also ‘right to the city’) 9–11, 
59, 243
tenure and legal issues (See also 
‘informality of urbanisation’) 171–172, 
255
human and citizens’ rights 30, 33, 44, 59, 64, 
82, 163, 167, 174, 181, 216, 286
humanitarian actors and interventions 20, 
64, 189, 303, 305, 308, 319
identity 33, 58, 164, 256, 266–270,  
281, 323
inclusive development 18, 26, 29–33, 41, 
43–45, 55–56, 71, 139, 143, 153–157, 
209–216, 237, 308
industrialisation 34–39, 44, 148, 162, 180, 
191, 198–199, 201–202, 209, 239, 241–243, 
266, 280, 284, 310
informality of urbanisation 3, 5–6, 8–17, 35, 
39–41, 55, 57, 59–60, 63, 65–71, 78–97, 
114, 128, 137, 145, 147, 149, 156–158, 162, 
165–181, 214–225, 244, 246, 255, 260, 284
grey zones 3, 10–17, 40, 137
informal settlements and slums 5, 8–12, 
55, 57, 63, 65, 67, 114, 128, 145, 147, 149, 
156–158, 162–163, 165–181, 214–219, 224, 
260, 284
inequalities 6, 30, 35–36, 55, 57, 111, 129, 131, 
174, 214, 243, 245, 259
infrastructure 5, 13, 15, 17–19, 26–29, 31, 
34–41, 45, 47, 63, 65–66, 68–71, 101, 109, 
113–115, 124, 168, 172, 188–262, 269, 296, 
304, 309, 312–313, 317
investments (See also ‘African 
Development Bank’ and ‘World 
Bank’) 15, 26–29, 34, 36–37, 40–41, 63, 
115, 218, 220, 260, 304
streets and roads 18, 65, 68–69, 168, 172, 
188–225, 246–247, 312, 317
International Monetary Fund (imf) 12, 214, 
217
Key Performance Indicators and Areas  
(kpis – kpas) 107, 113, 115–118, 130
land 6–7, 9–11, 15, 17, 55–56, 59, 62–67, 
141, 143–148, 153, 162, 164–182, 171–172, 
176–177, 198, 215, 217–219, 221, 224, 233, 
240, 242–248, 255–256, 285, 303–306, 
308, 310–312, 314, 316–319
allocation 62, 64–65, 217, 224, 308, 311
conflict 17, 63, 162, 164–182, 303, 306, 
310–312
management 7, 15, 55–56, 65–67, 218, 221
rights (See also ‘right to the city’) 9–11, 
59, 162, 218, 233, 244, 316
tenure and legal issues (See also 
‘informality of urbanisation’) 6, 59, 
65, 171–172, 176–177, 255
low-income (See also ‘poverty and 
vulnerability’) 16, 128–129, 170, 200, 
241, 280
megacities 4, 15, 17, 57, 139, 149–152, 239, 241
middle class 12, 16, 19, 101–102, 105, 110, 112, 
127–128, 155, 170–171, 268, 275–297
migration 3–7, 14, 17–20, 29, 34–35, 61, 139, 
164, 167–169, 188, 194, 220, 224, 241–244, 
248, 278, 280, 284–285, 291–296, 
302–320
governance (cont.)
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
329Index
<UN>
rural-urban migration and  circulation  
3–7, 14, 17–20, 34–35, 61, 139,  
164, 167–169, 188, 194, 220, 224, 241–244, 
248, 278, 280, 284–285, 291–296,  
302–320
mobility and transport 13–15, 17, 18, 36, 40, 
55–57, 59, 64–65, 68–70, 97, 115, 119, 
144–147, 154, 168, 172, 194, 197–198, 200, 
202, 210, 213–225, 255, 303, 306, 313
decongestion policies 18, 68–70, 145, 147, 
213–225
public transport 13–14, 57, 65, 68–70, 145, 
147, 200, 213–225
roads (See ‘infrastructures’)
taxi 40, 69, 147, 303, 313
traffic and congestion 13, 18, 68–70, 
145, 147, 168, 172, 194, 197–198, 202, 
210, 215
Oceania 194
Australia 194
poverty and vulnerabiliry 5–6, 9, 12, 17, 
19, 30, 34–35, 36, 55, 57, 61, 63, 65, 67, 
88, 90, 155–157, 166–169, 181, 214–218, 
224–225, 237, 254–257, 264, 269, 277, 
280, 285, 289
religion and religious communities 19, 
38–39, 43, 64, 163, 165–166, 173, 180, 
245, 256, 259, 266, 269, 275, 278–279, 
282–283, 288, 286–296
‘right to the city’ 10, 18, 155, 166–167, 213–218, 
221, 223–225
service sector (See also ‘tourism’ and  ‘business 
and trade’) 33–35, 61, 103, 232, 235, 
259, 307, 313
social services and public services 4–5, 
9, 12, 15, 17, 34, 36, 40, 42, 55–57, 59, 
62–70, 78–97, 101, 103–104, 107–118, 
120, 122–131, 140, 143–148, 150–151, 
153–156, 168–178, 191, 202, 220, 222, 224, 
243, 246–247, 255, 257–258, 262, 293, 
309–311, 317
basic services 5, 15, 36, 55–56, 63–65, 81, 
84, 247
education and schools 4, 34, 42, 59, 65, 
86, 113–116, 118, 122–123, 147–148, 154, 
168, 173, 202, 222, 224, 255, 257–258, 
262, 293
environmental education, 
trainings 113–116, 118, 122–123, 
147–148, 154, 202
energy, electricity 9, 36, 40, 66, 68, 140, 
145–146, 148, 154, 169, 172, 178, 246, 317
health 40, 55, 57, 59, 63, 65, 67, 69–70, 80, 
84–89, 91, 93–94, 113, 140, 150, 153, 168, 
224, 246, 310–311, 317
waste management 40, 64–65, 68, 70, 
114, 116, 144–148, 151, 153–156, 246
water and sanitation 9, 17, 36, 40, 59, 62, 
64–69, 120, 140, 143–148, 151, 154, 156, 
168, 172, 178, 246
slums (See ‘informality of urbanisation’) or 
(See ‘informal settlements’)
suburban neighbourhood and peri-urban 
areas 6, 13, 18, 63–68, 73–74, 112, 119, 
126, 128, 198–203, 241–242, 258, 261–262, 
268
tourism 215, 218, 247, 267, 286, 291, 296,  
314
United Cities and Local Governments 
(uclg) 28, 149, 151–153
United Nations (UN) 4, 8, 15, 26–30, 33–37, 
40–41, 59, 61, 140–141, 149, 153–155, 
214–216, 237–238, 292, 303, 308
United Nations Conferences on Housing 
and Sustainable Urban Development 
(UN-Habitat) 15, 26–29, 59, 61, 141, 
149, 153–155, 214–216
United Nations Development Programme 
(undp) 30, 59, 214, 303
United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (uneca) 28–29, 33–37, 
40–41, 153
United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization 
(unesco) 214
urban design and spatial planning 36–37, 
67, 105, 107, 139, 154, 188–210, 214, 221, 
224–225, 248
urban expansion 4, 18, 55, 57–58, 63, 140, 
155, 163, 167–170, 198–199, 216, 219,  
237–238, 241–242, 245, 260, 284, 
305–308, 310, 312–315
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
330 Index
<UN>
violence and war 5, 7, 20, 31, 44, 62, 65, 89, 
166, 179, 222, 255, 258, 302–316, 319
women and gender relations 33, 44, 170, 222, 
265, 267, 292–293, 296–297, 309
World Bank 12, 15, 34, 58–59, 61, 63, 141, 148, 
171, 202, 214, 217
youth and children 6, 19, 31, 33, 35, 64, 86, 
93, 102, 123, 127, 140, 165, 168, 170–173, 
181, 202, 222, 250–270, 275, 279, 283–284, 
290
Carole Ammann and Till Förster - 9789004387928
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com12/05/2018 11:43:26AM
via Universitatsbibliothek Bern
